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MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

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A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

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MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—PROF. WARD'S PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.[1]

By G. Dawes Hicks.

The twentieth volume of the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, containing the article on "Psychology," appeared in 1886. Alexander Bain, who wrote on it in that year's October number of Mind, was among the first to acknowledge its importance, and characterised it as "a signal achievement of philosophical ability". "When," he said, "the matters excluded by the narrow limits are filled in, when the illustration of the whole is duly expanded, and when, finally, the exposition of subtleties is transferred from *brevier* to *pica*, Mr. Ward will have produced a work entitled to a place among the masterpieces of the philosophy of the human mind." After an interval of thirty-two years, the desiderata thus specified have been made good, and it can now unhesitatingly be said that the prediction then recorded has been fulfilled. The article has developed into an imposing book, and serious students of the subject everywhere will wish to congratulate the author upon the completion of a work that will assuredly rank as a classic in psychological literature. Of the real greatness of the book one becomes conscious at well-nigh every turn. The originality and acuteness of its leading ideas, the thoroughness with which they are worked out and applied, the comprehensive insight which is brought to bear in the treatment of special problems,

[1] *Psychological Principles.* By James Ward, Sc.D., LL.D., D.Sc., F.B.A., Professor of Mental Philosophy, Cambridge. Pp. xiv., 478. Cambridge Press, 1918, 2nd ed., 1920.

the wealth and freshness of illustration, drawn from the most varied fields of inquiry—all combine to confirm the impression that we have here a monument of careful, profound and resolute thinking and research, a product of true genius in the sense in which Prof. Ward himself distinguishes genius from mere talent.

Bain's reception of the article was, as is observed in the preface to the present volume, generous; and no doubt would still have been so, had he actually gauged its revolutionary character. There is, however, in his running commentary no indication that he in the least suspected the extent to which the associationist psychology had been undermined. The time, indeed, was ripe for a new departure. The younger workers in psychology were casting aside one after another of the traditional doctrines. Adamson, in his lectures at Owen's College, had been gradually developing a view of the mental life and of its growth and evolution altogether unlike that of any of the current text-books, and which was only briefly hinted at in the very significant review he wrote of Sully's *Outlines* in the volume of MIND for 1884; even Croom Robertson, as is apparent from the posthumous Lecture Notes, had been deviating widely in his own teaching from the teaching he had imbibed in his student-days in Aberdeen. The *Encyclopædia* article came at an opportune moment and signalised a complete revolt from the school of which Bain was the last representative. No sooner was it published than it was at once recognised as a contribution to the science of first-rate value; it laid the foundation, in fact, of the best psychological work that has been done in this country during the last quarter of a century.[1] Although based upon the article, the book contains a large amount of fresh matter, the last seven chapters, dealing with experience at the self-conscious and social level, being almost entirely new. There are certainly some differences, and these not altogether unimportant, between the article of 1886 and what we have now before us; yet the slightest comparison of their contents will enable it to be seen that the root conceptions have remained the same, and it is a sufficient indication of the thoroughness with which those conceptions were originally thought out that now, after thirty-two years of subsequent research, Prof. Ward finds little to modify and is mainly

[1] A supplementary article was prepared for the tenth—the *Times*—edition of the *Encyclopædia* and was published in vol. xxxii in 1902. Finally, the two articles, with omissions and additions, were amalgamated into the new article of the present or eleventh edition, and this appeared in the twenty-second volume in 1911.

concerned to expand and carry forward the principles he had formulated in early life.

The *Encyclopædia* article has become, as its author is fully entitled to feel, "the common property of students"; and on that account a review, in any ordinary sense, of the work before us would, in these pages at least, be no less superfluous than difficult to write. One may be permitted, therefore, to make the appearance of *Psychological Principles* the occasion for referring here to certain fundamental issues which Prof. Ward's treatment of the mental life forces to the front, his own position in regard to which we now have stated in the form that seems to him, after long reflexion, to be the most adequate.

1. "It is the sole and the whole business of the psychologist to trace the history of the conscious life of the individual subject, and it is in the notion of the individual subject that he will find the limits of his treatment." So Adamson wrote in 1884. And no less emphatically Dr. Ward has consistently maintained that the standpoint of psychology is 'individualistic,' that psychology is 'the science of individual experience,' and that it 'never transcends the limits of the individual' (p. 27). Probably it is doing little more than re-stating in other words the position thus characterised to assert that "it is the exclusive business of psychology to analyse and trace the development of individual experience as it is for the experiencing individual" (p. 104), and not, that is to say, as it might be supposed to be displayed to an external spectator. But the really vital consideration receives in the latter mode of statement explicit recognition. There is nothing, of course, to preclude the psychologist making use of all the help he can get from the study of animal behaviour, physiological conditions, and the various other sources to which he is wont to have recourse; but in so far as psychology claims to be the science of the actual life of mind there can be no question as to the soundness of the contention just indicated.

I would urge, however, that Dr. Ward does injustice to the standpoint he has so convincingly put forward as the right one when he apparently identifies it with that of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, and declares theirs to be 'the proper' standpoint for the science of psychology. It is true that he guards himself from any implication of giving countenance to their *method;* but the question is whether their faulty method was not due, at any rate in part, to an erroneous standpoint. And I believe such can be shown to be the case. "There is no denying," we are told, "a steady psychological advance as we pass from Locke to Hume and his

modern representatives" (p. 26). Yet when, for instance, in violent antithesis to what Dr. Ward finds to be the case, Hume alleged that "all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences," and that "the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences," is it not manifest that he was trying to survey conscious experience not from within but *ab extra*, as though it were itself an object to be observed, and that consequently he was compelled to reject whatsoever did not present itself as so much matter of objective observation? Surely, it is here the *standpoint*, and not merely the method, that is *verkehrt*—a standpoint from which it was inevitable not only that any real connexion among so-called 'perceptions' should be missed, but that also the being of an experiencing subject as more than a succession of discrete perceptions should evince itself as an unwarrantable assumption. I would venture, therefore, to claim for the standpoint of *Psychological Principles* that it implies, as, indeed, I have already indicated, an entire inversion of the standpoint of Hume and his modern representatives—an inversion that was imperatively necessary if psychology was not to remain stationary before an *impasse* that blocked the road of further advance. The author's emphatic repudiation of the view that presentations are 'subjective modifications' ought, at any rate, to obviate a kind of misunderstanding to which the *Encyclopædia* article frequently gave rise.[1]

In point of fact, the radical divergence of the new standpoint from the old becomes apparent at the start—in determining, namely, the definition of psychology. The empirical psychologist cannot, it is contended, follow the procedure of the natural sciences, just because the two standpoints are utterly different (whereas according to Hume and his modern representatives they are essentially similar). The physicist asserts simply: there *is* this or that. But were the psychologist to give expression to the facts he is concerned with merely in the form: there are such and such presentations or feelings or movements, as though these were independent entities, he would be mutilating his data in a way that would render dubious every subsequent step he took. Either explicitly or implicitly he is bound,—at any rate, when dealing with the mature mind,—to express himself in the form: the individual experient *has* such and such presentations, *feels* thus or thus, *acts* in this wise or that. And this 'form

[1] *E.g.*, Mr. Prichard's criticism (MIND, N.S., xvi, p. 27, *sqq.*) was to a considerable extent misdirected, because he supposed Dr. Ward to be seeking "to vindicate the possession by psychology of a standpoint which may be or rather must be philosophically false".

of consciousness' cannot be eliminated except by ignoring what is, or has become, characteristic of concrete experience, and accordingly deserting the ground that is peculiar to psychology. So-called 'states of consciousness' are not, that is to say, independent entities; they are states *of* a subject, modes in which that subject lives and acts. And so-called 'contents of consciousness,' though not necessarily actions or affections of a subject, must be contents for a subject. The reference of what is experienced to a subject experiencing may be said, therefore, to be an inexpugnable postulate of psychology; the concept of a 'self,' or conscious subject, cannot be banished from psychological treatises—it is to be found "not more in Berkeley, who accepts it as a fact, than in Hume, who treats it as a fiction".

Bain, observing how, as it seemed to him, in the course of the exposition, the scope of the subject gradually extended, until finally it absorbed all the three elementary properties—cognition, feeling, and conation—and left only presentations, sensory and motor, outside its range, declared not unnaturally that 'this aggrandisement of the subject' staggered him. No doubt the shock in his case was partly due to a suspicion that he was here confronted with a 'nucleus and hiding-place of mysticism'. The suspicion was, however, an unfounded one. For in the article it had been expressly insisted that the psychological concept of a self or subject is in no sense coincident with the metaphysical concept of a soul, and might be kept as free from the implications of the latter as the concept of an organism in biology. So far from intending to postulate, as Bain supposed, "an entity distinct from feeling, knowing, and doing, and having a common relation to all three," the author had rather been showing grounds for assuming an entity of which feeling, knowing and striving are modes or activities—modes or activities that, in fact, go to constitute the very entity which had been taken to be distinct from them. What the contention amounts to is, I take it, that wherever we have a state or mode of consciousness, there we have what may otherwise be called, using Lotze's terminology, a mode of 'being for self,' a mode of self-expression on the part of a subject that in and through such act is in some measure and to some degree aware of, or experiencing, itself. The awareness in question may be confused and indefinite to any extent, it may be no more than the first dim obscure stirrings of feeling; but the point is it is always there, and were it not the gradual development of self-consciousness would be inexplicable. The objection that the notion of 'subject' has no legitimate place in an empirical science hardly requires serious refutation. There is surely nothing

'metempirical' in the argument that on the one hand the mature self-consciousness would be impossible if the earlier phases of the mental life did not possess, as part of their nature, this admittedly crude self-reference, and, on the other hand, that neither the primitive self-reference nor the mature self-consciousness indicates an entity which is distinct from the inner states themselves.

2. Everything experienced is, then, referred to a subject experiencing. Not only so, Prof. Ward is emphatic in contending that for psychology the antithesis of subject and object is primordial; absolute beginnings are beyond the pale of science, and, so far as it can be handled psychologically, experience already implies, or is constituted by, the duality in question. The relation of object to subject is, psychologically conceived, the relation of presentation, in the sense of that term which Prof. Ward has made familiar. Moreover, the relation is so fundamental in character as to justify 'the resolution of psychological facts into two entirely distinct categories—the subjective faculty or function of action-under-feeling, or consciousness, on the one side, and a field of consciousness, consisting of objects, ideas, or presentations, on the other' (p. 70).

The subject has the one 'capacity' of feeling—*i.e.*, susceptibility to pleasure or pain, and the one 'power,' that, namely, of attending to, or of variously distributing attention upon, given objects. The term 'attention' is used as practically synonymous with what has usually been called 'consciousness,' or, at any rate, so much of what has been meant by 'consciousness' as answers to being mentally active, active enough at least to 'receive impressions' (p. 49).

Inasmuch as it is only objects that sustain the relation of presentation, such objects, it is maintained, may safely be spoken of as 'presentations'. That is to say, it is proposed to use the name 'presentation' as a designation both for the relation and for one term of the relation. It is worth noticing that in the passage explaining the latter usage some significant changes have been introduced.[1] In dis-

[1] Formerly the passage ran as follows: "All that variety of mental facts which we speak of as sensations, perceptions, images, intuitions, concepts, notions, have two characteristics in common: (1) they admit of being more or less attended to, and (2) can be reproduced and associated together. It is here proposed to use the term presentation to connote such a mental fact, and as the best English equivalent for what Locke meant by idea, and what Kant and Herbart called a *Vorstellung*." Now the passage reads: "All the various constituents of experience spoken of as sensations, movements, percepts, images, intuitions, concepts, notions, have two characteristics in common: (1) they are more or less

carding the phrase "mental facts," Prof. Ward wishes, if I mistake not, to avoid any suggestion that, because they are 'in the mind' in the sense of being present to the mind, presentations are necessarily mental in nature. He would, I take it, allow that, from an epistemological point of view, presentations are appearances to the subject of entities other than the subject,[1] while insisting, at the same time, that the being and character of such appearances depend in part upon the being and character of the subject to whom they are presented. A presentation has then a two-fold relation—(*a*) directly to the subject, and (*b*) to other presentations. Following in this respect the Herbartian tradition, Prof. Ward sharply severs the presentation from the act of apprehending—the act which he calls the act of attention. The presentation is that which is attended to, that which in and through attending the subject is aware of; and, consequently, it may with propriety be described as an object, or better perhaps, in order to differentiate it from objects conceived as independent of any particular subject, a psychical object. Within the region of experience, presentations constitute the objective factor, and from them must be distinguished as heterogeneous whatsoever attaches only to the subject and the subject's attitude towards presentations.

That it is possible on this basis to offer a psychological account of experience which is fairly coherent Prof. Ward has sufficiently shown. Nevertheless, the theory of presentations requires, I venture to think, to be much more radically dissociated from its Herbartian prototype before it can be regarded as a satisfactory principle of psychological explanation. I am ready to admit that the objections one would press are mainly objections of an epistemological kind; but on a matter so fundamental as this I do not see how any hard and fast line can be drawn between psychology and epistemology, and, in any case, despite what has sometimes been urged to the contrary, Dr. Ward does not think that a position epistemologically untenable can be sound psychological doctrine. The query I would raise is that which was raised many years ago by Adamson,[2] whether, namely, 'presentations' are rightly described as objects, even of the kind called 'psychical' or 'immanent'. And, on this matter, I am constrained to differ

attended to, and (2) they can be variously combined together and reproduced. It is here proposed to denote them all by the general term *presentation*, as being the best English equivalent for what Locke meant by idea and what Kant and Herbart called a *Vorstellung*" (p. 46).

[1] *Cf.* C. A. Richardson, *Spiritual Pluralism*, p. 110.

[2] *Development of Modern Philosophy*, ii, p. 173.

from Dr. Ward. The difficulties which the treatment of presentations as objects occasions seem to me to be many, but it will suffice here to single out two of them. (*a*) A presentation, so regarded, occupies the position of a *tertium quid;* and, after the manner of an 'idea,' as conceived by Locke, stands in the way of any direct apprehension on the part of the cognising mind of an external object, in the ordinary sense of the term, or of what Dr. Ward has designated a 'transsubjective object'. Dr. Ward's contention is that it is only in so far as we in common experience relate numerically different but qualitatively similar immanent objects of various individual experients to a single reality that there comes to be for us awareness of common or transsubjective objects. But, not to mention the embarrassing circumstance of having thus to allow that the awareness of other minds must in some form or other be for the individual prior to the awareness of external things, it is peculiarly perplexing to be driven to assume that our belief in external things rests ultimately upon an inference, and upon an inference moreover that is logically invalid.[1] (*b*) The theory precludes, so far as I can see, the possibility of giving an intelligible account of the nature of the act of cognition or attention. For in what precisely does the activity of attention consist? Is it merely a process of contemplating the presentation offered to it, of accepting it as given, after the manner in which, according to another theory, we are supposed to be 'acquainted' with a datum? Certainly I do not imagine Dr. Ward to be intending to suggest anything of the kind. He frequently speaks of 'concentrating attention'. And by that he cannot mean a merely *gesteigertes Hinstarren auf den Gegenstand*, which, as Lotze urged, would be perfectly fruitless, if there were nothing either in the object or around it to compare and bring into relation. For he represents the conscious subject as, through the act of attention, differentiating and distinguishing the parts of the presented object, as gradually becoming aware of its several features. Now, any such process of gradual discrimination presupposes (assuming that the presentation is the presented object) that what the conscious subject is at first immediately aware of is not

[1] Logically invalid, because clearly the presence of similar features in numerous immanent objects would justify only the formation of general notions of those features and not the thought of a real external thing of which they are properties. It is no doubt the case that true beliefs often are attained psychologically through processes of reasoning that are logically vicious. But that we have, even from an epistemological point of view, no other ground than that indicated for the fundamental antithesis in knowledge is a conclusion in which, at any rate, one would only reluctantly acquiesce.

the presentation as it really is in its completeness of detail but the presentation as it appears to be when much of its detail is obscure or unrecognised. In other words, there breaks out within the field of presentation just that very contrast between appearance and reality which has usually been taken to subsist between the presentation and the external object. So far, then, as apprehension of it is concerned, an object derives no advantage from being a 'presentation'; whether the object be 'subjective' (in what Dr. Ward would call an epistemological sense) or 'transsubjective,' the problem which the cognitive relation forces upon us is in either case precisely the same.

To put the matter briefly, I conceive there is an alternative to the 'theory of presentations,' as here interpreted, and an alternative other than that which in the work before us is considered. This alternative may perhaps be brought into view by the suggestion that under the one term 'presentation' two essentially different factors are liable to be confused—factors which, for want of better technical terminology, one may be allowed to designate 'awareness of a content' and 'the content of which there is awareness'. What is meant can best be made clear by an example. Take Prof. Ward's own classical illustration of bestowing in the course of a few minutes half a dozen glances at a strange and curious flower. Let us, however, for the sake of the argument, suppose that the act of attention is directed, as it would certainly seem to be, upon the actual flower, and not upon a 'presentation' of it. Then, following Prof. Ward's account, we may assert that the attending subject will gradually discriminate a multiplicity of features—at first the general outline, next the disposition of petals, stamens, etc., afterwards the attachment of the anthers, position of the ovary, and so forth—that is to say, his state of mind will become by degrees a state in and through which he may fairly be said to be aware of the features of the flower. Now, this *awareness* of the features of the flower is not, it will be agreed, something that can be severed from the act of being aware, the act of attending. If one describes it not as the content of which there is awareness, but as the content of the act of attending at a particular stage of its progress, or as that which gives to the act in question its specific character and enables it to be distinguished from other acts of the same cognising individual, one will be doing no violence either to the facts or to language. No one would wish to maintain that awareness of the flower is that which is in this instance attended to, that *it* is the object upon which the act of attention is

directed. No one, I should suppose, would wish to deny that such awareness *is* a characteristic of the act of attending, when that act has reached a certain degree of completeness. Consider, now, the other factor—'the content of which there is awareness'. Again, meanwhile, we are, for the sake of the argument, taking the object upon which the act of attention is directed to be the actual flower. That object the conscious subject gradually comes to recognise has a variety of characteristics—a definite shape, a definite size, definite colours, and so on. The sum of the characteristics which the conscious subject will be aware of at any given moment will be different from the sum of characteristics which he will be aware of at another moment, and either of these will only be a fragment of the much larger sum of characteristics which there are good grounds for believing the flower itself possesses. Furthermore, the sum of apprehended features (='the content of which there is awareness') is clearly *distinguishable* from the larger sum of characteristics just mentioned. But just as clearly there is no reason for supposing that the former constitutes an existent fact, be it called a 'presentation,' or 'sense-datum,' or what not. What, on the contrary, we do seem entitled to affirm is that *it* only comes to be in virtue of the act of attention having been first of all directed upon the actual flower and that apart from that act it would have had no 'being' of any sort. If, then, it be described as a presentation *of* the flower, it is surely imperative to avoid any implication of the 'presentation' being there, as an existent fact, prior to the act of attention and in some way calling forth such act. As Prof. Strong concisely puts it, "when I present a lady with a bouquet of flowers, I do not present her with the presentation of the flowers, but only with the flowers".[1]

Such, then, expressed in a few words, is what I take to be a tenable alternative to the theory we are considering, and I hope enough has been said to make manifest where the roads diverge. Dr. Ward still retains, though it is true in a modified form, the old notion of the individual mind as a reacting essence, and of sensory presentations as the results of such reaction. I am far from saying that the view in question is not entitled to respect. Lotze's adherence to it is alone sufficient to elicit that. All the same, I believe it to be a mistaken view, and that a more resolute working out of our author's own theory of attention would compel its rejection. For, after all, the really significant feature of the last mentioned theory is not a mere matter of terminology, but the distinct

[1] *The Origin of Consciousness*, p. 37.

recognition of the truth that cognitive apprehension is, so to speak, from first to last of one piece, that its later and more developed phases differ in degree but not in kind from its earlier and more rudimentary phases. Once allow that cognitive apprehension is from the beginning a discriminative activity, and the doctrine of 'presentations' as themselves objects is, it seems to me, undermined.

3. "Psychologists have usually represented mental advance as consisting fundamentally in the combination and re-combination of various elementary units, the so-called sensations and primitive movements" (pp. 75-76). By no writer has this notion of 'mental chemistry' been more effectively disposed of than by Prof. Ward. It would not be untrue to say that his entire work is one sustained refutation of it. He has shown convincingly how impossible it is to proceed on the hypothesis of numerically distinct sensory units without attributing to such units a species of independent existence for which experience furnishes no justification and which cannot be brought into conformity with any really scientific conception of the development of mind. On the one hand, those who have attempted to work out the view have had in point of fact to admit that in the composite formations of actual experience the assumed units do not maintain their independence, that the complex formations cannot be interpreted as merely aggregates of the units supposed to make them up. Appeal, therefore, has had to be made to some other and indeterminable feature to explain the obvious fact of composition in the content apprehended. And on the other hand, experience supplies no warrant for the assumption that under *any* conditions the supposed units are independent facts capable of appearing to consciousness in isolation. The very reverse is suggested by the slightest inspection of the course of conscious experience. Conscious experience, taken collectively, resembles rather a continuous process than an aggregate of independent parts. In this process we can indeed effect distinctions of qualitative and other aspects. But what is thus distinguishable does not thereby establish a claim to be considered as an independent fact, and ought not to be thought of as having a separate mode of being. It is an aspect rather than a part of an aggregate or collective whole. In other words, it is an error to take for granted that the phases of experience which are the less developed and which, on that account, may be described as the more simple, exhibit a simplicity of ultimate elements which, as evolution proceeds, merely enter into more and more complicated combinations. What, on the contrary, does characterise the earlier stages of experience is specially the want o

definiteness and of precision in the apprehension of relations among the contents discriminated. And the contents themselves appear as vague and obscure, wanting in sharpness of outline and loosely connected with one another. Objects are apprehended by a mental life containing but small preparation for the apprehension of them. Consequently, the awareness of them is crude and confused, and the confusion is aggravated by the circumstance that what then constitutes the general point of reference in the inner life consists for the most part of a vague fluctuating mass of organic sensations and feelings connected primarily with physiological changes in the body. No steady background of 'self' has yet been formed against which the successively apprehended contents can stand out, and accordingly the mental life betrays a certain want of continuity, an aimless and easily distracted character.

All this Prof. Ward enforces with a wealth of argument that is irresistible, and unquestionably we have here one of the most far-reaching advances ever effected in the history of psychological theory. Let me not, then, be thought to underestimate its importance if, in the light of what I have been urging with respect to 'presentations,' I confess to misgivings in regard to the notion of a 'presentational continuum,' a *totum objectivum* that is gradually differentiated. My difficulty is this. It seems to be implied that the continuum, holding, as it were, its manifold elements in solution, is already there for the individual subject from the outset, either as awaiting the exercise of the activity of attention that its various factors should be disentangled or else as gradually becoming differentiated through some inherent tendency of its own. 'The presentational continuum as a whole, as *totum objectivum*, is,' Dr. Ward writes, 'for the subject, so to say, all there is, is the universe' (pp. 117-118). Yet he would agree that in mature experience we do come in point of fact explicitly to contrast what he understands by the phrase 'presentational continuum' with what is—that is to say, the universe. The external world we certainly do, in ordinary common-sense experience, take to be independent of any such 'presentational continuum' as is here conceived; and if, in this respect, common-sense experience be, as I believe it is, logically justified, a perfectly intelligible analysis can, as I have tried to show, be given of the way in which such experience is psychologically developed. How far the term 'continuum' is applicable to the real world of fact is, of course, another matter. In any case, the real world of fact is not a '*presentational* continuum'; and its parts are already differentiated, whether the individual conscious subject be aware of the differentiation or no. The stamens of the flower are, *in*

rerum natura, different from the pistils, although these to a casual observer may appear as confused. Moreover, no amount of attention to the confused *appearance*, in and for itself, would bring about its differentiation, still less would the confused appearance differentiate itself; it will only be through direction of attention upon the actual flower that, in the instance supposed, the parts in question will come to appear different, or to be presented as different. However true it may be, then, that "at any given moment we have a certain whole of presentations, a 'field of consciousness,' psychologically one and continuous"; and, at the next moment, "not an entirely new field but a partial change within the old field," yet one may fairly doubt the appropriateness of describing the change as coming about through the differentiation of a 'presentational continuum'. Nor will it do, I think, to reply that the description is appropriate *from the point of view of the experiencing subject*. It will not do, because, as already noted, the experiencing subject does come himself to distinguish between the confused appearance, the blurred presentation, and the object upon which his attention is directed, which object he does not then take to be in fact blurred, however much it may appear to be so.

4. The chapters on Imagination and Memory, the handling of which Bain took to be a good test of psychological ability, are full of original and valuable work. Prof. Ward questions, and evidently with justice, the sufficiency of 'force or liveliness' as a criterion for distinguishing 'ideas' or 'images' from 'primary presentations'. Intensity alone, he urges, is clearly not enough to account for the discrimination, nor will the further characteristic of 'strikingness' serve to render Hume's explanation of it adequate, for we are familiar with 'striking ideas' as well as with striking, but not necessarily intense, 'sensations'. The author is himself inclined to lay the chief stress upon the superior steadiness of percepts. "Images are not only in a continual flux, but even when we attempt forcibly to detain them they are apt to vary continually in clearness and completeness, reminding us of the illuminated devices made of gas jets, common at fêtes, when the wind sweeps across them, momentarily obliterating one part and at the same time intensifying another" (p. 171). On the other hand, what we perceive is not liable to this perpetual 'flow and flicker'. Now that it has been pointed out, no psychologist would, I suppose, doubt the importance of the feature thus admirably specified. I am disposed, indeed, to go further in the direction here indicated, and to contend with regard to a certain definite class of so-called 'images'

that the attempt to 'concentrate attention' upon them results not in their increased clearness and distinctness but in their gradual fading away and disappearing—a consequence we should, it seems to me, naturally expect on the view of attention I have been defending. At the same time, Dr. Ward would allow that there are other circumstances likewise of moment in this connexion. One is that which Stout and others have emphasised—the more or less fragmentary character of 'imagery' as compared with what is perceptually apprehended. And another, which has not often been noted, is, I think, the difference in amount of feeling-tone that is concomitant with a percept and its 'image' respectively.[1]

It is coming more and more to be realised, and I am sure Prof. Ward would concur in the statement, that the crucial problems of the psychology of cognition centre round that of the nature of imagination. *What* is it that in and through an act of imagining is presented to the conscious subject? What is the character and status of the content thus apprehended? In answer to that question, it is, as Dr. Ward insists, useless to say that what is perceived is present, and what is imaged is past or future. "The images may have certain temporal marks by which they are referred to what is past or future; but as imaged they *are* present" (p. 172). And it is in regard to the nature of this present something that psychology still finds itself almost wholly in the dark. Mr. Bradley once poured ridicule upon the 'pious legend' of the ghosts of former 'impressions' waiting in disconsolate exile in some subconscious Hades, till association announces resurrection and recall; and Dr. Ward is no whit less severe upon the thought of images or representations being accumulated and "somewhere crowded together like shades on the banks of the Styx" (p. 81). What, then, is it that persists? Not, Dr. Ward replies, the particular presentation as an isolated unit, but the continuum as differentiated. Waiving, however, meanwhile such objections as I have been pressing to the notion of a continuum, the reply would obviously carry us but a short way. If it enables us to understand to some extent the presence, in the later stages of a process of attention, of the traits first attended to, it throws little or no light upon the appearance of a memory-image, in the ordinary sense of that term. So far from being an outcome of the continuum's progressive differentiation, a memory-image would seem

[1] Dr. Ward does in one place note the fact, but not in this connexion. I may perhaps here refer to a paper of mine written twenty years ago and published in the *Proc. Aris. Soc.*, N.S., Vol. I., 1901, p. 200 *sqq.*

rather to imply a reverting on the part of the continuum to a former condition of its being. Dr. Ward is unquestionably on the right lines in pointing to the necessity of taking into account the intermediate forms—after-sensations, recurrent sensations, and memory-after-images, as Fechner called them—between the original presentation and the image. Yet, when all this has been recognised, the real problem remains, obstinately refusing to be solved. "Images as a whole are," it has to be admitted, "distinct from the presentation-continuum" (p. 173), and it is found needful to postulate the formation of a 'secondary- or memory-continuum,' which in some way gets split off from the primary continuum in consequence of movements of attention. "The precise connexion of the two continua is," we are told, "very difficult to determine" (p. 177); and in spite of much resolute wrestling with the situation, has in the end to be left undetermined. At the root of the whole difficulty is, I take it, the fact that we are not in a position to offer any psychological explanation of retention or revival, and are, therefore, compelled to accept it as, for psychology, an ultimate characteristic of mental life. But the notion of a memory-continuum seems to encumber us with an additional embarrassment—namely, that such a continuum is in no sense parallel to the continuum from which it is said to be derived. That is to say, it does not appear to be a continuum that can be intelligibly thought of as undergoing differentiation.

Prof. Ward considers the genesis and development of ideation from two sides, which he designates the subjective and the objective respectively. The discussion of the former —of the manner in which familiarity and facility are gradually acquired both in the process of apprehension and in practical activity—seems to me especially valuable, and to follow a line of reflexion along which one may hope a clue may some day be obtained to the nature of retention or revival. I am persuaded that the distinction I have laid stress upon between 'the awareness of a content' and 'the content of which there is awareness' is here of vital significance; and that it is the former alone that 'persists,' while "the ineptness of the atomistic psychology with its 'physical' and 'chemical' analogies" is nowhere more apparent than in its taking it to be the latter. But this is too big a theme to attempt to develop now.

5. No part of Prof. Ward's psychology is more distinctive than the theory he has propounded of the nature of feeling. Feeling, as he views it, is sharply contrasted, on the one one hand, with presentation and, on the other hand, with

attention. (*a*) Strict accuracy would oblige us to say, he would contend, that there is a feeling subject rather than, as in ordinary parlance, there is a subject that has feelings. Feeling, in other words, is never itself an ingredient of the objective continuum; it is always a purely subjective state or condition. Presentations stand in the relation of objects to the subject, but that is not the only relation in which they stand; they affect the subject, and this affection is feeling. Since, then, all knowledge is concerned with objects, we cannot be said to know feeling, any more than we can be said to know attention, immediately in itself. Feeling is immediately *experienced*, but only mediately *known*—known, that is to say, through its effects, through the changes it brings about in the presentational continuum. Furthermore, it follows from the opposition thus constituted, that the features most generally characteristic of presentations—that they can be attended to, revived, and associated—must be absent from feeling. (*b*) Not only is feeling not known as objects are known. It is not a mode of *knowing*. We do not apprehend in and through feeling. Feeling is a condition of *being* rather than a condition of *doing*; it is a *receptive* attitude on the part of the subject, not an exercise of activity. In a complete *psychosis*, feeling, then, occupies an intermediary position. On the one side, it follows the act of attention; it is the *effect* of non-voluntarily attending to changes in the presentational continuum. On the other side, it precedes the act of attention; it prompts to, and is in that sense the *cause* of, that voluntary attention which produces changes in the motor-continuum.

Despite the efforts of Stumpf and others to sustain a contrary view, there can, I think, be little doubt that in the mature mental life feeling does evince itself as being in contrast with presentations markedly subjective in character, and as being in contrast with modes of apprehending and striving a way in which the subject is affected. The doubt one would entertain turns upon the question whether we are justified in assuming this to be a primordial contrast, a contrast characterising the life of mind from the beginning. Whoever holds recognition of the distinction between subject and object to be derivative, to be gradually attained in the course of the development of conscious experience, will be bound to answer that question in the negative. For my part, I find it well nigh impossible to assign any meaning to the phrase 'awareness of an object' which does not involve applying to that of which there is awareness a number of predicates—*e.g.*, independence of the act of apprehending (*cf.*

p. 417)—that even in their crudest forms must obviously be altogether beyond the range of the primitive mind. Dr. Ward apparently considers an argument of this sort to be vitiated by a confusion of the standpoint of a given experience with the standpoint of its exposition. "The infant who is delighted by a bright colour does not of course," he writes, "conceive himself as face to face with an object; but neither does he conceive the colour as a subjective affection" (p. 48). Quite so; but the observation is scarcely relevant. The whole point of the contention against which it is directed is that recognition of what is subjective is just as much a derivative fact as recognition of what is objective. And if "it is the exclusive business of psychology to analyse and trace the development of individual experience *as it is for the experiencing individual*" (p. 104), is it not imperative to avoid using terms in our description that impute to the experience we are describing features which we have every reason for thinking it does not possess?

So far as I can see, then, the term 'subjective' expresses a characteristic which can only properly be said to belong to feeling as it is for the experiencing individual when that individual has attained a certain stage of mental development. And it is not, I think, difficult to point to the positive features that account for feeling acquiring the characteristic in question. For instance, apart from the opposition indicated by the terms pleasurable and painful, the several states of feeling exhibit no definitely qualitative differences; relatively to even the crudest kinds of sense-apprehension they are *uniform* in character. So too, and in virtue of this uniform character, feeling serves as a *constant* accompaniment of the variety of presented factors, and in regard to the latter there is no necessary connexion between any one of them and a specific degree of pleasurable or painful feeling. This relative uniformity and constancy of the feeling experience would in itself suffice to explain how it comes to be marked off from 'presentative' experience, and to be connected in a special manner with what eventually develops into the consciousness of self. But, in addition, there gradually comes to be established a close juncture between the pleasure-pain of feeling and the body; the body comes to be regarded as the *locus* of, or centre of reference for, pleasurable and painful feeling. And, to mention only one other consideration, those experiences which are beyond all others instrumental in defining for us the division between subject and object, the experiences of movement and of resistance to movement, are, as Dr. Ward has conclusively shown,

intimately associated with feeling as that which initiates and sustains them.

From the point of view I have indicated, one would not take the antithesis between presentations and what are ordinarily called feelings to be primitive and psychologically ultimate. In reply to one of the arguments on which the contention I am calling in question has been rested—that, namely, which points to the qualitative differences and distinctness exhibited by presentations as contrasted with feelings—it has often been urged that what is thus assigned as a characteristic mark to presentations is in fact, even in mature experience, a very varying one, that while it is prominent in visual and auditory presentations, it becomes less and less prominent as we descend the scale, until when we come to organic sensations, so-called, it appears hardly possible to discover a qualitative content describable in any other terms than those of feeling. I have no desire to insist upon this counter-argument as being in itself satisfactory. But it is worth while noting that it in no way depends upon the assumption that increasing indistinctness of content ultimately merges a presentation into mere feeling. One need not intend by it to imply that if two things approach one another so nearly as to be indistinguishable they become identical (*cf.* p. 43), but only to draw attention to certain facts which throw a doubt upon the primordial character of an opposition the reality of which in the mature inner life one would not dream of denying. Moreover, if bodily pains be admitted to be presentations, the significance of the term 'object' as applied to them must be stretched to the breaking point. They exhibit no trace of that reference to the outer world which is characteristic of visual and auditory presentations; and, although in our mature experience they are vaguely localised in the body, no one, I imagine, would maintain that even the faintest localisation is necessary in order that there should be experience of pain.

The truth is that the terms cognition and feeling carry with them, as familiarly employed, a connotation that renders them peculiarly inappropriate for delineating rudimentary phases of conscious experience. "Absolute beginnings are," it may be admitted, "beyond the pale of science," but still psychology is not on that account debarred from reasoning backwards to a stage of psychical existence that is prior to the emergence of either feeling or cognition as its differentiated aspects. There is no possibility, certainly, of deducing one of these from the other. But there is a possibility of forming some conception of a common root, so to speak,

from which the two diverging stems have originated. And when Prof. Ward insists upon the notion of experience as being wider than that of knowledge (p. 378), is he not laying stress upon a consideration that followed out genetically must lead very much in the direction to which I am pointing?

6. From what I have been saying I am afraid I may be thought to differ more fundamentally from Dr. Ward than as a matter of fact I do. Happily with regard to his masterly treatment of the thorny topic of conation I have no other duty to discharge than that of emphasising its great value. While strenuously maintaining that activity is for psychology ultimate, and that the mental life *is* only in being active, Dr. Ward refuses to look upon the specific mode of activity called conation as a unique or unanalysable faculty. Activity in consciousness, be it cognitive or conative, is what he designates attention (p. 344); conscious activity is, therefore, wider than and inclusive of conative activity (p. 262).

Conation, so conceived, is, of course, complex; it involves the conscious subject's activity, but it involves much else besides. In the first place, it is dependent on feeling; feeling, particularly painful feeling, initiates that change in the direction of attention to which conation is due. In the second place, feeling enters in more ways than one into the conative complex itself. And, in the third place, movements —or, as is here said, motor-presentations or re-presentations —form part at least of what is attended to.[1] Moreover, in view of his well-known contention that conscious action, either in the experience of the individual or of his ancestors, preceded automatic or habitual action, it should be noted that Dr. Ward is no less strongly of opinion that even the simplest purposive movement must have been preceded by some movement simpler still. For there could have been no ideal re-presentation of a movement without a prior experience of the actual movement. Movements, then, must be conceived as immediately expressive primordially of

[1] Stout supposes Prof. Ward to agree with him in holding that "the conative complex contains a simple and unanalysable element uniquely characteristic of it"—an element to which he gives the name of 'felt tendency' (*Brit. Journ. of Psychol.*, vol. ii., p. 4). I do not find in *Psychological Principles* any warrant for attributing this view to its author. On the contrary, I believe he would maintain that what Stout calls 'felt tendency' is not an unanalysable element, and that the subjective activity involved in it is fundamentally one in kind with that also involved, for example, in the non-conative attention of which feeling is an effect. "It is," he says, "difference in the objects that makes all the difference in our attitude, but it is not a difference in the psychical activity concerned with them" (p. 68).

pleasure or pain, and voluntary movements as elaborated out of these.

Why it has so often been thought that injustice is being done to the volitional side of experience unless conation, or some element in conation, be regarded as unique, and as alone strictly entitled to be spoken of as 'activity,' has long been a puzzle to me. Dr. Ward, at any rate, cannot be charged with overlooking the importance of the conative aspect of mental life. Psychology he defines as "the science of individual experience—understanding by experience not merely, not primarily, cognition, but also, and above all, conative activity or behaviour" (p. 28). And he expresses his full agreement with those who hold that we are primarily conative and became intellectual, because knowledge proved subservient to action (p. 262). With this position, which in more places than one he strongly enforces, his rejection of the view that conation is a specific faculty is, in no way, inconsistent.

7. The two remarkable and intensely interesting chapters with which the volume concludes throw a considerable amount of fresh light upon the author's point of view as a whole.

Hitherto Prof. Ward had been making use of a working conception that enabled him, for the time being, to set aside the troublesome question of heredity. After the manner of Hegel in the *Phänomenologie*, he had assumed himself to be dealing with one individual, a typified individual, whose development had been continuous from the beginning of psychical life, rather than with a series of individuals, each of whom except the first 'inherited' certain capacities from its progenitors. At the end, however, when in particular the formation of character calls to be considered, and when the emphasis will have to be on the experient rather than on the experience, a device of that kind can no longer be adhered to; instead of the 'psychological individual,' the concrete individual must constitute the subject-matter of investigation, and, instead of an *analysis* of mind, it will be a process of mental *synthesis* with which the inquirer will be mainly concerned.

But, by way of transition from 'general' to 'special' psychology, an extremely suggestive survey is taken of mental synthesis or development as a whole, to which all the partial processes depicted in the earlier chapters contribute. To the psychological observer, the prominent fact is a unity that is differentiated but never disintegrated; but, as the differentiation proceeds, the work of synthesis within the whole becomes to him more and more apparent. Starting with pronounced homogeneity, plasticity, potentiality, rather than with

definitely distinguished features, he reaches at the close pronounced heterogeneity, structure, actuality, such as are exemplified in a person. At every stage of the development, the two factors—the subjective and the objective, function and structure, the experient and the experienced—have been mutually involved. Yet, while in the analytic study, the objective results were the more obtrusive, here in the synthetic study it is the subjective process that is paramount; here 'the good which every soul pursues' becomes the chief clue to the intricacies of psychical evolution.

Regarding, then, the genesis of experience structurally, as the self-made property of the psychological individual, Prof. Ward now introduces the notion of 'psychoplasm,' in contradistinction to that of a 'manifold of sensations' or 'mind-stuff,' and corresponding to the notion of bioplasm in biology. The notion implies the evolution of a psychical organism, a gradually articulated system. Functionally, this organism is the work throughout of the feeling and active subject. The material, no doubt, is 'given'; but it is not merely on the ground of presentation that the synthesising supervenes. The objective differentiation progresses on subjectively determined lines; not only concentration of attention but interest is from first to last operative. And interest secures that stability and progression are correlative conditions of psychical, as of all other, evolution. Besides subjective selection, there is, however, implied in this psychogeny an objective factor—understanding now by the latter term not the psychoplasm but the common-sense world that each one comes to know and distinguish from himself, the epistemologically objective factor. Herein is included all that we collectively describe as circumstances, everything, in short, that is an antecedent condition or occasion of the successive syntheses which differentiate and articulate the psychical organism. This objective factor is, in fact, the environment of the psychological individual—on the one hand, the natural environment, which plays in the main a negative part in the individual's development, and, on the other hand, the social environment, which has none of the impassivity of nature, and is not subject to the rigidity of mechanical laws.

Passing, at last, to 'special' psychology, to the concrete individual, Prof. Ward is face to face with the problem of heredity, and propounds the view that all that can be said to be psychologically heritable is merely the psychoplasm which the conscious subject elaborates, not the conscious subject or 'psyche' itself. Just as for the biologist the organism given to the concrete individual is a more differentiated stage of the

bioplasm from which the series of ancestral organisms began, so for the psychologist the organism given to the concrete individual is a more differentiated stage of the psychoplasm with which the psychological individual began. Presuming, now, that acquired qualities are inherited, the broad difference between the organisms of two generations would be that what were *functional* modifications in the earlier would be *structural* modifications in the later; habit in the individual life would be the ground of heredity in racial life. Accordingly, what is inherited is not individuality or character but a particular *Anlage—i.e.*, psychoplasm as modified by heredity which the concrete individual has to elaborate.

My rapid sketch has done the theory scant justice, but has perhaps made manifest its singular acuteness and suggestiveness. That it contains much that is both true and significant I should be among the first to insist But that certain portions of it bring into prominent relief the difficulties in Dr. Ward's general position to which I have been alluding can hardly, I think, be gainsaid.

I will touch, first, upon a minor point. Dr. Ward is quite aware that in certain respects the analogy between psychoplasm and bioplasm breaks down. I do not know that this is a matter of any consequence, but it is perhaps worth while pointing out that it breaks down in one important respect to which he does not refer. The bioplasm of the biologist is made up of elements similar in kind to elements of the natural environment. The elements of which psychoplasm consists —presentations, ideas, concepts, and the like—are *toto genere* unlike the elements of the natural environment; they are, as he here puts it, contents of 'mind,' and in the natural world "as common sense understands it" their counterparts are not to be found. The relation, therefore, of the psychical organism to the natural environment must obviously be a relation very different from that of the biological organism to the same environment.

I pass, however, to a much more fundamental matter. The psychoplasm which experience is said to differentiate and to organise is repeatedly identified by Prof. Ward with the presentational continuum, and is, I take it, regarded by him as, at any rate, including the latter, though it may include more. It would, therefore, appear that the psychical organism, instead of being, as the bodily organism is, "diaphanous for its own subject and opaque to all subjects besides,"[1] must, on the contrary, be said to be opaque to its own subject and dia-

[1] *Realm of Ends*, p. 466.

phanous for all subjects besides. As the objective continuum which is gradually differentiated, the psychoplasm is that upon which the subject's power of attention is throughout directed; as *totum objectivum*, it is for the subject "all there is," that is to say, "is the universe" (p. 118). The concrete individual starts, so it would *seem* to be implied, with an inherited psychoplasm already differentiated up to a certain level; and his conscious activity is then devoted to further elaborating that psychoplasm, which in consequence gives rise to an ever increasing variety of more or less distinct and clearly defined presentations. And yet this cannot be what Prof. Ward really intends. For the presentational continuum of any concrete individual at each successive stage of his history can obviously not have been elaborated out of the psychoplasm with which he started. At every moment of his being, it is dependent for its material upon the environment; and the great mass of the presentations that *ex hypothesi* come to be distinguished can evidently not have been contained, even implicitly, in the inherited *Anlage*.

If, therefore, by 'psychoplasm' be meant the presentational continuum, the obstacles the theory has to encounter would appear to be insuperable. But in working out his conception of *Anlage*, of the psychoplasm with which the concrete experient starts invested, Dr. Ward departs more and more from that view of its nature. When he proceeds to scrutinise the contents of a concrete individual's *Anlage*, they turn out to be quite other than the contents of the objective continuum, as these have previously been determined in the main body of the book. Temperamental attitudes, moods resulting from coenæsthesis, instinctive emotions and appetites and actions, the constituents of talent, native endowments or capabilities—these are singled out as instances of the various facts which the term *Anlage* covers. Yet none of these can be described as 'objects,' extend the significance of the term how we may; they are said to be "tendencies to develop certain ancestral characteristics" (p. 428), and tendencies or dispositions, whatever else they may be, can surely not be classed under the head of 'presentations'. Once dissociate the notion of psychoplasm from that of a presentational continuum, and I believe it will prove to be a valuable and fruitful notion. I think, indeed, that even then the psychical structure would have to be thought of as far more intimately connected with the conscious subject whose structure it is than Dr. Ward seems willing to allow. Sometimes he appears to speak of it as a kind of clothing, which the individual puts on at birth and divests himself of at death (*cf.*, *e.g.*, p. 442); at any rate, the

soul or 'psyche' has in his view an origin quite different from that of its *Anlage*, the latter being transmitted, apparently through the instrumentality of physiological factors, from parent to offspring, while the former *may* be a new creation (pp. 423-425). But, to mention no other reason, on account alone of its being largely composed of feeling, admittedly an affection of the subject, it is hard to understand how the psychoplasm can be so "essentially distinct" (p. 443) from the subject that controls it as it is thus taken to be.

8. It will be seen that almost everything I have pressed by way of criticism has had reference either to the theory of presentations or to what is bound up with it. Repeating a statement of his in a well-known article in MIND, Prof. Ward expresses the opinion that 'presentationism' is able to account for nine-tenths of each of the facts, but that for the remaining one-tenth it requires to be supplemented by recognition of a dominating subjective activity or function (p. 411). I venture to urge that thoroughly as he has exposed the weaknesses of 'presentationism' he has yet been too lenient with it, and that the conception of the conscious subject, which he has himself done so much to develop, can not, in truth, be brought into coherence with the remnant of that doctrine which he retains. In the later portions of his book, I seem to discern indications of an interpretation of experience that has left presentationism in its entirety a long way behind. For example, in the concluding paragraph of the very valuable chapter on "Self-consciousness," it is argued that we are driven to regard experience as reciprocal interaction or *mutuum commercium*, which implies two agents, and not merely two kinds of phenomena (p. 382). It is true that here just as he conceives the self is only *known* reflectively in the phenomenal "Me" which is constructed by it, so he seems to imply that the external agent is only *known* reflectively in the phenomenal presentation-continuum which is partly, at any rate, constructed by it. But yet, in other passages, he speaks unhesitatingly of this external agent as the world we each of us come to "know," and to know as object of our contemplation (p. 417 *sqq.*). This "transsubjective level" of apprehension has no doubt to be attained; we do not start with it. But the question is whether it ever could be attained were our conscious activity directed always on 'presentations' that are intermediary between the transsubjective and the subjective.

II.—PROF. ALEXANDER'S GIFFORD LECTURES[1] (I.).

By C. D. Broad.

Probably few of the courses delivered under the Gifford bequest have been so eagerly awaited by philosophers as Prof. Alexander's. We all knew that he had an extremely ingenious and original system 'up his sleeve'; his scattered articles and his synopsis had served to whet rather than to slake our curiosity; and reports from those who listened to the lectures at Glasgow encouraged the hope that England was at length to produce a comprehensive system of constructive metaphysics in which the speculative boldness of the great Germans should be combined with the critical good sense of Locke, Hume, and Berkeley. On the whole, Prof. Alexander's readers will not be disappointed; they will feel, whether they agree with his conclusions or not, that he has at least produced a work in the grand manner.

The book is of stupendous size, occupying nearly eight hundred pages. It is therefore quite impossible to treat it with anything like adequacy. What I propose to do is to start by giving a neutral account of Prof. Alexander's general conclusions, and then to discuss in somewhat greater detail the arguments by which he supports certain of these.

Synopsis.

Everything in the universe, according to our author, is a differentiation of one fundamental stuff, called Space-Time. Space without time and time without space are abstractions, legitimate enough when properly defined and used, but contradictory if taken in isolation. S.-T. is really Motion, but we have to remember that it is not the motion of *things* in space during time. Let us call it Pure Motion, and defer for

[1] *Space, Time, and Deity*, S. Alexander, vol. i., pp. xii., 347; vol. ii., pp. xiii., 437. London: Macmillan & Co., 1920.

the present the question whether such a thing be really conceivable. All things are complexes of motions of various kinds, which persist within more or less constant contours. (I think the vortex-atom theory provides a helpful analogy to this view of Prof. Alexander's, though it would certainly misrepresent him if pressed too far.) There are certain features which characterise, in some form or other, all possible bits of S.-T.; these are called Categories. They are in no sense mind-dependent. Different bits of S.-T. will exhibit these general characteristics in different special forms; thus everything will have some shape and size, but one thing will be circular and another square. The particular forms in which a thing exemplifies the categories are the primary qualities of the thing. On the other hand there are qualities which only belong to complexes of a certain degree of complexity; they appear in different forms among different complexes of the right degree of complexity, but they do not belong in any form whatever to those of lower degree. These are called secondary qualities. They are in no sense mind-dependent, nor are they in general dependent on the physiological peculiarities of a percipient's body. Thus any set of motions of the right degree of complexity, when illuminated by the right sort of light (itself a form of motion), is red; and its redness is independent alike of the presence of a percipient mind and of the presence of a normally constructed eye. If either of these be lacking the red colour will not be *seen*, but that is the whole difference that will be made. Secondary qualities form an hierarchy in the sense that those which come higher in the scale belong to motion-complexes which also possess all the lower qualities. Thus the highest secondary quality that we know is mentality; this only belongs to motion-complexes such as brains; but brains also have the secondary qualities of life, chemical affinity, colour, and inertia—to mention them in descending order. Prof. Alexander further holds that a motion-complex with a higher secondary quality is always a distinct part of a larger complex, specially connected with this part, but possessing only lower secondary qualities. Thus our brains, which have mentality as well as life, etc., are specially differentiated parts of our bodies. The remaining parts have life, etc., but not mentality. Similarly he holds that in a blue body the peculiar motions that are blue are merely dotted about the contour, the interstices being filled with simpler motion-complexes which have only mechanical properties. At each new stage in the hierarchy something genuinely new appears in the universe. There is no possibility of predicting that such and

such a type of motion-complex will have such and such a quality until you have actually found that this kind of complex does in fact have this kind of quality. Such novelty is clearly compatible with complete obedience to law; it is a law of nature that such and such a complex has such and such a quality, but it is an *irreducible* law and cannot be discovered until instances of its operation have been met.

On Prof. Alexander's view, then, there is nothing sacrosanct about mind. It is just one stage in the hierarchy of qualities, as closely bound to brain as colour is to certain types of vibration. It happens to be the highest quality that we know; but, in the first place, even if there be higher qualities we could not know them, and, in the second, even if there be not now higher qualities there certainly will be such in course of time. Nothing in the world depends on mind, either for its existence or for even the most trivial of its qualities, with the single exception of value. Prof. Alexander takes an obvious pleasure in 'dressing down' and 'telling off' the exaggerated claims of mind, and I suspect that he secretly cherishes a hope that in the New Jerusalem, whose charter is the Treaty of Versailles and whose streets are paved with paper-currency, this journal may be rechristened SPACE-TIME. The main importance of mind for philosophy is that in it we can read in large and familiar letters types of relation which are common to all orders of existence, but are obscure to us from the very simplicity that they assume in lower orders of reality. There is nothing peculiar about the cognitive *relation;* there is one common relation in which any part of S.-T. stands to any other that affects it. Exactly the same relation of 'compresence' unites me to a book that I read, and a plant to the soil that it grows in. But the quality of the reaction differs, because my brain is so complex as to possess mentality while the plant is only complex enough to possess life. It is for this reason that my relation to the book is called cognitive, whilst the plant's relation to the soil is not. A complex of a given order can stand in this relation to any complex of a lower order, but not to itself or to any other of the same order or *à fortiori* to one of a higher order. A mind 'enjoys,' but does not 'contemplate' itself and its states; a plant 'enjoys' its own life, it cannot 'contemplate' it, though in a wide sense it can contemplate the soil that it lives in and the purely mechanical processes that go on in its own structure.

Now, knowing that I come at a certain stage in a hierarchy of complexes, I can understand that complexes may arise in

the future, or may even exist now, which stand in the same relation to me as that in which my brain stands to the rest of my body. Brain is a highly differentiated part of living matter with the new quality of mentality; so there might be complexes whose constituents are brains, and these might possess a new quality. A being so constituted would contemplate minds as minds contemplate life, and would enjoy its own peculiar quality as minds enjoy themselves. Such a being would be for us a god or angel, and its peculiar new quality would be deity or godhood. In this sense we are gods to plants; for they only live, whilst we think as well as live. But *our* gods would not be gods to themselves; *their* gods would be hypothetical beings of the next stage in the hierarchy. The world, considered as the matrix which is going to produce beings with godhood, is what we mean by God. If this stage be ever reached there will not be God but gods, and their God will be the world regarded as the matrix of the next stage. Thus we may sum up Prof. Alexander's theology in two parodies: 'God never is, but always to exist,' and 'There is no God but gods'.

The one place in Prof. Alexander's system where minds come into their own is in connexion with values. These he calls Tertiary Qualities. Truth, goodness, and beauty would not exist if there were no minds. This does not mean that they are subjective in the sense that there is no question of right or wrong judgment about them. It means that the only entities that have these qualities contain minds as constituents. Truth, *e.g.*, belongs neither to minds as such nor to objects as such, but to the complex mind-contemplating-object. And it is perfectly possible to believe that such a complex has the tertiary quality of truth when, in fact, it has that of falsehood. Moreover, these values are essentially social; they arise out of the intercourse of minds, some of whom are right and others wrong in their judgments or actions. There are analogies to the tertiary qualities at levels below mind. Thus adaptation, or the lack of it, of a plant to its environment is a value, and it is an attribute of the whole situation plant—living in—environment.

There is one other feature in the system that must be mentioned. Prof. Alexander, in common, I suppose, with most philosophers, is concerned to maintain that the actual is logically prior to the possible. Universals for him are types of pattern in S.-T., and are meaningless in any other connexion. And it is owing solely to the actual constitution of S.-T., which is homoloidal, that universals are possible at all. He has therefore to devote a good deal of argument to

apparent exceptions, such as four-dimensional and non-homoloidal spaces, which seem, on the face of them, to be other possible instances of universals which, instead of falling within S.-T., are genera of which actual S.-T. is merely one possible specification.

I have now, I hope, given a fair and intelligible account of the main outlines of Prof. Alexander's theory. The book contains, in addition to what I have mentioned, many very valuable discussions about particular categories such as substance, cause, intensity, etc. But space forbids entering into details. I propose therefore to devote the rest of this article to a fuller account and some criticisms of the doctrines of Space-Time, Mind, the hierarchy of Qualities, the nature of Universals, and Deity.

A. Space-Time.

It is idle to pretend that S.-T., as introduced to us in this book, is easy to understand. We must of course distinguish between the doctrine itself and the arguments for it; the latter might be false or inconclusive, whilst the former, if we could understand it, might still be a valuable alternative in terms of which to construe the world. Let us first try then to get some idea of S.-T. For Prof. Alexander the proximately fundamental thing is the event-particle. An event-particle, is the limiting case of a motion; moreover there is a motion-quality—presumably what one is aware of when looking at an object that moves quickly enough—but it is not, like genuine qualities, *correlated with* certain motions, it just is the motion. (*Cf.* Vol. I., p. 321.) Now motion does not imply something that moves; it is anterior to things and is the stuff of which they are made (I., 329). So it would seem that ultimately the fundamental thing is pure motions. These will differ from each other, of course, in direction, in the place and time where they happen, and so on. But we leave these matters aside for the moment. The intrinsic difference between them will be their swiftness; and if you ask how you are to understand a motion which is not the motion of something, I suppose the answer would be that *e.g.*, you can *see* a difference between a swifter or slower motion, and that this is independent of what happens to be moving. We are told that the best way to think of an event-particle is to start by thinking of a very simple qualitied event—*e.g.*, a flash of red colour. Then think away the quality of redness; the residuum is an event-particle. (*Cf.* I., 48, note.) Similarly

I suppose that the best way to think of a pure motion is to compare the jump given by the second hand of your watch with that given by the minute hand of a big public clock; then think away the other qualities of the moving object and just bear in mind the observable difference in the perceived jumps. The important point to notice is that for Prof. Alexander the pure motion is not an *abstractum* incapable of actual existence; it is a real particular, which in the special case of the watch-hand happens to have other perceptible qualities. Such pure motions are to be taken as fundamental and unanalysable; space and time are *abstracta* derived from them by a legitimate process. The event-particle is a kind of half-way house between motions and space or time. It is a limit which has spatial and temporal characteristics, and I imagine, also something corresponding to the swiftness of the motion whose limit it is. I think Prof. Alexander might have made all this very much clearer if he had known of Whitehead's work on Extensive Abstraction. It does not seem to me that his exposition of the nature of S.-T. is particularly clear. I have had to gather my notions of it from hints scattered all over the first volume, and my interpretation may quite well be wrong.

Now of course it seems extremely odd to the reader at first sight to take pure motions as fundamental and to analyse space and time out of them. For our normal procedure is to regard motion as analysable into the successive occupation of points of space by a bit of matter or by a recognisable quality or state of affairs. Still we know from experience in other branches of knowledge that it is often equally legitimate to regard A and B as fundamental and to construct C out of them or to regard C as fundamental and construct A and B out of them. Geometry offers many examples of this fact. Hence we ought to regard the *possibility* of Prof. Alexander's procedure with an open mind. But he holds that we ought to go much further than this; for he thinks he can prove that there are contradictions in space and time taken by themselves, and that these only vanish when they are taken in connexion with each other as characteristics of pure motions. Thus two questions arise: (i) Does Prof. Alexander succeed in constructing space and time from his S.-T. of pure motions? and (ii) Is it *necessary* to proceed in this way; is there really any objection to the more usual course which makes motion derivative?

The derivation of space and time occurs in the chapter on Perspectives and Sections of S.-T. Once more I must put the matter in my own words, and it may be that I have mis-

understood the theory. Take any event-particle e_{st}. If I am right, this will have a spatial characteristic s, a temporal characteristic t, and a 'quality' corresponding to the swiftness of the motion of which it is a limit. We must not suppose that the s and t factors are really separable; they are essentially bound up with each other and I suppose that the intensive quality of swiftness is the way in which the two are combined. Now (*a*) we can consider all the event-particles contemporary with e_{st}. These constitute a *section*. We might be inclined to say that the s-factors of all such particles is what is meant by space at the moment t. This would be a mistake according to Prof. Alexander. The reason apparently is that even by space *at a moment* we do not mean *instantaneous space*. Nothing instantaneous would have the properties of a space, for reasons which we shall have to consider later. I would remark at this point, however, that it is not obvious why a section should not be at least as legitimate a notion as an event-particle. Doubtless a space of contemporary points is a conceptual limit, but then so is an event-particle. However, there is another way of classifying points with respect to a given event-particle, and this provides another and—according to Prof. Alexander—more legitimate meaning of space at an instant. We can consider (*b*) the class of all event-particles, which are either (i) intrinsically contemporary with e_{st}, or (ii) are earlier stages of motions of which the assigned particle is a stage, or (iii) are later stages of such motions. This class is called a *perspective* with respect to e_{st}. It obviously includes event-particles of various dates. The s-factors of all these constitute space at t from the point s. Such a perspective of course includes many sets of contemporary event-particles, but many event-particles contemporary with any such set will fall outside the perspective to which the set belongs. *E.g.*, two flashes of light and a sound might start at the same moment from points equidistant from e_{st} and the flashes might pass through s at t. The three initial events would then be intrinsically contemporary; but the starting of the two flashes would be in the perspective while that of the sound would not, because it could not—owing to its smaller velocity—be on a course of motion that contains e_{st}.

A difficulty that I feel about this notion of perspectives is the following: We are here supposed to be at the level of pure unqualitied space-time. But all examples of perspectives have been in terms of definite qualitied events with characteristic rates of transmission, such as light or sound. Now the question is: Could one attach any meaning to perspectives

without these characteristically different velocities of transmission, and are not these velocities merely empirical, *i.e.*, characteristic of special complexes of S.-T. and not of S.-T. as such? I question the legitimacy of the notion of perspectives at the level of pure S.-T. If Prof. Alexander answers that there are differences of intensive magnitude even among *pure* motions, there is another question that I must raise. An event-particle is a limit, a kind of mathematical device, *bene fundatum* indeed, but not a genuine part of S.-T. Is it supposed to represent in some way, not only the spatial and temporal characteristics of a certain stage in a pure motion, but also the intensity of the motion (*i.e.*, its velocity)? On the one hand this seems necessary if there be intrinsic differences of intensity even among pure motions, and if event-particles are to be an adequate device for dealing with such motions. But, on the other, in the doctrine of perspectives a *single* event-particle is assumed to belong to various motions of various degrees of swiftness, *e.g.*, to the course of a wave of sound and to that of a wave of light which arrive at the same time. I confess that I find this very puzzling. If pure motions do not differ intrinsically perspectives seem out of place at the level of pure S.-T. But if they do then I do not see how you can talk of a single event-particle common to a number of intrinsically different motions; it would rather seem as if we should need a plurality of event-particles with the same spatial and temporal factors but some difference in quality to represent the different intrinsic swiftnesses of the different pure motions of which they are the limits.

To proceed. Two different kinds of sections and perspectives are possible with respect to a given event-particle e_{st}. We might consider the class of event-particles co-punctual with e_{st}, and say that the t-factors of all these constitute time at the point s. Again Prof. Alexander will not allow this, because in his view it is essential that time—even if it be in a certain sense time *at a point*—shall not have all its instants confined to one point. Accordingly, instead of such a section, we take a new kind of perspective. We include in it (i) all event-particles co-punctual with e_{st}, and (ii) otherwise include the same event-particles as in our previous perspective. We now consider the temporal factors of all these particles. Thus the 'temporal perspective' from e_{st} includes event-particles of the form $e_{st'}$ but none of the form $e_{s't}$, whilst the 'spatial perspective' includes particles of the form $e_{s't}$ but none of the form $e_{st'}$; for the former refers to a centre with fixed spatial characteristics and the latter to a centre

with fixed temporal characteristics. This, at least, is how I interpret the rather difficult statements in I., 75-76.

S.-T. as a whole is just all the pure event-particles. Any perspective is a selection of event-particles. In any perspective every position in space and every instant of time is represented by *some* event-particle, but there are many event-particles absent from any given perspective. Perspectives are inter-connected and include between them all event-particles. 'Points of space which are simultaneous in one perspective may be successive in another . . .' (I., 77). I take this startling statement to be a Pickwickian way of asserting that the perspective P_1 may contain the event-particles e_{xt} and e_{yt}, whilst the perspective P_2 may contain e_{xt} and $e_{yt'}$.

I find some difficulty in following Prof. Alexander's account of *total space* and *total time*, and their connexion with sections. His view *seems* to be the following: Total space is the space-factors of all event-particles, and total time is their time-factors. But if s be any point there are event-particles of the form e_{st}, where t ranges over all possible values. Similarly if t be any moment there are event-particles of the form $e_{st'}$ where s ranges over all possible values. Thus, whilst a section is not what we mean by space, because space confined to a moment is impossible; yet, since every position is in fact correlated with any moment, such a section does contain every position in total space. Similar remarks apply to temporal sections and total time. Thus momentary spaces and punctual times, though fictions, do possess respectively all the geometrical properties of total space and all the chronological properties of total time.

I must confess, however, that I am highly doubtful of the above interpretation, because there are statements that seem to imply and others that seem to conflict with it. We are told (I., 81) that 'in total S.-T. each point is in fact repeated through the whole of time, and each instant over the whole of space'. This certainly seems to mean that for any s there are e_{st}'s in which t ranges through all possible values, and *mutatis mutandis* for any t. But we also read on the same page that 'at any moment of its real history Space is not all of one date, and Time is not all at one point'. And on (I., 82-83) we learn that '. . . in their combination Space is always variously occupied by Time, and Time spread variously over Space'. This certainly seems to mean that if t be any moment the s values of the e_{st}'s do *not* range over all possible values. I take it that the odd statement that at any moment of its history Space is not all of one date must be

regarded as analytical. It simply tells us what Prof. Alexander intends the phrase *Space at such and such a date* to mean. It tells us that he means by it the spatial factors of the event-particles in a perspective taken from an event-particle with the assigned date. These factors of course belong to particles of various dates. The only way that I can see to reconcile the apparent flat contradiction between the quotations from I., 81, and I., 82-83 is to substitute in the latter for the words *Space* and *Time* the phrases: *The space of a perspective* and *The time of a perspective.* I may be very stupid, but I feel that more light is badly wanted here.

On I., 217 occurs the statement ". . . every point differs from any other by its instant, and every instant by its point". Such assertions are common, yet (*a*) the phrases *its point* and *its instant* seem to imply a one to one correlation between points and instants. This is elsewhere vigorously denied. Each point belongs to a plurality of instants and conversely. We might then (*b*) be tempted to substitute *its points* and *its instants*, and to suppose that what is meant is that if t_1 and t_2 be two different moments, then some at least of the s's in the class of event-particles of the form e_{st_1} are different from the s's in the class of particles of the form e_{st_2}. But this seems incompatible with the statement that each moment is at *every* point and each point at *every* moment. Again (*c*) we are repeatedly told that there are intrinsically contemporary points, *i.e.*, that there are event-particles with the same time-factor and different space-factors. A pair of such points *cannot* differ from each other by 'their instants,' for 'their instants'—*i.e.*, those of the event-particles of which they are the space-factors—are identical.

It seems to me then that the doctrine of S.-T. and its connexion with space and time is by no means clear, and that, as expounded, it contains inconsistencies. These *may* be merely verbal; they certainly need further elucidation from Prof. Alexander; and, until this be given, I do not feel certain that S.-T., as offered, is even a possible way of analysing the world. But our author thinks it not merely possible but necessary, because of the failure of all alternatives that try to do without it. Let us then consider his arguments for this view.

The argument substantially is that time without space and space without time involve contradictions which vanish only when the two are regarded as intimately linked factors of pure events. Before discussing this view in detail it is well to note that the time and space which are convicted of these

faults are *assumed* to be neither qualities of things or events nor relations between them. Now, it is at least possible that if the difficulties that arise be genuine, they are due not to the separation of time and space, but to the initial assumption that time and space are not merely relations between events.

Time is a continuous duration of successive instants. If time were alone this combination of attributes would be impossible; it is only because time is essentially connected with space that successive instants can form a continuous duration. The argument is that a duration involves some kind of togetherness. But the essence of successiveness is that, when one moment exists, all earlier moments have ceased and no later ones have begun to be. Hence time would be a series of isolated *nows*. This argument seems to me to be wholly invalid. All that has happened to the past moments is that they have ceased to be *present*—a purely psychological matter, as Prof. Alexander admits—not that they have ceased to *be*. Togetherness, as Prof. Alexander himself points out, means merely connexion and not simultaneity (I., 46). Nothing has been proved except the trivial proposition that successive moments cannot be together in the sense of being contemporary. It does not follow that they cannot be together in the sense of forming a whole of related terms, which whole is a duration. A tune is a whole of related notes, and these notes are successive; why cannot a duration be a whole of related but successive moments?

How is connexion with space supposed to heal the impermanence of time? This is explained in I., 44-49. Each moment must be correlated with several points, and each point with several moments. A point has permanence because correlated with many instants. And successive instants are 'together' as parts of a duration because they are correlated with these persistent points. It would, perhaps, be fair to put Prof. Alexander's argument as follows: There can be no duration unless something endures. The moments of time do not endure, therefore something is needed other than time to give a duration. This something is the point or points correlated with all the moments of a series. And these points endure because each of them is correlated with a number of moments. The argument rests on the fallacy that a complex of related terms cannot have a property not possessed by any of the terms. No instant endures; the terms of duration are instants; but it does not follow that a complex whose terms are instants related by the relation of succession is not just what we mean by a stretch of duration:

e.g., Trinity College has certain attributes which belong neither to the Master nor to any of the Fellows; yet it just is a complex composed of the Master and Fellows in certain mutual relations.

Space, according to Prof. Alexander, is under reciprocal obligations to time. Were it not for time space would be a blank undifferentiated unity, and consequently not a continuum at all. This argument seems to rest on some form of the Identity of Indiscernibles. It is assumed that if p_1 and p_2 be two different points there must be some qualitative difference between them. Pure space cannot supply these differences; we are not allowed to appeal to qualitied things or events because of the preliminary rejection of the relative theory of space and time; hence time itself must be called in to provide the qualitative distinction. How does time perform this service for space? In I., 49-50 we learn that each instant must be correlated with several points of space if time is to differentiate space. This is apparently necessary in order that time should be successive; otherwise it would 'be infected with bare blank extendedness'. But once the successiveness of time is secured it is able to discriminate points of space, presumably because different points are correlated with different instants or sets of instants.

Now I confess that I find all this most difficult to follow and still more so to believe. It does look as if space and time were attempting, like the inhabitants of the Scilly Islands, 'to gain a precarious livelihood by taking in each other's washing'. For let us put together the various statements about the mutual services of time and space: (i) There are stretches of time, in spite of the fleeting character of instants, because each instant is connected with an enduring point; (ii) points endure because each point is connected with a plurality of different instants; (iii) instants differ because each is connected with a (partially or totally?) different set of points; (iv) points differ because each is connected with a (partially or totally?) different set of instants. To these propositions we have to add the puzzling statement, already quoted, that 'each point is in fact repeated throughout the whole of time, and each instant over the whole of space' (I., 81). How the first four statements can escape circularity and how the one just quoted can be reconciled with (iii) and (iv), passes my wits to understand.

I suppose Prof. Alexander would take the line that this circularity just shows the intimate connexion of time with space. But this seems to me to be no answer. We were given to understand that time *without* space and space *without*

time involved contradictions, but that these were healed when the two were *taken together*, and that this contradiction in the separate factors and its disappearance in their combination was the great argument in favour of the doctrine of S.-T. But it seems (*a*) that the contradictions do not exist and (*b*) that, if they do, they only vanish to make way for vicious circles.

Prof. Alexander is not content with the general connexion between space and time which is supposed to be established by the above arguments. He thinks he can prove the more detailed proposition that the characteristics of temporal order depend on the connexion of time with a space of three dimensions. If space had but one dimension time would not be irreversible; if space had but two dimensions there would be no betweenness in time. I cannot follow these arguments, in spite of the very kind and courteous help that Prof. Alexander has given me by letter. I shall try to give an account of his argument to prove the first point, and shall state the difficulties that I feel, although he holds that I ought not to feel them.

The argument begins on I., 52; I shall put it in my own words. If t_1 and t_2 be two instants and t_1 precedes t_2 then t_2 cannot precede t_1. It is required to prove that if space had only one dimension t_2 might precede t_1 although t_1 precedes t_2. Take two event-particles $e_{s_1 t_1}$ and $e_{s_2 t_2}$. Prof. Alexander says that 'the points s_1 and s_2 suffice to distinguish the instants . . . but not to determine whether t_1 is prior to t_2 as posterior'. (I have altered the notation, but made no other change.)

Before considering his proof there are two points to be noticed: (*a*) The statement that the points s_1 and s_2 suffice to distinguish t_1 and t_2 seems inconsistent with other statements that he makes. The same instant can be, and is, according to him, connected with a plurality of points. Hence the mere fact that the points s_1 and s_2 differ does not *suffice* to distinguish t_1 and t_2. If he means that the difference of points *would* suffice to distinguish the moments if space had only one dimension, this is surely one of the things to be proved. (*b*) There is a defect in the conclusion of the argument, which is, I think, merely verbal. Prof. Alexander claims to prove that if space had only one dimension t_1 might be *either* before *or* after t_2. This would be an irrelevant conclusion; what he wants to prove is that t_1 might be *both* before *and* after t_2 if space had only one dimension. The defect is only verbal, because if his argument proves anything at all it does prove the latter proposition. Let us now

consider the argument. It runs as follows: t_1, like all instants, must be repeated in space. Hence there must be an event-particle $e_{s_3 t_1}$ as well as $e_{s_1 t_1}$. Now, if space had only one dimension, and thus reduced to a line, s_1 might be on one side of s_2 —the point connected with t_2—whilst s_3 was on the other side of it. Indeed this must be so, for 'if s_1 and s_3 were on the same side of s_2 their dates would be different,' whereas they are assumed to be both t_1. And if s_1 and s_3 were on different sides of s_2, t_1—which is connected with both s_1 and s_3 —would be both before and after t_2, which is connected with s_2. Put in terms of event-particles the argument is: There must be at least two event-particles in different places both with the date t_1. If space be one-dimensional these places must be on the same line as any other event-particle $e_{s_2 t_2}$. They cannot both be on the same side of this particle, for, if so, their dates would differ. But if they were on opposite sides of it their identical date t_1 would be both before and after the date t_2 of $e_{s_2 t_2}$.

It is, of course, evident that this very obscure argument rests on the fact that event-particles are limits of pure motions. If space were of one dimension all motions would be in one line. If we conceive of s_1 and s_2 as being successive points in the course of a single pure motion from s_1 to s_2, it is, of course, obvious that any point between s_1 and s_2 will be correlated with a date between t_1 and t_2, and that any point s_3 on the opposite side of s_2 to s_1 will be correlated with a date later than s_1. On this assumption it is no doubt true that t_1 cannot be connected with two different points; if there is only one motion there must be a one to one correlation between space and time, whilst it is of the essence of the theory that every point is connected with many instants and every instant with many points. But I do not understand why the one-dimensionality of space implies that the universe consists of a single motion. In the first place are there or are there not supposed to be intrinsic differences of velocity among pure motions? If so, the present difficulty does not arise. But if not, how can the doctrine of perspectives be—as it is apparently meant to be—a doctrine about *pure* S.-T.? Again, even if all pure motions were in one line and of one velocity what prevents some from traversing the line in one direction and others in the opposite direction? And what prevents a succession of pure motions with the same velocity from traversing the line in the same direction, and thus passing through the same point at different dates? Lastly, what prevents a plurality of pure motions of the same velocity from starting in the same direction at the same

moment from different points on the line and thus passing through different points at the same date? I conclude from the note on I., 53 that there is probably some objection to all these suggestions; but I find the whole conception of pure motions so radically obscure that I do not know what properties I may and what I may not ascribe to them.

(*To be continued.*)

III.—HUME'S ETHICAL THEORY AND ITS CRITICS (I.).

By Frank Chapman Sharp.

A well-known professor of philosophy in a German university a generation ago used to advise the students in his course on Kant to read Locke's Essay by all means, but to read it "furchtbar schnell". There is reason to believe that many students of ethics read Hume's ethical treatises in conformity with this point of view. It would not be remarkable if this were the case. Hume's works on ethics, particularly the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, appear at first sight—like Locke's Essay—to be simplicity itself. One or two readings would seem to be sufficient for getting out of them everything of importance which they have to offer. Nothing, however, could be farther from the truth. The *Treatise on Human Nature* presents a special set of difficulties of interpretation which seem to be due largely to the fact that Hume's thought grew as he wrote, and its expression was not subjected to a sufficiently careful revision when the end had been reached. What has contributed to miscalculation of the difficulties of the subject and to many forms of misinterpretation is a false appearance of system in the treatment contained both in the Treatise and the Enquiry. There is indeed a well-conceived plan at the foundation of each of these works. But Hume's mind was too rich in material to be able to confine itself within the limits of the somewhat narrow programme which he drew up for himself. Things of the utmost importance are said by the way, sometimes in the form of mere passing suggestions, while discussing primarily another subject; and his entire thought on some of these matters can be found only by putting together a number of widely scattered statements. Finally, many misunderstandings have been caused by the fact that he has a habit of stating principles without giving formal recognition to their consequences; oftentimes, no doubt, because he failed to see them, and sometimes, apparently, in his later work because as a somewhat disillusioned philosopher desirous

of getting a popular hearing for ethical theories he was deliberately writing down to the "plain people".

The widespread failure to get from Hume all that he has to give is shown, among other ways, by criticisms which, in many cases, are based upon direct misinterpretation, and in others are due to the failure to penetrate to the real foundations of his system and discover its essential character. Any misunderstandings that tend to obscure Hume's position in the history of ethics are a very serious misfortune. Hume is the greatest representative of non-rationalistic theory in the classical period of British ethics. Those who are following him in this path to-day can learn more from him in the way of method, of concrete facts, and of principles than from any other writer of modern times. He has penetrated to the truths embodied in ethical rationalism more completely than any other of its critics, and is thus its most dangerous enemy,—an enemy who can be caricatured, as he commonly is by those representatives of this school who undertake to write about him, only at peril to their own cause. The following paper is an attempt to deal with a number of serious misinterpretations which have become current, and which are concealing the real Hume from the view of students of the moral life.

The Historical Sources of the System.

Hume got his fundamental point of view, many of his data, and his conception of what they involve from either Shaftesbury or Hutcheson. We must therefore begin our presentation with that map of the moral life which these two famous travellers unrolled before the inquiring eyes of our youthful explorer.

In the first place all three writers agree that the object of the moral judgment is not outer actions but inner purposes, whether by this is to be understood intentions, motives, or character. All left unanswered questions of very great importance concerning the exact point in the inner life at which the moral judgment is aimed. But the central fact that the moral judgment is a judgment passed on the human will, this was presented so clearly as to leave no room for misapprehension.[1]

[1] In Hume this view was somewhat obscured by his attempts to introduce the Greek conception of ἀρετή into modern ethics. I have not treated this part of Hume's ethical theory because it was not demanded by the main purpose of the paper. Hume's errors in this matter lie open to the most superficial view. But it is a curious fact that its elements of truth, some of them at once very interesting and very significant, have never been

According to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson the source of moral distinctions is to be found in a reaction to motives or purposes on the part of our emotional nature. Such a view, we are sometimes told, identifies our attitude towards character with our like or dislike for mustard. It involves, as a matter of fact, the presence of an element which is nowhere found in the pleasures of gustatory sensations as such, namely thought, and this thought it is which arouses the corresponding emotion. For Shaftesbury the thought is that of the existence of such a balance between the agent's "affections toward the public good" and his "affections toward private good" as best "agrees with the good of his kind or of that system in which he is included and of which he constitutes a part".[1] The emotion aroused by this spectacle is the emotion of the beautiful. The moral judgment is one form of the æsthetic.

For Hutcheson, despite some differences in phraseology, the thought in question has at bottom the same object. The chief difference in treatment is the explicit statement that the object of approbation is the desire for the greatest happiness attainable for those who are within the range of influence of the action, including the happiness of the agent himself. In the earlier works, which were the ones that seriously influenced Hume, the emotion aroused is apparently sometimes regarded as æsthetic, sometimes as *sui generis*. The charm of balance or harmony is not explicitly ascribed to moral perfection; and probably Hutcheson's real thought is that the moral emotion, while possessing very important affinities with the æsthetic, is in the last resort different in content.

In essentials Hume agrees with what is common to these descriptions. But with regard to that fundamental problem, the source of the moral judgment, he saw a fact which his two predecessors had either failed to observe or had dismissed from consideration as without significance, the fact namely that for a being possessed of "social affections" the discovery of felicific qualities in conduct or character must arouse direct satisfaction. Can this satisfaction play no part in the moral judgment? Shaftesbury and Hutcheson assert by implication that it does not. Hume on the contrary sees that it cannot be thrust aside or ignored. More than this, he believes he

systematically worked out by any of the large number of enthusiasts for Greek ethics, or, for that matter, by any one else.

[1] See in particular *Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit*, bk. ii., pt. i., secs. i. and iii. "Best" is my gloss. It is required by the whole logic of Shaftesbury's thought, but is nowhere introduced into the formula in just so many words.

can describe and explain through it not indeed all phenomena, but "the most considerable part" of the phenomena of the moral judgment.

"The Benevolent Principles of Our Frame."

The preceding account is based upon an out and out denial of a view which has long been popular among British writers on ethics, the view namely that Hume's ethical theory is based upon an all-devouring egoism. *Prima facie*, the case is against these expositors, as they themselves would probably be prepared to admit in their moments of less intense excitement. For nothing could be more obvious to even the most superficial reading than the fact that Hume places the source of the moral judgment and of the conduct which it approves in what he calls "the benevolent principles of our frame". The only question open to discussion is therefore precisely what he meant by the "benevolent principles" in question.[1]

The Treatise finds the stimuli which arouse these principles to action in the kindred emotions of love and esteem, and in sympathy. Love and esteem, in accordance with an original constitution of the mind, arouse a "calm desire" for the good of their object.[2] This desire is called benevolence, and in the Treatise the name is confined to the desire as thus aroused. Sympathy is the power of reflecting, as in a mirror, the feelings of others through the instrumentality of the imagination.[3] Sympathy arouses what is called pity, defined as "the desire of happiness to another and aversion to his misery".[4] In their nature and constitution there is no difference between the desire called benevolence and that called pity. The only difference is in the nature of the stimulus. The "benevolent principles of our frame" consist then in altruistic desires (to use the modern term) which may be aroused to activity, either by love or esteem, or by the picturing power of the imagination.

Most egoistic hedonists recognise the existence of sympathy. They could hardly overlook it, still less deny it. In denying,

[1] On this subject the reader should consult the very valuable study by Prof. McGilvary, entitled *Altruism in Hume's Treatise*, published in the *Philosophical Review*, vol. xii., p. 272. A summary of his conclusions will be found in Mind, N.S., vol. xiv., p. 336.

[2] *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. ii., sec. vi., last paragraph; G. (Green and Grose Edition), vol. ii., p. 154; S.-B. (Selby-Bigge Edition), p. 368; *ibid.*, bk. iii., pt. iii., sec. iv.; G., ii., 363 n.; S.-B., 608 n.

[3] Bk. ii., pt. i., sec. xi.; G., ii., 111; S.-B. 316.

[4] Bk. ii., pt. ii., sec. ix.; G., ii., 166; S.-B., 382.

however, the existence of a desire for another's good they have treated sympathy, whether in effect or explicitly, merely as so much personal discomfort of which the victim tries to rid himself in the most economical way possible. This point of view is expressed in Hobbes' well-known explanation to the "divine" as to why he gave sixpence to the beggar, and is reflected here and there in his books. According to the Leviathan, for instance, gift as distinguished from contract, is "when one of the parties transferreth [a right] . . . in hope . . . to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion".[1]

It will appear from the preceding account that this position is as far removed as possible from that of Hume. Love and sympathy operate by arousing the desire for the good, not of self, but of their object. Hobbes' explanation of unselfish action is therein rejected.

There is indeed a single passage in the Treatise in which Hume seems to have lapsed into this view. "Benevolence is an original pleasure arising from the pleasure of the person belov'd, and a pain proceeding from his pain: From which correspondence of impressions there arises a subsequent desire of his pleasure, and aversion to his pain."[2] There are also several passages which taken in their most obvious interpretation declare pleasure and pain (apparently meaning the pleasure and pain of the agent) to be the sole ends capable of arousing human desire. One of them reads as follows: "The passions [in which are included the desires] . . . are founded on pain and pleasure, and in order to produce an affection of any kind 'tis only requisite to present some good or evil" [*i.e.*, pleasure or pain].[3] But on the very next page we read the following: "Beside good and evil, or in other words pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections." Here is a denial not merely of egoism, but of psychological hedonism in any form. Two explanations for these anomalies present themselves. The first is that the passages which contradict the main drift of the system must be interpreted to mean something different from what on the surface they appear to maintain. Prof. McGilvary, in the

[1] Pt. i., ch. xiv.
[2] *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. ii., sec. ix.; G. ii., 170; S.-B. 387.
[3] Bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. ix.; G. ii., 214; S.-B. 438.

article referred to above, argues for this alternative. But in the second place they may be regarded merely as lapses. The latter explanation, which for most of the passages seems to me to be the better, is readily believable if we accept an hypothesis also suggested by the same author which will appeal to every careful student of Hume as extremely plausible. "A higher criticism of the Treatise might try to distinguish between egoistic passages which were written first and non-egoistic passages which were afterwards inserted without proper rewriting of older passages in the interest of complete consistency."[1] This hypothesis becomes the more probable when it is noted that the passages which seem to teach egoistic psychological hedonism are all confined to Books I. and II. Book III., it may be remembered, was published a year after the preceding ones. Hume accordingly had more time in which to give it a thorough revision. Whatever explanation of these real or apparent inconsistencies may be adopted the fact remains that the recognition of altruism as the motive force in extensive fields of human action is unequivocal, repeated, and fundamental, and therefore cannot be interpreted away by any trick of exegesis.

T. H. Green's method of doing what we have just declared unpermissible possesses at least the charm of simplicity. He points out that in Book I. of the Treatise, Hume has announced and attempted to carry through a psychological theory of atomic sensationalism. But such a theory is incompatible with a doctrine of altruism. Therefore, any passages in which this doctrine appears, and any conclusions that rest upon it are intrusions of alien matter. They are the real lapses, and as such may properly be removed as excrescences. Unfortunately, however, the argument proves too much; and he who proves too much proves nothing. "A consistent sensationalism," writes Green in one place, "would be speechless". With this opinion I heartily concur. In my judgment the philosophical world owes Green a great debt of gratitude for having, in the course of a critical investigation which is, unfortunately, often grossly unfair to its opponents and not infrequently descends to pitiful pettifogging, contributed very effectively to the demonstration of this fact. But what follows? Surely this, that Hume's fundamental inconsistency lay in writing his Treatise; indeed in thinking the first thought of which it is the record. For, as a matter of fact, a being possessing only impressions and ideas as Hume defines these terms is on the intellectual level of the barnyard fowl. When we have said this we have

[1] *Philosophical Review*, vol. xii., p. 277.

—like the man who prayed for the good of every creature—covered the entire field. Now observe the consequences for ethical theory. They are fatal not merely to the existence of altruism, but to that of egoism as well. There is no ego; there is no desire in any proper sense of the term, for desire implies the idea of an end to be obtained and this is impossible without conceptual thought. There is therefore no egoism properly so called. Green himself asserts this in denying Hume the right to use the concept "self-love". Sensationalism, therefore, does not lead to egoistic hedonism in ethics; it leads to nothing. This is certainly the night in which (to use a hackneyed phrase) all cows are black.

What then is the student of the history of ethics to do with Hume's speculations in psychology and epistemology? The answer is that he is to set them forth insofar as they are the presuppositions upon which Hume's theory of the moral judgment actually depends. Otherwise he is to treat them as irrelevant to the inquiry, precisely as irrelevant as they are to Hume's theory of the balance of trade or his opinion of Charles I. These presuppositions are few, simple, and quite unmistakable. They are a certain view of human motives, including their dynamics as well as their nature; a conception of sympathy and its relation to these motives; a belief in the existence of conceptual thought in the ordinary sense of that term, as it is implied, for instance, in an essay on economics, but with no particular theory of its structure or origin; finally *at one point* a conception of the self related to that stated in Book I. of the Treatise as is genus to species. With these materials as data Hume attempts to work out a theory of the moral judgment that is in harmony with all the observable facts of the moral life. Whether he is to succeed will therefore depend solely upon whether the data upon which the argument immediately rests are sound and adequate, and whether his manipulation of them leads to conclusions consonant with the moral experience.

We must agree then, as it seems to me, that the attempt to read a purely egoistic theory of motives into Hume's Treatise must be set down as a failure. There is however one important defect or limitation in his doctrine of altruism as presented in this work which must not be passed over in silence. It appears in the following well-known passage. "In general, it may be affirmed, that there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself."[1] Whether by love in this sentence is meant the

[1] Bk. iii., pt. ii., sec. i; G. ii., 255; S.-B. 481.

emotion of affection, or, as in the English translation of the New Testament, the desire to serve, is of no importance in interpreting the passage because its intent is clear from the conclusion which is drawn from it. "Public benevolence," or regard to the interests of mankind, cannot be the original motive to justice, because there is no such thing as "public benevolence." This statement appears to mean: there is no permanent desire for the good of another person for whom you do not feel some form of love or esteem. Sympathy works sporadically and, apparently, in the concrete, in the presence, that is, of a particular person or persons whose feelings at the time are above or below the zero line. When this particular situation is reflected in the imagination of the spectator it tends to arouse in him the desire to preserve or perpetuate the pleasure of the person sympathised with, or to remove his suffering. This is unsatisfactory as a complete description of altruism without love. It would not account, for example, for such action as that of the volunteers who faced the danger of serious illness and death, and, some of them, the certainty of a most loathsome and wearing experience, in order to enable Dr. Walter Reed and his colleagues to test their theories of the relation of mosquitoes to the spread of yellow fever.[1]

It is likewise a much narrower view than is demanded by the premises of the system. Hume recognises that the idea of our own good as such, apart from any love (of course) and apart from the play of imagination in bringing pictures of our own future before our minds, has a tendency to arouse the desire for its realisation.[2] The logic of this position and of his general doctrine of the self, and the concrete facts of life which he himself observed and noted, alike urged his mind toward a recognition of the fact that the same principle holds for the idea of the good of others. Cumberland (if Hume ever read Cumberland) might have taught him that egoism and altruism are merely two different directions of the same force, the desire for the good as such, so that what is true of the mechanism of one is true of the other also. More than once Hume appears to be close to this discovery, but he never quite reaches it.

Hume's doctrine of altruism in the Enquiry seems to be identical, in most of the fundamentals, with that of the

[1] H. A. Kelly, *Walter Reed and Yellow Fever*, ch. vi.

[2] "The mind, by an original instinct, tends to unite itself with the good, and to avoid the evil, tho' they be conceiv'd merely in idea, and be consider'd as to exist in any future period of time." Bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. ix., G. ii., 214; S.-B. 438.

Treatise. Like its predecessor it omits that careful analysis of the nature and objects of desire which the student of ethics might wish to have. Wherever it exhibits any difference in treatment, however, it will be found to present the doctrine of the "benevolent principles" more clearly, more fully, and more consistently than does the Treatise. A lengthy argument seeks to prove that altruism is irreducible to egoism. Butler's conception of the psychology of benevolence is explicitly maintained.[1] And in one of the essays the fundamental fallacy of most egoistic theories is exhibited in Butler's manner.[2] Passing statements in considerable number place it beyond doubt that sympathy is regarded as affecting action through desire. These differences are all improvements. But the greatest and most important change in the treatment of the subject is the complete omission of the statement that there is no such thing as "a love of mankind as such". At one place,[3] indeed, there appears to be a repetition of the doctrine that love and sympathy are the sole stimuli of altruism. On the other hand, language is habitually used throughout the essay which is without justification, and, in fact, without meaning except on the supposition that there is such a thing as the desire for the good of our fellowmen, individually and collectively, quite apart from the stimulation exercised by affection and esteem and the sympathetic play of the imagination.

In the light of the preceding exposition we may examine Sidgwick's argument in behalf of the egoistic interpretation of Hume's ethics. It is stated in the following words: "At any rate he recognises—in his later treatise at least—no 'obligation' to virtue except that of the agent's interest or happiness".[4] This is a reference to the problem of section ix., part ii., formulated as "our interested obligation to [virtue]". In a paper in MIND,[5] I have tried to show that obligation meant for Shaftesbury—as it demonstrably did for Cumberland—merely the sum of the motives arising from a view of the personal rewards and punishments which the agent may expect will come to him as the result of his actions. With Hutcheson another step was taken in the evolution of the term. According to him it may mean either (1) "a determination, without regard to our own interest, to approve actions and to perform them"; or (2) "a motive

[1] Appendix ii.; G. (Green and Grose Edition of the Essays), vol. ii., p. 271; S.-B. (Selby-Bigge, Hume's *Enquiries*, second edition), p. 301.
[2] Essay xi., *On the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature*, G. i., 155.
[3] Appendix ii. G. ii., 268 n.; S.-B. 298 n.
[4] *History of Ethics*, p. 206. [5] N.S., vol. xxi., no. 83, p. 395.

from self-interest, sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue their own advantage wisely, to a certain course of action".[1] With Price begins the custom of using the term solely in the first of these two significations.[2] Hume's reference to *interested* obligation shows unmistakably that he is using it in the second. Be it farther remembered that there is not a single trace to be found anywhere in Hume's writings of the position taken by those redoubtable defenders of the faith, Clarke and Butler (and Sidgwick), expressed in the famous words of Butler: "When we sit down in a cool hour we can neither justify to ourselves this [the pursuit of virtue] or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or, at least, not contrary to it".

Our presentation of this part of our subject would be incomplete at an important point if we omitted Hume's account of what we may call the dynamics of egoism and altruism. He finds the foundation of these phenomena in desires which are ultimate elements in human nature, the desire for our own good as such, the desire for the good of another or others. The latter, while it varies greatly in strength, exists in some degree in every human being, or, at least, in everyone who has not lost it by a long course of crime.

Given a person's native endowment, whatever it may be, either desire may be strengthened by certain agencies. One of these, as we have seen, is such emotions as love and esteem. Another stimulus of the greatest importance is the concreteness and fulness of the picture of the situation in the mind. This is determined partly by the native power of the person's imagination. It is farther determined by one's experience. "The prospect of any pleasure, with which we are acquainted, affects us more than any other pleasure, which we may own superior, but of whose nature we are *wholly* ignorant. Of the one we can form a particular and determinate idea: the other we conceive under the general notion of pleasure." Similarly, "Any satisfaction, which we lately enjoyed, and of which the memory is fresh and recent, operates on the will with more violence than another of which the traces are decayed and almost obliterated".[3] Hume is here thinking

[1] *Inquiry Concerning the Original of our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good.* Fourth Edition, p. 267 f.

[2] *Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals.* Second Edition, pp. 173, 198 ff.

[3] See *Dissertation on the Passions*, sec. vi., par. 9; G. ii., 165. Compare *Enquiry*, sec. v., pt. ii.; G. ii., 216; S.-B. 230.

particularly of stimuli of egoism. But he applies the same principle to altruism in the words: "We enter more readily into sentiments [he is speaking of the sentiments of others] which resemble those we feel every day".[1] It is these facts, as Hume points out in one place or another, that account for the effects upon the will of distance in time and space, of closeness of association in social and business intercourse, of eloquence, of vividness of style in any of its forms, and other similar phenomena.

But this is not the whole story. There is another important factor, namely, habit. We react most easily to those ideas which most frequently stimulate us to action. This is regarded as partly a matter of association,—repetition, within certain limits, increases the "facility" of the associated processes which supply the will with its aims. In addition, the tendency to react to the idea of the situation is itself strengthened by repetition and atrophied through disuse.[2]

These facts placed in Hume's hands the key to many phenomena of human life. They explain others which his mind grazed without hitting. First in importance among the latter is the fact already referred to. Altruism and egoism are not two distinct desires like the desire for fame and for knowledge, but rather parallel manifestations of the same motive force, the desire for good as such. The psychological mechanism above described further explains—in large part at least—why the egoistic desires are likely to be stronger than the altruistic, why we are commonly more interested in the welfare of our family and our intimate friends than in that of our acquaintances, and in the good of the latter rather than that of total strangers. Finally, they answer the question put by Prof. James in the words: "What self is loved in self-love?"[3] The negative answer is: Egoism is not a desire for the good of a pure ego as such, whether a permanent self out of time, a metaphysical soul substance, or anything of the sort. Positively, egoism is a name for a great complex of ideas, varying enormously in range and concreteness, which arouse an extensive group of impulses to action of every conceivable degree of intensity and readiness of response. The idea of the good of self as a whole—that all-embracing end of which the egoistic hedonists and the school

[1] *Enquiry*, sec. v., pt. ii.; G. ii., 210; S.-B. 222.

[2] *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. v.; G. ii., 201; S.-B. 422. (Compare bk. iii., pt. ii., sec. x., fourth par.; G. ii., 319; S.-B. 556; bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. iv.; G. ii., 198; S.-B. 419.)

[3] *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i., p. 317.

of Green talk so much—is on this view a product of a very considerable process of mental evolution, and as a really living force is a comparatively rare phenomenon. The bearing of these conclusions upon the often repeated question: What reason is there for sacrificing the interests of self to those of others, is not remote. We shall consider it immediately.

With Hume's account of the altruistic elements of human nature before us the insistence on the part of many British writers (I do not find it to the same extent among the continental historians of ethics) that Hume was at bottom an egoistic psychological hedonist seems difficult to explain. The most considerable single reason for the prevalence of this interpretation will be found, I think, not in anything Hume has said but rather in the general position taken by most of the British moralists of the last half century. Their theory of human conduct has been at bottom so completely egoistic that the possibility of any other kind of a view has never really penetrated their minds. It is of course a highly refined egoism. The object of the desire which lies at the foundation of the moral life is not pleasure but character or else all-round development of personality. But the *ultima ratio* of self-sacrifice is found in self-gain. This view motivates the question asked in one form or another, again and again: What reason is there for following the altruistic desire? To this the proper reply is: What reason is there for not doing so? The answer expected to this question in its turn is a reference to some egoistic interest, whether it be pleasure, or power, or the possession of a beautiful character, or what not. The assumption that my conduct must be irrational—whatever that may turn out to mean—unless there is something in it for me carries with it the corollary that Hume, as a man of sense, must have had some good of his own up his sleeve all the time; and since, according to him, ultimate good was unquestionably describable in terms of pleasure, he must have been some sort of an egoistic hedonist.

But now there is another way to look at this matter. It is stated by Sidgwick as follows: "Grant that the ego is merely a system of coherent phenomena, . . . as Hume and his followers maintain; why, then, should one part of the series of feelings into which the ego is resolved be concerned with another part of the same series, any more than with any other series?"[1]

The implied answer represents a conclusion which Hume was not merely entitled to draw from his general view of the

[1] *The Methods of Ethics*, bk. iv., ch. ii.; seventh edition, p. 419.

self, it is a conclusion which follows directly and inevitably from one of his favourite and best known doctrines. For his famous statement, "Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chooses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it,"[1] while it contains several implications, contains among others this: if value is determined by desire we come finally in our search for a reason in conduct to an ultimate fact, the fact of the fundamental constitution of our desires. To certain profound minds, long fed on a diet of German metaphysics, this may perhaps sound very shallow. Nevertheless it makes it impossible to assert that Hume *must* have taken the road towards egoistic hedonism because, with his start, no other was open.

The Source of the Moral Judgment.

The preceding discussion prepares the way for an understanding of Hume's theory of the moral judgment. This has already, by implication, been sketched in outline. The source of the moral judgment, according to this view, may be described provisionally[2] as satisfaction or "delight" in another's good, and dissatisfaction or "uneasiness" in his evil. The simplest and in all respects most satisfactory way for Hume to have conceived the facts would have been to regard the satisfaction and dissatisfaction in question as feelings arising from the attainment or frustration respectively of the desire for the good of those affected. What he actually does in the Treatise without exception and in the Enquiry probably in most cases is to place their source in sympathy. This for Hume is the power of feeling the reflexion of other person's feelings. Properly speaking it gives us not merely the one set of emotions, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, joy and sorrow, but opens the door to the whole gamut of feelings with which our experience has made us acquainted. In other words to sympathise with the fear of another is properly speaking to fear, to sympathise with his anger is to be angry; with his love, to love; with his pride, to feel proud; with his hunger, to hunger; with his aches, to ache. Hume actually does define sympathy in this way in some places. But in his account of the moral judgment he ignores these forms of sympathy and confines himself to "delight" and "uneasiness"

[1] *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. iii.; G. ii., 195; S.-B. 416.

[2] This statement will be somewhat modified in the second instalment of this paper.

at the good or ill of others. To have done otherwise would have been to wander off into the byways in which Adam Smith was later to lose himself, byways which Hume, with his deeper insight, knew enough to avoid. The facts of the moral judgment, then, when properly examined, compel this limitation to joy and sorrow. But these same facts spoil the attempt to base the phenomena of moral approbation on sympathy, whether alone or principally. For I may sorrow or rejoice at the ill or good fortune of another though he is experiencing no similar feelings which my imagination can mirror. I may, for example, feel sorrow because of his physical suffering although he himself feels no sorrow but only a throbbing pain. And I may rejoice at that which is likely to be of advantage to an unborn child, or at the removal of a threatening evil of whose possibility the beneficiary does not even dream. As a matter of fact the emotions laid by Hume at the basis of the moral judgment have their ultimate source in desires for good, and sympathy can do no more than under certain circumstances to intensify them.

While this is in form a criticism levelled at a vital part of Hume's theory of the moral judgment, nevertheless the mistake, for such it appears to have been, was not a fatal mistake. For on any theory sympathy and benevolence are very intimately related. The former is the spur of the latter. Therefore, where the first is, the second will be present in some degree, as Hume's own theory of sympathy recognises. One of the facts which makes the distinction of chief importance is that benevolence may arise without sympathy, just as it may arise without love or any other stimulant whatever. This was apparently recognised in the Enquiry, though whether the proper conclusions for the theory of the moral judgment were drawn in this essay seems impossible to determine with certainty. In any event the satisfaction and dissatisfaction which Hume saw at the foundation of the moral judgment are intimately related in their origin with both sympathy and benevolence; and any mistake in the conception of the relationship of the judgment to the former or latter will not carry with it really serious consequences for other parts of the system.

The Meaning of Right.

To this view of the source of moral distinctions there is an obvious objection. It is stated by Hume as follows: "As this sympathy is very variable, it may be thought, that our sentiments of morals must admit of all the same variations.

We sympathise more with persons contiguous to us than with persons remote from us: with our acquaintance than with strangers: with our countrymen, than with foreigners. But notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, we give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England. They appear equally virtuous, and recommend themselves equally to the esteem of a judicious spectator. The sympathy varies without a variation in our esteem. Our esteem, therefore, proceeds not from sympathy."[1]

The reply takes the form of a farther definition or limitation of the meaning of right. The predicate *right* does not cover everything that happens to appeal to the passing sympathy of the moment; nor does it fail to include forms of good that may happen to leave our feelings cold. The play of sympathy (and we may add, of altruism) is affected, as Hume has shown in various places, by our relationships to the persons concerned, our distance from them in time and space, the nature and limitations of our own past experience, the efficiency of the working of the imagination, familiarity, and the preoccupations or humours of the hour. When we call an action right we suppose ourselves to have abstracted from these conditions, that is to say from all the accidental relationships of the action in question to self, whatever their nature. The moral judgment is the judgment of the impartial spectator.

The impartial spectator looks at the situation *as a whole*, for to ignore any part would be equivalent to an arbitrary turning of the back upon one set of interests or one side of the case.[2] He regards equal interests as of equal value whether they are past or future, near or distant, whether those of his enemy, his child, or himself.[3] In other words the moral judgment claims to represent a judgment based upon equal concern for equal interests; a concern for *bona* proportionate to their "real and intrinsic value".[4]

In the section of the Treatise above quoted (bk. iii., pt. iii., sec. i.) the moral judgment (as just defined) and the vocabulary to which it gives rise is represented as a device whereby we find a common means of communication with others; just as we more or less arbitrarily fix upon one visual size or shape as the "real" one, and thereafter use this as a standard of reference. This point of view reappears in the

[1] *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. iii., sec. i.; G. ii., 340; S.-B. 580.
[2] *Enquiry*, Appendix i., under ii.; G. ii., 262; S.-B. 290.
[3] *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. ii., sec. ii.; G. ii., 261-2; S.-B. 488-9; bk. iii. pt. iii., sec. i.; G. ii., 341-2; S.-B. 582-3.
[4] *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. ii., sec. vii.; G. ii., 300; S.-B. 534.

Enquiry.[1] But the Enquiry also presents a far more adequate conception. "The distinction between these species of sentiments ['humanity' and egoism] being so great and evident, language must soon be moulded upon it, and must invent a peculiar set of terms, in order to express those universal sentiments of censure or approbation, which arise from humanity, or from views of general usefulness and its contrary."[2] In other words there being in fact two attitudes toward human conduct, the personal and the impersonal, the latter as well as the former will create forms for expressing itself in language.

From this account of the meaning of right, certain conclusions of the first importance follow directly and inevitably. As Hume points out again and again, impartiality is often a difficult position to attain. Affection creates preferences, and the imagination tends like a searchlight to light up one side of a situation and leave the rest of the field in just so much deeper darkness. Now, when we call conduct right we believe we have emancipated ourselves from the effects of this play of chance forces, and that we have reached real impartiality. As a matter of fact we may have failed to do so. It follows that in such a case the judgment which gives itself out as a moral judgment is not really what it claims or supposes itself to be. It is what in everyday life we call an incorrect moral judgment. Or since claims which cannot be substantiated are called invalid, we may pronounce such a judgment as invalid.[3] The distinction accordingly between the valid and the invalid moral judgment is inseparably bound up with the fundamental features of Hume's ethical system.

It is true that this position appears to have been denied categorically in one or two striking passages. They have often been quoted by his rationalistic critics who are trying to brand him as a subjectivist. "The distinction of moral good and evil," he writes, "is founded on the pleasure or pain, which results from the view of any sentiment, or character; and, as that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows, that there is just so much vice or virtue in any character, as everyone places in it, and that 'tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken."[4]

[1] Sec. v., pt. ii.; G. ii., 214 f; S.-B. 227 f.

[2] Sec. ix., pt. i.; G. 248 ff.; S.-B. 271 ff; *Cf. Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. i., sec. ii.; G. ii., 248; S.-B. 472.

[3] *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. ii., sec. ii.; G. ii., 262; S.-B. 489.

[4] *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. ii., sec. viii.; G. ii., 311; S.-B. 546-547. *Cf.* pt. i., sec. ii.; G. ii., 247; S.-B. 471.

An examination of the context in which this statement appears will show that Hume did not intend it to represent his last word on the subject. What is far more important, however, it contradicts not merely a stray counter-statement or two, but the very foundations of the entire system. At the worst, then, Hume has been guilty in these passages of an inadvertence, for the joy and comfort of his enemies. It may be remarked, furthermore, that no similar passages can be found in the length and breadth of the Enquiry, a work which by its author's explicit and repeated declaration stands as the sole authoritative presentation of his position wherever there is any difference between his earlier and later formulations.

(To be continued.)

IV.—DISCUSSION.

PLATO'S 'MISCONCEPTION' OF MORALITY.

MIND No. 112 contains an article by Mr. Leon, in which is disclosed a defect in Plato's *Republic*, which has hitherto escaped the detection alike of his critics and of his admirers. The discovery is not only novel, but also leads to the somewhat startling and paradoxical conclusion that Plato was really a Nietzschian. To some of his readers Mr. Leon's argument has probably appeared to be based on insufficient grounds. Indeed the discovery of Plato's misconception of morality seems to issue from Mr. Leon's misconception of Plato. His views, at any rate, can hardly be accepted until they have been subjected to critical examination.

It will be in the interests of clearness to preface such examination with a brief résumé of Mr. Leon's main contentions. There is, he says, throughout the ethical part of the *Republic*, present, latently and implicitly at least, a fundamental misconception of the nature of morality: though by a sort of double language the 'more common sense and correct view' runs alongside of it. This misconception is said to consist of the 'heathen view of morality' as presented in the self-realisation moralists. This view of morality is assumed without further ado to be 'entirely false'. 'A man may have all his faculties developed and yet be a thorough blackguard.' Mr. Leon then refuses to speak of a moral faculty, because 'morality or character pervades the whole man and all his pursuits'. This is a manner of speaking which is hardly distinguishable from the self-realisation view: and what makes it stranger still is that the next moment he is taking Plato to task for having failed to distinguish the practical reason, *φρόνησις*, in other words the moral faculty, from the theoretic intellect, *σοφία*. In describing Plato's tripartite analysis of the soul, he says that *τὸ λογιστικόν* is (*a*) that *ᾧ μανθάνει ἄνθρωπος* and (*b*) the 'moral conscience'. Each of these three elements performs a double function, being present to a certain extent in every human being, while as each predominates it forms a special type of character. In this second function Mr. Leon, who, it will be noticed, persists in making *τὸ λογιστικόν* mean *either* (*a*) *or* (*b*), urges that *τὸ λογιστικόν* means conscienceless intellect: for, he says, moral reason cannot be the source of special interests. It is on this ground that Plato is accused of holding the 'heathen' view of morality. In the definition of justice, as the state in which each part of the soul *τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττει, τὸ λογιστικόν*, it is urged,

cannot mean the practical reason which 'can never be deposed'. 'It is plain' that Plato 'is thinking of the parts of the soul as the sources of different tastes and interests.' 'Plato must be interpreted as telling us that morality consists in a harmony' between the various interests, those of theoretic intellect being given pre-eminence. This view of morality, he says, becomes even more prominent in Bks. viii. and ix., where '. . . his tendency is to look upon deterioration of character as a gradual declension from philosophic occupation to sensual licentiousness'. Again, the discussion of pleasure in Bk. ix. is said to show (1) that the moral life is identified with that of the scholar, though (2) the sense of τὸ λογιστικόν as φρόνησις reappears when we are told that other pleasures are best when pursued under the guidance of τὸ λογιστικόν, and (3) that the bad life is the sensual life. Against Plato's supposed view it is urged (1) that 'the difference between the just and the unjust life cannot consist in the difference of non-moral values,' and (2) that as causes of wickedness the desires of all the elements of the soul are on the same level. 'All this,' he concludes, 'is due to Plato's failure to make the distinction which Aristotle made between φρόνησις and σοφία. Hence it is that for Plato, apparently, the moral question is: "Shall I be intellectual, ambitious, or a miser?"'

It is certainly a paradox to accuse Plato, the founder of the Utopian state, the first intellectual advocate of communism, whose aim was to form the happy state 'not by selecting a few of its members and making them happy, but by making the whole so,' of anticipating Nietzsche, whose dominating superman was to crush the herd beneath his feet, and live for himself alone with a total disregard for social duty. Plato is a philosopher whose work glistens with so many facets that especial care is needed if any selection of statements is to be made and put forward as the central doctrine. Mr. Leon is himself alive to the danger of misrepresentation: 'It is,' he says, 'fair to say that it would be a misrepresentation of the *Republic* if we did not remember that this error (*i.e.* Plato's alleged conception of morals as self-development) was only one side of the whole contention of the *Republic*'. What Mr. Leon does not consider is that a conception which might by itself be erroneous, a view of morality which in isolation might be inadequate, is justified and transformed by being used as subservient to a greater conception. Plato considered a full self-development to be a necessary and essential feature in the attainment of morality in its highest sense: he was convinced that in order to reach the highest perfection of moral goodness, in the Christian sense, it was necessary to combine it with what Mr. Leon is pleased to call 'the Oxford use of the term'. To construe Plato as holding up self-realisation as an end in itself and the sum total of morality is a misrepresentation of the whole, and not only of one side, of the *Republic*.

Mr. Leon's article starts with two very considerable assumptions.

In the first place (1) he begs the question that the morality of the well-meaning fool is higher than the morality of self-realisation, although he later makes the inconsequent admission that 'there is much to be said for the view that an all-round development of the faculties is essential for the perfect man'. There is: and until such a development has been shown to be unessential, Mr. Leon should not have assumed (2) that the conception of morality as self-development and his own conception (whatever that may be—it is nowhere made explicit) are mutually exclusive alternatives. That they are thus exclusive is never stated in so many words: but the whole argument rests upon the assumption. The claim of self-realisation to be the sum total of Ethics being rebutted, it is assumed that self-development is ethically irrelevant, and any attempt to treat it as relevant is regarded as an attempt to reinstate it as the sole aim and object of morality. Such an assumption as this leads to a complete misunderstanding of the Platonic conception of ἀρετή and τὸ ἀγαθόν, a conception which did not only not regard self-realisation and the performance of social function (or, in modern phraseology, 'duty') as mutually repugnant, but even as inseparable. All-round efficiency and harmony of character, together with what we now call moral goodness, were as yet undifferentiated parts of 'excellence'. The excellence of the individual as an individual was not considered separable from his excellence as a member of society. That a man might be good but inefficient or again efficient but evil were possibilities as yet included in the general antithesis of good and bad. To-day we have distinguished the antithesis of good and inefficient from the antithesis of good and evil, and have thereby rendered the word 'good' ambiguous. But the word was formerly all-embracing rather than ambiguous, and to call it ambiguous is an anachronism; for you cannot have an ambiguity without the possibility of various meanings. In Plato's day the various meanings of 'good' had not been distinguished: so that in using the word 'good' he could not have had in his mind any alternative meanings, and so was not ambiguous. When Plato uses the word ἀρετή he does not mean *either* 'moral' virtue *or* fullness of self-development or again sometimes one and sometimes the other: he means undifferentiated excellence of which every particular kind of excellence is an inseparable part. Is there not much to be said for such a wide conception of human goodness? Should not the ideal of morals be a perfect human being in a perfect society? Could it be said that to such perfection any form of excellence is irrelevant? A man who has 'all his faculties developed and yet is a thorough blackguard' may be a dangerous criminal: yet the social consequences of his actions may be less disastrous than of those of the well-meaning fool who ruins everything by his ineptitude. The qualities of intellect are not irrelevant to any tenable view of morality; and we should only be justified in quarrelling with Plato if he had made pure intellect the *summum bonum* regardless of the attitude of his sage towards his social duty.

Mr. Leon's treatment of τὸ λογιστικόν is very near akin to his treatment of ἀρετή. Just as he takes ἀρετή to mean *either* completeness of self-development *or* 'moral' goodness so he takes τὸ λογιστικόν, wherever it appears, as meaning *either* theoretic intellect *or* practical reason. Actually, however, τὸ λογιστικόν is the ground of *both* σοφία *and* φρόνησις. Had the distinction between theoretic and practical wisdom been recognised by Plato, he would not have maintained his contention that the best ruler must be a true philosopher. Actually Plato considered that true philosophy involved both the highest possible development of the theoretic intellect and the greatest possible quickening of the moral nature. The philosophic nature implies not only intellectual power but an ardent *love* of truth, together with such qualities as temperance, sincerity, absence of covetousness and meanness, courage, modesty, sociability and gentleness (485 b, *seq.*). It may of course be objected that philosophy does not have the moral effect which Plato was trying to vindicate for it, and that it does not lead the soul to a passionate love of true moral values. No one was more alive to this defect of current philosophy than Plato himself, who delivers a pungent attack on popular philosophers, not on the ground that they were stupid, as he would have done had he held the views attributed to him, but because they were, morally speaking, a corrupting influence. Plato's conception of true philosophy is intensely ethical. The supreme object of philosophic contemplation is the Idea of Good or concept of end, the supreme principle on which all values whether moral or 'non-moral,' depend, and which showed the entire rationality of the system of Ethics which Plato regarded as ideal. Plato and Aristotle alike interpreted the universe teleologically, and held that the most hopeful solution for the problem of Ethics lay in a search for the true end. To see this true end is the aim of the dialectical education of the guardians. Wisdom is not an end in itself. Knowledge is only good when and because it is of the good. With these views, how could Plato subdivide the highest principle in the soul, or admit the separability of σοφία and φρόνησις? The surprising thing is that Mr. Leon should demand it after his entirely justifiable protests that 'it does not seem right to speak of a moral faculty as something co-ordinate and competing with the rest and like them capable of being the source of special interests. Morality or character pervades the whole man and all his pursuits, and transfuses and gives them value.' This is just what Plato urges when he speaks of spirit and desire showing their truest usefulness and winning their truest pleasure when they follow the guidance of reason (586 b).

Again, in analysing the definition of justice, Mr. Leon makes the same error of insisting that τὸ λογιστικόν must be *either* practical reason *or* theoretic intellect. He argues (1) that the definition of δικαιοσύνη cannot mean the supremacy of practical reason, because practical reason 'regulates' the conduct of every man good and bad, and can never be 'deposed'. The sense of 'regulates,' how-

ever, is not the same as that in which Plato used 'rule'. In Plato's sense reason is deposed whenever the τέλος aimed at is the τέλος of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν—bodily indulgence. The practical reason of course still regulates conduct, but does so as the slave of passion. For Greek thought, good morality means aiming at the right end, and this is why τὸ λογιστικόν, which has a vision of and a love for the true good, must rule in the moral man: τὸ λογιστικόν is the governor of the soul because it has the true standard of value. This argument then rests on an ambiguity in the use of the word 'regulate'. But even had it been sound, it does not follow (2) that δικαιοσύνη means the supremacy of theoretic intellect alone. τὸ λογιστικόν never means this: it means reason, which sees what is noble and just and good, and which must for this reason be the guiding element in the good man. The argument is summed up by saying that, according to Plato, 'morality consists in a harmony or balance between sensuous enjoyment, the pleasures of ambition and an active life, and those of study or theorising'. It is not observed that this is a description, not of Plato's ideal, but of the 'democratic man,' who is placed lowest but one in the scale, and who says that all his desires are equally to be honoured, and consequently figures now as the *bon vivant*, now as the athlete, or again is at one time an idle trifler, at another a serious student (561 c). This kind of balance is not what Plato meant. The only true harmony for him is when reason sees the true τέλος, and all the elements of the soul find their truest pleasure in seeking it in conformity with the true aim.

The discussion on pleasure is next summarised, and the conclusion drawn that Plato identifies the moral life with that of the scholar, and the immoral with that of sensuous enjoyment. To this Mr. Leon rejoins (*a*) that the content of the unjust life may be highly intellectual pursuits, and (*b*) that as causes of wickedness the desires of all the elements of the soul are on the same level. But (*a*) Plato would not have denied that the intellectual may be a blackguard. Indeed, there is nothing he fears more than the corruption of the naturally gifted (494 b), or the ruin of the state through the pursuit of philosophy in the wrong spirit (497 e). The philosophy student is to be carefully selected, for dialectic may be a cause of lawlessness, if the irresponsible young are allowed to use it as a plaything, before their moral characters are firmly established (536 c-539 b). If Plato's end had been intellectual development for its own sake, these scruples would not have been present. Only a firm conviction that philosophy was necessary in order to enable the rulers to see the true τέλος and the eternal meaning of the moral code they were to enforce, could have induced Plato to allow so dangerous an implement into his state. Other pursuits of intellectual appeal, such as drama and certain kinds of music, are ruthlessly banned, and all the intellectual studies are chosen with a view to turning the eye of the soul to the true good. As to the second argument (*b*) that as causes of wicked-

ness the desires of all the elements of the soul are on the same level, this would hold if the desire of τὸ λογιστικόν were for mere intellectual development: but it is not: it is for truth and beauty and goodness, and for all that is akin to it in the world: it is in fact the nearest analogue in Greek philosophy to the Christian love of God and Humanity; and this can never be a cause of wickedness.

It is then a travesty of the *Republic* to say that 'for Plato the moral question is: "Shall I be intellectual, ambitious, or a miser?"' Mr. Leon reaches the conclusion he draws because he does not realise (1) that ἀρετή does not mean *either* perfect self-development *or* 'moral' virtue, but *both*, and that these were not conceived by Plato as irreconcilable ideals, but as mutually dependent aspects of human perfection: or (2) that τὸ λογιστικόν does not mean *either* theoretic intellect *or* practical reason but *both*: and that these were to Plato inseparable when developed aright. For Plato saw that the highest morality is not blind blundering obedience to the dictates of the herd, but conscious striving for a clearly seen vision of divine perfection. Mr. Leon lastly does not see (3) that Plato did not consider that indulgence in theorising was the *summum bonum*. This was the Aristotelian ideal. For Plato philosophy was a necessary means for producing the best rulers for the best state, and subserved the ends of the community. Plato was aiming at the ideal state and not at the superman, and the resemblance between him and Nietzsche is merely superficial.

E. HALE.

V.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology with some attempt to apply them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character. By WILLIAM MCDOUGALL, F.R.S., late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; Fellow of Corpus Christi College and Wilde Reader of Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1920. Pp. xvi, 300. 21s. net.

1. IT is a pleasure in these days to meet with a work, which, like the present, affirms unreservedly at once the reality of the group mind and its value. In the Preface and the Introduction the author expresses his position through quotations from Mr. F. H. Bradley's Essay on "My Station and its Duties," and also from Mr. Ernest Barker where he very closely follows Mr. Bradley, and further where he adopts the account of the group-person[1] as received by Maitland and other jurists. The Preface, too, refers with approval to Miss Follett's *The New State*. Moreover, in a discussion with Mr. Maciver, where he skilfully turns against him that writer's own presentation of the case, he insists on the actuality of the group mind as of the stuff of mind and "surpassing the measure of any individual mind". And he defends its collective reality more especially against objections drawn from the plurality and intersection of groups within it (*cf.* pp. 11, 14, 80, 180), pointing out how the individual minds reciprocally imply and complement one another, "and together make up the system which consists wholly of them". To complete the initial view of his position, we may mention in anticipation the all-important conclusion arrived at after a discussion of the crowd theory and the more elementary types of group, that in the highly organised group—an army is the primary example considered—the whole is raised above the level of its average member (p. 53)—a fact which Green has noted as tending to appear in the civic community.

2. It will help to discriminate Mr. McDougall's view more precisely, and to lead up to its further features, if some mention is made, at this point, of his declaration of war on the present writer. After reading the citations and discussions above referred to, one is apt to wonder what it is in my particular presentation of

[1] Of course Mr. Barker is here partly emphasising the point that the group, as real in itself, is not State-created.

"German 'Idealism'" which especially meets with his censure. It is not the acceptance of the group mind as a real system which is greater than its members who exist at any time, and which thinks and wills and feels and acts. This, in discussion with Mr. Maciver, the author unreservedly accepts and defends. But I think I see what he does object to more particularly in my statement as contrasted, *e.g.*, with Green and Bradley, though in my opinion there is no appreciable opposition. I am glad, of course, that he is able to go with them and with me so far as he does. But his language suggests that he finds in my ideas (*a*) too much collective consciousness, and (*b*) too little consciousness of collectivity; with, as a corollary from the former; (*c*) too lofty a notion of the rights and authority of the State.

To the first of these (*a*) I do not plead guilty. The collective or super-individual consciousness, in any sense other than that which the author defends against Maciver, I do not accept. So far as I know, it is a mare's nest; I do not know of any philosopher who believes in telepathic or magical unity in normal groups, but I am not acquainted with the views of Schäffle and Espenàs (p. 36). There is, I think, nothing resembling it in Hegel; (*b*) is the important point, referring to the sense in which the idea of self with the self-regarding sentiment is a *sine qua non* of volition in individuals and in groups. I think more of the substantial system of interests and dispositions; the author thinks rather of the explicit reflective self-consciousness. I must return to this below; (*c*), the question of rights, I must also recur to later.

3. Thus for the author "it is the extension of the self-regarding sentiment of each member of the group to the group as a whole, that binds the group together and renders it a collective individual capable of collective volition" (p. 56). This is the introductory condition to the study of highly organised groups, after the character of simple crowds has been analysed. It is noticeable that though not organised, nor continuous in existence or tradition, a crowd needs to be constituted by a common interest. A number of people in the street, moving about on their normal affairs, is not a psychological crowd. Yet a psychological crowd, though it has a certain degree of unity, has not a collective mind. For, though a collective mind does not involve a collective consciousness, it does involve an organised system of relations which accounts for the interplay of its mental forces; and a mere crowd has no such system (p. 47). But passing through the preliminary stage of highly organised groups, illustrated by the example of an army, in which we approach a group whose collective volition is at a higher moral level than that of its members taken apart, we come to consider, in Part II. of the book, "the most interesting, most complex and most important kind of group-mind, namely the mind of a nation state" (p. 96).

What is a nation? The answer of Prof. Ramsay Muir, that the essential condition is a belief (compare the "splendid falsehood"

of the Republic) on the nation's part that it is one, and his view that the essence of nationality is a sentiment, does not satisfy Mr. McDougall, for whom the answer to the riddle is as we have seen in the conception of the group mind. It would be hypercritical perhaps to object to his inserting (p. 100) the phrase "national mind and character" in the definition of a nation, as he proposes to examine these terms at length, and he has in fact told us, in the words cited at the beginning of this paragraph, what they are going to mean. "The group mind of a nation is an organised system of mental or psychical forces" he repeats on page 101. "A system of forces" I take it, very much because the influence of the past bulks so largely in it; the national character is not the national type, like a Galton photograph (Fouillée quoted, p. 107), but "that particular combination of mental forces of which the national life is the external manifestation". I find this a little in need of explanation. The traditions, I suppose, can only operate through the living minds. The definition must mean, the individual minds in full energy and co-operation, armed with all their resources. We need not enter upon the elaborate and interesting discussion, in the four following chapters (vii.-x.) of the basal conditions necessary to a national mind—a certain racial homogeneity though not "purity"; good means of communication; the influence of great men, war and national responsibility; but we may now return to the direct problem, what it is that makes a collective will. And here I must for a moment recur to the difference between Mr. McDougall and myself.

4. He finds in my interpretation of Rousseau's general will (155, *cf.* above 53—he refers to nothing of Rousseau but the same two sentences twice over) the *laissez faire* doctrine—pursue your private ends honestly, and the welfare of the State somehow results. I will go at once to the best explanation I can give of this notion of his, which seems to me wholly without foundation either in Rousseau's views or mine, and really not to justify me in occupying the reader with a detailed refutation of it by chapter and verse.[1]

It is true however that I attribute, as I said above, in a way, less consciousness of collectivity than he does to the group mind as a collective will. The problem which fascinates and will always fascinate me is such as this. Law is sustained by will. If will fails, law withers. By what analysis, by what tracing of social and ethical roots, can we justify such a statement? The nation wants houses to be built, Poland to be reasonably supported, but not rashly and to the destruction of East Europe. I need not go on with examples. How, where, in what responses of minds, do we find guarantees that these things or others in their place are so?

[1] Mr. McDougall's statement, on page 171, that Rousseau did not draw the distinction between the good of all and the good of the whole, seems to me quite incompatible with Rousseau's text, and the author's examples of the distinction are essentially on the same lines as that which I have given (*Theory of State*, p. 105 ff.).

Or must we say that we cannot at all tell, and nothing is collective will but, perhaps, a loudly patriotic war programme backed by a plebiscite? For my part, I should say that if you confine it to that, the interest and importance of the problem drop dead. It is the case then, that I regard the self, identification with which makes the collective will, rather as the substantive predominant and coherent system of interests and values, than as a special sentiment, originally egoistic, and expanded to become again a special sentiment referring to the group as a whole; no longer indeed egoistic, but an egoism expanded into altruism and bearing traces of its origin. This antiquated opposition of egoism to altruism, of the self-regarding sentiment as such to a feeling concerned with other objects wider than the individual self, is the framework in which Mr. McDougall's collective will slides beyond our native egoistic attitude (pp. 54, 79, 84, 263). And so with patriotism. There are two types of patriotism which are divergent in character. One is the daily simple spirit of communal labour, and duty; the other is the spirit of romantic and occasional glorification of the group, and reflective self-sacrifice on its behalf. Hegel has warned us of the difference and I think the warning is wise. I am speaking, of course, only of tendencies, and, on the whole, I quite think that Mr. McDougall's cases may be genuine, *i.e.*, you have formally a collective will when you will in the full light of the national consciousness and form the volition through the traditional collective institutions. But I think if you stop there you miss both the interest of the problem and the solid reality of the fact, and you run near to the more showy and less genuine patriotism, which is also morally the less trustworthy as not being identified with the sovereign human values which are not diminished by sharing.[1]

5. In the two closing chapters of Part II. (whose subject in general is the National Mind and Character) we find further emphasis on the importance of the self-conscious idea of the nation as a force in national life. It is a valuable recognition that "the nation, as an object of sentiment, includes all smaller groups within it" (p. 180), and also that more widely inclusive group sentiments "can only be realised by a further extension of true patriotism" (p. 181). And attention is rightly drawn to the power of ideas generally upon national life, when they become widely entertained and the objects of collective emotion. Such are the ideas of liberty, equality, progress, and human solidarity, which, more than any other, are fashioning the future of the world (p. 185).

Now, in connexion with this subject of the collective adoption

[1] Mr. McDougall hardly gives me credit for my continued efforts to elucidate the connexion of patriotism and the higher collective will. See Introduction to *Theory of State* and reff., p. lxii. And I do not accept his interpretation of my use and Mr. Bradley's of the doctrine of ideomotor action (*Social Psychology*, additional chapter, *cf.* this book, p. 164). He should at least have noted Mr. Bradley's definite repudiation of the doctrine in MIND, xiii., p. 19.

and development of ideas, the author insists on something which in general is acceptable but which may readily be given a dangerous implication. This is the general tendency to freedom and a voluntary character in the commonwealth which is highly developed under the influence of collective ideas, and more particularly the question of correlative rights as between the individual and the community. There is no question that a civilised and reasonable commonwealth presents an aspect of convention, contract, determinate agreement. The whole conception of law involves intention and loyalty. Thus the author is led to revive Fouillée's suggestion of the "contractual organism" (p. 175), which rightly affirms as an ideal what as a historical doctrine (the social contract) was false. What we further need, however, is to be clear whether the contract is the basis of the community, or the community the basis of the contract; and the author, at a later point, commits himself rather seriously in the former direction, as here, I think, he contradicts himself on the subject (pp. 175-176). His fluctuation about the wicked idealist philosopher, as between 156-157 and this place, is comic. I must quote the later passage, "His position [*i.e.*, the citizen's to-day] is one of extreme liberty as compared with that of any member of the ancient nations. He has definite rights as against the State. The State claims only a minimum of rights over him, the right to prevent him interfering with the rights of his fellow-citizens, the right to make him pay for his share of the privileges conveyed by its activities. And these rights it claims in virtue of contract between each citizen and all the rest. For each citizen is free to throw off his allegiance to the State and to leave it at will, and his continuance as a citizen of the State implies his acceptance of the contract" (p. 287).

First, it rushes of course upon all our minds as we read this passage that the contrast drawn seems upside-down, when the argument of Socrates to Crito rings in our ears (Plato's *Crito*, 51 D). "We, the laws of Athens, tell every man, when he has arrived at years of discretion, if he does not like us, he may take his property and depart whither he pleases," whereas in the modern world, is there a process by which, as such, a man can divest himself of his allegiance? He may adopt another allegiance, and in some cases, I believe, this annuls his previous allegiance, and in some does not. But the author's sentence is inaccurate, I think, in fact; and in spirit is more inaccurate still. For certainly a man cannot rapidly or readily rid himself of his allegiance just when its obligations come upon him.

And as to the general limitation of rights approved in the passage, would the author really maintain it to-day? The substance of his book was written down before the war (p. viii.), and I agree that the war has not revolutionised all our ideas. But I think it has refreshed our view of some things; and the truth that contract is based on community rather than community on contract, seems to be one of them. Progress is not, as used to be said, "from status to contract,"

but rather "from contract to community". The author might have learned something from the chapter with this title in "The New State". Contract is being standardised on the basis which relations, inherent in the community, demand, as Durkheim long ago pointed out. The individual's will is presupposed to be communally determined. That is no reason against the ideal of voluntary service. But it is a reason against the affirmation of a claim to withdraw from service or modify it at the individual's will and pleasure. The individual is really not constituted till his will is socialised. A Scottish professor is compelled by Act of Parliament to join the Scottish Widows' Fund. It is assumed that his will will recognise the communal relation involved. But he chooses his own rate of contribution, and so makes his own contract.

6. Part III. seems to me the most instructive portion of the book. It discusses the influence of race and of other factors on the development of national mind and character, beginning with the formation of race itself. The main suggestions are; that civilisation does not progress by natural selection in the ordinary sense; that races are formed by such selection in a period prior to civilisation; that a very considerable element in the formation of race is the influence of occupations—the account of the Le Play school's work is extraordinarily interesting, and parallel to suggestions to be found in that despised volume, Hegel's *Philosophy of History;* that in the historic or civilised period, in the absence of natural selection, the effect of social selection is mostly negative; that progress is rare and difficult to account for, and only becomes a normal feature in the later ages of Western civilisation, and is mainly due in this maturity of nations to the spread of a social organisation based upon the principle "from status to contract," and the abolition of the caste system—the statement here is lax, I think —leading to that form of the struggle for existence which operates not on individuals but on ideas and institutions, in a constantly widening area of knowledge and imaginative sympathy. Ultimately, the national self-consciousness, enriched by such a process, will become the guiding factor of the national will, and may even react, by better methods of social selection, on the influences now alleged to be making for race deterioration.

All this seems plausible, and I trust that the basis of hope which it contains is sound. I will add one or two remarks, not to controvert it, but rather as an aid to removing a certain looseness of texture which I seem to note in the argument.

It is quite well to be warned against assuming that progress is universal, and to be reminded that it may depend on special conditions, perhaps even on rare ones. Still I am not satisfied that here we have the facts precisely and comprehensively given. I shrink from the division of capacities and results into moral and intellectual (pp. 206, 273). It seems to me a bad principle of division, and one that operates as an imperfect disjunction, excluding dozens of things which ought to be considered. There is the

advance in æsthetic achievement in Egypt, say, or in China or Japan. I do not know what stopped it or when; but I suppose it was one of the great achievements of the world. There was the rapid growth of science and of moral ideas—here, surely, together —under the sway of the Greek mind, and the advance of the Hellenistic age which led up to Christianity. Was it moral or intellectual progress when a man first said "Homo Sum"—and the rest? Rome progressed in nothing but law; but that is a good deal is it not? The peoples of the Roman name invented nothing, we hear. Yet some say they invented modern architecture, and that the unprogressive period from 500 to 1500 A.D. was "the building-age of the world". Christianity and religion generally are a conservative force, and their prevalence makes society hide-bound. Yet an important thinker of to-day writes: "Christianity discovers the reality which *is* not, but creates itself—a reality which belongs to us to construct, etc.,"[1] *i.e.*, is the very ferment of progress. Things grew slowly from Christ's coming to the Reformation. But I suppose there was a good deal doing all the time, including some of the very greatest of Greek philosophy, a high-water mark of poetry, and the conversion of the Teutonic nations.

All this is what every one knows; but it does a little raise the question (and any one who is much of a student could multiply the facts a hundred times) whether progress may not be the rule of the human mind, though retrogression, destruction, reaction perpetually produce a superficial appearance of stagnation. In saying this, I do not throw doubt on the need of certain simple *sine quibus non*, in whose absence human life does hardly get a start. But I doubt whether the facts justify the denial of progress as an inherent character of humanity as such.

I insist on the case of China, to which, as we know to-day, the debt of the human mind is incalculable. Yet the author still takes it as the type of stagnation and futility. It is not merely that he thinks its progress arrested. As I gather, he does not realise that it ever made any advance of supreme value.

Points like these prepare us for the possibility that the author's fundamental paradox in these later pages, though it calls attention to important facts, is presented with a distorted perspective.

The paradox is that of the fundamental opposition between our real evolutionary achievement and the position which we *prima facie* have attained. Since the beginnings of civilisation, in spite of our immense apparent progress, we have been wasting the first-rate human stock which the race-making period of severe natural selection bequeathed to us. There has been no progress of the individual mind parallel to the development of civilisation and of nations (p. 203). Our progress has not been, in a phrase frequently repeated, a progress in our nature, in our innate qualities. It has often been arrested by the local attrition of the best

[1] Gentile, *Spirito*, 231.

stocks through negative selection, and it is threatened as a whole by similar influences operating in modern society.

Some difficulties present themselves to my mind. The absolute distinction between individual minds and the tradition of knowledge and conduct which they progress by assimilating and extending, is not easy to understand. On page 210 we are told, "Now this traditional stock of knowledge and morality has been very slowly accumulated, bit by bit; and every bit, every least new addition to it, has been a difficult acquisition, due in the first instance to some spontaneous variation of some individual's mental structure from the ancestral type of mental structure". And on page 212 "the greater and more valuable the stock of traditional knowledge and morality becomes, the more does fitness to survive consist in the capacity to assimilate this knowledge and to conform to these higher moral precepts" and the less in quickness of eye and ear and the like. Here both the growth and the assimilation of the tradition seem to depend on inheritable variations. *On this basis*, can the dissociation of the mind's nature from the progress of the tradition be maintained? Not that I am urging either the continued operation of natural selection, or the claims of use-inheritance. I believe indeed that selection through maintenance of a social standard is a safe method on any hypothesis;[1] but my present question is narrower; it is merely what the author wishes us to understand about the mind's relation to the tradition. I do not quite see how on his own ground he maintains the distinction.[2]

My own tentative suggestion would not depend on convicting the author of self-contradiction in denying the continuance of natural selection. It would be quite compatible with the doctrine that natural selection has practically ceased during historical times. It would rather call attention to the point which I think Dr. Archdall Reid has well insisted on, that innate qualities are after all (I use my own language) hypothetical on the environment. A man cannot grow up without food and relevant exercise, however fine a germ plasm he may inherit. Now this suggests that what we have, we really have; it is all of it germ plasm plus conditions. How far germinal variations help or hinder we could only know if we knew the limits of variation possible within a Mendelian unit, and more especially, the relation of Mendelian units to the general gift or capacity of thought. For this is what a truer and more appreciative account of progress seems to me to suggest. You have progress wherever you have thought, except where special conditions relatively arrest it. The variation or variations which give us thought, are the essence of humanity. The passage cited above from page 210, which is inconsistent with this idea, looks to

[1] *Cf. Selection by Maintenance of a Social Standard in Social International Ideas.* Macmillan, 1917.

[2] *Cf.* such phrases as "the innate moral disposition" (p. 266) most superficially defined, and "our seeming intellectual superiority" (p. 263).

me, as I said, inconsistent with the author's own distinction between the mind and the tradition. If we could see history and human life microscopically—and we can so see, very much more than the author admits—we should see, I suggest, not great plains of stagnation with here and there a stream of progress; but an ocean full of springs and currents, constantly no doubt turned back into eddies which remain in their place; but everywhere relatively pressing upon the elements which oppose them, and often breaking through for a space. In short, so far from believing progress exceptional, I do not believe that thought can possibly stand still; and to distinguish thought fundamentally from conduct seems to me ridiculous. Thus, to return to the group-mind; I see in the future as in the past the two tendencies, the reflective opposition of egoism and altruism and the association of progress with the sentiment which unites them;[1] and what seems to me the more solid advance, by which thought develops, on all sides and in all occasions and opportunities, the great values which do not decrease by sharing, and which alone are the sound criterion of national conduct and human solidarity. I recognise both, but I hold the true root of progress and guide of the will to be in the latter.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics. By R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe; London: Kegan Paul, Trubner & Co. Pp. x, 314.

Mr. HOERNLÉ sets out with very great advantages for the task he has undertaken in this book. Trained at Oxford, he has also had considerable experience in the teaching of philosophy in other universities in Great Britain, and he wrote this book in Harvard after some years of teaching there. He has had quite exceptional opportunities, therefore, for seeing contemporary philosophies in the making, and for understanding, from personal experience, how far a set of philosophical opinions can bear transplanting from one country to another.

The use which Mr. Hoernlé has made of these opportunities is most instructive. In changing skies he has kept his faith, and he remains a very staunch believer in the truth of the philosophical tradition which he finds expressed "at its best" in the works of Dr. Bosanquet. On the other hand, his flexible and assimilative mind has enabled him to incorporate much of the spirit of transatlantic philosophy. His book, then, while

[1] See page 287. The conception of progress here is so superficial that, by a meeting of extremes, it almost joins hands with the vaguest "progress of the species" enthusiasm.

not at all eclectic, has an international smack in it, and this is the more stimulating in view of the fact that British philosophy, in these days, is fully aware of the dangers of insularity, and knows that there is a New World as well as an old Europe. In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that Mr. Hoernlé's survey is restricted to Oxford and the United States. As the reader will shortly see, he has a very intimate and precise acquaintance with all the most important contemporary theories of metaphysics in English-speaking countries.

The various studies in the book deal with highly representative topics, and are carefully chosen with a view to eliciting Mr. Hoernlé's characteristic type of response on the most critical points in his philosophy. Still, they are relatively detached, and the best thing I can do, I think, is to deal with them *seriatim*, indicating their character as well as I can, and making a few running comments.

The prologue tells us that philosophy is the quest of wisdom and of the good life in the spirit of totality, and that it endeavours "to employ all the resources of experience in this task, taking each type of experience at its best, when its lesson is clearest, and learning most from those experiences which in range and organisation emancipate us most from superficial first impressions, and lead us deepest into the heart of reality" (p. 16).

The second chapter deals with the idol of scientific method in philosophy, and maintains that philosophers have too much insight for this species of idolatry (pp. 25 *sqq.*) and too much experience to be satisfied with merely formal argument (pp. 27 *sqq.*). Mr. Russell's theories, it contends, banish values from the world except for the single supreme value of austere contemplation, and its consequence, the renunciation of desire. According to our author (who has taken great pains with his documentary evidence), Russell's choice of this one value is eminently arbitrary, and yet his theory is superior to Dewey's instrumentalism precisely because contemplation really *is* one of the supreme values. Instrumentalism, indeed, ought to become 'dialectic' (pp. 45 *sqq.*). The only comment I shall make on this chapter is that, in some passages at least, our author seems only to pit his own temperamental many-sidedness against what he considers the temperamental one-sidedness of his opponents. I cannot see that he is the less temperamental on this account, but he would reply, I suppose, that his book as a whole justifies him in this particular.

Mr. Hoernlé's third chapter continues the work of his second. "Philosophical choices turn on total impressions" (p. 59), and science is far too "abstract" (pp. 68 *sq.*). The crucial instance of the philosophy of nature compels us either to endeavour after a synthesis of fact and value (value is 'objective') or else to seek to banish values under the specious guise of 'ethical neutrality'. Our author shows quite easily that Mr. Russell's 'ethical neutrality' in *A Free Man's Worship* is not neutral at all.

Thereafter Mr. Hoernlé sets out to "save the appearances," and offers us, in the first instance, a *liaison* chapter which admittedly (p. 82) gathers a great many fragments into its argumentative basket. It deals in part with the meaning of salvation as applied to appearances. We save appearances when we attain a true theory of them, or when we reach "the best total interpretation," where "best" means "the most comprehensive and inclusive, and the most systematic and organising" (p. 93). The chapter, however, deals more directly with its nominal subject (the world of sense) when it argues that sense is nothing without interpretation (pp. 76 *sqq.*), and that the 'reality' of things needs interpretation too. On the latter point, we are told that a thing is "really" what it is "truly". I must confess, however, that the accounts of the meaning of 'reality' and of 'unreality' on page 83 seem to me to treat a large number of distinctly different conceptions as if they were indistinguishable.

The fifth chapter sets out to "save" the physical world, but is also constrained in its turn to ask "How saving is possible?" as well as "What is saved?" "Saving" is possible because transcendence is possible, and although the passage from the 'this' of perception to its 'what' is difficult, the difficulty of transition is much alleviated by the fact that we never perceive a pure 'this' (pp. 131 *sqq.*) since perception is always judgment (p. 99) and even theory (p. 133). This general discussion is illustrated from the concrete case of colour and Mr. Hoernlé (with a great deal of excellent and pertinent criticism in the course of his argument) concludes that colour is a recognisable fact in the physical world (p. 108), that things are coloured under conditions (*e.g.*, illumination) and not otherwise, and that such conditions probably ought to include "the presence of a properly functioning physiological organism" (pp. 114 *sqq.*). It is a little hard to see why the presence of a mind should not also be included, and I confess I cannot see what precisely is saved.

We pass next to Mechanism and Vitalism (in two chapters). Here, our author pleads for the "autonomy of biology" (p. 146), and contends that biology is teleological as well as mechanical, and that teleology is logically dominant in this science (p. 144). Mechanism, in other words, is part but not the whole of an adequate description of life (p. 150). In all this, Mr. Hoernlé, to be sure, is quite logical and scientific. He is not at all "romantic" (pp. 174-186), but his proofs, I think, are dubious. As he points out, very truly, the real problem is "what in nature can and what cannot be explained in terms of the concepts of physics and chemistry" (p. 171). *Because* that is so, surely it is absolutely incumbent upon him to define these concepts with the utmost rigour. This he never does, and consequently I find it quite impossible to decide whether or not teleology, as he describes it, could or could not be a special case of physico-chemical combination. If it were, teleological terms, while legitimate, could scarcely be logically

dominant. To put it otherwise, Mr. Hoernlé denies that teleology includes conscious purpose or anything analogous thereto (p. 159), and defines it instead by the regulation, structure, organisation, and pattern which appears when parts and whole are reciprocally means and end (p. 160). Is it wholly impossible, then, that a "mechanical" collocation could exhibit an orderly pattern of this kind?

The next pair of essays set out to "save" the mind and the self. According to our author, the truth in these matters should be reached by a synthesis of the Cartesian and of the Aristotelian points of view. In a word, he offers us Behaviourism with a dash of νοῦς. If this statement appears cryptic and elliptical, I invite the reader to supplement it (if he can) by pondering over the rather meagre summary of his conclusion which Mr. Hoernlé gives us in a couple of somewhat rhetorical pages (pp. 242-243).

Mr. Hoernlé, of course, claims that he is able to displace most of the obstacles which stand in the way of this conclusion, but some may think that his task is less simple than he supposes, and even that, like Nelson in the Baltic, he is most conveniently blind to many pertinent signals. For example, he warns us that anyone who distinguishes act from object, must go on to distinguish the subject from nature, the soul from the body, the 'inner world' from the 'outer world,' that to distinguish in these matters is always to divorce, and that "if the bull be permitted, the best way to get out of these coils is never to get into them" (p. 206). None the less, despite this Gordian procedure upon 'coils' which he has made himself by treating distinct issues as if they were identical, he admits, in controversy, that "the English thinkers' emphasis on acts and awareness seems much more like what we mean, or think we mean, when we talk of being conscious of something" (p. 230). Here then is an appearance. Why should it not be saved? "Because," says our author, "I am in a position to set forth the 'genuine problem of the theory of knowledge'" (p. 206 n.). He knows, indeed, that we always ought to ask, "What does X perceive, remember, etc."? and never, "What is X's perceiving, remembering, etc." (*e.g.*, p. 245, as I gather the sense of it). Why?

To take another point, it seems to me that Mr. Hoernlé's elaborate discussion concerning a mind's acquaintance with itself and with other minds (pp. 211 *sqq.*) ignores relevant points in the controversy. Believing, as he does, that all knowledge is interpretation, Mr. Hoernlé seems to think that it can never make any conceivable difference whether the interpretation is based upon direct or upon inferential evidence. He seems to think, even (p. 224 n.), that there is a fallacy in believing that we can observe parts of our own minds directly although we never observe any part of anyone else's mind directly, and his reason is simply that any belief in the proposition, "This is mine and no one else's" implies a reference to propositions concerning other people. How could anything be more perverse? If, in fact, we are acquainted with our own ex-

periences and not with other people's, where is the absurdity? And if the facts were so, how would there be a fallacy in *defining* our beliefs about ourselves by contrast with our beliefs concerning other people?

Indeed, I should have thought this part of Mr. Hoernlé's discussion irrelevant, if it did not seem to be connected in his mind with another view which I think equally perverse. As I think, Mr. Hoernlé is desperately and most unreasonably anxious to deny the possibility of any sort of private being in the universe, even if the 'privacy' simply means that something or other is itself and is not some other thing. He maintains, for example, that if my processes of knowing are really parts of me and of nothing else they are therefore "divorced" from everything else, so that they cannot even refer to anything else without a miracle, and cannot be functionally connected with anything else in the way of action, reaction, or interest, without lamentable (and, indeed, insurmountable) difficulty. I cannot see the difficulty. X, let us say, is related to Y. Let us also admit, for the sake of argument, that it would not be X were it not so related. Does it follow, on that account, that it *is* Y when so related, or that it *could* be X if it were Y? I am loth to suppose that Mr. Hoernlé seriously means to say this; and yet, without supposing so, I cannot understand much that he says in his most interesting ninth chapter on "The Self in Self-consciousness". According to him, "the truth is that, concretely, what I am is expressed, for me as well as for others, in my attitudes and behaviour towards the world in which I exist. Every such attitude or behaviour, considered now from the point of view of self-consciousness, is seen to be an act of identifying myself—yes, quite literally my self—with something, or turning away from it". Quite literally my "self," I daresay, but is the *identification* quite literal? Mr. Hoernlé, as I understand him, agrees with James that I literally *am* my wife and child and bank-account, and thence he infers that anyone who denies this, and yet supposes that he can learn a good deal about himself indirectly, by distinguishing between the things that interest him and the things he neglects, "almost against his will becomes a witness to the necessity of the view which his explicit theory compels him to reject" (p. 280). Apparently Mr. Hoernlé can *sub-pœna* any witnesses he likes, but his theory is surely most surprising when he holds, as he does, that a self is a sort of noëtical body. Is a man's *body* identified with a door when, as we say, he turns towards it? Could it not be "saved" if it were not a door? And what is it, on the theory, when it turns away from the door? I suppose I should divorce my body (in its logical aspect) from the door if I denied literal identity with the door, just as I should certainly annihilate it (in its physical aspect) if the identification happened. Moreover, where is the identification, even in an intellectual aspect, when I deny?

Mr. Hoernlé concludes with an epilogue concerning religion and the philosophy of it. In this, he sees the universe "fired with the

presence of God," or perhaps (I am not sure) is more concerned to tell us what such enthusiasm means to a true philosopher. In any case, he bids us note that the essence of religion is the conviction that the whole of things is worth while. It may be so; but when I read Mr. Hoernlé's repeated excursions into the theory of value I cannot see why anyone should be stirred to his marrow by the value of the universe in any sense of value which Mr. Hoernlé defines with an approach to precision. Often, indeed, he seems to mean by 'value' neither more nor less than order and adaptation. In that case, there is no peculiar problem (although he frequently says so) in the relation of value to fact; and even when he interprets value in a larger (although highly indefinite) sense, it is very hard to believe that any appreciable trickle of human passion could ooze from Mr. Hoernlé's "value," and almost impossible to imagine that human history should foam and eddy with this dispute, and be flecked with the high courage of martyrs, the blessedness of serene communion, the wreck of empires and the awful barrenness of despairing hearts.

I do not know how far these remarks will enable the reader to understand the scope of Mr. Hoernlé's enquiry or the outlines of his answer, and this uncertainty would give me serious concern if the remedy were not in the reader's hands. Let him turn to Mr. Hoernlé. I have said enough, I hope, to show that Mr. Hoernlé has given us a very careful review of a great company of contemporary theories. There is, perhaps, a tinge of unmerited complacency in some of his statements as when (speaking of 'the standpoint of the whole') he tells us that "those who have never tried have no right to say that 'it can't be done,' and those who have tried and failed should not stand in the way of those who want to try again" (p. 247 n.). According to the spirit of this remark, I suspect, a whole troop of us ought to slip quietly away into outer darkness. For the most part, however, Mr. Hoernlé is manifestly anxious to be fair, and these "chips and rough modellings from a metaphysician's workshop," as he modestly calls them in his preface, make one think very highly of the establishment.

JOHN LAIRD.

Relativity, the Special and the General Theory: A Popular Exposition. By ALBERT EINSTEIN. Translated by ROBERT W. LAWSON. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1920. Pp. xiii, 138.

Space, Time, and Gravitation: An Outline of the General Theory of Relativity. By A. S. EDDINGTON. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1920. Pp. vi, 218.

The Concept of Nature: Tarner lectures delivered in Trinity College, November, 1919. By A. N. WHITEHEAD. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1920. Pp. viii, 202.

IT can hardly be expected that any man should produce an adequate review of three such books as these in the compass of a MIND

notice. If the thing could be done at all I am not the proper man to do it. For the first two works named are primarily concerned with the direct significance of the now famous theory for the specialist in physics. Except where the authors occasionally digress into the consideration of the wider issues of the theory of knowledge, it would be, in the proper sense of the word, an impertinence for the mere 'philosopher' to offer criticism. Prof. Whitehead's book, on the other hand, is directly concerned with *Naturphilosophie*, and is, in fact, far the most illuminating work I have read on the whole subject. He is concerned primarily to propound a general theory of the character of the object of knowledge we call Nature and the methods available for the study of it. The 'general theory of relativity' issues indeed in its main outlines from his theory of the character of Nature, but it appears in a form which is not identical with that given to it in Einstein's own exposition, and, so far as I can judge, Dr. Whitehead is fully justified in his contention that his version of the theory is far more consistent and philosophical than any which the physicists *pur sang* have produced. Dr. Whitehead's work would thus offer matter for a very full and searching criticism from the purely philosophical point of view, if I were really competent to undertake the task, as I am not. As it happens, however, the argument of the *Concept of Nature* is very closely parallel with that of the author's remarkable work on *The Principles of Natural Knowledge*, except that the more strictly mathematical part of that volume has nothing to correspond to it in its successor, perhaps a doubtful improvement. The *Principles* has already been carefully discussed in MIND by Prof. Broad in a way which leaves me very little to add except to express my admiration and concurrence.

I propose, therefore, to confine myself in the main to making some very general remarks on the significance of the general Theory of Relativity regarded as a contribution to the strictly philosophical problem of the character of that which we call Nature and the relation of the Nature studied in physics to the 'actual world' in which we live out our daily lives. Even apart from the really wonderful unification effected by the theory in physics itself by its reduction of the law of gravitation to the more general laws of motion,—a matter on which Mr. Broad speaks with proper emphasis in the issue of MIND for October 1920, there seem to be still more general reasons for holding that the theory in much the form in which Prof. Whitehead expounds it, or something very much like it, must be true. For my own part, I believe it to be true not merely because it has "scored" heavily in the verification of predictions made from it about the deflexion of light from circum-solar stars during eclipse of the sun or about the perihelion of Mercury, nor even merely because eminent physicists regard it as unificatory of the fundamental principles of their science, but because I find in it for the first time a complete solution of certain difficulties, unconnected with any particular

physical doctrine, which had long seemed to me to make it impossible to frame any intelligible theory of space and time themselves. Others besides myself have probably felt these difficulties, and may be glad to have their attention called to what at least promises to afford the solution of them. In the remarks I propose to make I shall necessarily have Dr. Whitehead's work primarily in view. But I may perhaps be allowed to say a word or two first about the other two books.

Prof. Einstein's own work ought to be carefully studied by any reader who wishes to know what exactly the Theory of Relativity asserts, and what, in spite of sensation-mongering journalists, it does not, what special outstanding difficulties in physics first led to its formulation in the more restricted form and how it came to be generalised. The whole story is told directly and simply, and with no introduction of any mathematics or mathematical physics which ought to be beyond the grasp of a fairly intelligent Board School boy. The little work,—excellently translated by Dr. Lawson—is strictly business-like, and keeps wholly to the concrete problems of physics, except for the last half score of pages which discuss "the Universe as a whole". It is just with these pages that I find my doubts about the distinguished author's treatment of his subject beginning. As is generally known, Einstein allows himself to speculate, as W. K. Clifford had done before him, on the possibility of a "difference of curvature" in different regions of space. The speculation is no integral part of the Theory of Relativity itself, but unfortunately has somehow attracted much more attention from the general public than anything which is really fundamental in Einstein's work, and unless it is clearly pointed out that there is really no logical connexion between the theory and the speculation, the former is likely to have to suffer for the sins of the latter. Hence I regard it as fortunate that Prof. Whitehead has protested emphatically against the confusion of the two. I think he is clearly right in saying that Einstein is standing in the light of his own theory by grafting on it speculations which that theory itself shows to be peculiarly meaningless. If a man believes in "space" as a sort of pre-existing framework into which "matter" is somehow fitted, he may be excused for the suggestion that peculiarities in the behaviour of the "matter" may possibly be due to local irregularities in the structure of the framework. But since it is just the great philosophical merit of the Einstein ideas that when you think them out you are finally rid both of the "framework" and of the "matter," this kind of speculation can only be excused in Einstein or in Prof. Eddington —who, however, has the merit of making the speculation highly amusing—by the reflexion that it is not after all so unusual for an original genius to miss the full significance of his own suggestions. Some day, I fancy, our descendants will compare Einstein's failure to reap the full fruit of his own ideas with Galileo's curious adherence to the mistaken Aristotelian explanation of comets as

exhalations. I should say that Prof. Whitehead also seems to me right in deprecating what appears to be the view of Einstein and others about the unique significance of light-signals and the velocity of light. It is true, of course, that when we try to imagine a way of intercommunication between denizens of distant worlds trying to compare their respective time-systems, light-signals at once suggest themselves as the best resource. It is also true that experiment shows that the velocity of light *in vacuo* must be a near *approximation* to the constant velocity c which plays so fundamental a part in the "Lorentz transformation" and consequently in the whole Relativity Theory. But I do not see that this approximation is more than a fact which we have to accept as empirically given, an "accident" in the proper sense of the word. I do not understand, any more than Prof. Whitehead, why this accident should be supposed to confer a unique position on light-waves in the system of Nature. Suppose we had been rational beings without retinas sensitive to light, a supposition which does not seem intrinsically absurd. Is it meant that the mere lack of retinas would have necessarily prevented an Einstein from putting the coping-stone on our system of mathematical physics?

Prof. Eddington's work covers in the main the same ground as Einstein's own exposition, though with more illustrative detail and a freer use of imaginative speculation about the Universe as a whole in the closing chapters. Readers who are not themselves specialists in natural science owe him a special debt of thanks for the very full and clear account of the actual work done by the scientific expeditions sent out to test the theory by observations during the solar eclipse of 29th May, 1919. As a non-expert I may also perhaps be allowed to express my high admiration for the pains which have been taken to make Einstein's mathematical methods,—a subject of which Einstein himself modestly says nothing in his own popular statement—intelligible in their main character. I should strongly recommend every reader of Einstein's own booklet to go on to read Prof. Eddington; the account of the relation of the "general theory" to the classical Newtonian dynamics seems to me to become decidedly easier to follow when it is less severely restricted to the necessary minimum of words than it is by Einstein himself. At the same time, from my own philosophical standpoint, which, so far as the knowledge of Nature is concerned, is pretty much that of Prof. Whitehead, I feel that Prof. Eddington is beset, still more than Einstein, by the ghosts of metaphysical superstitions from which his own theory should have delivered him. For example, I seem all through his book, to be uncomfortably pulled up every now and then by "materialism" in Whitehead's sense of the word, the false doctrine of the object studied in physics as a something "behind the veil" of our sense-experience. I note also the curious persistence with which the mind apprehending the "space-time continuum" of Nature is regularly confused with the brain—a portion of that continuum—

and it puzzles me to discover that Prof. Eddington apparently regards the "Fitzgerald" contraction as something which really happens in Nature. It seems clear to me, on Prof. Eddington's own showing, that the occurrence of the contraction is not a real event. It is an hypothetical event assumed in order to avoid accepting that plurality of space-time systems which the Theory of Relativity asserts. We may try to account for the failure of the Michelsen-Morley experiment to detect motion relative to the 'æther' by assuming the 'Fitzgerald' contraction *or* by accepting the (special) Theory of Relativity, but it is surely impossible to combine the two devices.

I proceed now to speak of topics of more general philosophical interest suggested by study of Prof. Whitehead's book. As I say, I cannot attempt anything like a full critical estimate of *The Concept of Nature*. But I am glad to have the opportunity of expressing my unbounded admiration for the work and declaring my deliberate opinion that no writer on philosophy who has not given it patient and attentive study will henceforth have any right to be heard in any question about the general character and fundamental principles of natural science. It is one of the great merits of the work that it puts us from the first in the right position for the understanding of the real problem. Ever since Aristotle in his *Physics* took the fatal step of bringing into natural science from logic the notion of a "subject of predicates" in the new form of a "substrate" of which the known colours and odours and explosions and so forth are "qualities," the way, as I quite agree with Dr. Whitehead, to a true understanding of the purpose of physics has been lost. To regain it, we need to insist with all the emphasis we can that the world with which physical science deals is just the world of the colours, temperatures, pressures, smells, etc., with which we are daily conversant. I have never seen this fundamental thesis (it is, of course, the true and valuable element in Berkeley's miscalled 'idealism'), argued with more power than in Dr. Whitehead's admirable chapter on what he calls the 'Bifurcation of Nature'. He is there concerned more particularly with two forms of the unhappy doctrine of the "substrate," the attempt to distinguish between a 'causal nature' (made up of "primary qualities") and nature as an "effect" (the system of "secondary" qualities), or again, between Nature as it *is* "outside the mind" and as it *appears to* the mind (with alleged "psychical additions"). I presume he would be willing to add, as a third and no less disastrous form of "bifurcation," the theory which reduces physics to the study of mere "symbols" which, as it is said, we have "substituted" for the realities of Nature.

If we once get back to the right point of departure, then, what we have to start with is a mind (which is not itself one of the 'objects' making up Nature, and of which it is no part of Dr. Whitehead's task to give any further account), knowing a complex of events which is Nature. And this complex is four-dimensional.

Every event fills a volume, and lasts through an interval. (There is the further complication, which I need not deal with here, that each of the minds which know Nature knows it through a peculiar relation to *one* of the events which compose nature, its one 'percipient event'. This 'percipient event' plays the same sort of part in the theory which the 'system C' does with Avenarius, and, as with the 'system C,' there is a little difficulty in saying whether it is quite, or only approximately, what we mean in common parlance by the 'nervous system' of a given man.) The Nature known is thus just the four-dimensional complex of events. The one fundamental thing about it is that it "passes"; as Plato puts it, it is a γιγνόμενον. Every event is a 'here-now' and different 'here-nows' overlap. It is the fourfold continuum of overlapping events which is our whole "given" datum in the study of Nature, our real world, and all advance in physical knowledge is advance in knowledge of the structure and contents of this continuum. If this is true, it carries us very far. With the disappearance of the "bifurcation" of Nature into a "reality" which does not appear and appearances which are not "real," of course the supposed supra-sensibles "matter" and "æther" disappear for ever, to the great advantage of philosophical thinking, to which both have long been open scandals. For "æther" we have left what Dr. Whitehead calls the "æther of events," the fact that "something is always going on everywhere," and for the distinction between space which is "occupied" and space which is "empty" we have simply a distinction in the character of that which is "going on". We get back, with a richer insight, to the position which Berkeley was trying to occupy, and from which he was only kept by his unfortunate grafting on the denial of Locke's "substrate" of the very dubious affirmation that the *esse* of Nature is *percipi*.

Next, as to space and time themselves. Until very recently one had to choose between two conflicting theories, each of which seemed hopeless. On the one side, it seemed quite clear that whatever we know about position in either has been learned from our awareness of the relations between events filling volumes. It must be out of this knowledge that we have in some way built up the conceptions, with which we work in our pure mathematics, of points and moments and the relations between them, and so far the relational theory of space and time seems manifestly in the right. But there was the fundamental difficulty, discerned long ago by some of us, that the traditional relational theory has not the courage of its own convictions. Every one who wished to be thought scientific talked it, but unfortunately when the relationist went on to talk, *e.g.*, about causality, he regularly assumed that somehow, out of the "here-nows" of our "given" we can build up a single unique space-order and a single unique time-order, the same for observers on any body in the Universe, a timeless space and a spaceless time such that if A and B are simultaneous for an

observer, say, on the earth, they will also be simultaneous for an observer who is revolving round Arcturus, and for a third who is revolving round Sirius. The writer of the present lines well remembers the distress caused to him in 1896 or 1897, when it dawned on him that this assumption was latent in the current language about "the whole state of the physical Universe at the time *t*," and that the assumption seemed highly precarious and in all probability false, since it appeared impossible to build up a time-order without reference to the particular space-order of the observer. If one took refuge, on the other hand, in the traditional Newtonian account of space and time, there seemed to be the difficulty that even if there are "absolute" positions, we can never know them, and thus there is the double unintelligibility of understanding how we can ever have come to be aware of their existence, and what use our awareness of that existence has when and if we do come by it. Now the beauty of Prof. Whitehead's "deduction of space and time," as it seems to me, is that it for the first time gives both the relationist and the absolute theories a fully definite meaning, and, in doing so, removes all incompatibility between them. By following out the relationist theory—the theory which makes space and time characters of events themselves, not of a framework in which events are enclosed, it is shown in detail how we can pass from the individual here-now of the pulse of actual experience to a plurality of 'scientific' spaces and times, each time-order definitely correlated with its own appropriate space-order. And when this has been done, it can be further shown how "absolute position" itself gets a real meaning as position in the "timeless space" of a single "time-system". It is not my business nor my intention here to discuss the details of Prof. Whitehead's subtle deduction. But I do wish to urge it as a strong argument in favour of a space-time theory like his, of which the main principles of the general Theory of Relativity form an integral part, that it succeeds in making the 'Leibnitzian' and 'Newtonian' theories compatible in the very act of giving each of them a fully definite meaning.

I will make but one or two more very general observations. As I have said, *The Concept of Nature* is a great contribution to *Naturphilosophie*, far the finest contribution, in my own judgement, yet made by any man. But *Naturphilosophie* is not the whole of philosophy and there are therefore some important questions suggested by Prof. Whitehead which he properly does not regard it as his business to solve. The most important of them all to my own mind is this. "Passage," as he says, is *the* fundamental fact about Nature. Also, as he says, the mind itself, in some sense, exhibits "passage". It is clear, of course, that there must be some important difference between the way in which Nature exhibits passage and the way in which the mind exhibits it, since the mind is itself no part of the fourfold continuum. The relation of mind to "passage" could not have been discussed with relevance in a course of lectures on *The Concept of Nature*, but the matter is one

of immense importance and requires to be examined very thoroughly before Prof. Whitehead's *Naturphilosophie* finally takes its place in a completed philosophy of all that is. On one or two points I am not sure that I have quite apprehended the author's meaning. I think he sometimes talks rather unguardedly of the "homogeneousness" of the time-dimension with the space-dimensions of Nature. I am afraid his words might suggest something which I am sure he does not mean to convey. There is, of course, no getting over the fact that as you come to elaborate science and in the course of doing so to distinguish before-after from up-down, left-right, before-behind, you can only make the separation in one way. You must separate your original dimensions into 3 + 1, not into 2 + 2. No possible scientific manipulation of your "given" will split it up into a two-dimensional "space" and a two-dimensional "time". In other words, it is a real characteristic of Nature that there is a "spatial *quale*" which is different from the "temporal *quale*," though what the difference is can only be indicated by pointing to a fully articulated space-system and a fully articulated time-system.

I am also not sure whether I quite follow the emphatic denial that Nature—the fourfold continuum—has a "serial order". Of course, it follows from the principles of the doctrine that none of the special "serial orders" worked out by dwellers on different moving bodies can be "*the*" order of events. But, I take it, the "interval" in the fourfold continuum from A to B is something quite definite, though, as its parameters are not all space-distances, it is neither a "spatial" nor a "temporal" interval. And since each different "point," so to say, of the fourfold continuum has its own interval from whatever you take as origin, have we not all the conditions required for an order of the points? But probably I am falling into some misconception due to mere ignorance.

If I might recur for a moment to my former point, I should like to ask whether the reality of the difference between the "spatial *quale*" and the "temporal *quale*" is not indicated by the simple consideration that Prof. Whitehead has to get at the definition of "moments" through "σ-antiprimes" but at that of "event-particles" through "σ-primes"?

A. E. TAYLOR.

Spiritual Pluralism and Recent Philosophy. By C. A. RICHARDSON, M.A. (Cantab.). Cambridge University Press. Pp. xxi, 335.

"THE pluralistic hypothesis," says our author, "is briefly as follows: 'Reality comprises selves (*i.e.*, active subjects of experience) alone, differing simply in degree or in kind of mental development, though the diversity is infinitely various. Experience, then, consists in action and reaction between self and other selves, described by Prof. James Ward in the expressive phrase '*mutuum commercium*'" (p. 9). In his final summary, he speaks of pluralism

as "the hypothesis that reality is made up of interacting subjects, the object of experience for each subject being the manifestation to him of the form to which his activity is determined by his interaction with others" (p. 329). The hypothesis throughout expressly challenges comparison with realism of the kind represented "in America by the neo-realists, and in this country by logical atomists of the type of Mr. Bertrand Russell," by whose teachings the author admits that he has been considerably influenced (Preface, p. vi).

The author's argument, on his own showing, stands or falls with his conception of the nature and function of 'explanation'. Scientific hypotheses are not "really explanatory," but are "merely descriptive. . . . They are attempts to describe the facts of existence in simpler terms than the immediately given data. It might therefore be urged that pluralism is also a merely descriptive hypothesis, the 'explanation' being simply taken back one step, and expressed in terms of different things. Yet it is just in this difference of terms that the root of the essential disparity between pluralism and other hypotheses is to be found. It implies a difference of type. For pluralism is expressed in terms of active selves. We all *realise* what it is to be active—it is just living and doing. We all *realise* what a self is. This realisation is far more than knowledge in the ordinary sense. . . . Pluralism, being expressed in terms of active selves, is truly explanatory *for such active selves, i.e.*, for us" (pp. 13-14). It would apparently, however, be more accurate to say that 'realisation' is not 'knowledge' at all: for "evidently the subject or knower cannot be an object of knowledge" (p. 14 *n.*).[1] Later he claims that pluralism "where it is successfully applied" provides a "final explanation—an explanation which is capable of fully satisfying such beings as ourselves in the search for the true nature and meaning of reality" (p. 64).

In the end, however, Mr. Richardson admits that pluralism does *not* afford a final explanation of the universe, since it involves, without solving, "the problem of the interaction of monads. We seek further for the concrete ground of this interaction, and are thus led to realise that some all-pervading principle, if it may be so called, is necessary to explain the unity of what in another aspect is a manifest plurality" (p. 82). In the last paragraph of his book he lays down that the final answer to "such time-honoured problems as freedom, immortality, creation, and the existence of God . . . must somehow lie in the determination of the nature of that concrete universal entity, in virtue of whose immanence the plurality of selves is no mere plurality, but a universe". In the end, then, pluralism, so far as it is provisionally

[1] *Cf.*, *e.g.*, p. 19: "Knowing is a relation between two entities, so that evidently the subject cannot know itself. It simply realises its own existence. . . ."

admissible, appears to partake of the nature of 'description' rather than of 'explanation'. But the description given by the author does not carry us very far. For though we are assured that the monads 'interact,' we are not told either *how* they do it, or *why* they do it. Nor does there appear to be any possibility of discovering "the noumenal conditions necessary in general for that type of interaction between certain subjects which is the ground of perception" (p. 285).

So much for the general results which 'spiritual pluralism' seeks to establish. As regards, now, the method of Mr. Richardson's argument, the chief difficulty which he has imposed on himself, and which he never overcomes, is that of reconciling his contention that the 'subject' or 'self' cannot be an 'object of knowledge' with his utilisation of the self as a principle of philosophic 'explanation'. The vacillation which this unstable position necessarily entails is reflected in his fluctuating conception of that activity which, it would seem, specially characterises the true, as opposed to the merely empirical, self (see *e.g.*, p. 194). We are told that "activity is fundamental" (p. 32), and that it is "just living and doing" (p. 13). Further: "The true meaning which causality has for us is rooted in the realisation of our own efficiency as active individuals. The active individual is the 'cause'. The end which his (generally purposive) activity accomplishes is the 'effect'" (p. 37). And "the self is purposive" (p. 146).

But we are also told that "the concrete self is the *knower*" (p. 19); that all subjective modes of activity "may probably be reduced to the single activity of attention" (p. 138); that "subjects of experience cannot be considered to be in any sense '*in* space and time'" (p. 43[1]); and that "any spatial or temporal reference is to elements in the object of experience alone" (p. 45[1]).

Now, apart from *changes* in attention—apart, that is, from the process of concentrating attention first on one thing (or portion of the field of consciousness) and then on another—attention itself is meaningless.[2] When, therefore, we have intellectualised and minimised purposive activity to the utmost, by *reducing* it to "the single activity of attention"; we must, in deference to the principle of the timeless self, then proceed either (1) to deny that there is, in the last resort, any such thing as attention, or (2) to assert that so-called differences in attention are really differences "in the object

[1] *Cf. inter alia*, pp. 138-139.

[2] *Cf. e.g. op. cit.*, pp. 248-249: "The distinctive difference between the fields of consciousness and sub-consciousness respectively *at any instant*" [italics mine] "is that while any part of the former is capable at that instant of becoming the focus of consciousness, parts of the latter are not. But it should be noted . . . that regions of the presented whole which at one time form portions of the field of sub-consciousness, may *at another time* [italics mine] form portions of the field of consciousness, and *vice versa*".

of experience alone".[1] The attention-process, in short, forms no exception to the general principle that we have to choose between timelessness and activity: we cannot have both.

Thus, in place of the living self, which believes itself somehow to transcend the antithesis of 'subject' and 'object,' we are finally brought back, by the doctrine of the timeless self, to something indistinguishable from Kant's Synthetic Unity of Apperception. The self, which in Mr. Richardson's philosophy was to explain everything, seems to become merely an element in a purely formal analysis of 'experience'—and a remarkably elusive element at that. Everything *knowable* about it is included in the 'Me'; the 'I' is left *unknowable*, and in place of knowledge we are offered a process of 'realisation' which is never explained, and would seem to be inexplicable. While, on the one hand, there is no trace of any *trait d'union* between the 'I' and the 'Me,' on the other hand our "sensations, feelings, desires, thoughts, and acts" all appear to be impartially included in the 'object' (*cf.* p. 187). What is here to prevent any monist from overthrowing Mr. Richardson's 'pluralism' by simply suggesting that *all* the individual experiences are in fact manifestations of one and the same Universal Self?

Furthermore, the 'individual experience' 'explained' by the 'interaction' of such defecated selves is said to be *absolutely* "one and indivisible" (p. 23). As such, however, it affords no excuse for demanding a pluralistic interpretation. The unity of the individual experience is indeed so unitary that our author will not even allow us to speak of that experience as "continuous" (*ibid.*).

And this brings up yet another difficulty in the way of defining the author's standpoint. A unity so absolute as to preclude continuity must preclude the idea of *growth of experience*—and with it the distinction between past and future (*cf.* p. 174). Doubtless, the logical complement of the timeless individual self must be a timeless experience (*cf.* pp. 138-139 and 177). But that is just what makes the conception of the timeless individual self so fatally obscure—not to say unintelligible. To add to our perplexity, Mr. Richardson claims that the method of his pluralism, as opposed to the analytic method of Mr. Bertrand Russell, is *genetic;* and that "in the first stage the investigation takes the form, for the

[1] Mr. Richardson lays special stress on the assertion that "one subject implies in the presented object one, and only one, focus of attention, and *vice versa*" (p. 259). If we accept this assertion *without any temporal qualification*, we cannot escape the conclusion that every time the focus shifts, a fresh (atomistic) subject is introduced on the scene. And what then becomes of the 'self' as Synthetic Unity? If, on the other hand, we attribute the *successive* acts of attention within the life-history of the human individual to a unitary 'self'—if, that is to say, we consider that the attentive 'self' is *at the very least* also a principle of Synthetic Unity—then the very unity of that 'self' compels us to regard the 'self' as being 'in time' even if the 'object' is not. Thus, the conception of the 'self' as that which attends is hopelessly irreconcilable with the idea of the 'self' as both unitary for each individual experience *and timeless.*

most part, of an analysis of the *growth* of individual experience and of the transition by inter-subjective intercourse to universal conceptual experience" (p. 12). And that nothing may be wanting to complete our bewilderment, while he rejects the idea of "duration" as applied to the self (p. 44) he admits in relation thereto the idea of permanence through change (p. 40).[1]

If, however, disregarding these difficulties, we accept Mr. Richardson's theory of the absolute unity of the individual experience, the promised land of pluralism, as has been already hinted, still eludes us. For what pre-eminently stands in need of philosophic explanation is the possibility of analysing at all what is called an 'indivisible' experience. Mr. Richardson admits, indeed, that "Analysis of experience is by no means entirely invalid" (p. 176). It is not, however, an admission, but an explanation, of this fact that we are constrained to seek. On the face of it, if analysis of experience is possible in any sense that is relevant to philosophy, then the very foundation of Mr. Richardson's philosophy is destroyed; and if it is not possible, then the pluralistic superstructure is destroyed.

Now, such 'validity' as analysis is said to possess appears to be purely relative to the purpose of practical calculation, and is achieved in the teeth of its theoretic 'inadequacy' (see esp. pp. 176 and 29). The situation, then, appears to be this: that though analysis is theoretically impossible and philosophically irrelevant, its results may, for practical or scientific purposes, be both true and useful. And how out of such a situation a coherent pluralistic philosophy is to arise, passes all understanding.

At this point it seems clear that Mr. Richardson should have dealt more faithfully with Solipsism. For Solipsism counters the demand for an explanation of individual experience by blandly accepting, as literally true, Mr. Richardson's fundamental contention: "Strictly speaking, there *is* only one fact about such an experience in its actuality, which fact may be stated in the proposition 'It exists'. The 'it' of this proposition is the *totum objectivum*, or presented whole, of individual experience" (p. 28).

In truth, Solipsism seems to afford the ideal fulfilment of Mr. Richardson's aspirations for a 'truly explanatory' hypothesis. Unlike 'Spiritual Pluralism' it has the courage of its aspirations. It is an 'explanation' strictly in terms of the self. It secures absolute unity at the outset, instead of leaving it, at the end of a long

[1] "From the subjective point of view, if I have first *A* and then *B* before me, I can, in no significant sense, be said to have apprehended a process of change; at most there has been a change in myself, and this, since it is I who have perceived both *A* and *B*, assumes *my* permanence" (*op. cit.*, p. 40). With Mr. Richardson, as with T. H. Green, the theory of the 'timeless self' shows a disconcerting tendency to develop, dialectically, into the theory that the *individual* 'self' is the *only* thing that either does or can change, in the full sense of the word; and that it is Reality, as *opposed* to the 'self' which is really timeless.

pilgrimage, still to seek. Its fidelity to the principle of Occam's razor (*cf.* pp. 16 and 104) is beyond reproach. Its 'explanation' of experience possesses what Mr. Richardson should regard as the supreme merit of being *absolutely* non-descriptive; for it tells us nothing whatsoever *about* experience. And, by the same token, the 'explanation' is absolutely final. For, accepting experience as the revelation of itself to itself, Solipsism transcends the everlasting 'Why?' of the metaphysical system-maker by transmuting it into an imperturbable, all-embracing, and self-sufficing 'Why not?' It thus overcomes not only the duality of subject and object, but also the duality of question and answer.

Then again, just because the Solipsist can logically seek to convince no one but himself, A's knowledge of the falsity and absurdity of Solipsist B's pretension to be the sole 'subject of experience'—or even A's persuasion that not B, but A himself, supports that solitary grandeur—cannot trouble the calm current of B's spiritual existence. It is for this reason—and *in this sense* —that Solipsism is, as Mr. Richardson says, "logically irrefutable" (pp. 21 and 170). Mr. Richardson himself goes so far as to say that "the events in the experience of an individual take place *just as if* he were the only existing subject" (p. 170).[1]

Without doubt there are great and attractive possibilities in the idea of a pluralistic universe. But a 'pluralism' which oscillates between Monism and Solipsism, and which seems to have no definite idea of what it means by 'self' and 'experience' can hardly be regarded as a satisfactory solution of the philosophic problem.

HOWARD V. KNOX.

The Historical Method in Ethics, and other Essays. By JOHN HANDYSIDE, M.A. (Edin.), B.A. (Oxon.) late Lecturer in Philosophy in the University of Liverpool and Second Lieutenant in the King's (Liverpool) Regiment, 18th Battalion. Liverpool: The University Press; London: Constable & Co. Pp. xvi, 97.

OF the three great ethical questions (1) What ought we to do?; (2) How do we know what we ought to do?; (3) Why should we do what we see to be right?, it is with the second, which is logical or methodolgical, that Mr. Handyside's Essay which gives the title to this volume purports to deal. "The method of Ethics" he says, (p. 34) "is an *immanent* criticism of systems, a criticism, that is, which does not go for a criterion of systems beyond all systems—

[1] Mr. Richardson, who is here discussing the question of immortality, says: "This brings out the difficulties involved in assigning a definite meaning to the phrase 'ceasing to exist'". But it would be truer to say that it brings out the dangers involved in an uncritical acceptance of the notion of 'individual experience'.

for there is no Ethical knowledge, datum or construction, beyond all systems—but stays within the limits of the historical evolution, to criticise system by system, and part by part. And as the principle of this criticism can only be consistency, the method of Ethics is dialectical in that sense."

It is no doubt apparent inconsistency which gives rise to uncertainty and questioning; unresolved inconsistency is not to be tolerated, but we cannot conceive consistency to be an adequate criterion (except perhaps as applied to the whole, which is beyond our grasp). We always want to get rid of inconsistency—still the most thorough-going and systematic consistency cannot supply us with more than a negative criterion. It does not, *e.g.*, exclude incoherence—absence of apparent connexion. For system we require connexion of elements as well as absence of contradiction. Further, is it not as applied to the Whole only that we can say that all criticism of system must be *immanent?* We require a system, *e.g.*, of morals to be self-consistent—so far the criterion is immanent, but we also require it to harmonise with the *other* knowledge which we accept.

At the end of the essay Mr. Handyside speaks again of the criticism or immanent dialectic which, as the true method of ethics, "is the truth of, and takes up into a higher synthesis, the two imperfect and inadequate methods, the empirical and historical on the one side, and the rationalistic or demonstrative on the other". This latter is blamed for pinning its faith to *law*, whereas law "is not adequate to our moral experience," and it is to *system* and *consistency*—"systematic consistency" (p. 29)—that we must look for our criterion. But it seems difficult to see why the name of *law* should be refused to the notion or principle of consistency on which Mr. Handyside relies for systematisation in Ethics. This principle (or notion) is treated by him as though it were fundamental, an universally applicable criterion of valid ethical construction—a principle which could not reasonably be questioned, since according to him *consistent* means *rational*. Thus this principle would seem to carry its own evidence with it, and to be in fact a self-evident law used to systematise ethical material. The author, however, appears to hold that no *ethical* propositions are self-evident. But unless he can convince us of this his condemnation of "demonstrating" morality falls rather flat, and moreover the wind is taken out of his own sails, for as far as can be made out he never definitely admits any fundamental difference between 'moral' and 'positive' judgments, and on p. 23 rather anxiously discusses the question whether from historical ('positive') propositions, 'ethical' propositions can be proved. If self-evidence of propositions is not recognised, must not the self-evidence of conclusions from premises be given up too? It would seem to be only the self-evidence of the connexion between the steps in any process of reasoning, however lengthy, or between premises and conclusion in the simplest argument, that enables ordinary people

to follow the process and accept the conclusion. And if self-evidence in any case turns out to be illusory, we resort to a fresh application of the same test.

Mr. Handyside's indictment of the "Rationalistic or demonstrative method" affirms that attempts "to arrive by its means at laws which should have a universal claim on human conduct . . . have invariably failed" and expresses the opinion that the last attempt of this kind—that of Sidgwick—has even "demonstrably failed"—in fact, *must* have failed *because* every reasoning the conclusion of which is a moral judgment must have had some moral judgment as premise, and thus "must rest upon at least one moral judgment which is merely assumed". In criticising Sidgwick the author pays no attention to that writer's account of his own view, but applying to it the general considerations above referred to, pronounces that "those most ultimate propositions on which Sidgwick and his predecessors base their proofs of laws or maxims, either are not moral judgments, and in that case do not prove the conclusions, or being such are themselves equally in need of proof and equally unprovable". As far as I can see, the whole general contention is itself an assumption for which no evidence is produced, and the acceptance of which would seem to invalidate any system of Ethics into which reasoning enters.

As regards Prof. Sidgwick's Ethics, this is simply condemned without examination, and I venture to conjecture without first-hand knowledge on the part of the critic. Sidgwick (like Clarke, Kant, etc.) takes as ultimate and fundamental, propositions which he regards as self-evident, and among these Kant's Categorical Imperative "Act from a principle or maxim that you can will to be a universal law," and he gives us in his Philosophical Intuitionism an Ethics based on the principle of Rational Hedonism (no mere formal principle) which he regards as self-evident, and employs to systematise the facts and laws of moral life into a coherent, comprehensive and consistent whole, with the aid of all that ordered wealth of "historical" knowledge which he had at his command. According to Mr. Handyside such "history" is that which must supply the real material, the intuitional content, required by the "general form of all ideals," namely, the conception of System—"a scheme left to receive some concrete filling". Thus Sidgwick's Ethics does in point of fact fulfil the requirements of (1) system, and (2) concrete filling got from history and experience—conditions which Mr. Handyside seems to lay down, but which apparently he has not given himself a chance of discovering in Sidgwick's work. It is perhaps only careful readers of *The Methods of Ethics* who can appreciate the historical and critical equipment of the author, or the skill and thoroughness of the ethical systematisation which it accomplishes. The most relentless testing by summarising, indexing, and cross-references, and still more by long study, only serves to bring into relief the consistency and coherence, the articulation and underlying unity which make one think of the harmonious

one-ness of a living organism.[1] On the whole, Mr. Handyside's version of what he calls the "rationalistic or demonstrative" method in Ethics, seems strangely undiscerning. His account of Intuitionism in morals (p. 24) is grotesque, and his report of the Ethics of Prof. Sidgwick (to whom he repeatedly refers, and whom he contemns as having perpetrated the last attempt in this direction) is absolutely beside the mark.

Mr. Handyside is genuinely interested in his topic—he is thoughtful and desirous of getting at the truth—nothing is more remote from his intention than intellectual dishonesty or conscious misrepresentation. But this, while it makes him keen to justify the view which he has adopted and to meet objections to it, has not led him to make any careful or thorough study of those very divergent ethical thinkers—exponents of "Ethics as usually and traditionally understood"—who are here lumped together under the name of "rationalising demonstrationists". It is particularly to be regretted that Mr. Handyside did not devote more attention to Prof. Sidgwick, whom he dismisses in the most cavalier fashion, without, it would seem, having either heard of his historical work in Ethics and Politics, or made acquaintance at first-hand with *The Methods of Ethics.* (The general absence of illustrations and of precise references in this essay is a serious defect, and nowhere more unfortunate than in the present instance.)

The reason why Mr. Handyside calls his Essay *The Historical Method in Ethics* seems to be that while, as we have seen, he distrusts the supposed alternative method of "rationalising demonstration" ("the usual and traditional method," which is regarded as such a derelict)—he believes that these two can be taken up into a higher synthesis by (p. 38) "the critical or dialectical or speculative method" of which Historical Ethics (which he thinks has been much neglected) is when broadly taken "an essential aspect . . . supplying all the real matter or material for that criticism or immanent dialectic" which (as already noted) he regards as "the true method of Ethics" (and indeed of all knowledge). "Practical thought," says Mr. Handyside, "opinion as distinguished from science, works with intuitions; and there is nothing to produce intuitions but History." This is the concluding sentence of his Essay—and it seems to want a good deal of elucidation. Why should "practical thought"—which, I suppose, means thought about Practice or Conduct—be stigmatised as *opinion?* What science is there that derives no assistance from 'intuitions'? What Mr. Handyside means by Method is not very clear. He does not seem sure that Validity does not depend upon Origin. He identifies Rational with Consistent—and does not distinguish what men do, have done, or will do, from what they *ought* to do. He lays great stress upon the importance of Historical Ethics for a complete view of the subject, but does not seem to have realised

[1] It may perhaps be permitted to refer here to the article *Henry Sidgwick* in vol. xi. of Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.*

how much has been done already in this direction. "The theory of knowledge," he says (p. 27) "seems ultimately to hold that the only possible criterion of the system of truth as a whole is its consistency with itself, its exclusion of contradiction"—hence "the test of consistency may be of more value in the case of a view of morality as system than in the other view of it as law". (We may note here that System is what all the philosophical moralists—those who reject mere Perceptional or Dogmatic Ethics —have aimed at—*e.g.*, Kant and Sidgwick.)

"Ultimately," Mr. Handyside conceives, "we have grounds for believing that only certain forms of Being, of relation, and of system, or only one form, can be self-consistent, and such a form, if any, must be found for the ethical system, if ethicality is to be equal to the Absolute" (p. 38). What, in his view, History contributes seems to be the 'intuition' that men "have to create or maintain" a moral and social system "in which they may find their true selves, and so be truly satisfied" (p. 30). This is certainly something concrete, but it is highly ambiguous. Does "their true selves" mean their better selves (the selves which they ought to be) or the selves which they in fact are? Does true satisfaction mean a satisfaction with which a man *is* satisfied or with which he *ought* to be satisfied? Does *satisfied* mean *happy?* If it means 'happy,' no doubt we have here an end which most men have actually been pursuing, and which in the view of many moralists—including the Philosophical Intuitionists or Rational Hedonists who have been so unceremoniously dismissed—*ought* to be pursued. But the grounds on which precisely this deliverance of History—of 'intuition'—*ought to be* accepted, are not indicated. Does the dictum, that to be "truly satisfied" is man's ultimate aim, his true end, carry its own evidence with it? If not, by what method, by what logical procedure is it recommended or justified? The question which Method answers is: How do we know that this is right, or true? If there is a historical method of Ethics, it should show us by history what we ought to do; if it does not do this, it is either not a method of Ethics, or not historical. If our test is nothing less than the consistency or harmony of the *whole* we have no test for any part until we know the whole. We seem, to miss all through any clear distinction between justification and history, between what *ought to be*, and what *is*, done or believed. Ethics evaporates—Method eludes us. The reconciliations adumbrated are obscure.

Mr. Handyside considers that in passing to 'historical' method in Ethics we pass to an "empiricist account of morals," "an empirical and historical method," and this view of Method brings us to the *aperçu* that "Ethics is a positive science, a science about men's notions of value" (p. 5). It thus looks as though Mr. Handyside were here using 'historical method' in a sense that can "hardly be distinguished from the inductive method"[1]—("there is nothing to produce [particular] intuitions but history" he

[1] Sidgwick, *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations*, p. 126.

says, p. 39)—opposing this 'historical' procedure to "deductive reasoning from general premises assumed or supposed to be self-evident"[1] to which at the beginning of his Essay he so much objects. It is, of course, matter of 'experience,' of 'history,' that men hold such or such "notions of value," but it is only because the notions held are notions *of value* that they are ethically interesting and important—it is not in the mere occurrence of such entertained notions, but in the meaning and validity of "value" that we have to seek justification for 'ethical' as distinguished from 'positive' science, for 'ought' as distinguished from 'is'. Good is what we *ought* to seek, Right what we *ought* to do, even as Truth is what we *ought* to believe.

We may recall that Mr. Handyside was hard at work teaching and examining from the time when he left Oxford in 1907, and it was only after being appointed at Liverpool in 1911 that his attention was specially directed to "moral and social philosophy". When the great War came in 1914 he was keen to join the army, and received a commission in the 16th King's (Liverpool) Regiment in 1915. In October of the following year he "was mortally wounded while gallantly rallying his men in a particularly awkward and desperate situation". He lived and died as a brave man should, and was one of the many who could ill be spared—a man of intrepid spirit, strong to confront difficulties whether of thought or life. There can be no doubt that if he had had time and leisure for further study he might have done distinguished work—not only as a teacher, not only as a citizen, but also as a seeker after truth, and a thinker who tried to think for himself—his face was set towards the light—he saw "a great thing to pursue". At the time when the Essay which we are considering was written, he seems to have been at the stage in which his desire to reach the truth took the form of trying to show that the doctrine which he had accepted—only in an anticipatory fashion perhaps, but to which he held tenaciously and loyally—met all legitimate demands, and that other and competing doctrines did not do so. We must recognise that this stage might naturally have passed into another—still what we are here primarily concerned with is, of course, the Essay as it stands. It is in some sort a first attempt on the part of a young writer to deal independently with some of the largest and most difficult of philosophical problems, and it is perhaps no wonder that he has not wholly succeeded where so many have failed. Of the other two Essays which the volume contains—"The Absolute and Intellect," and "System and Mechanism"—it may be sufficient to quote a sentence from the very interesting Biographical Note by Prof. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, who says that "they are the work of one fresh from the study of constructive idealism as presented in the writings of Bradley and Bosanquet, and the author is in the main in sympathy with that position".

[1] Sidgwick, *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations*, p. 126.

E. E. C. JONES.

VI.—NEW BOOKS.

Mind and Conduct. Morse Lectures Delivered at the Union Theological Seminary in 1919. By Henry Rutgers Marshall, L.H.D., D.S. Williams and Norgate. Pp. ix + 236.

Anything on this subject from the pen of Henry Rutgers Marshall merits the closest attention and the most careful consideration, all the more so when, as here, the conclusions he has arrived at in several well-known books are brought together in a concise form. Possibly the form is too concise. Personally we must confess that we should have preferred that the more fundamental questions raised had been discussed at such length and in such detail as their importance and the difficulty of the problems they involve seem to demand. Our reason for such a preference will probably be clear to most people when we say that the eight chapters in this book are devoted respectively to: Consciousness and Behaviour, Instinct and Reason, The Self, Creativeness and Ideals, Freedom and Responsibility, Pleasure and Pain, Happiness, Intuition and Reason, and that there are two appendices, the first on the "Causal Relation between Mind and Body," the second on "Outer-world Objects". Nor is the book a mere popular and superficial skimming of the topics. Though here and there traces show themselves of its original form and purpose as a series of lectures to a general audience, the book as a whole is logical, closely reasoned, and fundamental. But the inevitable consequence is, seeing that as far as the topics discussed are concerned, the contents of a library are compressed within the covers of a two hundred page book, that dogmatic statement is sometimes substituted for critical development at the most controversial points. In the circumstances the fact that the author has already elsewhere argued the controversial questions out at length only partly excuses the omission of the argument here.

The book is divided into three sections. Part I. consisting of the first three chapters is headed "The Correlation of Mind and Conduct". No psychological account of mind or consciousness is attempted. That is assumed. The claims of behaviourism are alluded to but not examined. Some discussion of these claims would seem to be relevant to the topic under consideration, and it is not entirely satisfactory to find it omitted. Nor is the feeling of dissatisfaction lessened by the account which Dr. Marshall gives of the early stages in the rise of consciousness of Self. Thus the statement that "each human being realises that he himself is a man-animal, and each of us observes his own behaviour more constantly and more carefully than that of other animals" is, to say the least, questionable, while the paragraphs which follow are equally open to the criticism that the point of view of the psychologist is assumed as the point of view of the naïve mind. A statement like "I do not hesitate to say that my neighbour was afraid when he fled in a panic, although I observed nothing but his flight, and no fear at all," illustrates admirably the defect of too great brevity of treatment. Surely there are variations in the degree of confidence with which I assert that another person is afraid, dependent not

merely on the external signs I consciously observe, but on subtle signs which I cannot specify, and on my own emotional reaction to all the signs.

The argument of the first chapter leads up to the important conclusion that the "noetic and neururgic correspondence appears to be thoroughgoing," that is, not only is there no psychosis without neurosis, but there is no neurosis without psychosis. If the psychologist accepts the proposition that there is no psychosis without neurosis, he is practically compelled to save his consistency and even his science by taking the further step, but, as a psychologist, he may surely suspend judgment on the first proposition in the lack of sufficient evidence, and it is by no means certain that he will not escape more difficulties than he encounters by taking this line. In any case the recognition of thoroughgoing correspondence necessarily involves the recognition of the 'unconcious' on an indefinitely large scale. We are in fact brought to an 'unconscious' more akin to the 'unconscious' of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann than the 'unconscious' of Freud and Jung. Apparently ignoring this wide extension which must be given to the term, Dr. Marshall would designate "subconsciousness" preferably "subattentive consciousness". The suggested terminology is of doubtful value, even having regard only to the narrower 'unconscious' of modern psychology. 'Unconscious' itself is certainly an unhappy term. But the essential character of the processes so designated does not seem to be their relation to attention so much as their relation to that synthesis which makes the personal consciousness, and 'subpersonal' would probably mark this relation better than 'subattentive'.

In the second chapter the chief theme is the contrast between instinctive and adaptive actions, and between "instinct-feelings" and intelligence. The author comes to the conclusion that no clear line of demarcation can be drawn, either on the behaviour side or on the consciousness side, that all behaviour is influenced by past situations as related to the present, and by present situations as related to the future, and that when we overlook the first we call the act adaptive, when we overlook the second instinctive, the position being analogous as regards the corresponding consciousness. "All behaviour displays a unity of process," and "all situations in consciousness display a unity of process".

The third chapter, devoted to the discussion of the Self, ought to be central in the book, but the argument is so difficult to follow, and the conclusions seem so strange, that we cannot yet be certain that we have grasped Dr. Marshall's meaning. The main thesis seems to be that "presentations" given in attention are simply "emphases within the complex psychic system of consciousness," the unemphasised "something more of consciousness" being the Self to which the presentations are given. On the face of it this seems a rather high-handed setting aside of the verdict of consciousness itself. The idea of Self, he further states, is a presented concept "and is but an image or simulacrum"—whatever this may mean—of the real Self, which is unpresentable. The questions are too large to go into here, and a perfunctory criticism would be worse than useless.

Part II., on 'Some Implications of the Correlation' begins with Chapter IV., entitled "Creativeness and Ideals". The main topic discussed here is the contrast between mechanism and vitalism, and their respective claims in the realm of the psychical. The conclusion is that creativeness is a marked characteristic of our psychic life, especially in connexion with adaptive acts and the corresponding intelligence consciousness. The existence of ideals is the most striking evidence of such creativeness, and these are quite obviously outside any possibility of a mechanistic explanation. The keynote, however, of the whole chapter is the notion of creativeness. Continuing the suggested noetic and neururgic correspondence of the first

chapter, Dr. Marshall holds that there is evidence to justify us in asserting creativeness all through Nature—objective creativeness he calls it, as contrasted with the subjective creativeness of consciousness. But the creative spontaneity of the Self as exhibited in ideals and purposes is the most tremendously significant fact of all.

The following chapter is devoted to "Freedom and Responsibility," and contains nothing that is really new in the light of the conclusions he has already arrived at. He has obviously 'freedom' already in his 'creativeness'. The outcome is that the Self is free to act in accordance with its own nature, the choice between alternatives being due to "the creativeness inherent in the free Self". We are always responsible for our acts. The notion that there is such a thing as irresponsibility is erroneous, and arises from the fact that we tend to define responsibility "in terms of accountability rather than in terms of authorship".

Part III. is entitled "Guides to Conduct" and is concerned mainly with the psychology of ethics as the title would lead us to expect. The argument need not be followed here. There is, however, a digression into educational theory in Chapter VI. (Pleasure and Pain), which is not a little interesting. Dr. Marshall obviously distrusts modern educational reforms, more especially along the lines which he takes to be those characteristic of the teaching of Froebel and Montessori. The educationist would have little fault to find with the argument, were it not for certain misleading suggestions which may conceivably do some harm by impeding educational progress. The first such misleading suggestion is that modern educational theory of the type indicated aims at making school work "amusing" to the child. Dr. Marshall says he finds the same idea as far back as Plato. It is in Plato, but neither in Plato nor in Froebel or Montessori is it adequately described in the way he suggests. If he will examine the opposing doctrine of effort in the light of the motives employed to produce the effort—for unmotived effort is impossible—he will probably come to see the real inwardness of the contentions of practically every modern educator. The second misleading suggestion is that experiments in the line of modern educational theory have probably been tried again and again in the past ever since the time of Plato, and having failed have left no record, so that the traditional education represents the surviving fittest. To any one who knows the facts the suggestion verges on the absurd. The new theories are enormously more difficult than the traditional education to carry out in practice. A gifted teacher here and there may in the past have approximated to the education which theorists of the present are aiming at, but that is all that has ever been possible. Even to-day with carefully trained teachers the ideal is still remote, though we have perhaps definitely entered upon the road towards its attainment. In other respects much of what he says is sound, if too vague and general to be very helpful to the educator.

In spite of our criticisms it must be freely acknowledged that the book as a whole is a valuable one, and deserving of careful study in practically every sentence. It requires careful study in fact owing to its concentrated tabloid character. It is by no means a book that is easily read and digested. So much the better perhaps in these days when books on psychology have so multiplied that room on our bookshelves has to be rationed out with the utmost care.

JAMES DREVER.

Teoria Generale dello Spirito come Atto Puro. By GIOVANNI GENTILE. Terza Edizione riveduta. Bari: Laterza e Figli, 1920. Pp. ix, 244.

In a previous reference to Gentile's ideas (MIND, July, 1920), I raised the question whether the character of reality as something given in the

"atto puro" of the mind was consistent with its character as the universe and the "whole". In the present work we have more material than before for an answer to this question.

If there could ever have been any doubt whether the author intended to identify the real with the ideas of individual minds, there can be none in presence of this book. Quite explicitly, the proposition "that the spiritual world is conceivable only as the very reality of my spiritual activity" is here pronounced to be nonsense if we construe it of the empirical ego which is one among many things and persons (p. 12). We have to take it of the transcendental ego, the Person who has no plural, the constructive process of all our experience (pp. 13-15). It is quite clear that this being, or rather this becoming, for the term being is rejected as inappropriate, is to be considered as a real whole, "il tutto" (p. 217), which includes in its energy all persons, all space and time, and all that we call nature, which apart from it or him are but artificial abstractions.

But now our question returns upon us in a further form. If reality is one with this super-personal and all-inclusive activity, can it be so strictly identified, as the writer desires, with the actuality of mind, with its very "act in action" ("atto in atto," p. 6)? Must it not be largely burdened with implicit features, outside its activity in any one time and place, which would constitute a transcendence of immediacy, and so form a link with older doctrines involving transcendence, which perhaps the new metaphysic has rashly construed as transcendence not of immediacy but of experience—such as Plato's Forms, and Hegel's Logical Idea or Nature?

If, on the other hand, we are really to insist on the act in action, saying that the idea "cannot be absolute, if it does not coincide with the very act of knowing it; because,—and this is the deepest origin of the difficulties with which Platonism has to struggle—if the idea was not the very act by which the idea is known, the idea would leave something outside it, and the idealism would not be absolute" (p. 217),—if we are to insist on this creationism so very completely, is not the essence of knowledge itself endangered? We do not indeed think that knowledge lies in copying a transcendent real, but we are accustomed to suppose that for all knowledge there is a real of which it is true and which speaks in it; and that if there were not, it would be merely a psychical succession. Does the new metaphysic with its creative becoming impeach this principle? I think there is some confusion between a spirit which embodies a reality guarded by the law of contradiction against confusion, and one frozen into immobility by such a law as supposed to exclude all synthesis and change (pp. 35, 37, 154). If Gentile's Idealism were steered straight at the point where creativeness is to be reconciled with rationality, if I felt sure that he really held the inseparableness of identity and diversity, I should welcome his doctrine with much greater happiness.

A restatement on this head would affect his attitude to other idealism on the problems of progress and change within the real itself, and on the very serious kindred problem of the relation between morality and religion. His standpoint, like that of much recent philosophy, is essentially that of morality, involving perfectibility and imperfection *ad infinitum* in the individual. I contrast certain characteristic sentences. "L'idealismo moderno—si muove in una direzione affatto opposta a quella in cui è orientato il misticismo." It is "profondamente Cristiano; intendendo per Cristianesimo la concezione intrinseceamente morale del mondo, . . . Il Cristianesimo—scopre la realtà che non è, ma crea se stessa, ed è quale si crea—una realtà che spetta a noi di costruire" (pp. 230-231).

We may compare with this Mr. Bradley's well-known judgment (*Appearance* p. 500). "You cannot be a Christian if you maintain that

progress is final and ultimate and the last truth about things. . . . Make the moral point of view absolute, and then realise your position. You have become not merely irrational, but you have also, I presume, broken with every considerable religion." This latter feature is very striking in Gentile's remarks on Hellenism; and on all religions of the East except what he interprets as Christianity. I insist on the antithesis; because I believe that it—the opposition of the purely moralistic or ethical and the profoundly religious attitude, is more and more emerging as the dividing line and divergent aspiration of modern modes of thought.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Discorsi di Religione. By GIOVANNI GENTILE. In series Uomini e Idee a cura di E. CODIGNOLA. Vallecchi, Editore, Firenze, 1920. Pp. 136. 5 fr.

This little book appears to me exceedingly valuable, both for its striking appreciation of an essential principle in idealistic philosophy, and for its clear and concise presentation of the quintessence of the author's views, explaining in some degree the prima facie exaggeration with which that principle is embodied in them.

The volume consists of three addresses on religion, the first of which "Il Problema Politico," was published in the review, *Politica*, in March, 1920, but the second and third, "Il Problema Filosofico," and "Il Problema Morale," now see the light for the first time.

We must not dwell upon the exceedingly interesting sketch, going back to the first "risorgimento," which explains how the new and positive "laicity" of Italian opinion to-day sprang by opposition out of the old and negative laicity or naturalism and anti-clericalism, which was itself a reaction against the larger and nobler liberalism of the Mazzinian epoch. "I giovani, a cui è indirizzato il mio discorso, mi intendono. Gli altri alzino pure le spalle, e tirino via." The men who have had experience of the war, so I understand him, had before it felt what a mere agnosticism in education meant, and are resolved to have something truly spiritual in the future. "Se la nostra azione è azione politica o Stato, il nostro Stato conviene pure che sia governato da uno spirito schiettamente e profondamente religioso" (p. 39).

But what does religion mean? Here, in the address on the philosophical problem, we approach what is the clearest statement known to me of Gentile's special point of view, which governs not only his idea of religion but his entire metaphysic. And in this work we have not only the point of view, but, I think explanations and illustrations which enable us to see its possibility more fully than I at least have grasped it before.

The paradox involved is the apparently absolute rejection of every "presupposto," and the consequent utter disruption of the philosophical tradition and also a fundamental perplexity as to how the spirit can connect itself with the universe. Modern philosophy in general, and the modern view of religion in particular, are taken as beginning *de novo* with Kant, as wholly and utterly divorced from the spirit of Greek thought, and as not attaining their genuine modern form even in Hegel, or before the present generation of Italian thinkers. It seems a good opportunity to look straight at this problem of the "presupposto," and understand what it implies, and how it affects, in particular, the author's religious standpoint.

You have the essential argument on nearly every page in Gentile;

here are two characteristic passages. "If there is anyone or anything beyond me, I am conditioned by it; and my action, my own being, does not depend only on me; I am not free" (p. 48). Or again "The great alternatives are two; either naturalism (however nature is understood, as material or as intelligible) or spiritualism. Either all is nature, or all is spirit. Since all cannot be nature, because, if so, we could not say even so much; then, all is spirit. And this cannot but mean that spirit has no preconditions (presupposti), and therefore is creator. This means that if I need, in the concrete, to conceive myself as thinking (thinking, for instance, a spiritualism) as spirit, I, whether I like it or not, am in the necessity of not presupposing anything as prior to myself; that is, of feeling everything as inward to me; of feeling the infinite responsibility of the act in which I posit myself, in which I realise my life, implicating the whole, and generating effects which will have their repercussion on the whole" (p. 74).

Now all this, in a sense, we are accustomed to. But when we find that the "presupposto" thus rejected is construed to include Plato's Forms, God or Nature as realities, and Hegel's logical idea, as each and all of them "block" objects of thought, given, transcendent, and immutable, denying all freedom to the finite spirit, we wonder in what sense the universe is to be a whole, and whether or no it is conceived as transcending the immediacy of the particular thinking being.

Yet we have seen in others of Gentile's works that he is fully aware how impossible it is to construe reality in terms of the particularity of the particular immediate individual. So far from the experience relied on being immediate and particular, it is just mediation and universality which are its note (p. 105). The Ego which is all-creative is Kant's transcendental ego, if we strike out all relation of experience to a noumenon. It is an Ego which is "We".

This we knew. But how at all to connect the actual individual's thinking with the universe which is thought, so as to avoid the sheer emptiness of an abstract creative liberty; this, on Gentile's principles we, or I at least, did not see how to do. In a minor detail, the same point arose where Croce denied the discipline of art under the external world.

But in this book there are elucidations which help us to see our way. The story of the formation of our moral freedom through "mediation and universality" (p. 105 ff.) seems to show that that with which we are in living unity, a social law, the mind and institutions of a group (pp. 107-108) is not to be counted as a "presupposto" in the sense which demands rejection, but is to be reckoned as inherent in the "We" whose pure and actual action is the all-creating spirit which "makes" itself and its world. Even the old example of the slave's attainment of liberty along with his master—the learning to rule through learning to obey—is recognised as a case of the law. All this we welcome.

But then from the position here recognised, that of the group-mind and communal life, an argument, we think, will run back and incorporate with our living real all that transcends, not our experience, but only our immediacy—Plato's Forms, and Nature, and the logical idea, and the living and immanent God. The view would remain good as insisting on immanence and unity, but its startling originality would be gone.

We may test this suggestion by two points on which Gentile is very explicit—(i) the absence of true morality from Greek ideas of life, and (ii) the predominant place of morality as against religion in genuine and characteristic modern thought.

(i) Greek Philosophy is naturalistic (as is every philosophy which recognises a reality prior to the finite spirit, even if it is Berkeley's

God), eudæmonistic (p. 95) and the intuition of the moral life is foreign to it (p. 98 n.). This is because in it the finite spirit accepts a reality which it does not create. The originating intuition of Christianity, on the other hand, "the ferment of all modern civilisation, is that the world is ours because we make it in the light not of what is but of what ought to be" (p. 70). "Love your neighbour" becomes moral when it refers to a moral act, not, as in Plato's love of the good, to a universal natural instinct (p. 99). Plato's real is there for the spirit to conform to; the Christian real is not there, but is an "ought to be" for the spirit to make. "If the good *was* originally, we could not make it (or do it), and the good which is not *done* (made) is not good." Therefore it is not a "*presupposto*" (levelled at Plato's "good") but a *result* of life and action (pp. 120-121).

This conception of an absolute new departure in Christianity, culminating in Kantian ethics and in the attitude of creative idealism, though it lays emphasis on an important feature of the progressive modern mind, seems wholly to ignore the mode of participation by which Gentile has explained how the finite spirit is linked with the group-mind, nourished by it and embodied in it. For this, the recognition of the human-divine spirit in the communal life, is the golden thread which links Plato to St. Paul and St. Paul to modern thought. And apart from such a recognition, extended to the universe, we hardly see how absurdity can be escaped when we insist on the truth that nothing is really ours which does not spring from our will.

(ii) In the third address, on "the moral problem," we are shown the conclusions which attach to this violent emphasis on the creative aspect of the spirit. "Modern philosophy" (the "actual idealism" before us) "is essentially ethical," and not, except in a subordinate sense, religious. "Idealism must say that morality and religion are antithetic terms, each of which is the negation of the other: *mors tua vita mea*" (p. 130). For religion is essentially mystical, the annihilation of the subject before an unknown transcendent object, and its attitude is essentially "where God is, we are not; in so far as he is, we are not" (p. 78). Here again the identity and diversity of the divine and human will in the communal spirit appears to be forgotten, and the true religious insight, that if God were not, we certainly should be nothing, the reverse of that embodied in the above proposition, to be ignored. Morality, then, is taken to include religion, but not as the element of peace and unity with reality, but rather as the element of negation and sacrifice of the subject, religion *per se* being indeed not a tenable attitude, but only intelligible and realisable as supplemented by philosophy, which restores the self-assertion of the subject, annihilated in religion. And so we are amazed, though we ought not to be surprised, to find the following utterance: "But Christianity is not solely a religion; it is also a philosophy, and therefore a moral doctrine; and its greatness rests on the philosophical and moral truths which it proclaimed, and by which it succeeded in transforming human civilisation, not on its sheer religious element" (p. 129).

Clearly we are here on the whole confronted by the moralistic attitude as opposed to that of religion, the attitude of individual perfectibility and progress *ad infinitum* which is so powerful in many philosophies of to-day. But this is not the end of the matter. In this case the attitude in question represents a justified hostility to the mythical transcendence and externalisation of God, and a demand for the synthesis of his reality in and through our inner life. It seems, after all, that there is recognised a divine reality, with which in some sense (we recall the lesson of the group-mind) man may be at one and may pass beyond himself, although it

certainly appears as if his value were to lie wholly in his private actual attainment, and not in a union by love and faith with a universe greater than himself.

"Religion, from this point of view, rather than the negation, is, in truth, the school or apprenticeship of the moral will. A school from which no spirit will ever believe itself discharged which does not hold its day's work to be finished, and which feels its life as an unceasing progress in learning what it is to create one's own personality." These are the concluding words of the book, and I am not perfectly sure of their import. But I suppose it to be that religion is the sense of imperfection and defect which urges forward the finite spirit, and that it does not, or not appreciably, involve the sense of peace in unity with the whole through faith and will, which to us seems fundamental to religion, and just to be wanting to morality. Yet we can understand in some degree from the author's emphasis on the "We" of the group-mind how it is possible for him to refer, as it seems, the very universe itself to the creative fact of our will and the process of our cognition.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

The Foundations of Einstein's Theory of Gravitation. By ERWIN FREUNDLICH. Preface by A. EINSTEIN. Authorised English Translation by H. L. BROSE, M.A. Introduction by H. H. TURNER, D.Sc., F.R.S. Cambridge University Press. Pp. xvi, 60.

This pamphlet is worthy of the numerous and eminent fairy godfathers who have stood sponsor for it. Herr Freundlich wrote it; Einstein gave it his *imprimatur;* Mr. Brose became acquainted with it while interned in Germany, and (not having heard, presumably, that the Allied scientists had officially determined that German science was merely an inferior imitation of their own brilliantly original discoveries) determined to translate it. Prof. Turner and Prof. Eddington (who cannot plead the excuse of ignorance) encouraged Mr. Brose; and the former provided an excellent introduction. The result is the best account of the new theory, for the purpose of the general reader, that has yet appeared. Prof. Eddington's *Report* is of course considerably more detailed, but there is much in it that can hardly be understood by anyone who is not pretty familiar with mathematical physics. Herr Freundlich's pamphlet should be intelligible to any educated reader, whilst at the same time it is full and accurate and not in the least 'popular' in the bad sense of the word. The translation seems to have been thoroughly well done, and Mr. Brose is to be congratulated on his work.

The following points may be of special interest to readers of MIND. (i) The author lays special stress on the work of Riemann on manifolds, and points out how Einstein's theory is a development of ideas thrown out by Riemann. (ii) He points out that the equations of the special theory of relativity might have been deduced from simple and almost self-evident considerations without reference to the velocity of light. It follows from these that there must be *some* velocity which will be reckoned to be the same in magnitude by all observers in uniform relative motion. That this velocity is *finite*, and is in fact that of light *in vacuo*, is an additional empirical fact established by the Michelsen-Morley experiment. These statements may be compared with Prof. Whitehead's results in his *Principles of Natural Knowledge.* (iii) He shows very clearly how the new theory fastens on the two weak points in the Newtonian mechanics—absolute motion, and the unexplained identity of inertial and gravitational

mass—and successfully avoids the first and clears up the second. It thus avoids the one great objection to Newton's mechanics, and synthesises the two principles which immortalise his name—the laws of motion and the law of gravitation. Lastly (iv) Herr Freundlich makes great play with two epistemological principles, which he regards as lying at the base of Einstein's theory and as furnishing a kind of limiting condition to which any satisfactory physical theory must conform. As they both seem to me somewhat doubtful, it may be worth while to say a few words about them.

The two principles are the denial of action at a distance, and the demand that 'only those things are to be regarded as being in causal connexion which are capable of being actually observed'. The first is supposed to show that the law of gravitation, as stated, cannot be ultimate, because, in the formula $\frac{d^2r_1}{dt^2} = \gamma\frac{m_2}{(r_2 - r_1)^2}$, we have a *finite* distance, $r_2 - r_1$, on the right-hand side. 'The distances between points which are at *finite* distances from one another, must not occur in these laws, but only those between points infinitely near to one another.' The second is supposed, both by Herr Freundlich and by Einstein himself, to be the motive for getting rid of absolute space, time, and motion in the statement of the laws of nature.

The following criticisms suggest themselves at once. (i) If space be continuous there are no points 'infinitely near one another'; and therefore the first principle cannot be fulfilled. (ii) Even if there were infinitesimal distances they certainly are not the distances that can be observed, and therefore to regard purely differential laws as ultimate involves a breach of the second principle. (iii) It is rather unfortunate to insist on the absolute necessity of such laws at a time when pure mathematics is rapidly developing, in the theory of integral equations, methods that enable us to deal with integrated laws; when physics, in the theory of Quanta, is moving rather in the direction of discreteness; and when certain philosophers, such as Russell, are developing the notion that the continuity of nature is a logical construction, and that the ultimate data are of finite magnitude. (iv) The second epistemological principle seems to me, as I have argued elsewhere, to have very little in its favour, if taken as anything more than a methodological postulate. Physics certainly cannot get on if it confines itself to what actually can be observed. On the other hand, anything that could exist is in principle *observable*, *i.e.*, if we had the right kind of senses we could observe it. The fact that we should need a greater modification in our senses to enable us to perceive points of absolute space, if there be such things, than to enable us to perceive electrons, if there be such things, is surely epistemologically quite irrelevant. Naturally we ought to avoid postulating unobservable entities if we can do without them, and Einstein has at length shown that we can do without absolute space, time, and motion in mechanics. But the real objection to them has always been, not simply that they were unobservable, but that they did nothing. Electrons and molecules are postulated as causes and their properties can be determined with more and more accuracy from their observable effects. The laws of mechanics profess to *analyse* all motions; absolute space, time, etc., were merely parameters that simplified the analysis; and it was always clear in principle that they must somehow be dispensable.

C. D. Broad.

Theology as an Empirical Science. By Douglas Clyde Macintosh, Ph.D. London: Allen & Unwin. Pp. xvi, 270.

Prof. Macintosh has written a fresh and able book which deserves a longer notice than is possible here. In the Preface he tells us he will not cavil about the right to term theology an 'empirical science,' if the reader accepts the view that "a genuine knowledge of a divine Reality has been gained through religious experience at its best," and that "this knowledge may be formulated and further developed by means of the inductive procedure advocated and exemplified in the body of this book". The author is of course right in insisting that theology must set out from the data of religious experience: Schleiermacher taught us this, though Prof. Macintosh is more careful than Schleiermacher not to identify religious experience with the experience of a particular church. Still it is not so clear that theology can be regarded as a purely descriptive or empirical science. So-called inductive procedure is never merely inductive, and least of all in religion where the data are not bare data but always involve interpretations and valuations. The writer, however, is justified in claiming that the theologian need not be unscientific; he may follow the method of other investigators, examining a specific experience and trying to understand it.

Dr. Macintosh holds that in the religious consciousness we have experience of a divine Reality, and the fundamental hypothesis of theological science is, that man can learn by 'observation and experiment' what God does under different conditions. Generalising from these data we reach 'empirical theological laws,' laws which tell us how God can be depended on under given circumstances. Thus testing religious experience we can build up a body of theological laws and establish a religious theory. Theology, like the other sciences, has a pre-scientific stage out of which it develops.

Spiritual experience has two aspects, an objective and a subjective. Revelation on the one side has its correlative in religious perception on the other. Or, to put it otherwise, there is a constant and a variable factor in religion, God being the constant, and the human adjustment by which God is experienced the variable. Prof. Macintosh finds revelation most conspicuously present in Christianity, and especially in Christ. But his conception of revelation is broad, and his interpretation of Christ and the Gospels is free of dogmatism.

In the third part of the book entitled "Theological Theory" the writer seeks to formulate theological principles on the basis of the working religious consciousness. Thus, when formulating the moral and metaphysical attributes of God, he does so on the ground of the pragmatic absoluteness or absolute sufficiency of the religious Object as given in experience. One must object, however, that the moral perfection of God is not to be reached empirically: it is a postulate.

The book may be cordially commended: it is frank and courageous without being extreme. Its defect seems to be that it overstates the case for empiricism. For instance the author time and again appeals to 'religious experience at its best,' as if this were an empirical datum. Yet what is best in religion rests on valuation, while valuation implies a standard or religious ideal in the light of which selection is exercised. And this ideal cannot be merely empirical.

G. Galloway.

Saggio di una Concezione Idealistica della Storia. By Mario Casotti. In series Il Pensiero Moderno a cura di E. Codignola. Vallecchi, Firenze, 1920. Pp. 447. Lire 12.

This thoughtful and elaborate work is a defence and application of the doctrine that the essence of reality is in history, and that its fullest manifestation is in the evolution of philosophy. The writer follows Gentile and Croce, though not slavishly. His treatise is closely reasoned, and the account I can give of it is no more than an outline.

The book falls, as he tells us in the Preface, into two parts. The first four chapters criticise empiricism and metaphysical realism, which are for him correlative doctrines, each of them implying on the one hand a world of appearance, and on the other a rigid reality, external to the knowing mind. On such a basis (p. 77) history can exist only on sufferance. The logic of such a reality is the logic of bare identity (p. 86), of the concept and purely analytic inference, and in such a reality nothing can ever come to pass.

The remainder, and by far the longer portion, of the book, deals with the realisation of "becoming" as the metaphysical basis of the universe, and the consequent prerogative place of history in the world (p. 105); its identity with actual and living thought and the dialectic by which that develops *ad æternum* (p. 122).

The pivot of the argument is the conception of self-creative thought, according to which, following Vico's principle of "Verum et factum convertuntur," the spirit can know nothing, but what itself posits and produces (pp. 32-33). Any object, any pre-existent being, limits thought *ab extra*, and is incompatible with the reality of becoming in the universe.

To carry out this argument it is essential to show that all forms of experience, from the world of sense-perception upwards, can be identified with forms of philosophical thinking, and the reasoning takes the shape of a sort of deduction of the categories, according to which this conclusion is attempted to be established with regard to sense-perception, art, moral will, and religion (pp. 140 ff.).

But, in harmony with the underlying purpose, an important subtlety is introduced into the exposition, differentiating the point of view from that of Hegel. It is, in a word, the reduction of Phenomenology to Logic (ch, viii.). That is to say, sense-perception and the rest are not to be actual phases of mind which follow each other in history. Facts cannot be categories; for every fact has all the categories in it; and the forms of experience are not historical facts but philosophical categories which govern the course of history, but do not take the shape of a finite factual sequence. Thus history falls, in a sense, into cycles, *ricorsi* in Vico's phrase, but not mere or recurrent cycles (p. 236). Philosophy itself, for example, though the highest thing, may become abstract and effete; and then the inherent impulse of the whole will call for a recrudescence of sense-perception or of religious intuition to renew the missing element. The point is to avoid finality in the dialectic—to make it a recurrent though not a mere repeating series (pp. 234 ff.).

Obviously the whole thing turns on the paradoxical identification of all reality with philosophical thinking—the fresh and actual life of thinking, which alone is creative and ultimately originative. We are accustomed to something of this kind in the consideration that all knowledge must grow out from our present basis and activity of judgment. The transition is effected, as it seems to me, with extreme ingenuity, by insisting that every phase of experience implies a philosophy—an attitude—and therefore that ultimately the completed shape of art, say, or even of sense, is that

attitude to the world which a being in any one of these modes by implication adopts. Even a monera, we are told (p. 149), has its attitude to the universe. Therefore in thinking at its completest you have all experience and all reality (pp. 262 ff.). And this, as we said, being identified with creative thinking, is characterised by its novelty and originality. It meets contingency, as I understand, and reduces it to order, as the *fieri* passes into completion (p. 354). This slight sketch may suffice to indicate the line of thought we are dealing with. There are signs, which I welcome, that there really is to be a whole and a universe. The world of values is eternal; and the spirit, one would think, must be a whole, or it could not enforce the dialectic sequences. (Croce's doctrine of "opposites" and "distincts" is modified, I should say, by the author, and very effectively applied). Moreover, it is plain and emphatic that the thinking in question is not that of the particular human unit (p. 410). It is the whole which creatively maintains itself (pp. 262 ff.), but then the identification with thinking is harder and harder. If, as once is said, it is the whole which thinks in me, then the paradox of creative thought is a good deal blunted.

I welcome the high importance here assigned to thought; but I am perplexed by the apparent omission to consider what it is that thought has to tell us. Does it not always affirm that it reveals to us a reality which is *not* the mere act of thought? The apparent denial of this is something which I hold that our new idealists should reconsider.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

L'Essenziale della Filosofia del Diritto. By Prof. PAMFILO GENTILE, Libero Docente nella R. Università di Napoli. Aquila: Officine Grafiche Vecchioni. 1919. Pp. viii, 128.

The chief interest of this little book lies in its being a serious attempt to apply the principle of literal immanence—the principle of Croce and of Giovanni Gentile—in the province of the Philosophy of Law. Beginning with an explanation of objective knowledge on the principle of coherence, as against any view which involves correspondence with a "transcendent" reality, and dismissing as irrelevant all attempts to base the principles of right on historical and evolutionary fact, it proceeds to wrestle with the difficulty that a literal exclusion of transcendence *prima facie* destroys the possibility of progress. Thus the ordinary conception of natural law as an ideal beyond actual events—an "ought to-be"—is excluded, and it is hard to explain—to admit or to deny—the historical phenomena of better and worse. For as nothing can be outside the series of facts, all the good and evil there is ought to be equally present in it throughout. And the author's manful defence of this position, in his loyalty to the immanent doctrine, is almost admitted by himself to be unsuccessful, seeing that he returns to the conception that the Philosophy of Law must be accepted as a science of what ought to be and sometimes is not. Only we are to beware of the belief in ultimate ideal codes of Law.

Thus Law ranks with Morality, and he explains, I think rightly, against the section on Law in Croce's *Pratice*, in what sense a legal system is distinguished from moral principles by external "coerciveness"; not *de facto* coercion. Yet this distinction is capable, I hold, of a yet more pregnant elaboration.

He adheres, however, to Croce's rejection of a speculative treatment dealing with forms and details of the State. It is part of Croce's reluctance to insist on any characteristic which involves the external expression

of mind. And he takes as a prerogative instance of its uselessness the contractual theory, which, literally interpreted, fails, as he says, to explain how a majority is justified in coercing a minority. Law should be justified, he urges, not by its source or imponent, but by its ethical content.

The "superpersonal" or ethical will, has, he tells us, nothing to do with the generality of the will, and may be realised in any form of government. For this view there is much to be said; but I should urge, reversing a phrase which the author applies to the "state of nature" in relation to law, that such forms of government should be "above" and not "below" popular democracy.

As it is, just for want of a reasoned nexus between general and universal, his final conclusion comes terribly near the *reductio ad absurdum* that you need not obey a bad law, and that the mantle of ethico-political sovereignty falls on the shoulders of any rebel who is sure he is right. Only, if we recognise rational freedom, and take the individual as rational and not as merely natural, we may practically, as I understand him, sympathise with modern democracy.

In principle, the difficulties here pointed out arise from the narrow assumption of literal immanence, which makes it impossible to indicate a real whole manifesting itself in the shapes of actual life. In his references to Hegel and elsewhere I think the author greatly modifies this narrow immanence, to which he desires to be loyal, and his book appears to me to be instructive from its clearness, candour, and sincerity.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Psychology of Normal and Subnormal. By HENRY HERBERT GODDARD. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. N.D. [1919]. Pp. xvii, 349.

This is probably the first psychology that has had its inspiration in feeble-mindedness. Its author, famous for his remarkable study in heredity, *The Kallikak Family*, has, as Director of the Vineland Laboratory and Training School for the feeble-minded, acquired from his experience a firm conviction that psychology should be the study of intelligence, *i.e.*, of the power of varying adaptively the response to stimulation, and a healthy suspicion that it usually has been little more than a juggle with technical terminology (p. ix.). It is certainly extraordinary how much light he contrives to throw on normal psychology by his knowledge of the feeble-minded, and how aptly he can illustrate from it. But our wonder and delight are sensibly diminished when we discover, to our horror, that we are all suspected of feeble-mindedness ourselves. For putting his trust in the Binet tests, and explaining all mental achievements in terms of "neuron-patterns," Dr. Goddard places the high-water mark of mental development at the 'mental age' of 20, and decides that the 'average' mental age cannot be more than 16 (pp. 53-56). Later on, however, he finds that he has been too optimistic. "Present indications point to a level much below our assumed level of 16 years" (p. 251). For "the use of mental tests in the U S. Army has established beyond dispute" (p. 234) that "half the human race is little above the moron," with a mental age of about 13, while "12 per cent. of the drafted army of the U.S. was found to have *too low intelligence* to be sent over seas" (p. 250). Moreover, Millet's famous *Man with the Hoe* is manifestly "a perfect picture of an imbecile," who is unfit for higher work (p. 240), and "the truest democracy is found in an institution for the feeble-minded and it is

an aristocracy—a rule by the best" (p. 238). Thus it is that "the facts of modern civilisation" are best explained (p. 234).

Now all this is highly important, if true. For if true, it would call for a pretty complete reconstruction of our social and political institutions. Instead of our gerontocratic 'democracy,' which raises men to power when they are too old either to enjoy or to exercise it, we should institute an aristocracy of youthful intelligence and vigour, if the mind culminates at 20. And yet it quite well may be true. For civilised societies have now for many generations been so organised as to favour the survival of their inferior stocks. It is quite credible, therefore, that the 'average' man may have sunk to the 'moron' level. But Dr. Goddard hardly adduces convincing proof of this. The U.S. army tests should have been more fully discussed; as it is, they may be suspected of having been merely a device for camouflaging the allotting of commissions on 'aristocratic' lines. As for the Binet tests of intelligence their value is plainly empirical and not *a priori* and infallible; it would be very interesting to learn how the leading psychologists would stand them. But if they were required to give the public this pledge of their faith in their own methods, it would probably turn out that they were not simple-minded enough to run any risk of appearing feeble-minded!

F. C. S. Schiller.

La Filosofia di Benedetto Croce. By Emilio Chiocchetti. Second Edition, revised and enlarged.

Religione e Scienza. By Agostino Gemelli, Società Editrice, "Vita e Pensiero". Milan, 1920.

A famous cartoon in *Punch* many years ago represented Gladstone and Disraeli each presenting to the other his newly published work. Disraeli as he receives *Juventus Mundi* is saying to himself, "Dull!" Gladstone accepting the new novel is saying, "Frivolous!" I am reminded of this whenever I open a book and find it impressed with the approbation of the Holy Office, or when I am informed that a philosopher's book has been placed on the Index. There is something distinctly comic in the idea of an official censorship of philosophy—but this is not enough to account for the feeling. It seems, in advance of acquaintance, that an approved book must be dull and that a forbidden book can only have been condemned for some frivolous reason.

The two books now before me, bear the Imprimatur and I expected them to be dull. They are not. On the contrary both bear witness to the wonderful vitality and strength of the neo-scholastic philosophy in Italy. If there be any evidence of dullness it is on the part of the censor, for the authors seem able to expound sympathetically the most alarmingly unorthodox doctrines and have only to add that of course they do not themselves hold them.

To expound the philosophy of Benedetto Croce to the followers of the neo-scholastic philosophy is the purpose which Signor Chiocchetti sets before him and he fulfils it in an admirably clear and complete manner. He has one advantage. Croce is not hostile to Christian belief or even to Catholicism although to both he is distinctly antipathetic. Religion is not opposed to philosophy but it is lower and not higher in degree, also as mythology it is a mixed or hybrid, and not a pure form of philosophy. This is a very different attitude towards religion to that taken by positivism, which also has still a large following in Italy. The keynote of

Croce is immanence. There is no transcendent God. Croce is not an absolute idealist but rather a realistic spiritualist,—meaning of course by spirit not something ghostly but the universally active concrete mind. There is no reality confronting mind, either above it or below it in degree. Reality is life or mind in its activity. Nature is not thing in itself, the only reality is *Lo Spirito*. Chiocchetti's exposition is more than sympathetic, it is enthusiastic, and over and over again he interposes to say how he himself accepts it without reserve. Yet he must have a transcendent God, and notwithstanding Croce's declaration that the immortality of the soul has lost its meaning and interest in philosophy, God and the soul are still, for Chiocchetti, "i massimi problemi". The origin of Croce's philosophy in Hegel and Kant is excellently expounded and so too is its relation to the older Italians, Rosmini and Gioberti, and to contemporaries. The author is very sympathetic to Varisco, on account of his devotion to religious problems, but as compared with Croce, Varisco's weakness lies in his lack of system. System our author thinks is Croce's strength. Not the least interesting part of the book is the final note on the *Idealismo attuale* of Gentile and his pupil Guido de Ruggiero. Another "note" in the book is interesting and amusing. It is a good-natured reply to that flippant sceptic, Giuseppe Rensi, the Professor of Philosophy at Genoa.

"Religione e Scienza" consists of a series of "Saggi Apologetici" by the eloquent and learned professor, Brother Agostino Gemelli, the Franciscan. The essays are not culled from reviews and periodicals, they are serious studies connected by a common purpose and ideal. There is a curious difference in the way the problem of religion and science presents itself to a believer in revelation, according to whether he holds the catholic or protestant faith. Challenge a protestant concerning his belief in miracles, he will bring to mind some dogma such as the virgin birth, and the question for him will be whether a certain interpretation of a single historical event is credible. But challenge a catholic, and he will bring to mind a dogma such as that of the real presence, which affects his whole conception of nature and present everyday fact. The relation between catholicism and science is therefore different in one of its essential characters from that between religion and science.

Brother Gemelli is not content to affirm that there is no real conflict between science and faith, he holds that there is positive harmony between them. They rest on postulates common to both, and the mental dispositions in catholicism and science are akin. This is set forth in the first essay in an argument masterly in form, although it may not carry conviction to the non-catholic. It shows how the catholic may reconcile himself to science but also, what is more important, how faith may give him more and not less freedom in research.

Gemelli is a vigorous controversialist,—to have seen him rise in his Franciscan robe and address a congress of philosophers is an experience to remember—and he has himself investigated the matters with which he deals in the essays. They are intended to illustrate and enforce his own conclusions. One of them tells the story of the thinking horses of Elberfeld. It bears the humorous title "Beasts who think and discourse and —— men who do not reason." Another is named "The miracles of biology," and deals with the researches of Carrell and others. A third treats of the methods of certain believers in spiritualistic phenomena and particularly of the famous medium Eusapia Paladino. The two last essays are historical. They deal with definite charges which have been made against the Church of obscurantism and direct hostility to scientific research in matters of human welfare. One is the case of the Plague at Milan in the sixteenth

century named after St. Carlo Borromeo, a story familiar to readers of Manzoni's *I promessi sposi*. The charge was that the church by insisting on certain religious processions against the earnest protest of the civil authorities, who had forbidden them in order to prevent the spread of the contagion, actually and positively spread the plague. The last essay is on the trial and condemnation of Galileo.

H. Wildon Carr.

The Construction of the World in Terms of Fact and Value. By Cyril Tollemache Harley Walker. B. H. Blackwell, 1919. Pp. vii, 92.

Mr. Walker's subject is a problem which in modern times is being increasingly recognised as central in philosophy, *viz.*, the relation of fact to value within the real world. Chapter I. shows how the concepts of fact and value arise in "the world of the average man," how they are developed over against each other in "the objective world of common-sense," how they reach sharp distinction in the world of science (the realm of pure fact) and of art (the realm of pure value). With the help of this survey of actual worlds, Mr. Walker then sketches the resulting problems presented to philosophy, and argues that there is a fundamental distinction, though not a complete disjunction, between fact and value. Chapter II. resumes the enquiry from the subjective side, and discusses the distinct character of cognition as apprehension of fact and of valuation as the making of values. Mr. Walker throughout insists on the receptive quality of the former process and the contributive quality of the latter. He thus reaches by a study of cognition and valuation, some definition, or rather characterisation, of fact and value in general. Fact is determined first as something given, capable of being stated, particular, and verified. Value is not simply a derivative of fact, nor is valuation simply a consequence of cognition. Neither, on the other hand, can facts be eviscerated into a species of value. Value is seen to be an ultimately distinct something added to fact by the activity or reaction of the cognising mind. Value is first different from fact, in that it is something *made*, not *given*. Values then become relatively independent of facts through being attached to the ideal contents of facts dissociated from their actuality. Thus values, such as love and beauty, etc., are originally made by a reaction of the mind towards particular facts presented to it; but the contents of the particular facts are detached by the mind from their actual occurrence, and thus arises an ideal world where contents possessing value can be handled and systematised independently. A value is finally defined as a content which counts as good, bad, or indifferent. A further difference therefore arises between fact and value, in that a value need not, like a fact, be particular. Nevertheless values must, like facts, be ultimately expressed in language and verified in concrete experience.

Chapter III. leads on to a discussion of value-systems. We are shown how values, in spite of their original subjectivity, may become objective and even absolute. Prof. Bosanquet's and Prof. Münsterberg's theories on this subject are criticised, and it is argued that "absolute" values are those which pass the test of being found consistent, persistent, and satisfying in human experience. In conclusion the author claims to have shown that value and fact may be combined as two finally distinct elements in reality, and that value-systems and fact-systems are both legitimate and distinct constructions, representing respectively the receptive and creative functions of the mind.

The great value of Mr. Walker's discussion lies in the fact that he employs a radically empirical method, while at the same time maintaining

a perfectly clear distinction between the spheres of psychology and logic. Nevertheless his argument often suffers from over-compression, and would have gained greatly in lucidity if he had made more frequent use of concrete illustration. It is difficult to say what actual concepts Mr. Walker regards as values, or how he would classify the different values which he does recognise. Is truth for instance essentially a value? If it is, it seems impossible to exclude value from the world of pure science. If it is not, in what sense precisely is truth, even in the world of science, *better* than falsehood or error? Pleasure and pain Mr. Walker apparently refuses to recognise as values, on the ground that they are mere feelings, whereas values are created by a definite act of the mind (p. 86). But are not pleasant and painful sensations immediately felt as good and bad respectively? What of utility again? It seems to be essentially a value-concept. Yet Mr. Walker, in order to show that subjective idealism breaks down in the world of *fact*, does not hesitate to argue that it is more *economical* to assume a common world (p. 70); and he also meets the sceptical objection to the permanence of substances as given facts, by saying that it is "less arbitrary and more convenient" to accept the view of common-sense (p 48). Moreover in speaking of the world of art as the world of pure value he says that utilitarian activities as such do not belong to it (p. 26).

In short the processes of cognition and valuation, and the worlds of fact and value, seem to interpenetrate and involve each other more essentially than Mr. Walker's sharp distinctions admit, and his very instructive attempt to define them leaves some impression of vagueness owing to his failure to state or classify the actual kinds of value in use.

OLIVER C. QUICK.

Beauty and the Beast. An Essay in Evolutionary Æsthetic. By STEWART A. MCDOWALL, B.D., Chaplain and Assistant Master at Winchester College, Author of *Evolution and the Need of Atonement*, etc. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1920. Pp. 93. 7s. 6d. net.

THE argument of this book presupposes in the main Croce's philosophy, more especially his Æsthetic, but attempts to carry it further by contending that beauty is not only expression, but more definitely, the expression of relation, or "relationship"—are the two ideas quite convertible, "Beziehung" and "Verwandschaft"? The relation, thus expressed in beauty, is the personal relation of the divine love (pp. 28, 34, 38).

Perhaps the chief contention, bearing on the actual nature of beauty, which this interpretation necessitates, is the rejection of the traditional view that æsthetic experience is in essence a "quieter" of desire. The author maintains that its characteristic is the opposite; a "longing," and creative stimulus, which can find satisfaction only in the above-mentioned relation.

On this I would only remark in general that if a man has come to a certain metaphysical doctrine on what he thinks sufficient grounds, it is natural that all forms of experience should seem to him to point in that direction. But still it is an awkward matter to make such suggestion the primary point in any special province of life. A difficulty arises in knowing exactly what we are speaking about, and in distinguishing such a definite phenomenon as truth or beauty from the underlying suggestion with which we believe that all experience is charged. Thus the account of

truth, beauty, and goodness, on page 69, hardly gives us a valid differentia for each of them.

The main idea of this Æsthetic *qua* Evolutionary lies in developing the supreme sense of personal relation out of beginnings which show themselves in the sexual impulse, psycho-analytic enquiries being pressed into the service. "In the great adventure of Creative Love, to sex is given the task of bringing about those relations which constitute the ground-work of the personal union which is Love" (p. 64). "Then Beauty is seen as Spirit's grasp upon the relation between all the parts of the whole—a relation that is not yet complete, and can only be complete when the sole relation is that of love between personal beings, of whom God is the first in timeless Being" (p. 66).

What I cannot help feeling is, that in addition to the contradictions involved in Croce's theory (*cf.* pp. 9 and 10) we have here got a further development which may or may not be instructive for evolutionary theory or for religious philosophy, but tells us nothing, strictly speaking, of what we mean by beauty, and of what we care for when we try to appreciate it. The whole enquiry is given a special twist.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Six Theosophic Points and other Writings. By JACOB BÖHME. Newly translated into English by JOHN ROLLESTON EARLE, M.A. Constable. Pp. vii, 208. 10s. 6d. net.

The translator, as I judge, wishes this book to be received on its intrinsic merits. It is a well printed companionable volume; and has no introduction, and almost no note or comment, with the exception of a single and very helpful citation from Prof. Joachim. The writings have their own several title pages which show that they all date from 1620 or 1622. But the unlearned, of whom I am one, cannot identify them with books whose titles they have seen elsewhere, or with parts of those books.

And, I take it, this treatment is right. The book is thus not loaded with learning, of which plenty no doubt can be found elsewhere. The occasions of writing, and the details of the jargon, do not very greatly matter. The volume, if I am right, is meant to be a friend, like a great poem or a devotional book. Learning would have stood in our way.

My overwhelming impression, which I must set down very shortly, is that of the intense and penetrating realism of Böhme's views. If we ask for his theories and arguments, indeed, we are tempted to say the reverse. But if we attend to his judgment and insight as to what sort of a place the world is, what we have to expect there, and where in it our happiness and misery lie, how it pierces to the heart! The world, we learn, is not a place of quietness or comfort; it is essentially, in its very roots, a place of battle and victory. Gentleness, indeed, not fierceness, is the conqueror; but fierceness and pain are fundamental, because gentleness and goodness are, by their nature, not original, but to be won by what we should call a self-transcendence. The most coherent conspectus of the ideas is on pp. 166 ff., where we really might be listening to the feeble pessimism of to-day and its refutation.

And if you ask Böhme for his evidence, he does not at bottom refer you to his alchemy. He would answer simply, as elsewhere: "I speak as I know and have found by experience; a soldier knows how it is in the wars"

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

The Ways of Life: a Study in Ethics. By Stephen Ward. London: Humphrey Milford. Pp. 127. 6s. 6d. net.

The preface says, "Ethics resemble science in that what is most promising is also most debatable". . . . "So the aim of ethics should be, not to say all that has been said, but to establish new relations, and, by means of these, get others, according to the increasing subtlety and capacity of human kind."

This seems to me a very hard book to estimate. It is full of good things, and full, too, of what I almost venture to call mistakes. And the above quotations suggest that the author would welcome this opinion, at least if I wrote "paradoxes" for "mistakes". Book I., "Manners," is aimed, I take it, at showing what simple factors are all man needs to describe and guide his life, if only he used them straightforwardly. He is a co-operative being; he likes to be active and to play a game for the sake of playing it; and life is just such a game—just a game whose interest never ends. (Here, I think, something is wrong. A game, as he says, is hypothetical. Life, I hold, is categorical.) Thought makes our world, which is a means of endless variation of our activities. The great difference between one group's world and another's is how much thought has been applied to it.

But man has not in the past let himself think freely and guide his activity by thought, and so his life is exceedingly unsuccessful. And the enemy, in Mr. Ward's language, is morality. If he had printed it "morality" most of us would see what he meant, and sympathise with him.

The second book, "Morals," draws out his idea. Morality, printed *without* the quotation-marks, is in its most pronounced form a taboo. It is all that is objectionable in codes, precepts, preachments, prejudices, imperatives, customs that corrupt the world. The antidote and antithesis is thought. Make a clean sweep; teach everybody to think, and manage their own lives, which is what their brains were given them for, get rid of morality ("morality" I insist is what he means), and you will have transformed the world for the better.

And to the vices of "morality" he adds the paradoxes of ethics, making, I think, undue capital out of them. To feel an "ought" shows you must be bad. To do a duty because it is good is proof of an ulterior motive, *i.e.*, contradicts morality. To exercise choice proves that you are not free. Self-sacrifice involves several absurdities, because the author will not see that the self can transcend its existence. The moral consciousness is the greatest thing in life, but it cannot be directly made a rule of living. You can only value it rightly "when the arbitrary relation between morality and conduct has been severed".

I should suggest, *meo periculo*, that if we read "morality" where the author writes "thought," "codes and imperatives" where the author writes morality, and, perhaps, "religion" where the author writes "the moral consciousness," though he does not quite see *how*, in religion, are realised the freedom and perfection which morality demands but cannot find in life—if we might make these emendations we could see what he is driving at, and sympathise.

Bernard Bosanquet.

Philosophical Currents of the Present Day. Vol. II. By Dr. Ludwig Stein, o. ö. Professor of Philosophy, University of Berne. Translated by Shishirkumar Maitra. The University of Calcutta, 1919. Pp. iii, 235-393.

The second volume of Prof. Stein's book contains chapters on Hartmann (neo-realism), Spencer (evolutionism), Voltaire, Nietzsche, and Stirner (individualism), Dilthey (mental science), and Zeller (history of philosophy). The book is of some interest to those who like their philosophy watered with biographical anecdotes and literary references, and it seems to have been well written in the original. These qualities may have justified its first publication, but they are scarcely an excuse for translating it, and the jolts in the translation are not the less aggravating on account of the discursive amble of the philosophy. The following 'sample of the style of the great linguistic artist' W. Dilthey is not elegant in English, "But from the stars there rings, when the stillness of the night comes, even to us, that harmony of the spheres, of which the Pythagoreans said that only the noise of the world could drown it, an indissoluble metaphysical union which is at the base of all arguments and survives them all" (p. 356). Even an uncouth translation, however, may be disfigured by carelessness in proof-reading and otherwise. The translator is plainly ignorant of Greek; but any of his friends who happened to possess a very moderate acquaintance with that tongue could have told him that the letter τ is not the letter ι, and that there are conventions concerning accents. One might ignore misprints, but the date 1917 in the quotation from Spencer (p. 276) makes nonsense of the passage in which it occurs. And what can be said for this 'howler'? "The great favourite of Popper is Voltaire. From the philosopher von Ferney Popper took . . . his philosophical starting point for he dealt with the problem of the 'significance of Voltaire for modern times'" (p. 309).

J. L.

Employment Psychology. By Henry C. Link, Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919. Pp. xii, 440. 10s. 6d. net.

As Prof. Thorndike rightly says in his introduction to this book, the author "has the great merit of writing as a man of science assessing his own work, not as an enthusiast eager to make a market for psychology with business men. Indeed, the story of his experiments is distinctly conservative, for in many cases he could have obtained an even better prediction of success at a given job than he did obtain, by applying the technique of partial correlations and the regression equation so as to obtain a weighted composite score from a team of tests."

The book is valuable not so much for its addition to psychological knowledge as for its exposition of the practical application of psychological methods to the problems of vocational selection. The actual results obtained are correlated with the known skill of the workers or with the foreman's estimate of that skill before and after he became intimately acquainted with them. The tests applied are carefully described. They were designed to examine assemblers, tool makers, machine operators, clerks, stenographers, typists, and others. The book can be heartily commended for its sane, scientific, and practical outlook on the subject.

The Mind of a Woman. By Dr. A. T. Schofield. London: Methuen & Co. Pp. viii, 120.

This chatty little book claims to be a contribution to feminine psychology by "a physician occupied almost exclusively for some thirty years with nervous diseases" so that "he has become intimately acquainted with women's minds, at any rate in a pathological state" (p. 7). The results are by no means as lurid as might have been expected: in fact the book is just the sort of production a cynical suffragette (if such there were) might point to with pride, when justifying the contention that if once women got the vote, a general feminisation would follow, and all other things would speedily be added unto her, in a 'democratic' country. The author, who professes great admiration for Benjamin Kidd, nevertheless notes (p. 62) that even in the three specifically feminine arts of dress, cookery, and music, woman has never been able to wrest supremacy from the male. But the chief thing he proves, perhaps, is that these popular comparisons of the sexes are in no way profitable.

F. C. S. S.

Vivre, Essai de Biosophie théorique et pratique. By Paul Oltramare. Geneva: Georg & Co., 1919. Pp. xvi, 326.

Biosophy, the discipline expounded in this book, is "at the same time practical and theoretical, social and individual," being "the science of life considered in its highest manifestation, the spiritual". Yet it "has not the ambition to supplant religion. Its aim is to prove that human life can be fully spiritualised without the intervention of the strictly religious hypotheses and hopes" (p. xvi.). Or as the publishers' announcement declares, "it is particularly addressed to those who are alienated from all religious faith," and wishes "to enrol them in the good fight of truth against error, and of liberty, justice, and beauty against everything that tends to lower man to the brute". Actually it appears to be a sort of revival of Comtian positivism and is composed of moralising reflexions in the style of the ancient Stoics, full of amiability and enthusiasm and the most unexceptionable sentiments. In fact it contains little or nothing that anyone could take exception to as new, and nothing that could be censured as severe, not even the (very sound) criticism of psycho-analysis on pp 227-228. Prof. Oltramare hopes that his book will lead to the formation of an international Biosophical Alliance, and this hope we may all echo Unlike other international alliances it cannot do any harm.

F. C. S. S.

Psychology and Folk-lore. By R. R. Marett, M.A., D.Sc. Methuen & Co. Pp. ix + 275.

This is an excellent little book of its kind. The title is perhaps somewhat misleading, for there is much more Folk-lore than Psychology, in the sense of the psychology of the schools. But interesting psychological material there is in plenty, and the book itself is thoroughly readable from beginning to end. It is a collection of addresses, lectures, reviews, and articles on anthropological topics, nearly all with the psychological interest more or less emphasised. As one would expect, therefore, the chapters are somewhat loosely bound together, and there is no sustained argument, anthropological or psychological, running through the book as a whole.

The title is taken from the first address, a presidential address to the Folk-lore Society. The main contention here is that the folk-lorist must approach his subject matter from a psychological, and not merely a sociological, still less a purely descriptive, point of view. The usage of 'psychological' is somewhat wide. The author means simply that the folk-lorist must get at the real inwardness of survivals from a past stage of culture, thus understanding "why survivals survive". A considerable part of the address is taken up by a criticism of a view attributed with dubious justice to Dr. Rivers, that the folk-lorist as such is concerned with sociological rather than psychological considerations. Possibly the disputants are using the word 'psychological' in different senses. Chapters IV., V., and VI. continue the theme, more especially the last on "The Interpretation of Survivals," which is a further strong plea for the psychological attitude.

Chapters VII., VIII. ? and IX. also belong together. These chapters discuss "Origin and Validity in Religion," "Magic or Religion," and "The Primitive Medicine Man". In the first two, the interest is not psychological in any marked degree; in the third, that interest again becomes prominent in the working out of the relation between the 'psychological' medicine of the primitive medicine man and the medical science of the modern doctor. The remaining chapters are much more anthropological than psychological, and their interest for the psychologist as such is slight. All of them, however, are interesting.

JAMES DREVER.

The New Psychology and its Relation to Life. By A. G. TANSLEY. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1920. Pp. 283. 10s. 6d. net.

Some of the most remarkable advances in psychology have come from those who have received no systematic training in the subject. The aim of this excellent book is to present in non-technical language such recent psychological advances: it has been written by a botanist. As the author observes, "the flood of light thrown upon the workings of the human mind by the discoveries and the resulting conceptions of modern psycho-pathologists has illuminated the mental mechanism, not only of the hysteric and the madman, but of the normal human being". He has endeavoured to combine "what may be called the 'biological' view of the mind—a view excellently represented, for instance, in Dr. McDougall's well-known, *Introduction to Social Psychology*—with the concepts which we owe mainly to the great modern psychopathologists, Prof. Freud and Dr. Jung".

The book is therefore based on the writings of Freud, Bernard Hart, Janet, Jung, McDougall, and Trotter. It can be thoroughly recommended for the scientific and temperate standpoint which it endeavours to maintain from start to finish and for its general clearness of exposition. It will prove full of interest not only to the general reader who seeks a fair summary of the above-named writers' views, but also to the expert psychologist who is enabled by his professional knowledge to supply criticisms which it was beyond the power of the author to suggest. Psychology owes a debt of gratitude to Mr. Tansley for his useful book.

Le Thomisme. Introduction au Système de S. Thomas D'Aquin. By E. GILSON. Strasbourg, 1920. Pp. 174.

An excellent general introduction to Thomism. M. Gilson's main object throughout is to dwell on the point that Thomism is no mere "apologetic,"

but a systematic and coherent philosophical theory of the organisation of the whole of reality. This is well brought out by starting with the problem which, as a matter of fact, confronted St. Thomas,—the refutation of "Averroism," and passing in review successively the Thomist doctrines of the relations between faith and reason, the nature of God and the proofs of the existence of God, creation, the nature of angels, the nature of man, the union of soul and body, the intellectual and conative "powers" of the soul, and the "end of life". The work is skilfully done and with close adherence to the text of the Angelic Doctor. The brevity at which M. Gilson aims makes his exposition at times hard reading, but it may confidently be recommended to all who wish to know something definite about a very "live" philosophy and have not the leisure or the opportunity for minute personal study of the original texts. For readers of the texts the constant references to the parts of the Saint's extended works where the fullest treatment of the special problems will be found are highly valuable. It is a pity that so good a piece of work should be disfigured by an unusual number of tiresome errors of the press.

A. E. T.

Un Philosophe Néo-platonicien du XI^e Siècle, Michael Psellus. By Chr. Zervos. (*Préface de M. François Picavet.*) Paris: Ernest Lecroix, 1920. Pp. xix, 269.

Light is still much needed on the obscurest part of the history of the transmission of classical thought to modern times, the early middle ages of the Byzantine Empire. M. Zervos has done good service by this careful and fully documented study of the revival of Hellenic letters at Constantinople in the eleventh century and of the life and character of one of the leading figures in the movement, Michael Psellus, first Dean of the Faculty of Arts,—as we should phrase it—in the University of Constantinople after its re-opening by the Emperor Constantine Monomachus towards the middle of the century. The work is based on wide study of all the remains of the period, published and unpublished, and may serve as a valuable corrective to current views which tend to treat the revival of thought and learning as a purely Western affair and to represent the mediæval Eastern Empire as intellectually stagnant. M. Zervos is enthusiastic for his subject and his hero, though I cannot honestly say his study does much to remove the impression of Psellus as morally and mentally a poor creature which one had gathered, *e.g.*, from the notices of him in Finlay. Perhaps one ought not to expect much of a protégé of the successive husbands raised to the throne by the amorousness of that lively old lady, the Empress Theodora. A valuable feature of the book is the full and careful bibliography of the not very accessible published works of Psellus. I am not sure whether M. Zervos is really quite at home in the earlier history of Neoplatonism. Some of his statements about Plotinus surprise me, and it is unfortunate that Maximus, the unlucky associate of the Emperor Julian, should be referred to several times over as Maximus of *Tyre*. His home appears to have been Ephesus and there is, so far as I know, no evidence to connect him in any way with Tyre. I am much afraid he has been confused with an earlier and a better man, the well-known writer of the second century.

A. E. T.

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VII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS.—xvii., 9. **J. E. Creighton.** 'Philosophy as the Art of Affixing Labels.' [The concrete universal is a cure for all the criticisms of philosophy.] **G. A. Barrow.** 'A Via Media between Realism and Idealism.' [A review of Lossky's *Intuitive Basis of Knowledge.*] xvii., 10. **D. F. Swenson.** 'The Logical Implicates of the Community.' ["Unless men are capable, in principle, of a logical understanding of one another, they cannot understand one another either æsthetically or ethically," and understanding depends on "rationality in the sense of meaningfulness, consistency and truth". The first depends on the principle of identity, which guarantees sameness in the universe of discourse, in so far as minds "really understand each other". The second depends on the principles of inference, causation and teleology, the third is not creation but discovery.] **J. R. Kantor.** 'Intelligence and Mental Tests.' [Believing that "with the passing of a subjectivistic psychology and its replacement by an extensive study of concrete human reactions the need for a native intelligence . . . will disappear," the writer explains the failure of mental tests to lead to "a wider extension of knowledge concerning psychological phenomena" as due to the assumption that "what is measured by the tests is a mental factor and not a specific mode of adjustmental response," for all "intelligent acts must be *specific*; for our reaction patterns are definite concrete responses," and to increase them increases "our *general* capacity to respond," and so our 'general intelligence'.] **J. E. Turner.** 'Dr. Wildon Carr's Theory of the Relation Between Body and Mind.' [Criticism of his Aristotelian Society Address, 1917.] xvii., 11. **H. C. Brown.** 'The Problem of Philosophy.' ["The fundamental category of science is description . . . of philosophy, action" . . . "Scientific description involves selection" . . . "Philosophy starts from the truths with which science ends, but its purpose is not merely to cite or to systematise . . . where the scientist seeks discoveries, the philosopher makes interpretations." But no complete agreement on these is likely.] **C. I. Lewis.** 'Strict Implication—An Emendation.' [Corrects a mistake in his *Survey of Symbolic Logic.*] xvii., 12. **T. L. Davis.** 'De Profanitate.' [Points out that the practice of swearing is a proof that a false proposition implies any proposition.] **E. L. Schaub.** Report on the 20th Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association. xvii., 13. **J. H. Randall, Jr.** 'The really Real.' [Points out that 'real' is "essentially a category of laudation and a judgment of value" and that 'neo-realists' degrade the term when they apply it to all that merely 'is'.] **I. Bentley.** 'A Note on the Relation of Psychology to Anthropology.' [Apropos of a complaint by Dr. Hrdlicka about the difficulty of getting psychology properly defined.] xvii., 14. **E. B. Holt.** 'Professor Henderson's "Fitness" and the Locus of Concepts.' [Destructive criticism of *The Fitness of the Environment* and *The Order of Nature,* which are charged with systematic misapplication of concepts (the question of their 'locus');

Henderson's argument for teleology is denied any "iota of value," and need not "cast the faintest shadow on the path of the most uncompromising mechanist".] **G. A. Katuin.** 'The Ideality of Values.' ["Values are dynamic, evolutionary and changeable. Above all values are practical" but "a judgment of value is something more involved and more complex than just a state of appreciation" . . . it is not "mere instinctive or habitual reaction to an act or object".] xvii., 15. **L. E. Hicks.** 'Normal Logic or the Science of Order.' [All men think alike by 'instinct,' "the basis of instinct is cosmic order . . . the cosmos is logical" and "not only are we in the cosmos; the cosmos is in us" and subjects us to "external control". Also direct "dyad inference" (from implications) should not be rejected. As regards a criterion, "logical thinking is based on constant relations, inspires belief, has true-or-false quality, advances knowledge, is orderly, coherent, harmonious with the environment". This is not absolute, but 'fairly reliable'. It follows that "no hard-and-fast line" can be drawn "between logic and its neighbours"—psychology and epistemology.] **G. D. Walcott.** 'A New Content Course in Philosophy.' [Consisting of comment on the results of the sciences as formulated in the Home University series.]

Revue Néo-Scolastique de Philosophie. No. 85. February, 1920. Articles. **H. Pinard, S.J.** *Essai sur la Convergence des Probabilités* (concl.). [Conclusion of the essay mentioned in the summary of this review given in Mind, N.S., 116. The general line of argument is that, in spite of the logical weakness of "induction," we can reach practical certainty in dealing with questions of historical fact through the "convergence" of probabilities, *i.e.*, by what is often called in English the "consilience" of inductions. The reason why this method is more trustworthy in history than elsewhere is that the weaknesses of induction only affect it as a method of generalisation. In history we are not generalising but attempting to establish unique singular facts. Has the author sufficiently considered whether it is ever possible to know anything but "universals" *about* the "singular" fact?] **J. Lemaire.** *La Connaissance sensible des Objets extérieurs.* [A discussion of the 'reality' of the objects of sense-perception. The argument is too long and intricate for reproduction here. The conclusion is that the immediate object apprehended by sense is "within" us, but can be shown to have its analogue "without the mind". The writer holds that this view preserves what is fundamental to the doctrine of S. Thomas about the *species sensibiles*. The points are well argued, but it is *assumed*, on what seem to be insufficient grounds, that what I perceive must in some sense be "in" me, and that the so-called "objectification of our sensations" is a genuine psychical process. What if one denies both assumptions?] **R. Kremer.** *Le Néo-Réalisme Américain.* [A good introductory account of the position of the American so-called "new" realists.] **R. M. Martin.** *La question de l'Unité de la Forme substantielle.* [An historical discussion of the views of the English Dominican scholar, Robert Fishacre.] Note on Cardinal Mercier's American tour. Reviews of books. No. 87. August, 1920. **P. Charles, S.J.** *L'Agnosticisme Kantien.* [A short historical article tracing the development of Kant's views on the "proofs of the existence of God" from the dissertation of 1763 to the publication of the first *Critique*, with the object of showing that Kant's final rejection of the "cosmological argument" is a logical development from misconceptions of its point already latent in the *Dissertation*. I could wish the author had discussed the curious question why Kant, in the *Critique*, entirely omits to examine the special form of the argument on which he had himself formerly relied as "the only demonstration" of God's existence.] **E. Janssens.** *Notes sur la conscience douteuse.* [In defence of "probabilism" against all other

systems of casuistry.] **J. Bittremieux.** *Notes sur le Principe de Causalité.* [An interesting article. The reasoning is difficult to follow, but the author's object is to establish the *a priori* character of the principle of Causality by arguing that even if we deny that it can directly be deduced from the law of Contradiction, the denial of it can be shown to violate that law. The principle is thus *a priori*, a position which it is desired to maintain because of the part played by the principle of Causality in the arguments for the existence of God. The author's method of proving his point does not impress me. As I understand him, he first assumes that the principle of Causality is true and self-evident, and then argues that, this being so, to assume that its contradictory is also true violates the law of Contradiction. But surely this is equally true if one assumes the truth of *any* proposition which contradicts a proposition already known to be true. Apart from deference to the Aristotelian tradition, there seems to be no reason for attaching more importance to the Law of Contradiction than to any other principle of logic.] Reviews of books, etc.

VIII.—NOTES.

To the Editor of "Mind".

DREAMS.

Sir,—Dreams present features which condemn Freudian speculation as inadequate. And we ought, I think, to agree further that the "incoherence" and "illogicalness," emphasised by Signor Rignano (*A New Theory of Sleep and Dreams*, July Mind), are frequently absent. In the first place, the dream may be as "fantastic" as, say, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, and yet be quite "coherent" within its own sphere. The practical interests of waking life being suspended, freedom of invention is untrammelled. This invention may be grotesque,—as is the work of many of our day-dreams,—but it *may* be well ordered and exceedingly beautiful. In the second place, there is a sort of dream, not only remarkable in point of its inventiveness, but respectful of the kind of "coherence" which we value in waking life. I was once the victim of a grim dream-serial quite as reasonable as are most adventure novels. And on one or two occasions I have enjoyed what may be called the reflective dream; carrying the familiar psychological and æsthetic interests into a new field. Thus the question of the perceptual content of dreams had been interesting me. I found myself anon floating in a room with richly decorated walls and was able to examine the detail of this decoration deliberately. I noted its complexity, and knew that I was doing so in a dream. On another occasion I was able to alter my perceptual surround at will, with the same belief, fully reflective, that I was playing with the contents of a dream. There is nothing more surprising in these night-dreams than what characterises an ordinary day-dream on the mountain-side. The point is that "coherence" and the "logical" may show equally in both. Day-dreaming becomes fantastic very readily; the creation of genius may be merely that portion of it which is worth preserving.

Dream-experience may thus be coherent and purposive, even when a marked freedom in the way of inventiveness is displayed. But there is dreaming, of course, in which "dissociation," anarchy, and chaos predominate. "Many dreams . . . *have a plot*, the point of which is usually directed against the dreamer. He at any rate neither foresees nor constructs it. Now this implies 'dissociation,' not merely between the dreamer and the waking self (as is attested by the amount of amnesia for dreams), but also between the dream and the 'maker of dreams'."[1] Now to account for this dissociation we may have to look back very far. It repeats, perhaps, on the small scale, within us human sentients, what took place originally on the great or cosmic scale. The tendency which can "dissolve" even 'waking personalities' and which is displayed so frequently in our more anarchic dreams may be continuing the titanic

[1] Dr. F. C. S. Schiller in his review of Bergson's *L'Energie Spirituelle*, Mind, July, 1920.

process in which all finite sentients arose. We are watching the tide now at the point of its furthest advance.

In the specially anarchic dream, where dissociation is very marked, there is prolonged or echoed, as it were, the original process of the birth of sentients (with its inevitable attendant confusion and discords), which took place at the dawn of this particular world-system. (*World as Imagination*, p. 462 ff.) Novel sentients actually arise within us and contend with us—*e.g.*, the malign 'maker of dreams,' who is sometimes more formidable than any ordinary adversary of waking life.

But there are dreams and dreams. And we have to be on our guard against the theorist desiring simplicity who seeks to account for all dreams in the same way. Reality, after all, is not concerned to be simple just for the psychologist's convenience.

DOUGLAS FAWCETT.

Villa Sommerheim, Wengen,
Switzerland, 18*th July*, 1920.

DEATH OF WUNDT.

PROF. WUNDT died on 1st September at the advanced age of eighty-eight years. The world is thus deprived of the most prominent and widely-known of present-day philosophers. Few, indeed, would claim for Wundt either the speculative genius or the imaginative insight of a Herbart or a Lotze; but his extraordinary versatility and his comprehensive acquaintance with vast fields of knowledge have rarely, if ever, been rivalled. Year after year, books and monographs and articles issued from his pen in steady succession, and almost everything he wrote exhibits a surprising mastery of detail and power of turning it to account in constructive work. As a teacher, too, he was effective and inspiring; without a note, and in pre-war days usually to audiences of more than three hundred students, gathered from all parts of the world, he would handle, in a concise and lucid manner, themes of notorious difficulty.

Wilhelm Wundt was born on 16th August, 1832, at Neckarau, near Mannheim. In 1851 he began the study of medicine at Heidelberg, and took his degree in 1856. In the following year he habilitated in the Department of Physiology, and remained in Heidelberg for some years as Helmholtz's assistant in the physiological laboratory. During that period he published two monographs on physiological subjects—one on the theory of muscular movements (1858) and the other on the theory of sense-perception (1859-62). He was still at Heidelberg when, in 1863, the *Vorlesungen über Menschen- und Thierseele* appeared—a volume which, he used in later years to say, contained the wild oats of his youthful days. Two elaborate monographs on the mechanism of the nerves and nerve-centres followed in 1871 and 1876, which embodied a good deal of careful experimental research. In 1874, Wundt succeeded F. A. Lange as Professor of "Inductive Philosophy" in Zürich, and, in the same year, the first edition of the *Grundzüge* was published in one volume (increased to three volumes of huge proportions in the fifth edition of 1902). His sojourn in Zürich was, however, a brief one. He removed to Leipzig in 1875, on his appointment to one of the philosophical chairs in the university; and Leipzig continued to be his home for the last forty-five years of his life. In his *Antrittsreden* of 1874 and 1876 Wundt sketched the view which, as Professor in Leipzig, he consistently maintained of the function of philosophy, and of the influence which philosophy, as he conceived it, should

exert upon the empirical sciences. Philosophy, he maintained, is based upon the results reached by the empirical sciences, and forms their necessary supplement and completion. Three years after his advent in Leipzig (*i.e.*, in 1878), the Leipzig Institute of Experimental Psychology was started in a humble way, but it grew by rapid strides, and was the precursor of similar laboratories in practically all the German Universities. The *Philosophische Studien*, of which Wundt was the editor, served as a medium of publication for the work of his pupils, and many valuable articles of his own, not however always on psychological subjects, are likewise contained in the twenty volumes that appeared from 1883 to 1903. From 1880 onwards a series of elaborate philosophical works were given by him to the world. The first volume of his *Logik*, devoted to "Erkenntnislehre," was published in 1880, and the second (in later editions expanded into two volumes), dealing with "Methodenlehre," in 1883. Then followed, in 1886, the *Ethik*,—an investigation, as he described it, of the facts and laws of the moral life. And, as the culmination of his attempt at philosophical construction, the *System der Philosophie* appeared in 1889, in many respects the most original of all his works, wherein an idealistic metaphysic is developed, widely removed, however, from the forms of idealism prevalent at the time. The later years of his life were occupied with a huge undertaking. In 1900 the first volume of his *Völkerpsychologie* saw the light, and five other bulky volumes followed. He was dependent here for his material upon the labours of others, and the book cannot be said to be of the value of his more strictly philosophical treatises. It should be mentioned that Wundt contributed an article on "Central Innervation and Consciousness" to the first volume of MIND in 1876, and also an interesting account of "Philosophy in Germany" to the second volume. He married shortly after leaving Heidelberg, and leaves a son and daughter surviving him, the former being a distinguished authority in Greek Philosophy. His own work was done; but philosophical science loses in him a genuine inquirer who spared himself no pains in the search for truth.

DEATH OF MEINONG.

We deeply regret to announce the death of Dr. Alexius Meinong, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Graz. Prof. Meinong died, after a short illness, on 27th Nov. at the comparatively early age of sixty-seven years. His important work, *Ueber Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit: Beiträge zur Gegenstandstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie*, published during the war, has only recently reached this country, and contains some of Meinong's most careful and original investigation. We hope in a later issue to give an account of his many contributions to philosophy.

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MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—PROF. ALEXANDER'S GIFFORD LECTURES (II.).

By C. D. Broad.

B. Mind.

(*a*) *Enjoyment.*

With this confession I leave S.-T. and pass to Prof. Alexander's views about mind. There are two points to be considered about this, *viz.*, the ontological position of mind and the epistemological question about its knowledge of objects. The former is closely connected with the theory of a hierarchy of complexes with new secondary qualities, and I will set it aside for the present. We are said to enjoy but not to contemplate ourselves and our states and to contemplate but not enjoy qualitied complexes of a lower order than minds. Now I find considerable difficulties about both enjoyment and contemplation. I will begin with the former. I might sum up my difficulties about enjoyment in one question: Is enjoyment by a mind a mode of knowledge or only a mode of being? The word *enjoyment* first appears on I., 12. '. . . I am accustomed to say that the mind enjoys itself and contemplates its objects. The act of mind is an enjoyment, the object is contemplated.' It seems then clear that to be an enjoyment is just to be a mental act. (I exclude for the moment the analogies to enjoyment at lower stages of the hierarchy of qualities.) The meaning of the verb *to enjoy* is more difficult. I take it that it is not intended originally to be an active verb. We enjoy enjoyments; and on this view 'I enjoy X' just means 'X is one of my mental acts'. But then we also have the phrase constantly used, 'I enjoy myself'. This clearly

cannot mean 'I am one of my mental acts'. It presumably must mean 'I am a complex composed of enjoyments'. This interpretation certainly seems to be borne out by the statement that we experience an act in the sense in which we strike a blow, but experience an object in the sense in which we strike a bell. (*Cf.*, I., 12.) If this be so to enjoy is not to know. 'I enjoy X' simply means that X is one of my acts, and it is thus a statement about the nature of X and the complex to which it belongs. It just classifies X as a mental act and assigns it to that complex of such entities which is me.

Yet Prof. Alexander constantly speaks as if to enjoy were to know, and as if we could enjoy things which are certainly not acts of our minds. Thus on I., 21 we are told that the mind in contemplating a horse 'enjoys its togetherness with the horse'. Now this togetherness is a relation between the horse and the state of my brain due to the horse. Hence I do not see that the statement 'I enjoy my togetherness with the horse' can possibly mean—as it ought to do on the above interpretation—'togetherness with the horse is one of my acts'. In fact I am constantly said to enjoy what can also be contemplated; yet I cannot contemplate my mind or its states. Thus in I., Caps. III. and IV., I am said to enjoy the space and time in which my mental processes go on, and these are said to be identical with the space and time in which my brain and its processes exist. Now the latter can of course be contemplated. Thus to say 'I enjoy such and such a space' cannot mean 'Such and such a space is one of my mental acts'; for, in the first place, the statement is perilously near to nonsense, and, in the second, it must imply that some of my mental acts can be contemplated, which is contrary to the theory. Hence the verb 'to enjoy' must have shifted its meaning. One possibility is that Prof. Alexander does here use 'enjoying' as an active verb, and not merely as a verb with a cognate accusative. He may really mean that enjoying is a form of knowing, although a different form from contemplation. On the other hand he *may* not have committed this inconsistency. The phrase 'I enjoy my mental S.-T.' *may* be elliptical. He may only mean that mental events have in fact spatio-temporal characteristics, that these are in fact the same as those of the corresponding neural processes, and that mental events are enjoyed but not contemplated. If this be so the proposition: 'I enjoy the space and time in which my neural processes go on' will only mean: 'I enjoy mental acts which in fact have the same space and time factors as those which can be contemplated in the events of my brain and nervous system'. If this be the

meaning the word 'to enjoy' is of course used ambiguously, but it is not necessarily used to mean or to imply any form of knowledge.

However this may be, the relation between enjoyment and knowledge on Prof. Alexander's view remains to me very obscure. Prof. Alexander often says, as on I., 12, that 'my awareness and my being aware of it are identical'. Now this is an important and characteristic doctrine; but surely it ought to be proved. It cannot surely be meant that to be aware of a tree, and to be aware that I am aware of a tree *mean* the same, and that it is an analytic proposition that there can be no unconscious or unnoticed awarenesses. Of course there is a sense in which it is analytic. No doubt in one sense of *experience* the statements 'I am aware of a tree' and 'I experience my awareness of a tree' mean the same. For, in this sense, *experience* does not mean knowledge; the statement 'I experience my awareness of a tree' merely means 'This awareness of a tree is one of my mental acts'. No one doubts that the word experience can be used in this sense. But in this sense I might be 'aware of' all my awarenesses and yet know nothing whatever about them, nor even know that I had them. The important question of fact is: Granted that I experience all my awarenesses in the perfectly trivial sense that they are all awarenesses of mine, am I ever or always aware of them in the sense of knowing them? Prof. Alexander of course denies that I can be aware of them in the sense of contemplating them. If this be so, then either I do not know my states of mind at all, or there must be a form of knowing different from contemplation, and of course different from 'experiencing' in the sense described above; for that is not a form of knowing my states of mind, but the form of being which states of mind have. It would then be a question of fact whether I 'knew' all or only some of my states of mind, in this sense of knowing which is not contemplating.

Against the view that I can contemplate my states of mind Prof. Alexander produces two arguments, one positive and the other negative. The first is on I., 19: 'If I could make my mind an object as well as the tree, I could not regard my mind, which thus takes its own acts and things in one view, as something which subsists somehow beside the tree'. This argument seems to me quite inconclusive. It is not necessary that I should contemplate my mind, but only a certain act of it, *viz.*, this awareness of the tree. Secondly, my mind for Prof. Alexander is a complex continuum of my acts. Therefore, to talk of 'my mind taking its acts and

things in one view' means no more than to say that a certain continuum contains two different constituents, such that the object of the first is the tree, and the object of the second is the first. I do not say that our minds are continua of this kind, but I do not see why they should not be. Certainly there is no incompatibility between this and the fact that our minds are things 'which subsist somehow beside the tree'. Probably the real objection is that on this view one part of my mind would 'subsist beside' another which itself 'subsists beside' the tree. It is probably felt that because a perception and a tree cannot both belong to a single complex which is a mind, therefore a perception and a perception of a perception cannot do so. But this seems a mere prejudice. If I could contemplate my perception of a tree, my contemplation and the perception would doubtless be 'beside' each other, as the perception and the tree are. Of course it is true that the perception and the tree do not both belong to a mind. But this is presumably because trees are not mental, not because they are 'beside' the perception of them. What has to be proved is that the 'besideness' of contemplation is incompatible with both terms being mental and belonging to the same mind. I find this frequently and vigorously asserted, but it does not seem to me self-evident, and no effort is made to prove it.

The negative argument is that introspection, which seems to make against Prof. Alexander's view, can be explained in terms of it. '. . . An *-ing* (*i.e.* a mental act) . . . may exist in a blurred or subtly dissected form. When that condition of subtle dissection arises out of scientific interests we are said to practise introspection, and the enjoyment is said to be introspected'. The common view is that in introspection a state of mind becomes the object of a fresh act of attention, just as an external object like a flower may. Consistently with his general view Prof. Alexander has to deny this; he has to hold that when a state of mind becomes introspected a change happens in its mode of *being*, not in the fact that it becomes cognised by a later act. Now it seems to me that being always differs from being known. An originally 'blurred' emotion might change in the course of our mental history into a 'subtly dissected' one, but unless both are in some sense known this will not constitute knowledge about the emotion. For this it would seem needful to know both the blurred and the dissected states, and further to recognise such a connexion between the two as makes it reasonable to call the dissected state a dissection *of* that particular blurred one. It may be that for intro-

spection it is *necessary* that a blurred state shall develop into a dissected one so connected with the former that it can be called the dissection of *it*, but this process itself *is* not knowledge of the fact that the one state has developed into the other, for no process is the same as the knowledge that it has happened. If you say; 'But this process and all the stages in it are enjoyed', the answer is irrelevent. It only means that the process and the stages in it are mental; to be mental does not *mean* to be known; and if you say that everything mental is *ipso facto* known, you ought to produce some proof for this very doubtful proposition, and to tell us by what kind of knowledge a mental state is known, since you deny that it is contemplated.

Very closely connected with this point is Prof. Alexander's theory about the memory of past states of mind. His theory of the memory of objects is plain and straightforward. It is just a present awareness with a past object bearing the marks of pastness on it. But clearly past states of mind cannot be remembered in this way, because no state of mind can be contemplated at all. Now the great difficulty about remembering past states of mind on any such theory as Prof. Alexander's is this: Suppose I thought about my dinner yesterday, and that to-day I remember this act of thinking. The act of remembering belongs to to-day, the act of thinking which is remembered belongs to yesterday. On the ordinary view there is no difficulty; remembering would be a relation between to-day's act of remembering and yesterday's act of thinking, and there is of course no reason why a cognitive relation should not thus bridge a gap in time. But on Prof. Alexander's view you cannot contemplate a state of mind, you can only enjoy it. And enjoying is not a relation between one state of mind and another; it is merely the mode of existence peculiar to states of mind. Thus a state of mind and the enjoyment of it are essentially contemporary, for the enjoyment of a state of mind is just the existence of that state. Thus memory of past states could not be described as 'a present enjoyment of a past state,' for this would be sheer nonsense; and, on Prof. Alexander's theory, it equally cannot be described as 'a present contemplation of a past state,' because states of mind—whether present or past—cannot be contemplated. What then is a memory of a past state on Prof. Alexander's theory?

I think we can understand his view best by bearing in mind his doctrine of perspectives. It will be remembered that 'space at a moment t' did not consist of the spatial characteristics of event-particles at t merely, but consisted of

the spatial characteristics of a certain selected group of event-particles of *all* dates. Similarly, I think he holds that 'my mind at 10 o'clock to-day' does not consist simply of enjoyments whose date is 10 o'clock to-day. It consists of a certain selected group of enjoyments of various dates. We have seen the principle on which some event-particles of an assigned date are included in, and others excluded from, the perspective of a given event-particle. What is the corresponding principle that includes some of last week's enjoyments in 'my mind at 10 o'clock to-day' and excludes others of the same date? The principle seems to be that these past enjoyments which are remembered by me at 10 o'clock to-day and those future enjoyments that are anticipated by me at 10 o'clock to-day are to be included in the selection which constitutes 'my mind at 10 o'clock to-day'. All others are to be excluded. If you now ask Prof. Alexander how he reconciles the presentness of my memory of yesterday's thought with the pastness of the thought and with the denial that the one contemplates the other, his answer will be, I take it: 'The remembered thought is past, for its date is yesterday; but there is a present memory of it, because this past enjoyment is included in that set of enjoyments of various dates which constitutes 'your mind at 10 o'clock to-day'.' I support this interpretation by the following passages, all from I., 127: '. . . The past enjoyment is the way in which the actual past of the mind is revealed in the present; but it is not revealed *as* present'. '. . . It is not revealed *in* the mind's present, though it forms one part of the total of which another part is the mind's present.' '. . . It is imagined to persist with the present; and so it does, but it persists as past.' 'If time is real the mind at any present moment contains its past as past.'

Now, as regards this view there are two remarks to be made: (i) As usual there seems to be a confusion between being enjoyed and being known. It may, for all I know, be a precondition of my present memory of my past state that this past state shall form part of 'my mind at the present moment'. But memory surely is a kind of knowledge, and just as it seems to me that the mere existence of a present state in my mind *is* not knowledge of that state, so equally the mere existence of a past state in my mind *is* not knowledge of it and therefore is not memory. Surely Prof. Alexander's sound principle that no object gains its existence or its qualities from the fact of being known ought to be supplemented by the equally sound principle that no existent—not even an enjoyment—gets known from the mere fact of ex-

isting and having such and such qualities. It seems to me that his best plan would be (*a*) to keep his distinction between enjoyment and contemplation, and then (*b*) to supplement it by a distinction between enjoyment and knowledge by enjoyment (and also probably by one between contemplation and knowledge by contemplation). Knowledge by enjoyment and knowledge by contemplation would then be two different sorts of knowledge by acquaintance, if the latter phrase be used merely as opposed to inferential and to descriptive knowledge. But, whilst contemplation would be acquaintance, enjoyment would not. The doctrine would then assume the following much more plausible form: We have knowledge by acquaintance, in the sense of non-descriptive and non-inferential knowledge, both of external objects and of our own states of mind. But this knowledge is differently conditioned in the two cases. The mere existence of our state of mind is *ipso facto* accompanied by and forms the foundation of direct judgments about them, which we will call knowledge by enjoyment. The mere existence of external objects does not found immediate judgments about them. These require a certain relation between the mind and them, *viz.*, contemplation or acquaintance. This relation does not subsist between minds and their states, and is not needed. When the relation of contemplation subsists between our minds and external objects it founds judgments of contemplation, which resemble judgments of enjoyment in being non-descriptive and non-inferential, but differ in the respects mentioned above. I do not say that this is true, or that it is what Prof. Alexander means, but I cannot help thinking that it would improve his theory.

(ii) Apart from this standing difficulty there is another that is perhaps worth mentioning. Does the statement 'X is a state remembered at *t*' just *mean* that X is one of the past states included in 'the mind at *t*'? Or does 'the mind at *t*' just *mean* the selection of states that are present, or past and remembered, or future and anticipated? On either of these alternatives the statement that a past state is remembered if it forms part of the mind at the moment of remembering is merely trivial and analytical. For, in the one case, memory is just defined by reference to the mind at the moment of remembering; and, in the other, the mind at the moment of remembering is just defined by reference to remembered and anticipated states. Prof. Alexander's doctrine of the remembering of past enjoyments is only substantial if (*a*) those past states which are remembered have some intrinsic distinction from those that are not, and (*b*) the mind at a

moment is, not a mere artificial, though legitimate, selection of states of various dates, but something naturally marked out and recognisable. Now, I grant that by 'my present self' I do not mean a mere instantaneous cross-section, also that 'my present self' undoubtedly includes my acts of remembering past and anticipating future enjoyments. But, from what has gone before, it evidently does not follow that it contains these past and future enjoyments themselves. That I can make a selection of past, present, and future enjoyments on these principles is obvious enough. And I can *call* such a selection 'my present self'. But that 'my present self,' in this sense, is anything that I actually recognise as a natural unit, or that it is any less artificial than a momentary cross-section, is by no means obvious.

(*b*) *Contemplation.*

The details of contemplation are very elaborately worked out in Vol. II., and much that is of great value and interest is said there. But I must confine myself to the general outlines and a few special points. It is of the essence of Prof. Alexander's theory that there is no peculiar relation which can be called the cognitive relation. There is one common relation between all finite parts of S.-T. however high or low they may be in the hierarchy of complexes. This is called *compresence*. A stone is compresent with another that attracts it, just as a man's mind is compresent with a stone that he perceives. But we say that the man cognises the stone, whilst we do not say that the one stone cognises the other. The difference is not in the relation, but in the nature of the referent. When a complex which has mentality is compresent with a stone we call the relation cognitive; when a complex that has only mechanical and secondary qualities is compresent with a stone we do not talk of cognition. Since any bit of S.-T. is compresent with any other, since cognition just is the compresence of a complex which has mentality with some lower complex, and since we are complexes with mentality, it might be thought that we ought to cognise everything in the universe below the level of mind. Prof. Alexander's answer is that pairs of finites may not be compresent to each other with respect to all their characters. Thus, things behind my back are not compresent with my mind if I am not thinking of them; but they are still compresent with my body since they exert attractive forces on it. Such things 'never fail to be compresent with me in

some capacity of me,' though they may not be compresent with me in my capacity of a thinking being. (*Cf.* II., 99-100.)

This solution of the difficulty has implications which Prof. Alexander does not explicitly state, and which it is important to notice. He cannot merely mean that unnoticed things are compresent with the part of my body which only lives and does not think, but not with the part that thinks as well as lives. For, if this were so, there would be a finite bit of S.-T.—*viz.*, this latter part—with which they are not compresent; which is contrary to his view. We must therefore suppose that everything is compresent with the part of my body that thinks, but not with it *quâ* thinking. What does this involve? A certain set of motions has the quality q_n, and, consequently, all the lower qualities q_{n-1}, q_{n-2} . . . , etc. If everything be compresent with it everything makes some difference to this—as to any other—set of motions. If some things be not compresent with it *quâ* possessing the quality of q_n but only *quâ* possessing (say) q_{n-1}, q_{n-2} . . . , etc., this must mean that a set of motions possessing the qualities q_n, q_{n-1}, q_{n-2} . . . can be modified without any modification of q_n. Thus it is implied that there is not an unique correlation between a set of motions that possesses the quality q_n and the quality q_n itself. Presumably the higher your complex the more modification it can undergo without change of its highest quality.

In sensation some sensum B evokes by causal action a set of motions in the brain of an observer. These motions are enjoyed, and the enjoyment of them is the sensation of B. Any other sensum B′ would excite different motions, and the enjoyment of these would be the sensation of B′. But suppose we are aware of an image or of a memory. Here the object that we become aware of is not the cause of that brain-state which, as enjoyed, is the awareness of the object. The cause may be purely internal to the body. But the final result is the same, *viz.*, the production of a set of motions which (*a*) is complex enough to have the quality of consciousness and (*b*) is 'appropriate to' the object, so as to be the consciousness *of it*. Just as every finite object that affects our minds produces the appropriate act, so no act exists without an appropriate non-mental object. And this object may be quite independent of the cause of the act. (We shall have to deal later with the apparent exceptions presented by error and illusion.)

The first point that seems to need further light is the relation between 'compresence' and 'appropriateness'. At stages below life and mind it would seem that compresence

practically comes down to causal influence, and that appropriateness is secured by the assumption that any difference in the cause involves a difference in the effect and conversely. The explanation also applies at the level of mind in the case of sensation. When I am aware of an image the image and the brain-process are compresent, and the latter is appropriate to the former. But the compresence does not here mean causal influence, and thus the appropriateness cannot be secured by any axiom about causation. It would seem that here the appropriateness must be the primary fact, and the compresence derived from it. We call this image compresent with this act of imaging because the latter is appropriate to the former and not to any other object.

Now the question that arises is: What justifies the assertion that every act has an appropriate object in the non-mental world? An act is a certain brain-state with a mental quality. This may be produced by causes which have no connexion with the object to which such an act is appropriate. Surely we might expect such acts to be constantly happening in the absence of any appropriate object. Nor do I see how we could tell in any given case whether there was an appropriate object or not. A certain brain-state is produced by causes internal to our bodies; this brain-state is complex enough to be conscious and we enjoy it; and we define the consciousness of the appropriate object to be this enjoyment. What is to prevent all this going on even if there be no appropriate object in the non-mental world? The object has nothing to do with the causation of the brain-state, so that might happen in its absence. The object has nothing to do with the brain-state being conscious, for that is entirely dependent on the structure and complexity of the brain-state itself. So the brain-state could be conscious in the absence of the appropriate object. But the enjoyment of a brain-state which is conscious just is the awareness of the appropriate object. Thus I cannot see what prevents the awareness of an object from existing although no such object exists, has existed, or will exist. Prof. Alexander's epistemology is of course meant to be thoroughly realistic; but his account of what constitutes consciousness of an object seems to me to involve all the difficulties of extreme subjective idealism. The reason is not far to seek. Compresence at the lower level of existence shows itself as causal influence, and the peculiarity of this relation is that if a exists A can only influence it causally if A also exists. Thus, in this sense of compresence, the existence of a is a guarantee of the existence of anything else that is compresent with it. But at

the cognitive level compresence does not always or usually show itself as causal influence; the enjoyed conscious brain-state *a* can be compresent with the object A though there is no causal influence between them. If we ask what constitutes compresence in such cases the answer apparently is that compresence here shows itself as appropriateness. Now the appropriateness of *a* to A only means that there is a one-one correlation[1] between the two, that a different *a* would be the awareness of a different A and conversely. But this relation of appropriateness, unlike the causal relation, does not guarantee the existence of one term given that the other exists. It is a mere correlation of the internal structure of two terms. Thus *a* might exist and be appropriate to A, but this would be no guarantee of A's existence. For to say that *a* is appropriate to A only means that if there be any object of which *a* is the awareness then that object must have the A structure and not (say) the B structure. A certain key will only fit a certain lock; but if keys and locks be produced independently the existence of the key is no guarantee of the existence of an appropriate lock. So it seems that the theory tries to make the best of both worlds. It tells us that the relation of act to object is that of compresence; we ask for an illustration of this and are offered instances of causal influence between physical objects. In these instances if one term exists all others compresent with it must exist too. Then we find that acts and objects do not as a rule have this relation, but another, called appropriateness, which does not have the peculiar property that if one of its terms is an existent the other must be so too. But we slur over this difference, because we are told that appropriateness just is compresence, and we remember that the examples of compresence which we have met were such that if one term exists so must the other.

I suppose that Prof. Alexander's answer would be somewhat as follows: Compresence is one and the same relation everywhere, and the feature that we notice in causal influence is common to all instances of compresence. Now every finite is compresent with other finites. A conscious state *a* exists. Our general principle implies that there will be other finites compresent with it. And the nature of compresence is such that these must themselves exist. Among the other existent finites only that one which is appropriate to *a* is compresent with it. But, since *something* must be compresent with it,

[1] Perhaps more strictly a many-one correlation, since presumably different brain-states enjoyed by different people can be awarenesses of the same object.

and since only an *appropriate* finite could be compresent with it, there must exist a finite appropriate to a. If this be the right interpretation we have three independent premises: (i) All finites are compresent with some other finite in respect to any assigned quality of them; (ii) What is compresent with an existent finite exists; (iii) Finites that have the quality of consciousness are compresent in respect to this quality only with other finites that are appropriate to them. It follows formally from these premises that every cognitive act has an appropriate object which exists. It is often difficult to distinguish what Prof. Alexander assumes and what he claims to prove, and the above tedious discussion is perhaps justified if it disentangles the premises and the conclusions of his theory of contemplation. It leaves me with a very grave doubt as to whether there is one single relation of compresence, the same at all levels, and differentiated only by the different qualities of the relatum. At the lowest level compresence is just the fact that two finites are both bits of one continuous S.-T. This is easy enough to understand, and it is easy to see that every finite is in this sense compresent with every other. But at the stage of mind compresence has become rigidly selective, there is a one to one relation between cognitive state and appropriate object. It is obvious enough that what is compresent with an existent must itself exist, if compresence merely means coexistence as finite bits of one S.-T. But it is by no means so obvious when this meaning has dropped into the background, as it has done at the level of mind and its objects. Prof. Alexander offers other illustrations of this sense of compresence which is independent of causation. He takes them from the sphere of life. An animal acts appropriately to catch prey which he does not now see. The prey does not cause the action, yet the action is appropriate to the prey. This does not seem to me a very happy illustration. If the animal does not yet perceive its victim (say a mouse) its present action is appropriate only in a general sense; it is one that can equally be continued into the movements needed for catching a mouse or into those needed for catching a bird. On the other hand the act of imagining a future scene is supposed to be not merely appropriate in a general way to the image, but to be uniquely correlated with it. Again, it is asserted that a mental act cannot exist without an appropriate object; and we have objected that on Prof. Alexander's view it is difficult to see why this should be so certain. Now cats often make the appropriate movements for catching mice and then fail to catch them—sometimes because it is not a mouse

but a bit of dead leaf that starts their actions. Thus the illustrative analogy is rather in favour of our objection than of Prof. Alexander's theory.

(*c*) *Appearance and Illusion.*

This brings us to Prof. Alexander's view about appearance and illusion, a subject which is always the crux of realist theories of perception. He distinguishes between real, mere, and illusory appearances. Real appearances are genuine parts of a perceived thing. From different positions we perceive different parts of the same thing and these are its real appearances. An example is the elliptical visual appearances of a circular object. Mere appearances are real parts of some complex of several things. Thus the bent visual appearance of a stick half out of water is a mere appearance of the stick, because it is not a part of the stick as such but of the more complex thing 'stick-in-different-media'. Lastly, illusory appearances are cases where the observing mind intrudes itself into what is observed. 'An illusory appearance is so only so far as it is supposed—either instinctively . . . or by . . . judgment—to belong to the real thing of which it seems to be an appearance.'

There is an interesting comparison (II., 191-192) between this view and Prof. Stout's, which throws some further light on the above distinctions. For Stout all appearances would be at best *mere;* for in any apprehension by us of external objects our own bodies are concerned, and the appearance apprehended is a function of them as well as of the external object. Prof. Alexander says: 'For us this position is unacceptable, because the action of the sense-organ is part of the process of sensing . . . not its object . . . The distorting or qualifying thing must be either observed or observable in the sensible object.' I do not quite understand whether Prof. Alexander's difference from Stout on this point is substantial or only verbal. Does he accept Stout's view that changes in the sense-organ modify the apprehended appearance as much as changes in the medium between the the body and the external object? If so, the difference is merely verbal. Prof. Alexander just refuses to call variations due to my eye mere appearances because I do not and cannot perceive my eye when I perceive an external object by means of it. But I equally do not and cannot perceive my glasses when I perceive external objects through them; are we to say that distortions and changes of colour due to them are real appearances? If you answer that I can see my glasses

at other times, it is equally true that I can see my eye at other times by making suitable arrangements. If, on the other hand, Prof. Alexander intends to deny the facts alleged by Stout he has a very difficult position to maintain. So far as I can see the eye, with its lense, behaves exactly like any other optical instrument such as a camera or a magnifying glass, and no sharp distinction can be drawn between the bodily and the non-bodily conditions of the variation of appearances.

As regards real appearances of shape and size Prof. Alexander has a very interesting theory. In the first place he holds that spatial characteristics are not perceived by means of any of our sense-organs but by the brain. The use of eyes, ears, etc., is to make us aware of the secondary qualities possessed by complicated motion-complexes. But these motion-complexes *quâ* bits of S.-T. excite areas or volumes in our brains. The enjoyment of these volumes is the awareness of the shapes and sizes (and, I think, distances) of the external object. Since our brains are only affected through our special sense-organs we cannot *intuit* the spatio-temporal attributes of an external thing without at the same time *sensing* some of its secondary qualities. Hence we think that we sense the spatio-temporal attributes; but this is a mistake. Really we intuit the contour of a thing by our brains and sense the secondary qualities which belong to the motion-complexes within that contour by means of our special organs of sense. Now Prof. Alexander points out the important fact that, although a circular disc looks smaller as we move it away from us, and although it looks elliptical as we turn it round, yet the felt and the seen contours continue to coincide. Though we see an ellipse and feel a circle there is at no point a gap between the two. Now what we see at any moment is those event-particles from which light reaches us at that moment. These are not contemporary. If we are looking straight down on the disc the centre is nearer to us than the outside parts, light has therefore further to travel, and so what we see at the centre is earlier than what we see at the outside. The further we are from the disc the less is the difference in time between the central and the peripheral events that we see and this difference apparently is seen as decreased size. Similar remarks apply to the elliptic visual appearances. Thus all can be regarded as parts of the one thing because the thing is something with a history and the visual appearances are selections of events of different dates in that history. Touch, though not perfect, gives us the nearest approximation to the real geometrical properties of things.

The above theory, if I have understood it aright, seems to me to contain a very valuable suggestion for dealing with conflicts between sight and touch. Once we remember that things are not momentary volumes but have a history, and consequently are extended in four dimensions, we see that the phrase '*the* shape of a thing' needs definition, and we see that the object of vision on a realist view cannot be a set of contemporary parts of the thing. And, if space and time be so closely bound up with each other as Prof. Alexander holds, temporal differences in an object might, I suppose, be interpreted as spatial differences. But these valuable hints need considerable working out. In the first place, when Prof. Alexander says that touch gives us the nearest approximation to 'the real geometrical properties of things,' we should like a clear definition of what is meant by *the* shape or *the* size of a thing, taken as a four-dimensional contour. Secondly, the touch that assures us that a disc is circular is *successive* touch; we run our fingers round the edge. Thus the object of touch no more consists of contemporary event-particles than does that of sight. And the more slowly we run our fingers round the edge the greater will be the time differences between the event-particles felt. These differences thus (*a*) depend on our own action, and (*b*) are much greater than any that occur in the object of sight (for the latter are inversely proportional to the velocity of light, and the former to that of our fingers). It seems odd then that the deliveries of touch should be so constant as compared with those of sight, if the variations in those of sight be due to time differences in the different parts of the seen object.

The theory of illusory appearances I find more difficult to follow. The general principles are clear enough. In *all* perception there is ideal supplementation of a sensum by association. If the perception be not illusory this supplement can be verified by sense in the perceived object on further experience. If it be illusory it cannot. 'An angel would see illusory appearances as mere appearances,' because he can contemplate the percipient's mind as well as the perceived thing, and can thus see—what we cannot—that the attribute ascribed to the latter really belongs to the complex thing composed of it and the former (II., 213). The main difficulty is over illusory sensations. Suppose I see a certain patch as green (through contrast) when it is really not green. Then according to Alexander (*a*) the green that I see is actually in the world, (*b*) it is not merely an universal green that I apprehend, and (*c*) the mode of filling a patch with a colour is a real factor in the world. The illusion

consists in seeing the real particular green, in the real relation of 'filling' a contour to which it does not stand in this relation. On II., 214, we are told that 'the actual intuited space of the grey patch is filled with the green quality'. And the cause is that 'the mind squints at things, and one thing is seen with the characteristics of something else' (II., 216). Now I really do not see how all these statements can be reconciled. A certain intuited contour is filled with a grey colour, and this means that motions of a certain kind are going on within it. We see this patch as green. The particular green of the patch really is somewhere else in the world. Where precisely? Let us say in a particular piece of grass. This means that in the contour of the piece of grass motions of another kind are going on. In what way and in what sense can our minds put the particular green of this bit of grass into this grey contour? The statement that 'the actual space of the grey patch is filled with the green quality' suggests that the mind really transfers (in a perfectly literal sense) the green motions of the bit of grass into the grey contour. But if it does this the originally grey contour really is green for the time being, and there is no illusion; whilst presumably the bit of grass must really cease to be green. This cannot be what Prof. Alexander means; but I can offer no suggestion as to his real meaning here.

C. The Hierarchy of Qualities.

I regard this doctrine as perhaps the most important thing in Prof. Alexander's book. I believe that something of the kind will prove to be the necessary and sufficient means of settling the embittered controversies between mechanists and vitalists, if only the extremely muddle-headed protagonists on both sides could be got to see what they are really arguing about. And I think that Prof. Alexander is quite right in holding that the question ought to be raised at a much lower level than that of life or mind, certainly at that of chemical action at least. It is needless to enlarge on the doctrine, for the general outlines of it will be clear enough from examples that have occurred earlier in this paper. There are just two points, however, that call for some criticism.

(i) Prof. Alexander holds that if a complex has the quality q_n then it is always a specialised part of it that will possess the quality. This part will indeed also possess all the lower qualities q_{n-1}, q_{n-2}, . . . But the rest will *only* possess q_{n-1}, q_{n-2}, . . . I do not see any very good reason for this view. It is of course suggested by the analogy of the brain, which

has consciousness as well as life, etc., and is an integral part of a larger whole which has life, etc., but no consciousness. But I do not see why *e.g.*, a coloured physical object *must* consist of specialised coloured motions dotted about within a contour among others that are merely mechanical. It *may* be so, and it provides Prof. Alexander with a convenient way of dealing with intensity; but that seems to be the only argument in favour of this possibility.

(ii) It is not clear to me that 'quality' is used in the same sense all through the alleged hierarchy. *E.g.*, red seems to me to be a quality of a certain motion-complex in one sense, and life to be a quality of a more elaborate complex in a very different sense. By saying that a body is living I just *mean* that its motions and other changes fit into each other and into the environment in certain characteristic ways. The statement is an analysis of its characteristic modes of change. But by saying that a motion is red I certainly do not *mean* that it is a vibration of such and such frequency. The statement is not an analysis of its characteristic mode of motion, but is the assertion that a property, which is not analysable in terms—such as velocity, frequency, etc., that apply directly to motions as such, occupies the same contour as a certain set of motions. Prof. Alexander holds that organic sensa are characteristic of living bodies and are contemplated by us when we have organic sensations. If this be true organic sensa are qualities of living bodies in precisely the same sense in which colours are qualities of certain non-living bodies. But the *life* of a living body does not seem to me to be a quality of it in this sense, for the reasons stated above.

We are told that the characteristic behaviour of a living being could be exhibited *without remainder* in physico-chemical terms, provided only that the nature of the physical constellation were known. 'If we could secure the right sort of machine it would be an organism and cease to be a material machine' (II., 66). Yet life is not an epiphenomenon; such and such a constellation *could not* exist without life. Similarly I suppose that such and such a vibration *could not* exist without being red. Now I agree with this; but I believe that the 'could not' has a different meaning in the two cases. If life could be exhibited without residue in physico-chemical terms, it is because life just *means* characteristic modes of change. A machine that moved and changed as a living organism does would be alive by definition.[1] The necessity here is

[1] Though the very important difference remains that such a machine would be an *artificial organism*, *i.e.*, one produced by the deliberate action

analytical. But I do not see that red can in this sense 'be exhibited without residue in physico-chemical terms,' because no part of the *meaning* of 'red' has anything to do with motion and change. I agree that there is a perfectly good sense in saying that the vibrations which in fact are red could not fail to be red. But I understand this to be a synthetic proposition asserting it to be a law of nature that such and such types of vibration are always accompanied by such and such a colour. The statement about life is like saying that a figure all of whose points are equidistant from a fixed point could not fail to be circular; the statement about red is like saying that a ruminant cannot fail to be cloven-footed.

The sense in which it is certain that life can be exhibited without residue in chemical and physical terms is that by calling a body alive we mean no more than that it changes and moves in such and such characteristic ways. (I omit the question of organic sensa.) The sense in which it is nevertheless possible that there is something new in an organised body is that (*a*) it may be impossible even theoretically to deduce all the behaviour of such a complex from the most exhaustive knowledge of what its parts would do if they were not in such a complex; and (*b*) even if the parts obey precisely the same *laws* within as without this complex, and if therefore the peculiar behaviour of living bodies comes down to a question of *collocations*, there is still the question whether the laws and collocations of the inorganic world will account for the coming together of these organic collocations. Neither colour nor consciousness can be exhibited without residue in physical and chemical terms in the sense in which life can, since to be coloured or to be conscious does not mean to move in certain peculiar ways. The only sense in which red can be exhibited without residue in physical terms is that, since redness and a certain sort of movement are constantly connected, any proposition which ascribes a predicate to red objects can be replaced by one which ascribes the same predicate to movements of the sort that are red.

D. Universals.

Universals on Prof. Alexander's view are patterns which are or may be repeated in S.-T. Individuals are complexes of S.-T. The configuration of an individual is particular, but it follows a plan which may be repeated by other configurations

of mind, whilst an ordinary organism is rather a *natural machine*, produced so far as we know, without any deliberate design. This is the really queer thing about organisms.

at the same time or by this configuration at different times. We might be tempted to hold that it is a plan as such that constitutes an universal, and that it is merely a contingent fact that all plans are plans of configurations of S.-T. This Prof. Alexander would deny; all possibility is rooted in the actual, all that is actual is S.-T., and it is part of the *meaning* of a plan to be a plan of a configuration of S.-T. The essence of universality is that configurations of the same spatio-temporal pattern can exist anywhere in S.-T. This, Prof. Alexander thinks, is only possible because S.-T. has an uniform 'curvature' in Gauss's sense.

The last statement seems to me to be much too sweeping. We must recognise an hierarchy of universals. Let us start with something that is merely geometrical and take the series:—circles of 1″ radius, circles, closed conics, conics in general. Now suppose that the curvature of S.-T were not uniform. Then (*a*) circles of 1″ radius might still be possible at some places and times though not at all; (*b*) even if there could be nowhere and nowhen circles of 1″ radius, circles of smaller radius might be possible at various times and places; (*c*) even if this were not so conic sections of some kind might be possible always and everywhere, so far as I can see. Thus many variations in the curvature of S.-T. might be imagined which would only cut out universals of the lowest order, *i.e.*, those whose instances are particulars, such as circles of 1″ radius, and would leave higher universals, such as conics in general, standing. And, unless it be essential to an universal to be capable of having instances *always* and *everywhere*, many variations of curvature would be compatible with the subsistence even of lowest universals like circles of 1″ radius.

When we pass to more concrete universals like cats and dogs, the argument is stronger still. I cannot imagine why the existence of dogs requires complete constancy of curvature. It is admitted that no two dogs are exactly alike in shape, and that any dog changes its shape considerably in the course of its history. Thus the curvature of S.-T. might vary considerably from place to place and from moment to moment without prejudice to the possibility of things built on the pattern of dogs, or even of pug-dogs, existing always and everywhere. Of course if S.-T. were such that a pug in one place was rolled out into the shape of a dachshund by merely chasing a cat from one end of a garden to the other, the universals 'pug' and 'dachshund' could hardly be said to subsist. But S.-T. might vary in curvature without varying so wildly as this; and, even if it were so wild, the universals 'dog' and 'cat' might still subsist unmoved.

E. Deity.

I do not quite know how seriously Prof. Alexander intends his theology to be taken. I suppose it is a point of honour with Gifford Lecturers to introduce at least the *name* of God somewhere into the two volumes, and we may congratulate Prof. Alexander on the ingenuity which discovered a place in his system for something to which this name might be not too ludicrously applied. Whether the religious consciousness will be satisfied with Prof. Alexander's God I cannot say. He modestly professes to have very little personal experience of religion, and, as I too come very much nearer to 'our countryman Dr. Middleton' than to 'the Cardinal Baronius' on that 'theological barometer' suggested by Gibbon, of which these two theologians were to form 'the opposite and remote extremities,' it would ill become me to say what the religious consciousness does want. Prof. Alexander's candidate for the position of God has the two merits of being necessarily mysterious to us, and being in a definite sense higher than ourselves. The vaulted roof of St. Pancras station seen at midnight has been known to evoke the religious emotion in one eminent mathematician returning to Cambridge from a dinner in town; and what the sight of St. Pancras has done for one man, the thought of the next stage in the hierarchy of qualities may do for others. It might indeed seem difficult to feel much enthusiasm about a God who does not yet exist, and who will cease to be divine as soon as he begins to be actual. Still the merit of faith is commonly held to increase with its difficulty, and the merit of religious adoration may vary according to a similar law.

Frankly it seems to me that the doctrine of what Prof. Alexander calls 'deity' is an integral and important part of his system, but I suspect that it is not what anyone else means by deity, and that it has been somewhat strained to make it fit in verbally with the concepts of religion and theology. If Prof. Alexander really does feel towards his deity as religious persons do towards their God I apologise most humbly for poking fun at it.

The theological reference seems to have warped the discussion in at least two ways. (i) We hear much more of the quality of deity as such than about the beings who would possess it. This is because the former is identified with God, whilst the latter would merely be gods, and polytheism is out of fashion. But all sorts of interesting questions could be raised about gods in Prof. Alexander's sense. There may be gods, with respect to us, existing now. If there be we might

stand in one of two different relations to them. Our brains might be parts of a god. This might be true of some of us and not of others. The 'good old German God' might be more than a myth if it would consent to forego its capital letter. The quality of deity might belong to a material system composed of special parts of the brains of all Germans or of all Hohenzollerns. Taking the latter hypothesis the brains (and consequently the minds) of Hohenzollerns would be connected with the good old German god in a way comparable to that in which the merely living part of our bodies is connected with our brains, which think as well as live. The brains of other Germans would only stand to the German god in a sort of relation in which (say) plants stand to animals. In general, if any gods exist now, parts of the brains of some of us might be parts of a material system which has deity. Others of us might have no share in any god. Or it might be that all men and no animals stand in the more intimate relation to some god. We might expect that if some men stand in a much more intimate relation to deity than others this would show itself in their lives and thoughts. With half the ingenuity that Prof. Alexander has lavished on proving that his God has many of the attributes ascribed by theologians to their God, I would undertake to work some of the most characteristic doctrines of the Christian religion into his system on the basis of the possibilities outlined above.

(ii) I think that the theological implications of Prof. Alexander's phraseology have led him into a quite unjustifiable optimism. He seems to hold (*a*) that S.-T. will always go on producing higher and higher complexes with new and more wonderful qualities, and (*b*) that we ought to regard these new qualities with something of the love and reverence which religious persons feel for their God. But these assumptions seem to me quite baseless. (*a*) What we know of nature, apart from alleged divine revelations, rather tends to suggest that the higher complexes, such as those that carry life and mind, are unstable; that they can only arise and persist under very exceptional conditions; and that these conditions are unlikely to be permanent. (*b*) What we know of the relations between beings who have only life and those which have both life and mind does not justify a very comforting view of the probable relations between ourselves and gods. Animals have life and mind; plants, I suppose, only life. The main relation of the worshipper to the god in this case is that the latter eats the former when it can. Whilst this presents an interesting variation of the religious

conception of the Sacramental Meal, it may cause the timid worshipper to view the coming of the Kingdom with a certain degree of apprehension.

I must bring this long discussion of Prof. Alexander's book to an end. I have mainly mentioned points where I disagree or feel difficulty. The system is so original, and so many hard questions are dealt with in the book, that it is almost certain that I have misinterpreted Prof. Alexander in many places. It will necessarily take the philosophic world some time to think itself into the new positions, and we are bound to make mistakes in the process. The author himself must give us help on the way; and it is in the hope that he may be moved to do this in the pages of MIND that I have 'praised with faint damns,' which, I hope, have not disguised my admiration for a great work of philosophic speculation, nobly conceived and conscientiously carried through.

II.—HUME'S ETHICAL THEORY AND ITS CRITICS. (II.).

By Frank Chapman Sharp.

The Standard of Right.

According to Hume, as we have seen, the term "right," when applied to conduct, means that the person judging believes himself to have abstracted from all relation of the action to his private interests, and from all accidental relations to himself of whatever kind they may be. Right represents the desires of an impartial observer of the situation. Since human beings are constantly supposing themselves impartial in their judgments when in fact they are not, the actual judgments of the race contradict each other to an enormous extent, and varying types persist through generations or centuries. Of all the mass of human judgments those alone may properly be called "correct" or valid which are the expression of a thorough-going, all-sided impartiality, because they alone really are what they give themselves out as being.

This conception of right raises two questions fundamental to ethics: Is there some one standard valid not merely for you or me, but for the race? And if so, what is it? Hume's attitude towards the first question we shall find it convenient to reserve for later consideration, premising only that he believes in the existence of a universal standard. Turning to the second question we are compelled to say that Hume answers it in only very general terms. The conduct approved is that which is useful or agreeable to the agent or others. This is well enough as far as it goes, but it is only half an answer. The really interesting problems are still before us. In life it constantly happens that we are compelled to choose between the good of one person or group and that of another; or again between the harm of one party and that of another. In such cases which interest or set of interests ought to prevail? Hume recognises at one point or another—though he nowhere undertakes a systematic presentation of the subject—that three very different

and sometimes incompatible principles are used by the men in the street in solving problems of this kind: They are: (1) One ought to choose the *greater* good, or, where harm or loss is inevitable, the less harm. (2) Where the actor himself or a member of his family is one of the parties affected, he ought to choose the *nearer* good, even where the result is a net loss for those affected. (3) The good *of those who are worthy of admiration* ought to be preferred to the good of those who are not; and the good of the more admirable ought to be preferred to that of the less admirable. With changed terms, the same principle is applied to the distribution of necessary evils. In so far as the admired are admired for moral qualities (3) becomes the principle that claims are a function of moral desert or merit.

Now, as has been said, Hume sees these facts, but just as he nowhere presents them as a whole so he never subjects them to a serious and systematic examination with a view to solving the problems of validity which they present. Why, we can only guess. Of one thing we may be sure, however, namely that he had a pretty well defined view of his own, for bits of it are dropped here and there. All that we can do to-day is to pick up the crumbs which fell from his table. His contributions to this subject—if this be not too pretentious a name for them—deal with just two items. Both have to do with the claims of the "nearer" good.

Logically the definition of right in terms of impartiality requires a modification of the doctrine that morality has its source exclusively in concern for the good of others. Hume has nowhere discussed this subject in the light of his general conception of right; but he leads his readers to the necessary conclusion by a different route.

Taken literally a view which reduces all morality to benevolence can only lead to Comte's maxim: Live for others, in the sense of, Live solely for others. But Hume has discovered the inner contradiction at the root of such an ideal. In showing that the institution of private property would have no place in a society governed by the spirit of universal benevolence, he writes: "Suppose that, though the necessities of human race continue the same as at present, yet the mind is so enlarged, and so replete with friendship and generosity, that every man has the utmost tenderness for every man, and feels no more concern for his own interest than for that of his fellows: it seems evident that the use of justice would, in this case, be suspended by such an extensive benevolence, nor would the divisions and barriers of property and obligation have ever been thought of. Why should I

bind another, by a deed or promise, to do me any good office, when I know that he is already prompted, by the strongest inclination, to seek my happiness, and would, of himself, perform the desired service; except the hurt, he thereby receives, be greater than the benefit accruing to me? in which case, he knows that, from my innate humanity and friendship, I should be the first to oppose myself to his imprudent generosity."[1] This is the principle which in the Essay on Suicide he states in the words: "I am not obliged to do a small good to society at the expense of a great harm to myself".[2] This is the only conclusion which his definition of right permits. Impartiality works both ways. The moral point of view is the Copernican point of view. It does indeed thrust self from the position it tends to arrogate to itself at the centre of the universe, but it assuredly does not annihilate it. In accordance with this insight we shall have to say that Hume's system involves the view that the desire from which springs the valid moral judgment is the impartial desire for good as such; and Love thy neighbour as thyself, rather than Live solely for others, is the requirement of the moral ideal.

A second problem on which Hume has expressed his opinion concerns the claims of the greater good and the good of one's family and friends when the two conflict as they occasionally do. Hume recognises that public opinion in many instances regards the latter alternative as having the higher claim. He himself denies the validity of this claim, and asserts that the common belief arises from that failure to be impartial which is precisely the source of invalid moral judgments.[3] It cannot be said that he has worked out the doctrine of the subject satisfactorily. He has left it with a bare affirmation. And there it stands, a fundamental problem of ethics, of great theoretical if not practical significance, almost completely ignored by moralists till the present day.

The claims of the greater good, as we have seen, sometimes come into conflict with another ideal, that of the treatment of men according, not to the amount of their need or the good that can be conferred upon them, but according to their merit. Hume recognises in one place the existence of the judgments that directly approve preferential treatment

[1] *Enquiry*, sec. iii., pt. i., G. ii., 180; S.-B. 184.

[2] *Essays*, G. ii., 413.

[3] *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. ii., sec. ii.; G. ii., 261-262; S.-B. 488-489; pt. iii., sec. i.; G. ii., 341-342; S.-B. 582-583. Other illustrations of failure in impartiality as a cause of invalid moral judgments will be found also in the follow ng passages: *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. i., sec. ii., G. ii., 248, S.-B. 472; pt. iii., sec. i., G. ii., 344; S.-B. 585.

of the meritorious and the inflicting of suffering upon the evil doer as an end in itself, and explains it.[1] But in no place does he even express an opinion upon the validity of such judgments, except, of course, by implication. Of the problems, in particular, which are involved in the recognition of moral judgments based upon the desire of harm for harm's sake there is no genuine recognition in any of his writings.

The Problem of Universal Validity.

Nevertheless the problems of retribution are of the greatest theoretical, to say nothing of practical, importance. For they raise in its most acute form the question whether there is one standard valid for the entire race. They represent an ideal of hate face to face with an ideal of love. Since some persons accept the former where others reject it the question arises, which attitude is the proper one. Or must we rather say, as Socrates said to Crito: "Those who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another when they see how widely they differ".

My own answer is that there is a solution of this problem of retributive punishment which follows directly from the foundations of Hume's system. To understand it we must distinguish between two features of Hume's definition of right which as yet we have not attempted to separate. The impartiality involved in the nature of the moral judgment means impartiality of attitude towards the goods and evils of life, and, properly speaking, it means nothing more than this. Three such attitudes are possible, that of friendliness to goods, that of indifference, that of enmity. Hume recognises in his formal descriptions of the moral judgment only the first, so that for him morality consists (as we have phrased it) in equal *concern for* equal interests. But, as we have just noted, there exist judgments which have a *prima facie* claim to be called moral which are based upon enmity. And the question we have to face is, Can they justify their claim to validity? This is to ask whether, if we weigh equal interests with equal scales, we can find a place in the moral ideal for the demands of retribution.

To answer this question we must note that the great, indeed the overwhelming, majority of our moral judgments have their source in what (using the terms of the preceding paragraph) we may call friendliness to goods; otherwise

[1] *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. iii., sec. i.; G. ii., 349; S.-B., 591. *Cf. Enquiry*, sec. v., pt. ii.; G. ii., 213; S.-B. 226.

stated, in the desire that goods may exist. This is not merely true as a fact, it must be true in any human society which we can conceive of as existing on this earth. For the desire for the realisation of the good is constructive, but the desire for the infliction of evil is destructive. Universal destruction of values for destruction's sake would mean the ruin and death of the society in which it prevailed. The approbation of the infliction of harm for harm's sake is thus conceivable only as a sporadic irruption into an alien system of ideals.

It is on the basis of the impartial desire for the preservation and increase of values that we demand that a man shall moderate his ambition, his love of power, of money, and similar springs of action, till he brings them to a point where they are in harmony with the well-being of the whole of which he is a member. On what ground then can we urge an exception to this rule in favour of the desire for vengeance? Either this is a piece of favouritism, a dispensation granted to one desire that is not granted to others, or it is not. If the inclusion of the demand for retribution can be shown to involve no favouritism, then it ceases to appear as a rival standard; it takes its place in the organised system of values that make up the moral ideal as Hume conceives it. It therefore presents no exception to the doctrine of a universally valid moral standard, and is therefore of no farther concern in the treatment of the present topic. On the other hand, if its inclusion in our code of conduct is mere partiality, a determination to stand at all odds for what we happen to like, then we may like it as much as we will, it can nevertheless claim no place among moral judgments. Nor can it be raised to this dignity by the simple expedient of throwing the demands of the desire into the form of a universal judgment: Let all, whether others or me myself, who have committed such deeds, be made to suffer in return. For this formula as it stands is a mere counterfeit of the impartiality required for the moral judgment. It is obtained by picking out one interest of one party and universalising it. Whereas genuine impartiality requires equal concern for *all* interests, those of the victim as well as those of the would-be avenger. The mistake is the same as that made by Mr. Spencer in the use of his formula of freedom: Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man. As Mr. Spencer actually interprets this principle—except occasionally when caught in a corner—this means: I am at liberty to play the piano in my apartment all night long provided I am willing to allow the other residents of the same building to do the same thing. Here

obviously there is a failure to weigh all the interests concerned, which is concealed from view by our willingness to share with others the favoured one. The same is true of the demand for retribution. It has its source in a certain desire. Its advocate declares himself willing to universalise this desire. But in supposing that he has thereby transformed a personal desire into a moral ideal he forgets that there are other interests involved in the situation—those of the victim, for instance, which demand their chance to be brought to the scales and to have their part in determining the decision.

The only moral code in which the demand for retribution could find a place for itself would be one built from the ground up on the basis of a consistently impartial hatred for all goods. And such a code, as we have said, never has existed as far as we are aware, does not exist, and as far as we can see never will exist under any conditions concerning which it is worth our while to speculate.

I have introduced this discussion not for its own sake but as a means of approach to the question left unanswered above. Is there one code valid for the race? The approbation of retributive punishment is the most striking and important of the apparent exceptions. If it can be shown that this as well as all the lesser variations from the principle that that conduct is right which aims at the greatest attainable good of those affected—if it can be shown that these variations are all due to a failure to meet the conditions which we suppose ourselves to have met in calling an action right, then our question is answered in the affirmative.

What then is Hume's share in this result? I reply: His definition of right has supplied the instrument by which it was gained. The method employed is that which he himself employs here and there—very incompletely no doubt—to distinguish between valid and invalid judgments. Finally the conclusion reached is that which Hume himself accepts and argues for with a great deal of earnestness.

Since he himself, however, in his official arguments, so to speak, in behalf of universality does not use the method above presented, it may not be superfluous to examine the grounds upon which he does rest his doctrine of universality. He discusses the subject in two places.

In the Enquiry he affirms that regard for others ("humanity") is either universal in the race or is universal in all those who have not destroyed it by a career of crime. Ignoring the demands of malevolence and treating, as he usually does, morality as a matter of the service of others, he thence con-

cludes to the existence of a code which is valid either for all or for practically all the members of the race.[1]

In the essay entitled "A Dialogue" he reaches substantially the same conclusion in a different manner. Here the diversities of the moral judgment are reduced to two classes, as follows: "Sometimes men differ in their judgment about the usefulness of any habit or action: Sometimes also the peculiar circumstances of things render one moral quality more useful than others, and give it a peculiar preference".[2] Confining our attention to the first which will supply the principle for dealing with the second, it is easy to show that the whole argument is from Hume's own point of view an *ignoratio elenchi*. The differences in judgment about the usefulness of any habit or action are differences in what Hutcheson, reviving a scholastic distinction, calls material rightness. Some moralists seem to scorn this distinction as a trivial one. It is precisely the reverse. Every voluntary act involves (1) a view of the situation in which one is about to act, and (2) a purpose, or if you prefer, an intention to bring about a certain state of things. Now on Hume's own view an error in (1) is not an error in *moral* judgment; it is an error of the intellect (whether of the individual or of his time) committed in the attempt to examine the facts of the situation. Most of us would agree, for example, that it is an error to suppose that the negro is on the whole better off, in any reasonable sense of that term, under a white master than as a free man; we shall be equally ready to agree that it is an error to think of eternal salvation as depending upon the acceptance or rejection of this or that theological dogma. From this point of view the holding of slaves and the burning of heretics are materially wrong; *i.e.*, they are things which cannot be done by a man controlled by a moral purpose *who sees the situation as it really is*. Formal rightness, on the other hand, has to do with the purpose as such. The question of formal rightness always is, in essence, the following: Assuming the interest involved in the situation to be such and such, which of the conflicting interests or sets of interests has the superior claim upon the will? According to any system of ethics which regards the moral judgment as a judgment upon purposes it is mistaken answers to this question that alone constitute mistakes in moral judgment. This is precisely Hume's view. Therefore a discussion of variations in judgments of material rightness is entirely irrelevant to the moral problem

[1] Sec. ix., pt. i.; G. ii., 247-248.; S.-B. 271-272.
[2] *Essays*, G. ii., 299; S.-B. 336.

which he supposes himself to be treating in the Dialogue. The consequences of this singular lapse were most unfortunate. This essay is Hume's one systematic discussion of the nature, extent, and causes of the variations in moral judgments. As a result of getting on the wrong track in this place he never faced these problems in their entirety, and he thus failed to formulate a real solution of them.

Hume's contributions to the problem of universality in ethics, as we now see, were two in number. He asserted the existence of a code which though based upon "the particular structure and fabric of the mind" is in virtue of the fundamental unity of that structure valid for the race. What is far more important he discovered a cause of variations in moral judgments which has a tremendous range; a cause so extensive in its operations that it challenges the moralist to show the necessity of introducing any others; a cause which if it turns out to be the sole cause of the failure to attain unity of moral ideals will enable us to assert the possibility of formulating a single code valid in its principles for all mankind.

The Element of Truth in the Doctrine of Objectivity.

We are now in a position to estimate the force of what may perhaps be regarded as the central objection which rationalistic ethics has urged against Hume and the entire school of which he is a member.

Reid in his work, *On the Active Powers*, writes as follows: "Suppose that, in a case well known to both, my friend says—Such a man did well and worthily, his conduct is highly approvable. This speech, according to all rules of interpretation, expresses my friend's judgment of the man's conduct. This judgment may be true or false, and I may agree in opinion with him, or I may dissent from him without offence, as we may differ in other matters of judgment.

"Suppose, again, that, in relation to the same case, my friend says: The man's conduct gave me a very agreeable feeling.

"This speech, if approbation be nothing but an agreeable feeling, must have the very same meaning as the first, and express neither more nor less. But this cannot be, for two reasons:—

"First, Because there is no rule in grammar or rhetoric, nor any usage in language, by which these two speeches can be construed so as to have the same meaning. The first

expresses plainly an opinion or judgment of the conduct of the man, but says nothing of the speaker. The second only testifies a fact concerning the speaker—to wit, that he had such a feeling.

"Another reason why these two speeches cannot mean the same thing is that the first may be contradicted without any ground of offence, such contradiction being only a difference of opinion, which, to a reasonable man, gives no offence. But the second speech cannot be contradicted without an affront; for, as every man must know his own feelings, to deny that a man had a feeling which he affirms he had, is to charge him with falsehood."[1]

This contention could have been accepted by Hume as essentially sound. The only objection he need have urged against it is the supposition that it applies as a criticism of his system. Right, he teaches, does represent something more than the chance feelings of the passing moment. It means that the action will give a feeling of satisfaction to one who evaluates impartially all the interests affected. To say this is obviously to make no affirmation whatever about my own feelings as they are in the moment of judging, when they may be dulled by pre-occupation with other affairs, warped by personal prejudices, antagonisms, or emotional stresses, or dimmed by a dull imagination or lack of experience in that particular field of life. However remote from each other the starting points of the two theories may be, and however widely their farther courses may diverge, rationalism can pick no quarrel with a system such as Hume's on this issue. On the contrary Hume could well afford to admit that rationalism has performed a great service to ethical inquiry by insisting, in season and out, upon this central fact of the moral experience.

Morality as Fear of Public Opinion.

Before leaving this part of the subject I must call attention to one more misunderstanding with regard to Hume's theory of the moral judgment. In his Introduction to Hume, Green writes: "The pleasure of moral sentiment, as Hume thinks of it, is essentially a pleasure experienced by a spectator of the act who is other than the doer of it".[2] The basis for this supposition will be found in the words which immediately follow those just quoted: "If the doer and spectator were

[1] *Essay* v., ch. vii., Sir William Hamilton's edition (1863), p. 673.

[2] P. 367. Introduction ii., sec. 61. *Cf. Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 5 for another statement of the same view.

regarded as one person, there would be no meaning in the rule that the tendency to produce pleasure, which excites the sentiment of approbation, must be a tendency to produce it to the doer himself or others, as distinct from the spectator himself". This argument involves the assumption that a person cannot look at an act or a situation from two points of view. One hardly knows whether to take an argument of this kind seriously. If we must, let us test it by an examination of the following commonplace illustration. A gives money to a worthy person, B, to relieve the latter's necessities. According to Hume, A's fundamental motive must have been—if the act is to be counted a thoroughly moral one—a desire to give pleasure to B (or to relieve him from pain). The pleasure which he here desires to produce in B is obviously a pleasure distinct from that produced in the spectator of the deed. The latter, looking impartially at once at A's resources and B's needs, feels the satisfaction of a benevolent man in the act. What is there to prevent A from reacting in the same way? Can he not feel a generous satisfaction at his conduct when viewed from this standpoint, a satisfaction the same in kind and source as that of the spectator? If he does he is playing the role of agent and spectator at the same time. Is there anything in the logic of Hume's theory to make this impossible? Nothing whatever. Is there anything in his language to show that he regarded it as impossible? Far from it: Hume constantly assumes that the agent may play the spectator. The fundamentals of his system are not merely not incompatible with this position, they demand it.

Suppose we occupy ourselves for a moment by combining Green's statement above with his other statement about the incompatibility of altruism with a sensationalistic psychology. This would mean, translating it into the terms of the just used illustration: A could not merely feel no approbation of himself for helping B, he could not even form the idea of B's needs as something demanding his assistance. What then is left to serve as motive for the action? Green's answer is: Nothing but the desire to stand well with the spectator. "Understood as [Hume] himself understood his doctrine it is only 'respectability'—the temper of the man who 'naturally,' *i.e.*, without definite expectation of ulterior gain, seeks to stand well with his neighbours—that it will explain."[1] Our reply to this assertion is that the sensationalistic psychology of Hume will explain nothing whatever beyond the range of

[1] *Essay* v., ch. vii., p. 370; sec. 64.

motive possible to Principal Lloyd Morgan's chicks; and that they are as incapable of the aspiration for respectability as they are of the enthusiasm of humanity. If we consider what results would flow from the application of Green's principles of exegesis to the interpretation of Hume's *History of England*, or let us say, to Mill *On the Subjection of Women*, we shall see just how much they are worth. Their worth being precisely zero we are free to consult Hume himself. What does he say? "Our regard to a character with others seems to arise only from a care of preserving a character with ourselves; and in order to attain this end, we find it necessary to prop our tottering judgment on the correspondent approbation of mankind."[1] This statement is made not merely once, but over and over again. It may seem somewhat exaggerated to some of us, as if Hume, in the endeavour to walk straight, were leaning backwards. Let that be as it will. What alone concerns us here is the fact that starting with those premises of Hume's ethical theory which it is alone profitable to consider, there is nothing in them or any legitimate deduction from them which can properly be urged in criticism of the view that the desire to stand well with one's neighbour is a mere derivative from the desire to stand well with one's self. The attempt therefore to manœuvre Hume into a position where he can find room in his ethical system only for the fear of public opinion must be adjudged a failure.

Reason in the Moral Judgment.

Having completed our account of Hume's theory of the moral judgment we are prepared to inquire what role is assigned to reason in the formation of the moral judgment.[2] The word reason has a considerable number of meanings which it is necessary to distinguish:—

(1) By reason may be meant the power of intuiting necessary truths. If these truths are thought of as a special set of judgemnts, applicable to a definite field, as the axioms of geometry are held to apply to space, then, as we know, Hume denies the existence of such axioms.

(2) If, on the other hand, reason be defined as the power of apprehending those necessary truths upon which thought of every kind depends, specifically the law of contradiction, then it can be shown that although Hume himself does not specifically mention the fact in so many words, the logic of

[1] *Enquiry*, sec. ix., pt. i.; G. ii., 251; S.-B. 276.

[2] Certain aspects of this subject are discussed in Mind, N.S., vol. xiv., by Norman Smith in a paper entitled *The Naturalism of Hume.*

his theory makes it necessary to assign to this law an important part in the determination of the structure of the moral standard. The principle of contradiction can of course play no such *rôle* in Hume's system as in Kant's. It can appear only in the form of the principle of consistency. Some modern rationalists who try to lean on Kant as far as possible do not appear to see the difference, but it is in reality clear and important. To accept contradictions is to believe differently about the same, while to judge or to act inconsistently is to feel or to act differently about the same. Consistency, in other words, is nothing more or less than persistency—persistency in the use of a principle of approbation or of action.[1] Consistency in judgment is requisite wherever there is a principle at the foundation of the judgment. The principle upon which the moral judgment is based in Hume's system may be formulated as that of equal concern for equal interests. To say that this must be employed consistently is to say that this feature of the moral judgment is of its essence, so that failure to conform marks the judgment as invalid.

(3) Again, if reason be defined as the power of conceptual thought, then most emphatically Hume regards it as playing a large *rôle* in the moral judgment. Not merely, as he asserts in a formal statement, does reason in this sense apprise us of the existence of the actions which arouse approbation and disapprobation; it lies in the very nature of the moral emotions—conceived of as satisfaction and dissatisfaction at conduct or character—that they should be aroused by ideas. We may assert with confidence that no moralist has ever thought of denying this fact. Everybody knows that, in normal adult life, emotions are aroused only by ideas—or rather by judgments (in the logical sense of the term). It is thus clear that the formation of a moral judgment is something very different from the operation of a "sense," whether it be called internal or anything else. The name "moral sense" is most misleading as a representation of anything that Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, or Hume ever thought of teaching. The members of this school—whether they used the term little or much—were perfectly clear about the facts. It is only their critics that have allowed themselves to get muddled. Perhaps one reason for their mistakes may be found in some words of Viscount Bryce: "There are

[1] Obviously this latter principle must be something else than the principle of consistency. In view of their failure to see this fact it is not surprising that the Kantians of every tribe have been reduced to pitiable straits in the attempt to find a content for the moral ideal.

always people ready to assume that things are what they are called, because it is much easier to deal with names than to examine facts".

(4) The rationalism that finds its clearest Eighteenth Century expression in the writings of Price asserts that reason (or the understanding, as Price calls it) contributes a new conception to ethics, the unanalysable, *a priori*, idea of right. It need hardly be said that Hume does not share this view; but it may not be superfluous to point out that his own position is based not upon an appeal to sensationalistic first principles, but upon the possibility of analysing the term. If we can define right conduct as that which has a tendency to arouse in an impartial observer a feeling of satisfaction, we can see that, as the conception arises in the course of individual or racial development, its appearance in the arena of life means not the emergence of a specifically new conception dropping in upon the mind from a world outside of experience, but rather a new organisation of pre-existing conceptions, each of which has its roots in experience.

Because Hume took this position he was at liberty to repudiate another favourite, if not necessary, feature of all theories of ethical rationalism. This is the view according to which certain ideas, solely by their own power, so to speak, are capable of arousing feeling, so that you could predict *a priori* of any rational being that having the idea he must have the emotion or desire. Hume denies this in the words: "Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will".[1] The rationalistic doctrine, as is well known, caused Kant a great deal of worry. Its clearest statement and the best argument in its favour is found, however—as in many other instances—not in Kant, but in Price.[2]

Price having demonstrated to his own satisfaction that right is an unanalysable idea having its source purely in the understanding, and that the insight that right, as predicate, belongs to a certain action or class of actions is due to the workings of this same faculty, faces the question: What if there be beings who know what is right, but, in its presence, are as indifferent as are the stones at our feet? Price meets every difficulty of this kind by boldly asserting that "excitement belongs to the very ideas of moral right and wrong, and is essentially inseparable from the apprehension of them. . . . When we are conscious that the action is fit to be done or

[1] *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. iii., ; G. ii., 193; S.-B. 413.

[2] Price's *Review* was published some years after Hume had written the *Enquiry*. Nevertheless, it supplies the best possible foil for the antithetical position of Hume.

ought to be done it is not conceivable that we can remain uninfluenced or want a motive to action."[1] The same assertion is made with regard to the idea of the good of self, of the good of others, and of truth. According to Hume, on the other hand, the power of responding to ideas by motives has its source in the "particular structure and fabric of the mind," which might conceivably have been different. "'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to choose my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me."[2] In maintaining that "'tis not contrary to reason" he means to assert, among other things, that the idea, though it is the stimulus of the dynamic element in the desire, lies outside of this element, as the match lies outside of the gunpowder; so that it is possible in the abstract to have the idea without a trace of the corresponding emotional or volitional reaction. That Hume's analysis of the moral experience does not commit him to any such bold assertions as his opponents have been forced into making in connexion with this subject is certainly one of his titles to the attention of judicious minds.

The Authority of the Moral Judgment.

When men talk about the place of reason in morality they are often in reality thinking about its "reasonableness". But no one can discuss this question without having in mind the claims of possible competitors. Of these the most clamorous is the welfare of the ego. Its claims to the last word were championed by the moralists not merely of the dark ages when egoistic hedonism was a power in the land, but of the enlightenment of the latter part of the Nineteenth Century under the sway of what for want of a better name we may call the Green-Caird school. We have already seen[3] how Hume would handle the pretensions of egoism to be the judge of last resort in matters of reasonableness. We need give no more attention, therefore, to this aspect of the case.

The inquiry into the reasonableness of morality, however, sometimes has a different meaning from the question: What is there in it for me? The inquirer may have in mind its ability to stand the test of reflective criticism from any point

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 310; *cf.* p. 89 ff.
[2] *Treatise*, bk. ii., pt. iii., sec. iii.; G. ii., 195; S.-B. 416.
[3] Mind, N.S., vol. xxx.,

of view whatever.[1] Turning away, then, from the insistencies of egoism the problem for a theory such as Hume's can only be formulated as follows: "Is there anything in moral action which appeals to the desires which I find possess the deepest significance when I sit down and scrutinise them in a cool hour?"

The experiences that force this question upon us are far from infrequent. Who of us has not many times allowed himself to be determined in his actions by feelings which, for one reason or another, he has reprobated even in the moment of obeying? When Paul du Chaillu was exploring in West Africa his party ran out of provisions and were without food for several days. When they were reduced almost to the extremity his men killed a huge snake and devoured it with great relish. But du Chaillu was unable to bring himself to touch it though he cursed himself all the time for his squeamishness. This is a fair illustration of the distinction which Butler designates as the distinction between power and authority, even if it is not of the sort that he had specifically in mind.

Butler's solution of the problem is well known. It consists in asserting that the moral judgment carries within itself an element or factor which is directly apprehended as authoritative. Hume's solution is nowhere stated in so many words in his published works. The one specific reference to it which is preserved to us is found in a letter to Hutcheson relating to the latter's Compendium: "You seem here to embrace Doctor Butler's opinion in his *Sermons on Human Nature* that our moral sense has an authority distinct from its force and durableness; and that because we always think it ought to prevail. But this is nothing but an instinct or

[1] In the common use of the term, "reasonable" means "capable of standing the test of reflective examination," or, "approved when all relevant facts have been brought into consideration"; where "relevant facts" mean those which are capable of influencing in any way the decision. The English and French habit of employing this particular term to represent this meaning may have lured some students of ethics into the rationalistic fold; but it can have been only those who could not distinguish a pun from an argument. This will be evident if we examine a typical statement like that of Sidgwick (*History of Ethics*, p. 215.): "It is only another way of putting Hume's doctrine that reason is not concerned with the ends of action to say that the mere existence of a moral sentiment is in itself no reason for obeying it". This sounds rather plausible till it is translated into German, where reason as first used would become "Vernunft," and at the end of the sentence would become "Grund". Thereupon the reader awakes to the fact that he was being treated to a piece of linguistic legerdemain.

principle which approves of itself upon reflexion and that is common to all of them."[1]

This solution of the problem of authority is patently incomplete and in so far unsatisfactory. It is possible to work out something better, however, with materials supplied by Hume, and on the basis of the fundamental principle of his system, the principle, namely, that morality is a matter of values and that value has its source in the affective side of our nature. We distinguish between the relative value of different desires and feelings, according to Hume, in proportion to their force, durableness, and number. Where choice is necessary, cool, *i.e.*, impartial reflexion always desires the greater value. When such a feeling as the antipathy to snake meat appears we may obey it because it is at the moment a more powerful impulse than that which can be aroused by a calm estimate of values. Nevertheless, even at the time we may know we are sacrificing the greater value for the less, and wish we could, by a word of command, annihilate the recalcitrant feeling. An impulse obeyed, but in the very act of obedience wished out of existence, is precisely one that may be said to have power but not authority. And the distinction is accordingly perfectly explainable from Hume's premises, and by a method which he adumbrates. Authority is thus the voice of our permanent self (which in no normal human being is the equivalent of the merely egoistic self) as against the temporary self, a voice which we may refuse to obey at the moment, but which in that very moment we know we shall ever afterwards wish we had obeyed, and which, therefore, in the act of disobedience we wish we could either destroy or control.

The Useful Character and the Useful Building.

Hitherto we have been dealing with the valuation of character as a means to an end, its utilitarian or extrinsic value. But an ethical system which recognised no other element of worth in character than this would be open to the objection first urged by Adam Smith in the following words: "It seems impossible that the approbation of virtue should be a sentiment of the same kind with that by which we approve of a convenient and well-contrived building; or that we

[1] Burton, *Life and Correspondence of David Hume*, vol. i., p. 149. *Cf.* Adam Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, pt. iii., ch. iv. (Bohn edition, p. 222). "The passions . . . as Father Malebranche says, all justify themselves, and seem reasonable and proportioned to their objects as long as we continue to feel them."

should have no other reason for praising a man than that for which we commend a chest of drawers ".[1] Hume himself raised this objection, but answered it in a very vague and inconclusive manner. In the Treatise he pronounces these variations in our feelings "very inexplicable";[2] in the Enquiry he says: "There are a numerous set of passions and sentiments, of which thinking rational beings are, by the original constitution of nature, the only proper object: And though the very same qualities be transferred to an insensible, inanimate being, they will not excite the same sentiments".[3] This is much the same as the statement of the Treatise, only in more words. As a matter of fact, all this time Hume was holding in his hands precisely the cards he needed, but, curiously enough, he failed to play them. However, he has laid them out for us, and if we do not use them the fault is our own.

The direction in which a solution is to be sought seems sufficiently clear. It is not to turn our back upon all that has been already accomplished. It is rather to find additional modes of value in character which do not apply to material objects, and which, therefore, will account for the differences under consideration.

Such a mode of valuation may at first sight seem to be given in Hume's frequent references to beauty of character. The immediate source of this language is doubtless Shaftesbury, who, in turn, borrows it from the Greeks. For Shaftesbury, moral beauty is due to "harmony" between the egoistic and altruistic elements of our nature. But Hume attempts to explain the æsthetic element in character in a very different way. To say that an inanimate object, as a skilfully designed machine or a well cultivated field, appears beautiful is, according to him, to say that the view of it affords the spectator a sympathetic delight in the promise which it holds out of happiness in the form of work done or food supplied. Beauty of character has its source in the same kind of qualities, and touches the same springs in human nature.[4] Obviously, then, it cannot be regarded as a new element over and above utility; it is rather another name for the same thing. Accordingly, whatever may be thought

[1] *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, pt. iv., ch. ii.; Bohn edition, p. 271.
[2] Bk. iii., pt. iii., sec. v.; G. ii., 371; S.-B. 617.
[3] Sec. v., pt. i., first note: G. ii., 202; S.-B. 213.
[4] *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. iii., sec. i.; G. ii., 336; S.-B. 576. *Enquiry*, sec. v., first paragraph, and in many other parts of the essay. It may be worth noting that this theory of beauty was suggested by Shaftesbury. See *Characteristics*, vol. iii., p. 180 (5th edition). It does not represent, however, his dominant view.

of Shaftesbury's contributions to the æsthetics of morals, Hume evidently can be of no help to us in this direction.

The desired new element however is found in another feature of the good character. All the greater manifestations of will power arouse, or tend to arouse, an emotion which is akin to or identical with that of the sublime. Hume recognises this aspect of character, calling it the heroic. Unfortunately however his account of it is so manifestly artificial as to obscure and almost destroy the effects of the recognition. In the Treatise he writes: "Whatever we call heroic virtue, and admire under the character of goodness and elevation of mind, is either nothing but a steady and well establish'd pride and self esteem, or partakes largely of that passion. . . . The merit [moral value] of pride or self esteem is deriv'd from two circumstances, *viz.*, its utility and its agreeableness to ourselves [he means, the possessor]; by which it capacitates us for business, and, at the same time, gives us an immediate satisfaction." [1]

The inadequacy of this account is only too obvious. Pride has its source in the consciousness of the possession of that which is capable of evoking admiration. Accordingly there must be such a thing as a capacity for admiration before there can be pride in possession. Admiration for the heroic, accordingly, cannot be reduced to the satisfaction of knowing that I possess qualities which, if I had the capacity for admiring them, I should rejoice to possess. Hume would have done better to treat the emotion of the sublime as an ultimate constituent of the mind. He was of course endeavouring to simplify. But there is nothing in his system requiring him to simplify this emotion out of existence, any more than the emotion of anger, fear, love, or hate. In rewriting the above-quoted passage for the Enquiry he seems to have been struck by its artificiality. But in his lengthier and far better treatment of the subject he has not entirely freed himself from the trammels of the earlier presentation. However, the fact remains that Hume has specifically noted the direct admiration which goes out to power of will as such, an admiration which, while it is somewhat akin to that which is evoked by a few material objects, such as a mountain peak, or a majestic cathedral, separates as by a great gulf our feelings for the overwhelming majority of inanimate objects from our enthusiasm for moral heroism.

There is still another respect in which our attitude towards

[1] *Treatise*, bk. iii., pt. ii., sec. ii.; G. ii., 356; S.-B. 599-600. The corresponding passage in the *Enquiry* is in sec. vii. See G. ii., 232 ff.; S.-B. 252 ff.

a good man differs from that towards a well-contrived house. A man may arouse emotions of gratitude and resentment both by what he does in relation to us personally and by his treatment of others; broadly speaking—with exceptions which from the point of view of theory are of undoubted importance—for an adult civilised person, a house does not. Unfortunately Hume has not dealt with the subject of resentment and gratitude or thankfulness except in a very unsystematic and confused way. He recognises their existence of course, and the fact that they play a *rôle* in the moral judgment. Indeed at times he actually identifies the feelings at the basis of the moral judgment with resentment and gratitude, thus making the same mistake as Westermarck to-day, who begins his description of the moral judgment with the second story.[1] But confused and perhaps even conflicting as some of Hume's statements are on this point, the requirements of his system are unmistakable. Starting, as he does, from the position that the original source of the moral judgment is feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction having their source in the desire for good, he is bound to recognise "thankfulness" and resentment as consequences of these feelings.

"Resentment," says Westermarck, "is an aggressive attitude of mind towards a cause of pain." Originally it tends to arise indifferently towards material objects and conscious beings, and in the latter towards intellectual, temperamental, and moral imperfections alike. What it really craves, as Adam Smith clearly shows, is to make the source of pain sorry for his action. Hence when an adult jerks or swears at a tangled fishline he is apt to be ashamed of his folly because he is attempting to satisfy a desire which he knows to be incapable of realisation. Hence the ordinary man learns to control himself on such occasions—more or less completely—and in proportion as he refuses the emotion its expression, it tends to die out. In the case of intellectual and temperamental defects the impulse can of course reach its goal. But when, for example, we who are teachers have let ourselves loose at the stupidity of a thoroughly well intentioned pupil we have, when we have later come to ourselves, felt regret at pain caused which could not be compensated by resultant good. Our victim was helpless and could only suffer. There is one case and only one in which the impulse to express our resentment can be justified in the eyes of a

[1] *Enquiry*, sec. v., pt. ii.; G. ii., 207 (also 208, 209, in spots); S.-B. from 219. *Treatise*, B. iii., pt. iii., sec. v.; G. ii., 368; S.-B. 614.

humane man, namely where the occasion is a moral delinquency. For there the expression of our feelings is capable of producing a change in the outer action and oftentimes in the inner spirit. Here again the law of atrophy holds, and the more clear headed and more sympathetic ultimately come to feel little or no resentment except as a reaction to wrongs committed.

What is true of resentment is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of gratitude or thankfulness. It seeks to make the benefactor rejoice because of his benefaction. In half a dozen ways which anyone sufficiently interested can easily work out for himself, it arouses impulses which can only be satisfied by the response of mind to mind, and for reasons readily conceived it concentrates itself largely—never completely—on traits of character. Admiration of beauty (in Shaftesbury's meaning and other allied senses) and of strength, fused with thankfulness for moral and extra-moral traits of mind, are either love or the most important ingredient of love. Thus we see how, without going beyond the confines of Hume's general theory of morals, we can account for the love and the hatred of the good or bad character respectively as a phenomenon which has no real parallel in our attitude towards useful material objects.

Thus far we have defended Hume by means of his own ideas. But there is another factor which he himself does not mention and which is not referred to by any of his predecessors, but which may be worth a moment's attention in the interest of a complete view of our problem.

There is a service which an unselfish spirit can perform for us which no material object of any kind can possibly supply—that of taking an interest in our welfare, of entering into our life. We crave this for its own sake, entirely apart from any ulterior advantages which we may calculate to obtain from it. It is for this reason that we value the expressions of kindness and gratitude in those persons whose gifts or services are only a source of embarrassment because we can neither use nor refuse them. So strongly do we feel in this matter that when a total stranger in a crowded street car accidentally treads on our toes we wish him to express his regret, though we never expect to see him again. This valuation of the unselfish character is not, strictly speaking, a moral valuation, because it has its source in a personal rather than an impersonal point of view. But it is a valuation of morality just in so far as morality involves unselfishness.

Our feelings of warmth for those who care for a cause in which we are interested represent but another application of

the same principle. The cause in question need have no moral flavour whatever, as the football interests of our university. But it will of course be deep in proportion as the common interests go down to the roots of life. Veterans who have fought in the same war in defence of the same country know well what these feelings are. The good man has something of the same feelings for every other good man who is engaged in the same warfare against the evils which afflict humanity.

The adequate answer to Adam Smith is thus to be found in the recognition of the intrinsic value of character as entitled to a place by the side of the extrinsic or utilitarian value, and in an analysis of the phenomena of "thankfulness" and resentment which shows why they attain their complete development (for the most part) only when their object is human character.

III.—THE ETHICAL AND ÆSTHETIC IMPLICATIONS OF REALISM.

By W. P. Montague and H. H. Parkhurst.

Metaphysical theories are usually defended on the ground that they are true; and even when the advocates of a theory expatiate upon its ethical or æsthetic value, they do so because they think thereby to establish its validity. This indirect method of procedure is natural to all those who share the comfortable assumption of the pragmatist or the idealist that there is some sort of correlation between the good and the real—though even for such philosophers the validity of their method presupposes the validity of the theory which it is intended to establish. To the realist, however, it seems neither natural nor justifiable to appeal to the nobility of realism as evidence of its truth. For him, things are what they are, regardless of their power to edify. This may perhaps be one explanation of the fact that the multitudes of efforts made by realists in recent years to explain and defend their theory have included little concerning the ethical and æsthetic implications of realism. It is the question of these emotional implications of realism, considered on their own account and not as an indirect substantiation of the doctrine, which is the subject of the present paper.

By realism we mean the epistemological doctrine that nothing, whether abstract or concrete, whether real or unreal, about which it is possible to discourse, depends for its character or its status upon the mere fact that it is known. In other words, that cognition is always selective and never creative of its objects. The older forms of the realistic doctrine, such as the dualistic realism of Descartes, and the common-sense realism of the Scottish school, were contented to insist upon an objective status, independent of being known, for the concrete world of existence, and tacitly regarded the realm of abstract forms and universals as a creation of the mind. The realist of the present day assimilates to the common-sense existential realism of modern philosophy the profound subsistential realism of Plato. He would emancipate from their supposed depen-

dence upon cognition not only the things of earth and heaven but the totality of laws and forms—all qualities and all relations. More than this. The new realist has discovered that it is impossible to confer independence upon the real and the true without at the same time emancipating the shadow correlates of these—the false and the unreal. For every true proposition has a contradictory which is false; and if the truth of the true proposition depends upon its subject-matter rather than upon the thinking of it, then, by the same token, the falsity of the false proposition depends equally upon its subject-matter rather than upon the attitudes of belief or disbelief which a spectator may entertain towards it. Round squares and mermaids are not unreal because sane people disbelieve in them; they are sanely disbelieved in because they are unreal.[1]

It should be noted that realism as thus defined is a purely epistemological doctrine, and as such is not committed to any of the various metaphysical theories as to the nature either of objects or of consciousness. The objects may be one or many, material, spiritual, or both. Consciousness may be the property of a soul, of a transcendental ego, or even a mere form of relation between material things. The essential point is that cognition, irrespective of its intrinsic nature, discovers and does not create the universe of which it is a part. Again, it is necessary to bear in mind that the realist, in holding that the function of cognition is discovery, is not thereby condemning consciousness to an otiose and epiphenomenal rôle. It is of the very nature of discovery to bring about profound alterations in the thing discovered. The lantern that a man carries does not create the obstacles in his path. It reveals them, but in revealing them as they are it enables the man to remove them, and to create new things in their place. The pragmatist has no monopoly of the doctrine that intelligence is practically efficient. Realists are quite in agreement with him, but they hold that the only direct effects of consciousness are upon the organism. Without itself altering the objects known, consciousness enables its possessor to alter them. If objects were changed by the very act of knowing them they could hardly be so effectively changed by action based upon that knowledge. Indeed, under such circumstances, action itself, as distinguished from cognition, would be altogether superfluous.

[1] Thus in a sense the term realism is somewhat inadequate for the theory which it denotes. There is need for a more appropriate name, such as objectivism, for the doctrine that the status of the unreal and the false, no less than that of the real and the true, is independent of whether or not they are apprehended.

Now, while this is true of all action, we propose to confine our discussion to the realistic implications of the types of action involved in the pursuit of the ethical and æsthetic ideals.

I.

From the standpoint of one who seeks to create beauty in the world of things or goodness in the realm of conduct, the primary condition of effective action is an unflinching recognition of the realities of the situation in which this creation is to be accomplished. If the sculptor intends to change a block of marble into a statue of a god, he must recognise the independent objectivity of the marble and of the laws by which he is to chisel it. Similarly, the moral reformer who would change a community that is impoverished into one that is prosperous must recognise the independent objectivity of the poverty which he is to change, and of the economic laws by which he is to make the change. As a matter of fact, the creative artist and the constructive reformer are found to possess a more than ordinary degree of appreciation of the independent reality of the physical world with its blended worth and imperfection. The entire procedure of the artist bears witness to his deeply-grounded belief that ugliness and beauty alike are external to himself and to all beholders. In his own view his significant task is that of discovery. In combating ugliness he feels himself to be combating no mere psychic state either of his own or of another consciousness. In the same way when pursuing beauty he has the sense of recognising something independent both of himself and of his entire audience. As faithfully as the scientist he scrutinises nature and man to determine their inmost essence; and though a dreamer and a harborer of ceaseless fancies, it is not as a dream or a fancy that he regards the cosmos. Of the objective reality of that c osmos which is his study he is incorrigibly persuaded.

And similarly of the moral reformer. His two most insidious foes are the sentimentalists who see the world as they would have it rather than as it is, and the complacent conservatives whose habituation to the evil in their environment prevents them from recognising its existence. Buddha and Christ, Luther and Lincoln were actuated by a flamingly vivid perception of the evil about them. Familiarity served not to dull but to enhance this perception, and the vision of what they wished to accomplish was never for a moment confused with the ugly reality confronting them. They were

neither sentimentalists nor optimists, but realists, imbued with a grim and poignant appreciation of actualities.

In those other cases in which the religious spirit has been opposed to militant morality, the opposition has been due to the religionist permitting his faith in the ultimate goodness of the universe to blur his appreciation of the actual badness of the world in which he is called upon to act. If God is good, and if God creates all, then all must be somehow good. And if, despite this, things still seem evil, it is not for us to protest, but rather to rest secure in our faith that evil is not real but only good in disguise. This anti-moral passivism to which religious people are sometimes subject receives formulation in technical philosophy in the theory of absolute idealism according to which the realm of finite life, its sins and tragedies, is labelled the world of Appearance—a fragmentary and distorted expression of an absolute Reality to whose internal perfection the misery and discord in our experience actually contribute in much the same way as the discords of a Wagnerian opera contribute to the higher harmony of the whole. The religious attempt to justify the ways of God to man is in essence the same as the idealistic philosopher's tendency to minimise actual evil by relegating it to the realm of "Appearance". In both cases there is an anti-realistic denial of the actuality of evil, and in both cases the intellectual denial of evil engenders a practical indifference to its presence and to the means proposed for removing it. In short, it is only against real evil that it is worth while to contend. And, conversely, all who have contended fruitfully against evil have had a lively sense of its reality. Hence, while realism does not bar the conception of a God or an Absolute, it does bar all forms of those conceptions which involve excuses or denials of the evil which our world contains.

Associated with the recognition of the reality of evil in nature goes a wholesome interest in the laws of nature. It is only by the use of natural law that nature's evils can be ameliorated. And it is interesting to note that the great moral heroes who have preached the reality of evil have also preached very definite methods for its removal; while, conversely, those anti-realists by whom evil is regarded as good in disguise have usually been indifferent and incurious as to the laws of the material world. Magic and thaumaturgy, prayers and incantations, are good enough devices to cope with an evil which has but a shadow existence: and they seem not inadequate to those for whom the laws of nature are only laws of mind. The responsibilities of natural

science need be assumed only by those for whom evil is one of nature's realities.

So far we have been considering the necessity for a recognition, by the artist and the reformer, of the *existential* reality of the material world in which values are to be embodied, and of the laws and conditions of that embodiment. But there is an equal necessity for all creators to recognise the *subsistential* reality of the ideals themselves of goodness and beauty. For, irrespective of the definition of the æsthetic and ethical, and irrespective also of the nature of the specific ideal which is to be made real, the one who is striving for its realisation must recognise that the validity of that for which he strives is objective and in nowise dependent upon his discovery of it. Even for a reformer who accepted hedonism as true the essential objectivity of the realm of values would be in nowise diminished. For if the happiness of my neighbour is a good, it will be a good irrespective of whether or not I recognise it as such. The realist conception of value implicit in the attitude of anyone who seeks to create value, be he artist or moralist, is not necessarily of something dissociated from conscious experience, but of something whose essence and nature is independent of the would-be creator's awareness of it. The socialist who believes in the desirability of the collectivist state may be mistaken in that belief, but in order that it should inspire him to action he must regard its worth as something intrinsic and independent. From the individual standpoint, belief in the value of a thing is exactly like belief in its truth. In either case the belief may be mistaken, but the assumption of its independent validity is a prerequisite of all action. The sculptor, the architect, the painter, the musician, when they seek to embody in material form the as yet non-existent objects of their imagination, are inspired to their efforts by their belief in the more than imaginary beauty of those objects. If they supposed for a moment that the worth of what they were to create was merely subjective, and dependent upon or derived from their own attitudes of approval, their motive for creation would cease to be æsthetic and become merely hedonic and selfish. In short, even from the hedonistic standpoint, beauty and goodness are the permanent possibilities of enjoyment as truth is the permanent possibility of apprehension. And as permanent possibilities of apprehension have a nature and structure that is quite independent of whether or not they are actually perceived, so equally the permanent possibilities of enjoyment have a nature and structure that is quite independent of whether they are realised. In neither case

does the status of possibility exhaust the nature of the essence to which it pertains.[1]

II.

And now that we have seen the extent to which the realistic standpoint is presupposed by artist and moralist with regard both to the world of existence and to that of subsistent ideals, we proceed to discuss how the realist's interpretation of the universe enhances its beauty and moral dignity. In short, we wish now to show that realism, in addition to being a prerequisite for the creation of values, is also a prerequisite for their appreciation; that it is itself a source of new values, both ethical and æsthetic.

Science reveals to us a universe in which there are no evidences of beginning or end or spatial limit. The span of each human life, though all too brief for the accomplishment of chosen tasks, appears to him who lives it a not inconsiderable duration. It is long enough to permit weary waitings and final defeat of cherished hopes and the passage of hours that seem distended and slow beyond all power to estimate. And yet the extent of even the most prolonged individual existence is to the span of recorded history an almost negligible quantity. In the eyes of man himself the magnitude of that vastly greater temporal period of human history causes his own little biography to shrivel to a point by comparison. But we know that, measured by the incalculable standard of the entire racial history, the time comprehended within the limits of recorded annals is but a moment in an extended day. We are persuaded, though bereft of images to convey the persuasion, that to measure, in turn, the entire duration of human experience, incredibly prolonged though

[1] Considered as permanent possibilities of enjoyment ethical and æsthetic values differ in two respects.

(1) An æsthetic value is a possibility of immediate enjoyment, whereas an ethical value is a possibility of mediate enjoyment. Rhythm and symmetry are æsthetic values because the direct experience of them is pleasant. Courage and kindness are ethical values, not because to contemplate them as such gives direct enjoyment, but because to practice them produces results from which enjoyment is derived. Any enjoyment of ethical ideals as such is not ethical but rather æsthetic.

(2) As the two types of value differ in the manner in which they produce enjoyment, so also do they differ in the kind of subject-matter in which respectively they are embodied. Æsthetic values are embodied in sensory material, such as tone, colour, form, and as such are directly perceptible, whereas ethical values are embodied in rules of conduct and attitudes of will which are to be apprehended only conceptually.

Due allowance being made for these differences, one might be justified in saying that virtue is beauty of spirit, while beauty is virtue of matter.

it be, against the larger dimensions of the tale of life from its beginnings upon our planet, is to render the lesser unit once again almost pitifully diminutive. But consider the incommensurability between the period of moderate temperature, adapted to life, upon earth, and the total duration of that body as a physically distinct satellite of the sun. And according to all evidences we are compelled to regard even that last temporal immensity as but a passing interval against a background of even more unimaginable phases. Compared with the ampler chapters of cosmic evolution, the gestation, birth and adolescence of our mighty solar system is but a syllable—a single pulse in a symphony for which temporal limits may not be predicated.

If, as regards duration, the universe which constitutes the subject-matter of science is thus staggering, its spatial extensity is no less so. There again we encounter a series of magnitudes which may be arranged in a hierarchy. Beginning once more with man, we find that his body is of dimensions which, by comparison with certain orders of existence at least, seem to himself of considerable dignity. But if, by contrast with the microscopic, the cubic contents of a human body bulk somewhat large, in what terms are we to describe the magnitude of our earthly globe, measured by the same standard? But even the earth itself proves of little account with regard to the space it occupies, when compared with the proportions of the solar system. When the magnitude to be envisaged transcends the limits of that already unimaginable immensity of the sun with its attendant satellites, imagination is completely paralysed, and the mind is compelled to resort to indirect means of naming and mapping those extra-solar distances. Of the proportions of the milky way and the yawning abyss of space beyond the uttermost stellar system we can make no approach to comprehension. And yet of such inhuman vastnesses does science tell; of such kind is the universe with which the intelligence of mortals grapples.

But the anti-realist, be he pragmatist or absolute idealist, is set upon belittling this cosmos which he is privileged to inhabit. He would take advantage of the intricacies of the epistemological problem to reverse that process of increasing scientific knowledge by which man has emancipated himself from the thrall of his own vanity. Belief that the world and all therein was made for man's behoof and that its events are to be explained by their bearing upon his weal and woe, that the sun and the stars are set in the sky as lanterns to light his path—that man, in short, is the centre about which all things revolve—all such belief serves indeed to feed the

vanity and soothe the fears of the race in its infancy. But chastened by the austerities of physical science, we have made some approach to a decent humility; and the glories of anthropocentricism are no longer more than the bells and paper crown with which the fool was wont to play at royalty. But no sooner has the plain man abdicated from the throne constructed by his own vaingloriousness than philosophers approach and tempt him in new and intricate speech to resume his rôle of legislator for nature. We can learn of things only through their often distorted impressions upon our senses; we can conceive the world only under conditions by which it is related tc our minds; and the newer anthropocentricism bids us interpret the relativity and egocentric limitations of our experience as a relativity and egocentric dependence of the world which we experience. In the older view man recognised that the world at least existed independently of his knowledge, even though the origin of its existence and the character of its laws were motivated by his needs. But the anthropocentric philosopher surpasses in arrogance the old-time theologian; for with his slogan, no object without a subject, and his claim that the meaning and existence of things are inseparable from the experience of them, he reduces a whole vast cosmos to the status of a mental construct. Our own experiences are, to be sure, the world's *ratio cognoscendi*. The idealist would conclude that they are therefore its *ratio essendi*. Whether, as pragmatist, he teaches that reality changes with the changes of human opinion, that there is no objective truth, but only as many truths as there are beliefs, or whether, as absolute idealist, he invents a transcendental or universal Self which functions through each of our finite centres and thus sustains the world —in either case the anti-realist belittles the things of nature by relegating them to a false and unnecessary dependence upon experience, and denying them their ancient privilege of existing in their own right irrespective of their status as objects of any experience, finite or absolute.

If common-sense realism is outraged by the reduction of the visible and existent universe in all its vast extent to mere mental content, with a consequent belittlement in power and magnitude, the new or Platonic realism of the present day is still more outraged by the idealist's relegation to the status of subjective dependence upon consciousness of the even vaster realm of abstract subsistence. For the invisible region of the subsistent comprehends the infinite totality of essences and values—of truth, beauty and goodness—and the laws of its structure possess a kind and degree of validity which, to the

realist, far transcends the validity of the transitory and contingent sequences and coexistences which obtain in the world of the concretely existent. Plato, who was perhaps the first clearly to proclaim the objective reality of abstract forms and relations, was strongly influenced by Pythagoreanism, and it is natural that the clearest illustrations of the nature of the subsistent should be afforded by the subject-matter of mathematics. Consider the kind of reality to be attributed to the properties and relations of numbers if those relations and properties are regarded as in no way dependent either upon the concrete objects by which they may be exemplified or upon the consciousness of the mathematicians who discovered them. To the realist it is clear that the truth that 7 and 5 are prime numbers and that their sum equals 12 would be totally unaffected by the annihilation of all existing objects and all existing consciousness.

This realist faith that universal truths are independent of the particular subject-matter in which they are exemplified by no means conflicts with the realisation that we attain to a conceptual knowledge of the universal through a perceptual knowledge of the particular. In the teaching of arithmetic or geometry it is pedagogically necessary to use concrete diagrams of particular shape and size which are experienced at particular times and places. It is by attending to the generic aspects of such diagrams that one comes to appreciate the abstract and universal relations of number and space. This initial psychological dependence of the universal upon the particular prevents many from arriving at a clear conception of the logical and ontological independence of universals. In other words, the fact that the particular is the *ratio cognoscendi* of the universal produces upon the immature or philosophically confused the illusion that it is also the *ratio essendi*. Just as the mind of the child in its early development depends for its knowledge of universals upon their concrete embodiment so do the minds of men in the early stages of culture. In both cases alike we find the same anti-realistic identification of the abstract and universal with its particular manifestation. To one who is emancipated from this confusion the realm of number and geometric form appears in its abstract purity, freed from all limitations of matter and place and from every vicissitude of temporal change. It is because of this freedom from the bonds of locus and date that not only numbers but the entire realm of essences possess a richness and an immensity in comparison with which even the infinities of the existent world are dwarfed to insignificance. For our actual universe is but

one from the limitless store of spatio-temporal systems; any given existent world is but a cross section of this absolute or subsistent totality. For the Pythagorean, the domain of the subsistent appears to have been restricted to number and geometric form; while in Plato's philosophy it received the somewhat different limitations of high logical generality and ethical and æsthetic value. Neo-Platonism was more consistent in that it recognised that any individual, such as Socrates or Cæsar, possessed an eternal archetype. It is perhaps only in the neo-realistic philosophy of to-day that the domain of the subsistent has been seen to include every character whatsoever, quantitative no less than qualitative, specific no less than generic, valueless no less than valuable, fragmentary no less than integrated. From this standpoint we might be tempted to define the world of subsistence after the manner of Leibnitz as the totality of possible or thinkable objects. There would, however, be two drawbacks to this seemingly simple definition. First, the term possibility would have to be paradoxically broadened to include its negative, the impossible, for the subsistent must include not only such empirically impossible objects as centaurs and mermaids, but also such logically or intrinsically impossible objects as round squares. While, secondly, though any subsistent may be termed thinkable or conceivable, yet it is at least uncertain whether this relation to thought is intrinsic to the nature of the subsistent.

What are the ethical and æsthetic implications of the transcendental universe of subsistence as thus realistically conceived? At first sight it might seem that we had upon our hands a vast incoherent heterogeneity of miscellaneous essences promiscuously related. And the fact that this wild totality was regarded realistically as independent of consciousness might seem quite insufficient to confer upon it value of any kind. But to condemn the subsistent in this way would be to overlook the most significant of its characters. For the realm of the subsistent is not merely an aggregate of terms. It is also a system of propositions, that is, identity relations between these terms. These propositional relations do, to be sure, include the false no less than the true. It is, however, from the true propositions that the universe of subsistence derives not only its unity and structure but the ethical and æsthetic values with which this paper is concerned. While the round square fills honourably its humble rôle of illustrating the meaning of impossibility, it is the obverse aspect of this impossibility, namely, the proposition that squareness and roundness are reciprocally incompatible, that

is really significant. Here is an eternal truth whose status is independent of its recognition by any mind, divine or human. Moreover, while such eternal truths are also independent of the world of concrete existence, the world of concrete existence is by no means independent of them. Whatever thing would exist as square must forego the joys of roundness. An eternal truth is indeed an identity relation based solely upon the abstract natures or essences of the terms related, and however varied the temporal and spatial collocations of an existent system they can never be such as to violate the relations that obtain between essences. A square thing may be red or blue, but it cannot be round; an event can be past or future in reference to some given event, but it cannot be both; a thing may be black or non-black, but it cannot be a black that is not the opposite of white; seven electrons may or may not combine, but their number can never be evenly divisible by two.

While there is significance in this capacity of the eternal truths of essences to exercise a selective veto upon the world of existence, the ethical and æsthetic significance of the realm of the subsistent follows even more directly from those intrinsic characters of eternity and immensity of which we have spoken. In the present day, particularly, when the omnipresence of change and the stirring implications of creative evolution are for the first time accorded the recognition that is their due, it is something of a relief to realise that, though Heraclitus was right in his belief that all things changed, he was no less right in his vision of the changeless *logos*, a system of invariant forms and laws by which the flux of existence is measured and defined. However invigorating and splendid the experience of the flowing aspect of reality may be, there is after all a universal craving for the permanent. To participate vicariously through contemplation in the eternal order that transcends existence brings quiet to the mind and permits the conscious ego to transcend its own limits and to rise to a kind of Nirvana—a Nirvana which is, however, attained through expansion of consciousness rather than through its suppression.

That one of Plato's insights which was most important for ethics was also the one most neglected by his disciples, particularly by Aristotle. We refer to his conception of the superiority of ideal good to any existential power, even that of the divine creator. Ideals of right and justice, according to Plato, do not derive their validity from God. On the contrary, it is God who must derive his worth from them. In short, right is above might and independent of it in the

Platonic universe. Which means that religion depends upon ethics, not ethics upon religion. The whole history of religious ethics has been corrupted by failure to realise Plato's discovery of this supremacy of the ideal. The barbarous notion that moral values derive their significance from the will of a heavenly being, that living nobly means nothing more than conforming one's action to the commands of such a being—in short, the doctrine that obedience is the cardinal virtue, and disobedience the cardinal vice, these are the notions, as false as they are degrading, which characterise the ethical traditions of those who reject Platonic realism. For the realist, ethics is an affair of ideals, not of commands, and it is rooted not in the contingencies of existence, but in the necessities of subsistence. If courage and mercy are excellences of character, they do not become more excellent if there happens to exist a power which wills them, nor less excellent if there be no such power. The ethics of realism, because it is based upon eternally subsistent ideas, cannot be corrupted or shaken by anything that may happen to beliefs about the merely supernatural.

The conception of a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness has undergone many changes in the past, and will probably undergo as many in the future. Belief in the existence of such a power has its consolations and its dangers. We may regard it as supported by the facts of science or as refuted by them, but in no event should the primary sanctity of the sense of duty—reverence for values as such—be put at the mercy of anything so precarious and irrelevant as existential supernaturalism. Ethics—the science of what is noble and beautiful in the way of living—should be freed from all vestiges of authoritarianism. The evil notion that one needs to apologize for the good or to justify the claim of the ideal upon the heart by translating it into the mandates of political or theological authority should be for ever repudiated. This does not at all mean that the realist should forgo the use of any empirical method in his attempt to discover the specific ideal which is applicable to a given situation. The truths of essence are as difficult to discover as the truths of existence, and the realist's assurance of the absoluteness of duty is in no way incompatible with a dubiousness as to what is his specific duty in a given situation. Nor should we fail to realise that the content of duty may change and evolve—that rules of conduct were suitable for yesterday which may not be suitable to-day, and that a change in the situation of an individual will call for a corresponding change of the means used to attain the ideal.

Modern realism is cosmocentric in its outlook rather than anthropocentric or egocentric, with regard to the Platonic world of subsistence no less than with regard to the existential world of common sense and science. It would deny to the individual the pseudo-creativeness attributed to him by the philosophy of idealism and pragmatism. It would accord to him no transcendent powers of legislating for nature, or of supporting by his consciousness the infinities of space and time. But in depriving the individual of these illusory powers to constitute reality by his thought, realism gives back to him the increased responsibility of membership in the independent and self-existent order of nature. To be alive in a world that is not of our own making is after all a noble adventure. And to have the privilege of contemplating existent nature in all its vastness, to feel that each new scientific law is not a mere résumé of our impressions but a veritable conquest of the objective universe, gives to the realistically emancipated a high and serious elation which is quite beyond the reach of those who would subject nature to a status of dependence upon mind. And when to the tumultuous and inexhaustible welter of things existent, realism adds the quiet and infinitely greater immensities of the realm of subsistence, the mind gains access to new and imperishable sources of joy and peace. The comprehension that the whole universe of essence and existence, though not created by us or dependent upon us, may nevertheless be mastered through contemplation, induces an emotion of pride freed from the petty arrogance of subjectivism. It is this pride in a universe that is independent yet controllable, and external yet progressively knowable, which is the ground for all sound appreciation of the beautiful and the sublime.

IV.—DISCUSSIONS.

THE MEANING OF 'MEANING'.

It is probable that the Symposium on Meaning which was held at the Oxford Philosophic Congress, and was published in the October issue of Mind, will have presented to a casual reader the usual features of a philosophic discussion. That is to say, it reads like a triangular duel, in which each participant aims at something different, and, according to the other, misses it, and hits a phantom. I had aimed at what seemed to me the really vital point about Meaning, which I regard as one of the great untouched problems in logic and psychology, but both Mr. Russell and Prof. Joachim, the latter 'resolutely' (p. 404), appear to avoid it. Mr. Russell regards what I aimed at as quite an unimportant part of his paper, though I tried to expound a theory diametrically opposed to his, which seemed to me directly to negative his solution of '*How Propositions mean*'. He wanted me, it seems, to discuss the very peculiar, very interesting, but somewhat unnatural hybrid between Humian sensationalism and behaviourism with which he is now experimenting. Prof. Joachim, lastly, attempts no positive contribution to the question, and labours only to show that Mr. Russell "asserts what no one can possibly *think*" (p. 405). His friends will infer, that, if so, Mr. Russell also does not think it, and that possibly Prof. Joachim has not understood what he meant. I cannot but agree with Prof. Joachim that Mr. Russell has chosen to express himself in difficult and apparently contradictory terms, as philosophers so often do, though the 'contradictions' which strike me most are not identical with those selected by Prof. Joachim. Yet I dare not suppose that they are more than verbal, and think it possible that I have failed to understand Mr. Russell.

After which candid confession I feel entitled to say that he has not understood me in some important points.

(1) I feel sure that he has not understood the two, to me, essential points he says he agrees with, *viz.*, that meaning is *not* a property of 'objects' and that it is essentially personal. For not only does he fail to explain how he can adopt conclusions which are in him devoid of any visible support in the way of premisses, but the whole of his paper seems to negative any such agreement. How, *e.g.*, can meaning be "an observable property of observable entities," if he 'agrees' that it is attached to them by our personal attitudes, whereby they are '*taken* to mean'? Or how can the

meaning of words prevail over that of those who use them, if he 'agrees' that meaning is ultimately personal?

(2) On the other hand he misunderstands both me and the character of my objections to his theory, when he supposes my method to be 'philosophic' rather than scientific: that the method of knowing is *one* and that there is *no* specific philosophic method, is both a corollary of Pragmatism, and, I believe, a very real and important point of agreement between us.

(3) He has entirely misunderstood my alternative to (what I call) the 'intellectualist' method of observation or contemplation. Or rather, he refuses to look at it, and insists on applying to it categories against which it is a systematic protest. When he declares, *e.g.*, that "all the *words* in which Dr. Schiller endeavours to describe his unobservable entities *imply* that after all he can *observe* them" (p. 401) and that "his very *words* turn them into *objects of contemplation*"[1] (*ibid.*), I can only gasp, and retort that my theory does not concede any such power to *words*. To dispose of it thus would seem to be a typical case of the over-riding of actual meaning by verbal, which could hardly be surpassed from the writings of Mr. Bradley[2] or by the most literal pedantries of formal logic. Because the words '*imply*' a meaning I disclaim, am I to be debarred from using them so as to confute superstitions based on verbal meaning? Because I call certain processes 'unobservable,' have I called them 'unknowable'? Because I contend that many of our most vivid and vital experiences are not properly to be described as 'observable objects,' must a *tabu* be put upon the word 'experience,' and must I be tied down to the very words I reject as inadequate, 'observe' and 'object'? All this because Mr. Russell thinks he cannot understand "how anything can be experienced without being an object" (p. 402). Is there then no 'subject' at all, no one that experiences and acts? If so, why do we all habitually talk about it?

I suspect, however, that when Mr. Russell says '*can't*,' he means '*won't*'. But even language, that supreme court of appeal for so much philosophy, refuses to bear him out. It has words for *actions* as well as for 'objects' and 'relations,' it recognises *verbs* as well as *nouns*, and summons philosophers to recognise them too! Now actions, processes, attitudes, are never properly 'objects,' though they can (verbally) be hypostasized by a *fiction* which ignores their dynamic quality and the selective construction of the '*objects*' *of our interest*. Neither are *agents* 'objects' *to themselves;* especially not the Self, which has been such an insoluble crux for intellectualist analysis. It has successfully defied transformation into an object, and the distinction of the 'I' and the 'Me' has merely disrupted the unity of the personality which common-sense postulates, and psychic functioning attests.

[1] Italics mine.

[2] See MIND, No. 72, p. 500, for the doctrine that we are condemned to mean what we say, and *cf.* No. 73, p. 41-42.

Mr. Russell has obviously got deeply involved in this ancient difficulty. Having insisted that there are to be nothing but observable objects in experience, he has had to dissolve away the Self, after the manner of Hume. Yet he cannot afford to do this, because his theory of Meaning involves an appeal to 'mnemic causation,' which is, on Humian principles, a double contradiction, because memory demands psychic continuity, and causation, agency.[1] When invited to recognise activities and continuous agents, he has no right to refuse and to require them to be transmuted into 'objects'. For the contention he has to meet is that *they* are the primary reals, and that 'objects' are secondary, and constituted by the operation and selection of 'agents'. Moreover, even if the demand for 'objects' were as legitimate as he thinks it, it could not possibly be satisfied by an analysis which does not provide for the continuity of any object at all.

And when this analysis inquires into '*what* swirls in the tide of life,' it may be invited to contemplate the answer which a still more scientific analysis gives to the question—what *moves* in the world of physics? Physics now analyses all material phenomena into the motions of 'electrons'; but it does not profess to know what the 'substance' of an electron may be, and hardly even attempts to guess what 'electricity' may be *per se*. The simple truth is that, alike in physics and in psychology, activities are far more certain, and better known, than the 'substances' ('objects') in which they are feigned to inhere. And no wonder: for are not activity and life the primary realities, and the sources by which all our notions of 'substances' and 'objects' are deposited?

The 'behaviourist' method of explanation, moreover, which so fascinates Mr. Russell, is far more in sympathy with this attitude of physics than with the old static conception of a world built up of solid substances bound together in stable relations. For even at the lowest it is surely far more certain that the *amœba* nourishes itself by putting forth *pseudopodia*, than that it recognises staple articles of food standing in a nutritive relation to its internal economy. Behaviourism is *dynamic*, as modern explanations tend to be; but the non-behaviouristic stratum in Mr. Russell's beliefs seems to be incongruously and dangerously *static*.

(4) Passing next to Mr. Russell's reply to my criticisms of the theory that 'images' are the original vehicles of meaning, I find that I must question its adequacy and relevance, perhaps because it is put too elliptically for my comprehension.

(*a*) His reply to the objection that images cannot be essential to meaning, because there are excellent thinkers addicted to imageless thought, is that this "ignores the history of the individual. The essence of meaning lies in the causal efficacy of that which has meaning," and this is "a result of habit. A word, through association,

[1] Mr. Russell here seems to use the notion of causal agency in a way hardly compatible with his own formal analysis of the notion in his Aristotelian Society address (vol. xiii.).

acquires the same causal efficacy as an image having the same meaning; habit causes it to have this efficacy directly, without the intermediary of the image. But that does not prove that the image could have been dispensed with originally" (p. 398).

This means, I suppose, that though the imageless thinker *now* dispenses with the use of images, he was once less independent. The psychology seems somewhat conjectural. Also is it not a trifle dogmatic to assume that objects have meaning and causal efficacy, and that in these allegations lies the essence of meaning? This is just the question at issue. And in any case how is the answer relevant to the objection? How can the fact that in a mind that has imagery, and uses it, the meaning originally attached to the images may be transferred to the words it uses later, prove anything about a mind that does not have or use images, and yet contrives to mean?

(*b*) To the objection that meaning and imagery do not in fact vary concomitantly as they should do on his theory, Mr Russell has no reply except the *argumentum ad hominem* that he would not have expected from me so much insistence on 'verbal precision'. Now it may be that I have erred in demanding, vainly, 'vitality and concreteness' from philosophic formulas that are fog-producers; but I do not see how this is relevant to the question whether meaning and imagery do, observably and in fact, behave as if they belonged together. Nor again can I see relevance in the very true remark, with which I cordially agree, that "precision in the meaning of words is a social product," or, as I should prefer to say, a consequence of 'intersubjective intercourse'. But I may point out to Mr. Russell, who is, I take it, committed to the laudable ideal of defining precisely all the words he uses, that this ideal is unattainable in principle, because every word he defines is defined by others which are undefined and ambiguous; so that, until he has defined everything he has not really got precision anywhere. The inference, to me, from this situation, is not that nothing need be defined, but that definitions, explanations, paraphrases, etc., should be used, as best one can, until the personal meaning to be conveyed has actually been conveyed, and is understood.

(*c*) To my third argument for the independence of meaning Mr. Russell has, so far as I can see, no objection. He merely agrees that, when "the associations of the image are different," the meaning will be different, but has nothing to say on the question how in that case the meaning will be communicable. If meaning depends on images, and the images mean differently, because they have different associations, then images *fail* as vehicles of meaning. Whence I should infer that it might be better to drop the images and to *start* from Meaning as the primary process in understanding.

(5) It seems to me to be a serious misunderstanding to suppose that in my mouth 'intellectualism' is a term of abuse and means merely 'bad' (p. 398).

This charge rests, I suspect, on a confusion between 'intellectual' and 'intellectualist'. I have not the faintest desire to interfere with the exercises of Mr. Russell's intellect, and yield to no man in my admiration for them. I consider him perhaps our finest 'intellectual,' and a leader of our '*intelligentsia*'. I also hold that he inclines, as a rule, to 'intellectualist' views of philosophic questions—as is natural enough in so distinguished an intellectual. But I am quite ready to discuss how far his intellectualism goes, and I recognise that, unlike most intellectuals, he has had the courage to vivisect himself and to analyse his intellectualist bias, magnificently, in the *Journal of Philosophy*, xvi., 2.

Moreover, I by no means use 'intellectualist' as a term of abuse. It is as purely and coldly a descriptive term as 'voluntarist' or 'sensationalist'. It merely means one who tends to explain human behaviour in terms of intellection. Nor can I conceive why an intellectualist should object to being described as such. If *I* were an intellectualist (as I am an 'intellectual') I should be *proud* to be called one. For it would mean that I believed I had succeeded in explaining the real in terms of man's highest and most specific function, his intellect. When, therefore, I object to 'intellectualism,' I do not mean that it is 'bad' to explain in terms of intellect, but that it is *wrong*—intellectually. It is wrong intellectually, because it tries to account for our cognitions by the unworkable fictions and blind abstractions of a 'pure thought'. Now I hold that this explanation is not adequate. The intellectualist accounts, even of the human intellect, fail to describe its nature and functions. The intellectualist attitude in philosophy is moreover false and futile, because it is covertly inspired by hidden forces or 'complexes' which are neither intellectual nor admirable. But, unfortunately, intellectualists do not understand how they are tricked by their instincts and prejudices. However, it is clear that these contentions are the result not of any *a priori* animosity to intellectualism (and still less to intellect), but of willingness to face the facts. They presuppose an unflinching use of the intellect, even upon itself, and so a goodly dose of intellectualistic affinity. For only one who is capable of severely controlling his desires will confess, even to himself, that the perfect sage is an unattainable ideal; the ordinary man, whose beliefs are dictated by his emotions, could hardly reach conclusions so repugnant to human vanity.

It is, therefore, something quite definite that is meant by the charge of 'intellectualism'. In Mr. Russell's case and in the article under discussion, it means that Mr. Russell wrongly and needlessly *insists* on assuming the attitude of the spectator or contemplator, and will not look at, or for, anything but 'objects'. Now, as the active side of cognition is there, and *is* all-pervasive, it follows that, if you ignore it, you cannot describe correctly. Historically this attitude is explicable enough; it was determined

by the use of the senses, but as the intellect was largely developed by the functions of perceiving and interpreting their data, intellectualism and sensationalism often co-operate and fuse for the purposes of my criticism. Theories of knowledge based on them all suffer from the same incurable defect, that of overlooking that the active side in our nature pervades also our 'cognitions'.

It is *not* true that this side is unintelligible or inexpressible. In every language there exists a vocabulary for it—though it is very defective in Greek, from which our philosophic tradition is derived. Only, of course, the words of the actor are different from those of the onlooker. They are often inadequate, and can always be misunderstood; we should not try to haggle over them, but penetrate to the meaning it is sought to convey. However, 'objects of contemplation' and 'unobservable entities' are not terms it is natural to select in endeavouring to describe activity as it is immediately felt by the agent. As I said, the verbal stronghold of such descriptions is in the verb; but its inexpugnable and insuperable attestation is in the personal pronoun, 'I'. Whoever sets himself over against his experience—even to contemplate it—as Mr. Russell repeatedly does,[1] confesses thereby that it cannot be completely analysed into observable objects, and so admits the failure of his 'intellectualism'.

I tried to show, therefore, that these difficulties of our intellectualistic psychology were factitious and gratuitous. There is an alternative way, and it is wrong to neglect to explore it. If, moreover, such neglect is *wilful*, the *choice* of the intellectualist method becomes, clearly, *arbitrary:* it is, moreover, *self-defeating*. For to *refuse* to recognise the voluntarist alternative to intellectualism is itself an *act of will*, and this act proves that intellection is not the *only* process native to the human mind.

[1] *E.g.*, when he recognises 'propositional attitudes' (*How Propositions Mean*, p. 30). 'Attitude' is precisely the word I regard as least inadequate to the expression of the nature of Meaning.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

THE BASIS OF BOSANQUET'S LOGIC.

I AM so much interested in Mr. Leonard Russell's point of view (MIND, October, 1920), that I will venture, if I may, this once more, to try to meet it as far as I can.

On one matter, indeed, I do not see my way to any agreement. It seems to run right through the discussion. It is the question whether I am bound, on my premisses, to hold that the subject of a hypothetical judgment must exist in fact (*l.c.*, p. 476). The reason is, as I understand, that I hold the ultimate subject of the judgment to be reality.

In my view it is this doctrine which gives me absolute freedom in my account of the immediate subject of judgment. I take it to be the essence of thought to qualify reality as a whole; and the instrument of its operation I take to be always a discrimination, including in this term selection and combination, within the whole content which reality offers as experience. Any discriminated content that will prescribe a special line of connexion within the whole will serve as the immediate subject of a judgment. The name of a real thing suggests a real subject taken as it is given. But the antecedent of a hypothetical judgment, usually an idea introduced by an "if," suggests at once something divergent from given reality. The "if" introduces an ideal subject, of which the consequent predicates something not true of it as it stands, but true in the light thrown on it by its connexion with what is relevant in the whole. The reason why I say that this is fundamental is that I cannot comprehend the notion of a thought which does not operate towards qualifying the whole reality. Thought, I should have said, strictly speaking, *is* the whole or the reality operating through minds to qualify itself by establishing definite coherences prescribed by discriminated conditions. Thus I can see nothing in the point that knowledge cannot be based on the whole reality, because it is based on discriminated systematic connexions. It is based, I believe, on a systematic connexion at every point of affirmation, but never on any connexion apart from the criterion of the whole content, the appeal to which is its nisus and its nature. The whole specified in its parts in the light of the whole—that is what I understand by knowledge as a construction created by thought.

Subject to this difference of opinion, I can agree that we get knowledge by "constructing a world," but this only in a definitely limited sense and degree, which I will recur to, "other than the

real world" (p. 474). The main work of construction is, I believe, ordering and adjusting the world of experience in 'obedience' to the principle of totality which is the law of coherence. Surely Mr. Russell would not say with Gentile that thinking simply creates the world? As I understand, we make it in discovering it, and discover it in making it.

But this factor of agreement, which goes very deep with reference to the active character of thought, is yet modified by a further difference between us, though again, I hope, re-modified towards Mr Russell's position by a further explanation. I am writing as shortly as I possibly can, and beg for a favourable hearing.

The further difference is this. I admit the work of construction, but cannot agree that it comes under the head of supposition or position. Therefore I must deny that "posited systems are at the basis of our whole explicated knowledge of reality" (p. 475).

Supposition, as I see the matter, is not construction, and cannot construct a world. Construction is the complete work of thought, of judgment. Supposition is ideal experiment, and has the limitation of all experiment. The experiment is one thing; the judgment upon it is another. The whole purpose of the experiment is to see how the real world reacts—how the special track we have selected opens up and continues—in consequence of what the experiment does. Why does "reality" make a difference and furnish the test? Because reality is the whole; it does not matter which word you use; and the whole is the criterion of thought. I am not sure whether Mr. Russell means that he formulated his view, that science is necessary to contradict science (p. 474 top), in opposition to mine or because of it; but I say it in so many words (*Logic*,[2] i., p. 297 n.). Only, supposition does not tell you whether science is for you or against you. It is solely when you have judged, that you have committed yourself to a survey of the whole, which says that there is no superior generalisation against you. I agree that content is what you have to consider; but it seems to me to be only in the judgment, which affirms of reality, that you have the whole content brought to bear. Strictly, you cannot have a posited *system*. For you cannot *posit* the consequences, the unification, of combinations. You can only *judge* them.

But we seem to have such a thing. We seem able to suppose a world, in erecting which we draw consequences and so unify combinations. Here we are misled, I believe, by the feature, apt to pass unnoticed, of conclusion-premisses (cf. *Implication*, pp. 65-66). The moment you glance at posited data, inference begins to grow. Consequences begin to draw themselves long before the main conclusion is drawn. "All men are mortal" is put forward as a premiss. But it is chock-full of conclusions. And so is the structure of any coherent system which, we say, in current language, that we "posit" or "suppose". The moment we look at the factors of our supposition taken together, judgment

and inference, which go beyond it, begin. The criterion of the whole, and the appeal to it, is inherent in our thought, and cannot be barred out.

This was my further difference. I agreed that thought was productive; but I do not agree that its operation as such can be identified with supposition.

But now I have a re-modification to offer which will take me, I hope, some little way at least back towards agreement.

Mr. Russell had in mind (October, 1918, p. 447) the non-Euclidean geometries. Now I have no right to say a word as of myself on this subject. But I find a discussion by Prof. Alexander (in *Space, Time and Deity*, i., pp. 157, 160 ff.) which seems relevant and suggestive. It is instructive in itself that Prof. Alexander discusses them under the section-heading "A Product of Art". He compares the construction of them "with the arbitrary act of imagination by which we construct a chimera". They are "the investigation of certain notions for their own sake when freed from their attachments". They are products of free thought "giving rise to fresh combinations". Yet they retain a kinship with nature such that they give us valuable knowledge, which can perhaps also be said, but certainly in a sense much more remote, of works of art (Alexander, pp. 161-162). Discrimination within the whole has here passed into divergent supposition. Abstraction and combination have led the way to a posited world—other than the real world.

This, I take it, is the sort of case which Mr Russell is determined to have recognised. Here we certainly get knowledge, and we seem to get it by constructive thinking about an assumption or supposition. I fully admit the importance and significance of the topic. I only venture to suggest two remarks: (1) Pure thought, in drawing consequences, seems to me to transcend supposition by asserting, not positing, its own laws; (2) it also seems to me to transcend supposition just because it pursues the suggestion freely and constructively, *i.e.*, it takes, out of a complete survey of reality, any and every consequent which the supposition indicates to be relevant. Thought would contradict its own nature, and would fail to be creative, if it confined itself to dwelling on the content of an assumption. Rather, like art, it works out the possibilities to which a notion, applied to the whole of content without restriction, gives it the clue.

Then, to come to terms with Mr. Russell's ultimatum (p. 477); "The judgment, I should say, is always and inevitably based on such a partial system, though referring to the whole of reality"; *I* should say that I believe I understand what it means, and that I recognise in it, as I have explained, high practical truth in the case of certain freely constructed systems; but strictly and ultimately I cannot but hold it to be a contradiction in terms. A judgment which refers to the whole of reality must, in principle, be modelled by coherence with it. In a given case the demands of the whole

may make no apparent difference to that one out of innumerable partial systems which is more immediately in question. But this cannot be because the whole of content has not to be consulted, but only because, allowing for undeveloped interdependence of systems, its answer is on the whole taken to be favourable.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

DO WE KNOW OTHER MINDS MEDIATELY OR IMMEDIATELY?

In the October number of Mind there was an article by Mr. Joshua C. Gregory, criticising my paper on 'Our Knowledge of Other Minds' in the *Aristotelian Proceedings* for 1918-19, and I should like to say something by way of a belated reply to him. Mr. Gregory disputes my contention that we know other minds as directly and immediately as we know physical things, and defends the orthodox view that minds can only know one another indirectly, *via* the material world. The truth of this view seems to him obvious from the consideration of such facts as the following: a person's thoughts, feelings and desires are concealed from public inspection; absence of bodily signs makes it impossible for us to perceive a person's mental states; our knowledge of other minds depends upon our own previous experience and upon their resemblance to ourselves; some mental lives altogether elude our apprehension. Mr. Gregory then concludes that the existence of other minds is inferred and not perceived; but the inference, he insists, is implicit and spontaneous. It is the work of primary, unconsciously acting memory, and is made by us in our infancy, so that in mature experience the recognition of other mental lives appears to be immediate.

It does not seem to me that the facts upon which Mr. Gregory bases his conclusion are all of them equally certain; thus, *e.g.*, I should be prepared to argue that our knowledge of other minds is not limited to mental states similar to those experienced by ourselves. But even granting that all Mr. Gregory says is correct, the facts he refers to in no way conflict with the 'direct acquaintance' theory. It is perfectly true, of course, that other people's thoughts do not lie exposed to our view and that even their emotions may be difficult to discern; but this is not a reason for denying that what little we do perceive of other minds *is* perceived and not inferred. The fragmentary character of our acquaintance with other mental lives could only be regarded as an argument against the view I am defending if by 'immediate' knowledge were meant a knowledge that is exhaustive and infallible. But 'immediacy' in this connexion simply means that when the act of discrimination is directed upon a mind, then what we apprehend is a mind and not something that intervenes between us and it; it does not mean that the discrimination is either perfect or attained without any trouble. Certain conditions such as the similarity of a mind to our own may help us to discriminate it more perfectly, while under other conditions we may completely fail to detect the presence of a

mental life—but this only shows that our knowledge of other minds is subject to the same limitations as our knowledge of anything else. Mr. Gregory thinks that if minds can be directly perceived, we ought to be able to tell at a glance whether an amœba has consciousness or no. But then he might as well argue that if physical things can be directly perceived the discovery of the bacillus of cholera ought not to have occasioned Koch the slightest difficulty.

I am not concerned to deny Mr. Gregory's contention that our knowledge of the inner lives of others is inseparable from the observation of their bodily behaviour. If minds do not exist apart from bodies this is just what one would expect to find; but my point is that we could have no clue to the interpretation of expressive behaviour unless we *also* perceived the mental state of which it is an expression. And it is because the two have been perceived together that the bodily movement may become the *sign* of the inner state—though this does not mean that immediate apprehension of minds is forthwith "repressed". Mr. Gregory grants "some plausibility" to my contention that the reason why we do not perceive minds alone is that they are always connected with bodies; but he qualifies this concession by the enigmatic remark that "we do perceive dead bodies alone". Certainly; —why not? Mr. Gregory apparently thinks that having once got into the habit of perceiving minds together with bodies, we should not be able to perceive bodies without minds. But our slavery to habit is not so bad as all that; and—fully in accordance with the direct acquaintance theory—not even the 'habitual conjunction of mind and body' can make us go on perceiving a mind when it is no longer there to be perceived.

In defending the traditional theory against my criticism of it Mr. Gregory accuses me of having misrepresented the nature of the inference upon which our recognition of other minds rests. This inference, he maintains, is as unconscious and spontaneous as walking, etc., and he constantly compares it to the 'complication' of perception: just as the child learns to see the hardness of the table, so it learns to see that its mother is pleased when she smiles. Now it seems to me that the two cases are not parallel. The hardness of the table has, in the first instance, been as directly apprehended as its colour; but the mother's gladness has, according to Mr. Gregory, never been apprehended at all. It is useless to call upon 'unconscious memory' to reinstate something that has never been experienced. And however much one may insist that the inference is unconscious, there is no getting away from the fact that the psychological—and not merely the logical—starting-point of such an inference must be the child's own experience, which is contrary to all we know of the development of a mental life. Thus, *e.g.*, Mr. Gregory says, "the child learns from its own pain, pleasure or anger associated with bodily manifestations to perceive from similar bodily manifestations the possession by other minds of

similar feelings or emotions". But if the child is to learn from its own pain, anger, etc., it must be capable of detecting these states in itself—which presupposes in an infant an astonishing power of self-analysis; and even if this were a likely supposition, it would not be of much avail, because there is no similarity between a baby's experience of its own angry kicks and the sight of its mother's frowning face—so that its correct interpretation of her expressive behaviour would still remain a mystery. To say that we make the connexion between our own movements as we feel them and the movements of others which we see, "as we make all fundamental connexions — unconsciously, spontaneously, and implicitly," is simply to give up all attempt at explanation.

As against this mythical theory of inference I urge, then, that the presence of a mental life is revealed to us along with the shape, colour, and other qualities that characterise the body, and that living beings appear to us from the first as *qualitatively* different from inanimate things, though it may take us a long time to discover in what precisely the difference consists. There is no contradiction in maintaining that we are aware of minds long before we know that they are minds. This view seems to me to afford a satisfactory explanation of the fact of intra-subjective intercourse; and in my paper I tried to show that there is nothing in the nature of knowledge to make direct acquaintance with other minds impossible. Mr. Gregory has several criticisms to make of the general view I take of knowledge, but they seem to me to be based on a misunderstanding of my position. Thus, *e.g.*, he remarks that I 'have been compelled' to criticise the traditional psychological view 'by deductions from neo-realistic principles'. But it was a distinct object of my paper to consider the bearing of realism upon the problem of our knowledge of other minds; nothing 'compelled' me to take the realistic theory as my starting-point except the fact that I happen to believe in its truth.

NATHALIE A. DUDDINGTON.

V.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Instinct and the Unconscious: A Contribution to a Biological Theory of the Psycho-neuroses. By W. H. R. Rivers, M.D., D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S., Fellow and Prælector in Natural Sciences, St. John's College, Cambridge. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1920. Pp. viii, 250.

Merely to enumerate the titles of Dr. Rivers's chapters, or tell over in one's mind the "inhibitions" and "dissociations," the "substitutions" and "phobias" and "complexes" which advertise so many of his pages, is to see at once that his book will attract attention wherever an interest is taken in the newer problems and concepts now knocking for entrance at the gates of psychology. And attention once caught, it is safe to say, will be held. For the reader will not be long in divining that he has more than a mere record of psychological observations before him. He has an effort at a systematisation of the newer facts; and this in short compass, for it is a comparatively short book.

All work on these themes tends to invite comparison with that of Professor Freud. One feature of the present book which will appeal to many readers may be at once recorded. It has all the interest of having been written by a man apparently about as familiarly acquainted with the phenomena of danger as Freud with the phenomena of sex. It is, of course, a war medical book. Compared with Freud it reminds one more than once of the great difference between the rough and ready methods of war and the refinement, patience, and thoroughness which are possible in such an exclusively civil practice as Freud's has been. Yet it seems to succeed in being convincing on one point at least; not intrinsically a supremely important one, but yet interesting. It shows how good a basis there is, after all, for a view of Freud which is often rested only on prejudice; namely, that his theory of psycho-neurosis is one-sided owing to the exclusive stress which it lays upon sexual factors.

The author's preoccupation with danger experiences is not alone responsible for this result. What has mostly contributed to it is rather just the happy accident which has given the study and practice of psycho-therapy into the hands of an anthropologist. The writer is interested in the theory of his subject. His approach is biological. One of his chief aims is to cast a biological light upon these mental-pathological symptoms. From this circum-

stance chiefly has arisen a certain relaxation of the stress upon sexual factors as the generative agents in the various pathological conditions.

This result seems to arise naturally out of the author's work rather than to be anywhere explicitly pushed into the foreground.

Like all his compeers he works with the conception of the unconscious. He recognises a process whereby functions which were conscious become unconscious. Following the general lines of recent theory in these matters, he takes psycho-neurosis to be the disturbing reverberation of these unconscious functions upwards into conscious life. He wishes biology to throw some light on the question how such functions come to exist. Why should a conscious process pass down into the unconscious? What biological necessity is there for there being processes thus held down? The need is not far to seek. Inhibition of early tendencies is a corollary of evolution. Kinds of activity which have been superseded must be kept down out of the way of superseding ones. In pathological conditions the former reappear. We have an outcrop of "something necessary for the welfare of some of the ancestors of man which still comes into action in special circumstances".

A point of genuine theoretic interest thus arises. What instinctive tendencies are they which do crop out, in man, in a pathological way? "Not universally the sex instincts" is what the author would reply. The reason is fairly obvious. The sex instincts are not the only ones, from a biological point of view, which are old and strong in us. Of far more ancient lineage than the control of them is the control of our natural tendency to go demoralised in the face of danger. Self-preservation is our earliest task. Sex control comes to be a task too, but not till far later. There seems to be this much of justification at anyrate for the author's visible tendency to suspect that sex instincts have been made to do duty, in various quarters, in recent theory of neurosis, where danger-instincts would have served better.

But the whole issue as to which set of impulses most taxes our powers of control is rather aside from the focal point of interest of these studies. Whatever may most need control, the machinery of the controlling process is what interests the author. And in this he bears testimony to the fact—we were not out of need of being reminded of it—of the indebtedness of the whole world of psychotherapeutics to Freud for the real clues to this mechanism. Much and violently as Freud's opinions are still opposed upon all matters, the impression which his general view of the mechanism of repression leaves on the candid expert now, as the author testifies, so far from being one of suspicion, is frankly one of wonder that anything so obvious and simple should not have been thought of long ago. This does not prevent but that within the general truth of the view there should be a great deal still to be understood. And in the interests of further understanding the author would appeal to the hypothesis that the mechanism of inhibition has a

biological function. We cannot but say here how much we welcome a mass of stimulating reflections upon a general hypothesis about which, for certain, many had long been waiting for some biologically-trained psycho-therapist to come forward and offer his opinion.

In his effort at systematisation the author appears to have been rather particularly indebted for his impressions to three sources; (*a*) the experiments of Dr. Henry Head and his colleagues on sensibility, more especially the observed incidents in the process of the return of sensibility to Dr. Head's arm after the experimental severing of the afferent nerve; (*b*) the facts of "immobility" as a device for meeting danger (whereby, to take a common example, a hare in flight will suddenly "clap" flat to the ground in a suitable spot, and suppress absolutely every movement in its body); and (*c*) the experiments whereby Keith Lucas and A. D. Adrian brought out the physiological principle which they call the "all-or-none" reaction of a nerve to a stimulus.

In the experiments of Dr. Head the author detects a phenomenon also appearing in those of Lucas and Adrian. The feature of the latter's experiments was the manner in which the response of the excited nerve seemed to refuse to grade itself to the varying strength of the stimulus. When the nerve was stimulated the reaction simply either took place or didn't, according as the stimulus passed a given point of intensity or fell short of it. It was a case of reacting all-or-none, wholly or else not at all. One of the interesting features of the experiment of Dr. Head, on the other hand, was the definiteness with which a stage of "protopathic" sensibility preceded the stage of the full return of normal or "epicritic" sensibility, and the definiteness with which, at the primary stage, feeling, etc., were simply either there or not there, all discrimination being at a minimum. On the strength of these facts, and under a sense, perhaps, of the closeness of the connexion between sensation and action, the author places the protopathic sensibility and the all-or-none reaction of a nerve, under the same heading, and reads them as the same in principle.

These facts seem to have furnished more or less the clue to what is the governing idea of the book, the author's conception of the nature of instinct (chap. vi.). The feature of instinct is taken to be that it is thus all-or-none. Instinctive reaction does not grade or adjust itself. It is the nature of instinct, as an American might say, to go "with a plop". There is no mediation with it. It simply, so to speak, goes off full blast, or else does not go off at all. "An animal or child exposed to danger, which is so recognised as danger that it produces a reaction, tends to give itself to the reaction fully. If it runs away it tends to run with every particle of the energy it is capable of putting forth; if it cries or screams or utters other sound it tends to do so with all the vigour at its command. In these cases there is no discrimination of

the degree of danger" (p. 44). "If the danger be sufficiently great, and if certain lines of behaviour by which it would normally be met be frustrated, even the adult man will fail to discriminate the nature of the danger and to graduate his movements accordingly. He will devote every particle of his energy to flight or other form of primitive or instinctive behaviour" (*ibid*).

A question of importance now arises, for it concerns the central theme, the mechanism of suppression and its way of operating. We might get the simple force of it by putting it thus. Looking away from the facts of sensibility and of instinctive reaction as matters of interest in themselves and considering only the process whereby the more primitive among these sensibilities and reactivities become displaced to make room for others, what are we to say of the act of putting them out of action? What are we to say of the inhibiting-act itself? Is it of the all-or-none type?

The author takes as more or less typical of this act of repression —or of suppression as he maintains it should be called—the immobility-reaction to danger (chap. viii.). Here, all happens as though, in the appropriate circumstances, some mechanism simply sprang-to, regardless of grading. In the animal which would protect itself by immobility, every movement is at once and indiscriminately suppressed. This seems to favour the view that originally the act of suppressing was an affair of all-or-none; that it is instinctive, therefore; and his taking this standpoint commits the author (*a*) to the peculiarly thought-provoking position that there is an instinctive tendency to suppress instinctive tendencies (we incline to agree with this, and it suggests to us that intelligence may be a species of *release* of this tendency), and (*b*) to the attempt to explain how indiscriminate suppression came to be graded, which involves the question how instinct generally came to be graded.

The act of suppressing has, in fact, come to be graded. There are many evidences of this. Some of the most interesting are found by the author among the facts of hypnotism and hysteria. That these two conditions are conditions of discriminated suppressing is part of the light which, for the author, biological considerations have to throw upon them.

The view taken of hypnotic states is highly noteworthy. The author finds here an outcrop of features useful in adapting a herd to the task of survival. He regards the hypnotic condition as a throw-back to the gregarious instincts. He finds in its anæsthesias, its hyper-æsthesias, its astonishing docilities and all the rest, things gregariously useful. Its heightened sensibility is gregariously useful, so is its insensibility, so is its general suggestibility.

But the central feature of the hypnotic condition is one which links it with hysterical conditions (chap. xiv.). In both we have a reappearance of one general device whose day of primary usefulness is past, namely, the immobility-reaction to danger. In hysteria

and hypnotic states alike, the paralyses and anæsthesias which are found may be regarded as partial manifestations of a process which, if it were complete, would produce paralysis of all movement and insensibility to all stimuli over the whole body (p. 130).

We have here a conception which seems to us determinative of a good deal in the author's views; his conception of suppression as something not originally graded which has become so. In hysterical and hypnotic states we have a process of indiscriminate suppression modified in the carrying out. The problem is how the modification has been made.

The reply given is that the discriminativeness has been induced by suggestion. Much is set down to suggestion in the book. Sleep, in the chapter on sleep, is said to be procured by suggestion. Hypnotism admittedly comes by suggestion and hysterical suppressions of sensibility, etc., are attributed to the same cause. It operates, in fact, on all instincts.

The great source of suggestion (chap. xiii.) is herd life. Indeed, suggestion, for the author, is little else than the herd instinct in operation. Instead of following McDougall in this matter and taking suggestion as one of three parallel manifestations of herd instinct the author takes it as the one central tendency which itself takes three shapes. He names these in a way calculated to remind us of the mutuality (and the unconscious character on both sides) of the relation denoted in each case. There is a "mimesis" in herd life whereby, when one member happens to do a thing, the others find themselves doing it. There is a mutual "sympathy," and there is thirdly a mutual "intuition". With these terms he would replace McDougall's "imitation, sympathy and suggestion". Suggestion operating within the necessities of herd life is the great articulating factor, adjusting primitive instinct to the definite demands of situations.

One feature of these discussions on suggestion and connected themes, which rather militates against clearness, is the manner in which the author seems to move back and forth between the two problems, that of grading in instinct generally and that of grading in the instinct of suppressing in particular. We must at once say, however, that although clearer statement could have been wished for, of what was being done, this free movement between the one problem and the other is the reverse of unjustifiable. They are at bottom the same problem. It is really indifferent whether we ask how the suppression-act has come to be graded or how instinct itself has come to be graded. Every instinctive reaction is an instinctive suppression. Instinct tears down its own channel; but the very act of opening that channel is a shutting of others. In the case of the rabbit on the grass, the very act of scampering away is an abstention from feeding or playing. In asking how instinct learns to grade its actions and not simply go full tilt down its own groove we are literally asking how it learns to grade its suppressions. The whole problem is one of

grading the suppressing-act. Suggestion, for the author, is the universal grading factor so long as we remain on the level of instinct, *i.e.*, on the unconscious plane. The other way in which our instinctive actions may be checked in their career and properly adjusted or graded is through intelligence. This, however, takes us on to the conscious plane. Graded instinct is thus not necessarily intelligence; which seems a difficulty in the theory, since it leaves the difference between the two very hard of specification. To this point we shall have briefly to return.

There is much discussion in the book upon the conception of the unconscious, much also of a practical therapeutic kind which we shall only be able to touch upon incidentally if at all, as we pursue the matter of central theoretic interest. The presupposition which underlies the work is clearly that in dealing with instinct we are dealing with something of the all-or-none order. What is the effect of this presupposition? What is the value of it? What is the necessity for it?

In the first place, even if it should not admit of acceptance as it stands, we do not see that to upset it is to upset the book. We do not see, in other words, that it is indispensable to there being a problem at all. There must, of course, *be* a problem. Anything which would wipe that out, stands self-condemned. The wonders of instinct have evoked men's admiration for too long. But although we happened not to assume instinct to be by nature ungraded, we could still clearly have a problem; namely the problem of accounting for the *extent* to which grading in instinct has gone, of getting at the source of the continuous *further refinements* of it.

Is there, however, any good reason for demur to the all-or-none principle as applied to instinct? Our first impulse is to reply (very naively no doubt) that while there is no very good one there appear to be quite an array of little ones, against this presupposition; a presupposition of which there is certainly a great deal of philosophical prejudice in favour.

For example: (*a*) in regard to the experiments which gave rise to the terms "protopathic" and "epicritic," the presupposition in question seems to import into our interpretation of the results an abruptness of antithesis—we put it no higher—which sounds artificial.

We have alluded to the motive for launching these two terms as designations of two levels of sensibility, *viz.*, the definiteness with which the process of recovery fell into two stages. Now, while Dr. Rivers will not say that the later-returning over-laying epicritic system, distinct from the other as it is, simply suppresses the underlying protopathic one; he does contend, and he believes it to be borne out by the facts of the experiment—at which he himself was present—that during the healing process certain features of the protopathic system are suppressed and certain others are taken up

into the epicritic and fused therewith. The impression is left as though the all-or-none principle—taken too seriously as the principle of the suppression-act—were here working against true theory. One has the impression of something which does not discriminate *within what it takes*. It goes-to like a spring. What it crushes it crushes and what it leaves it leaves.

(*b*) The all-or-none character also works unconvincingly at times when introduced into a series of biological considerations. Roundly, it is difficult to imagine an original biological function for the all-or-none type of thing, of such nature and importance as to throw light on pathological states. This is not to say we cannot find a biological function for the suppression-act; but "all-or-none" is the *malady* of the suppression-act, and has not any huge, obvious, universal, biological place such as is wanted and required for the author's purposes, though it may well enough have some place.

This fact seems to us to come out particularly clearly when the author would throw a biological light on the phenomena of dissociation (chap. x.). Dissociation—it is one of the author's contributions to terminology—is not the state constituted by the mere suppression of part of the conscious life. We have dissociation proper only where the suppressed part is able to attain to an independent consciousness, one which alternates with the normal. The "fugue" is an instance of dissociation. The individual in this condition carries out a connected series of actions *qua* another person, which he subsequently cannot remember or understand his having done. When the author raises the question, What biologically useful condition is indicated here? his suggestion is that it is connected with some such alternation of environment as we find in the life of an amphibian; and when we recall what an episode in the history of terrestrial life must have been its emergence from the sea, the brilliance of the hint will be appreciated. But inevitably it recalls to our minds the unlikeliness of a biological use for the malady. There might be some use for an original condition whereof the malady might be regarded as a distortion.

The impression arises somewhat as follows. For an answer to the question Whence dissociation? our attention is drawn to the frog and the newt, and at once it becomes plain and illuminating that of course memories of land life had better be suppressed during water life, and water-experiences had better be at rest whilst one is tackling the environment of the land. But, we incline to ask, were land and water so different at the time the human race was emerging? Is there any evidence that our human line of ancestry leads through anything so close to a literal newt stage?

While no doubt the present amphibian is the summary victim of two alternating fugues, and is no doubt much convenienced by that (from the human point of view) malady; it is a present form of life, a comparatively not extremely widespread product of the sharpened distinction of land and water, whose characteristic—its clean-cut alternation of lives—seems rather to take its place along

with the human malady of dissociation itself and along with all other similar conditions, as the distortion of something originally much less clean-cut which was the actual primitive and useful thing. All observation seems to point rather to the gradual restraining of older activities and gradual bending of them to slightly new tasks. When a species of creature, adjusted to a certain environment, finds its environment change without its thereupon going "down and out"—when in spite of a change a species survives—what really does become of the creature's old adjustments for its old conditions once the new environment has arrived? They do not go out of existence. Neither do they, surely, go out of action. They operate subduedly, they operate nascently, at new tasks. It is precisely inhibition of this *graded* sort which is the necessary accompaniment of evolution.

Yet all these considerations are not enough to shelve the principle that the nature of instinct is to be "all-or-none". What is wrong seems to us to be, that *this is applied as a description of how instinct looks from without as well as how it feels from within, whereas it is good as the latter only.* It is a description of the inner view applied to both views. This is the source, we fancy, of most of the head-shaking with which the principle meets. To observation it is simply untrue that the startled hare runs its fastest and its farthest every time it runs at all, nor does the child scream his loudest every time he cries. The author may say "he tends to". Yes, but that is the inside view. And the truth seems to be that from this point of view he not only tends to go the whole way; he does so every time.

We figure the matter to ourselves in somewhat the following way. Every real situation is a system of moments or appearances contained within an all-inclusive appearance or moment. The creature reacting instinctively reacts entirely—wholly—every time, to *that selection* of the appearances whereof the real situation is constituted, *which is apprehended.* Take the case of the rabbit on the grass. His ventures and poises, his starts and stops, his whole elaborate game of venturing out for a nibble in the dawn when he can just see and not be seen, is most delicately adjusted at every point. Even his fleeing is adjusted—he won't "clap" anywhere, but only in a nook among the grey grass where he will be invisible and the wind will not stir his hair! Read from without, it is all graded. But from within, what is it? Most likely, a series of literal presents in which even reaction and apprehension are hardly distinguished, but reaction is part of the apprehension—just This, and the ears go up; *This*, and the paws are raised; THIS, and it bangs away. Each reaction is a total reaction *to as many of the component moments of the situation as happen to strike a selection of cords on the many-stringed instrument of the animal's constitution.*

By making this distinction we are helped to explain the peculiar

convincingness which the author's conception of instinct has, despite of apparent artificiality; and which must have made him cling to it in spite of much opposition of the kind which it met with, as many will remember, at the philosophical congress of 1919. The undeniable truth which it seems to us to contain is that instinct from within, or as an experience, is whole-hearted.

And we venture to think that with this distinction respected, the conception of instinct round which this book is built may possibly gain not only in verisimilitude, but in working-virtue as a hypothesis as well.

For to recognise this distinction whilst not forgetting the facts of suppression, may quite well lessen the difficulty both (*a*) of seeing where intelligence begins, and (*b*) of understanding the rationale of its operation.

(*a*) We are warranted in saying, judging by what we feel like when we ourselves are most nearly instinctive, that in the This, This, This, of the instinctive series, each picture, while distinct from the others, is internally distinctionless; and that the supervention of intelligence is where This has become This-not-that. But all is activity or reactivity. It is This-*activity*-not-that, which constitutes intelligence. The emphatic focus on the less emphatic background, is really the dominant activity releasing the dominated one to a faint place beside it in consciousness. Intelligence thus becomes a species of release. It is the partial release of repressed activity into consciousness, under control. "Could we but find the springs to relax we might release to the animals themselves their buried intelligence."

And (*b*) to realise that instinct can be articulate from one point of view and "whole" from another (externally articulate, inwardly whole) is a matter of the greatest importance; it is what lends its peculiar interest to the assumption that to control instinct is itself an instinct. We are prepared to find whole-heartedness not incompatible with articulation. We are prepared to find when the articulation, which is at first external only, at length comes within (dawn of intelligence), that the whole-heartedness may remain. Life is not entirely a matter of golden means and compromise. Instinct has to be regulated; but there is always the instinct to achieve through the regulation, whereto we may give ourselves away. A man may kick too hard or bat too hard, but he cannot ever play his game too well. Instinct does not indeed survive unmodified in intelligence. But it does survive. Unmodified it is whole but undiscriminating. But when it becomes discriminating it can still be whole.

And finally, inasmuch as intelligence is by its nature graded, we cannot altogether agree with the author in the violent view, that what restores the balance, in cases of psycho-therapeutic cure, is not an intelligent, *i.e.*, voluntary process. Is not the psycho-analyst always appealing to intelligence and will? The appeal which cures, so far at least as the present writer has ever been able to see,

is always an appeal to release something. It is hardly possible to substantiate this important point without a brief allusion to two of the well-described case histories which the author prints; but they do happen to illustrate the point aptly. He instances two soldiers (we may call them A and B) who have each met with an experience, by the distressful memory of which they are pursued. Upon much repeated advice, each is found to have been, in all the ways he can think of, following the plan of drowning the memory; but in vain. Dr. Rivers hits upon the plan of making them "face up to it," and succeeds in the one case and fails in the other. The reason is that he can help A to face up to his experience, but cannot help B to face up to his. A's has fortunately an aspect which is beautiful, and which the physician can point out and so release that part of it into consciousness. And with that released, A can face up, and suppress what remains, and get well. B's experience, on the other hand, has no redeeming feature. (A Freudean would probably say that the released aspect of A's experience really operated because it released much more; and in the other case would have gone on willy-nilly till he found something sexual in it and released that.) Psycho-analysis from this point of view emerges as an art of releasing. Intelligence is a releasing. And it seems a mistake to say it is anything else than intelligence and will which effects psychical salvation. Indeed it seems no far-fetched thing to equate psycho-analysis and intelligence. Any animal can fear. It takes a man to "take up arms against his own fear".[1] An animal would cease to be an animal the moment you could psycho-analyse it.

We do not close this review of Dr. Rivers's work with any sense of having done justice to the element of brilliance and of what we can only call random suggestiveness about it, which is the result of that close acquaintance with fact which accompanies all its speculative importance and interest. But the perusal of it certainly strengthens the conviction that the greatest work in this great, rich, new field, will only be done by a thinker of synthetic mind who has something like the author's variety of scientific, philosophic, and especially anthropo-psychological equipment.

J. W. SCOTT.

Physics: The Elements. By N. R. CAMPBELL, D.Sc. Cambridge University Press, 1920. Pp. vii., 565.

THIS work is a critical study of the methods and theories underlying Physics. By Physics the author means that experimental science which the ordinary text-books profess to expound—the Mechanics, Heat, Sound, Light, Electricity, Magnetism, and the Properties of Matter, familiar to every schoolboy.

[1] From W. E. Hocking.

Some, of philosophical or mathematical leanings, would say that this sort of Physics was a relic of the nineteenth century, and shortly to be entirely superseded; that, although Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Mechanics were all right for use in Secondary Schools, they were beneath the notice of enlightened men. To this we should reply, that Physics is after all not a branch of Mathematics, but an experimental science that depends upon certain things done in the laboratory; physical measurements, in short. These measurements, of sizes and shapes and masses and weights and velocities of bodies, and of electrical potentials and capacities, and a thousand and one other characteristics of the external world, have been gradually accumulated and made more and more precise throughout several centuries, starting with Galileo and his inclined planes, and finishing up as far as we are concerned with such results as are to be found in Kaye and Laby's Tables of Constants. That is Physics. That is the liquor, the rest is only the froth: it is that that drives our trains and lights our houses and navigates our ships and provides our food and clothing and, when necessary, kills our enemies. If any mathematician or other person wishes to criticise the results, he can do so only by showing that there are mistakes in certain of our measurements, or in our deductions from them. To do this he must assume some to be correct. Moreover, we know already that the measurements are only correct within definite limits, not absolutely. If there is anything certain in this uncertain world, it is that no theoretical criticism can seriously disturb these results: it can supply a commentary on the text and explain obscurities and doubtful points and make minor emendations, but that is all. Or, to change the metaphor, the pruning the theorist can do is only to preserve the shape of the tree and increase its yield of fruit. The only thing that could cause a real revolution would be some new and unforeseen experimental facts. Dr. Campbell, therefore, is concerned with the criticism of the methods by which the results are obtained, not of the results themselves.

The practical person, on the other hand, may object, "if the results are so satisfactory to all concerned, why bother? Why shun delights and live laborious days criticising something you know is all right: for if the results are right, the method must be sound?" This is easily answered. In the first place, it is quite possible to obtain right results by wrong means; in fact, it often happens. It is always well to know as much as possible about one's tools, so as to be able to use them to the best advantage, and to know how to avoid mistakes. Finally, we can say, and this is the only defence Dr. Campbell deigns to make, we are inquisitive about these matters.

In discussing what is undoubtedly an important book on an important subject, the critic may be forgiven if he deals chiefly with what he considers are blemishes, for the author shows a curious perversity of doctrine, which naturally provokes attack.

One defect of the book is its immense length, a defect which neutralises to a large extent the merits of a lucid and lively style. Probably it is correct to say of this work, as has been said of others, that long books are written by people who have not time to write short ones.

There is no need to dwell on some of the author's peculiar views, such as his dislike of metaphysicians, or his doctrine of the nature of truth (pp. 256-267), which should bring a blush to the cheek of the most hardened Pragmatist; for they do not seriously affect his argument. But his distrust of Mathematics leads to difficulties that must be considered.

Part I. deals with certain preliminary questions. The chief points are: a not very satisfactory treatment of the subject-matter of science, and the basis of agreement on matters of fact; an interesting treatment of the character and proof of natural laws, including a lively attack on the doctrine of Causation and on Mill's Inductive Canons, and incidentally a confession that there is no such thing as inductive proof, which appears to be forgotten later on; a discussion of the nature of Theories, using the term in a special sense; and an apparently heretical treatment of Chance and Probability (matters that are beyond me). In the final chapters there are some excellent remarks on the use of imagination in scientific discovery, and on the place of science in education (pp. 224-229). The treatment of laws and theories seems to call most for comment.

"Laws," he says (p. 38), "are propositions asserting relations which can be established by experiment or observation. The terms between which the relations are asserted consist largely or entirely of judgments of the material world, immediate or derivative, simple or complex. The relations asserted, if not always the same, have always a common nature which may be described as uniformity of association." Later (p. 45) he says that most of the laws of science, apart from the most primitive and implicit, state relations between "concepts," and that "concept is a word denoting an idea which depends for its meaning or significance on the truth of some law". Most of the technical terms of Physics stand for concepts in this sense. Thus, he takes as examples Hooke's Law, that the extension of a solid body is proportional to the force applied to it, and Ohm's Law, that electric current is proportional to potential. Here "solid body," "force," "current" and "potential" are all concepts. Dr. Campbell's analysis and statement of the case may not be very profound or exact, but it would not be easy to improve upon it. It would be quite acceptable but for the fact that he afterwards introduces a very far-reaching distinction between laws and theories and between concepts and hypothetical ideas. A theory, according to his special use of the term (pp. 122-123), is expressed as a system of propositions falling into two groups. The first group, which he calls the Hypothesis, consists of propositions about certain hypothetical

ideas: these propositions and ideas are sharply distinguished from laws and concepts as not being directly derived from experience. The other group of propositions he calls the Dictionary, and it serves to relate the hypothesis to laws. Apart from the dictionary, the propositions of the hypothesis appear as arbitrary assumptions. It would be absurd to deny that this is an excellent description of a certain type of theory, particularly of theories depending upon an analogy, such as the Kinetic Theory of Gases, used as an illustration by the author. But it seems extremely doubtful whether this rigid distinction between laws and theories is everywhere applicable. In fact, it is Dr. Campbell's strict regard for this distinction that leads him into his greatest difficulties.

When he comes to discuss Fourier's Theory of Heat Conduction as an example, the artificiality of the distinctions is apparent. The hypothesis here is a differential equation relating certain variables and constants. The dictionary consists of a number of propositions stating that these variables and constants "are" the co-ordinates of a point in a body, temperature, time, density, specific heat, and thermal conductivity, all of them measurable quantities. The only reason stated for considering the whole thing a theory and not a numerical law is that differential coefficients are involved, which are not directly measurable, and that though a differential equation and its integrated form may be logically equivalent their meaning is different. It is clear from later discussion that the crux of the matter is the author's view that mathematical propositions as such are all hypothetical, and that the numerical relations which are the immediate result of measurement are somehow not mathematical.

The treatment of measurement occupies Part II. of the book. Numerical measurement, he explains, arises out of the fact that certain properties of processes and things display transitive asymmetrical relations of the kind that generate "order," and that numerals can be assigned to stand for the terms related. In some cases the numerals are not mere arbitrary symbols like the numbers on the doors of houses, but are found to be amenable to arithmetical manipulation, so that the results of certain physical manipulations and of certain arithmetical ones correspond. Thus, if two things weigh a pound each it is found that the whole collection of two things weighs two pounds. At this point Dr. Campbell distinguishes what he calls physical number, with a small 'n,' which is a property of things, and mathematical Number, with a big 'n,' which is something different, to be found only in the pages of *Principia Mathematica* (see p. 304). The authors of that learned work, I am told, consider cardinal numbers to be classes of similar classes, and surely these similar classes are just the things of the physical world, cows and potatoes, and gram weights and bits of wire, and anything else that is numerable? Fifty years ago, if an inquiring stranger had asked a mathematician what numbers were, he might well have been told that this was a great mystery not to be revealed to the

uninitiated. It would have been reasonable for him to believe that what he came across in his humble way and called numbers were not the same as the supernatural entities dealt with by those enlightened ones. But nowadays things are different. When it has been shown by logical deduction that two and two make four, the result can be applied to the constituents of the physical world as soon as we have made one simple observation, namely, that there really are as many two things, and still another set of two things. When, therefore, Dr. Campbell supposes that the numbers we employ when we count things are not the Numbers of the mathematician some astonishment is pardonable. When we find him spending laborious chapters proving, by logic apparently, that physical numbers can be added and multiplied and otherwise manipulated, it becomes more astonishing still. The trouble all comes, it would seem, from his having read *Principia Mathematica*, and not believed it. He should have taken it on trust, unread, like the rest of us.

Consider the process of direct measurement. Two observations are necessary. First, we make a comparison between two sets of perceived things or processes, whereby they are judged to be equal in some respect. One of the sets is taken as a standard. The second operation is a process of counting, which is not strictly a measurement, but is prior to all measurement in numerical terms. For instance, we can measure a length with a scale of inches by juxtaposition of the scale divisions included. The standard here is an inch, and the linear scale is a device that repeats inches in the correct manner for our purpose. For convenience the standard is usually put equal to unity, but of course we could call the inch 22·4 (millimetres) or 1/12 (feet), if we liked. The operation can be done in the reverse fashion. If our only standard was a yard, and the length to be measured was a few inches, we should have to find with a pair of dividers how many times it went into the yard. In any case what we are aiming at is to obtain a ratio, which we can do by dividing one number by another, but simplifying the operation by calling one of the numbers, arbitrarily, unity. It is well to notice that the result is a ratio and not a cardinal or ordinal number, and we can as a matter of fact utilise (*mutatis mutandis*) either the numeral or its reciprocal in calculation. This fact is not, I think, sufficiently emphasised by Dr. Campbell. He sometimes speaks, in fact, as though counting were itself a kind of measurement, and as if there was always one number which was *the* value of the magnitude measured. Normally there is an indefinitely large collection of numbers which all represent the value sought within any assigned limits. The true or right value is not a number, but a class of numbers. The only cases in which a single number truly represents the value of the measured quantity are where it is assigned by definition, as when we say there are twelve inches in a foot, and certain special cases where we are comparing discontinuous series.

That the limits within which lie the values of a quantity are always a finite distance apart, Dr. Campbell points out clearly. This depends, as he says, upon the fact that every instrument has a "step". We can always conceivably make the step smaller, but it is still always finite, because we can never judge that a thing is equal to q, but only that it is greater than p and less than r. We can for convenience take q, the arithmetic mean of p and r, and say that it equals $q \pm \delta$. This use of the arithmetic mean has certain other justifications, but it is still not *the* value except in so far as it symbolises by convention a class of ratios. Other kinds of average could be used instead.

Dr. Campbell points out (chap. x.) that those properties we can measure directly and in the full sense, such as lengths or weights, are additive, but that there are derived quantities which are not always additive, such as density. His statement here is unfortunate. He says (p. 282), "However we combine two bodies of equal density we always obtain a body of the same density". This is only true of solids and liquids. If we take two equal volumes of a gas of density 1, and pump all the gas from one vessel into the other, we shall have a gas of density 2, and density will be additive. What it means is that density is a specific property of solids and liquids that cannot be varied at will, but only between very narrow limits. Special cases can be found where magnitudes usually additive are specific properties, and so are not additive. Volume is usually additive, but in the case of an emulsion we cannot always combine the spheres of the emulsed liquid to make spheres of larger volume, because above a certain critical volume they will be unstable, and there will be no spheres of any volume.

Density, although it is a specific property and for the most part defies our powers of manipulation, can be measured because it is related by laws to properties that are not specific and can be added. Hardness cannot be measured except in a very limited and unsatisfactory way, by means of an arbitrary scale, because it is specific and not yet related by laws to measurable magnitudes. If we discovered a substance whose hardness could be varied at will, hardness would become measurable and additive.

Dr. Campbell gives an interesting treatment of the measurement of derived magnitudes by means of laws relating them to fundamental magnitudes, and of the theory of dimensions. One point, however, he has hardly proved. He shows (pp. 386-390) that the ordinary text-book statement that volume has the dimensions of length cubed is misleading and needs correction, and that volume can be treated as the ratio of mass and density, but he hardly establishes his case that the alteration is necessary or desirable on grounds of precision or simplicity. Doubtless many logical theories of dimensions are possible according to what kinds of quantity we choose as fundamental; the problem is, which is the best?

The treatment of the Theory of Errors is heterodox like that of Probability. Here again I should not venture to criticise. The

final chapter on the application of mathematics is valuable, if allowance be made for the author's peculiar views on mathematics. In an appendix there is an outline of the proposed continuation of the work.

To return to the question of theories and laws: the author rejects the view that simple numerical laws are theories on two chief grounds (pp. 336-337). They are (1) that they do not explain laws or predict laws as proper theories should; (2) that universal agreement is possible about them, but not about theories. As regards (2), it is true that the confidence that should be placed in generalisations varies, but there seems to be always some element of doubt, as his treatment of Induction shows. Moreover, it does not seem legitimate to distinguish sharply as Dr. Campbell does between experimental concepts, which are supposed to be given unequivocally in experience, and hypothetical ideas, which are not. Any general notion of scientific value is somewhere based on experience, and in some respects goes beyond experience. Dr. Campbell, in order to avoid the suspicion that numerical laws involve mathematical numbers, which are theoretical, explains how a law can be expressed graphically in such a way as to avoid the use of numbers (pp. 350-352). This very process of expressing a law as a graph shows that a numerical law can be legitimately regarded as a theory in his sense. We start with a number of experimentally determined relations, as, for instance, that at one atmosphere pressure a gas occupies 25 c.c. at half the pressure 50 c.c., and so on. These results are plotted as points, and, finally, a curve is drawn through them which represents the law, Boyle's Law in this case. Now the individual experimentally determined points are themselves laws according to any reasonable definition, and they certainly represent relations between concepts in Dr. Campbell's sense. Experiment can only give us a finite collection of points. The curve through them is theory. It has the characteristic properties of explaining the positions of the points and of predicting the positions of new points by interpolation. If it is possible to describe Fourier's Law as a theory according to Dr. Campbell's view of the nature of theories it is equally possible so to describe Boyle's Law.

Any ordinary generalisation that is important enough to have a name can be analysed into more special generalisations in relation to which it has the status of a theory. In order to get to laws that cannot be further analysed, we must burrow much deeper beneath the surface of explicitly recorded generalisations than the author does. Further, progress in generality, if also accompanied by increase in precision and refinement of statement, may involve a diminution in the arbitrary and fictitious element, so that it is not always the simple and primitive generalisation that is the least hypothetical. Several illustrations of this could be found from recent developments in Physics; in particular, one of the benefits conferred by the Principle of Relativity is an increase in generality of statement accompanied by an elimination of hypotheses.

In conclusion, it is to be hoped that Dr. Campbell's work will be read, not only by the philosophers, whom long training has inured to the study of long books, but also by the physicists. It would be a pity if they all put it aside, the experimentalist as mere theory, the mathematician as sheer blasphemy. The book may suffer from both these defects, and yet be a valuable contribution to their science.

A. D. RITCHIE.

Sulle Interpretazioni Immanentistiche della Filosofia di Platone. ADOLFO LEVI. Turin [undated]. Pp. vi, 240.

Il Concetto del Tempo nel suoi Rapporti coi Problemi del Divenire e dell' Essere nella Filosofia di Platone. Saggio sulla Teoria delle Idee. ADOLFO LEVI. Turin [undated]. Pp. 111.

Two generally excellent works on the interpretation of Plato by a thoroughly competent scholar who seems familiar with nearly everything which has been published on the subject for the last hundred years, and is also an acute and eminently sane critic. I would heartily recommend both to the students of Platonism in our own country, who are perhaps too prone to undervalue the work of continental Platonists outside Germany. Of the two works, the longer, which I have named first, is in the main expository and critical of other interpreters (mostly German and English), and serves as prolegomena to the second, in which Mr. Levi develops his own views of the meaning of Plato. As appears from the title-page of the former essay, Mr. Levi is strongly opposed to all interpretations of what he calls the "immanental type," *i.e.*, to all which do not recognise, or try to explain away, the metaphysical or ontological significance of the Platonic "Ideas" and their "separateness" from sensible existents. His thesis is that the Platonic doctrine is from first to last an "ontology," and not a "philosophy of experience". Hence he is led to a careful exposition of a whole series of interpretations which are subjected to careful criticism with a view of showing their incompatibility with the Platonic text, as well as with the statements of Aristotle about the Platonic doctrine, on the supreme value of which the author rightly insists. The interpretations selected for special consideration are—to mention only the chief among them—those of Fouillée, Dr. Jackson, Teichmüller, all grouped together as of the "pantheistic type," the "logico-methodological" interpretation (Lotze, Cohen, Natorp, Hartmann, Marck, Prof. Stewart), and the "mathematical" (which means primarily that of Milhaud. Robin, though constantly cited, receives no full examination).

The exposition of these various interpretations of Plato strikes me as full, fair, and clear, and in respect of most of them, in my own opinion, Mr. Levi's criticism is finally annihilating. I am par-

ticularly glad to see that the importance of the Platonic doctrine of the soul as the "self-moving" is clearly recognised, and that it is shown that this one doctrine excludes all the "pantheistic" readings of Plato which require the identification of God, the soul of the world, and the supreme "Idea" with one another. As Mr. Levi rightly sees, it is precisely because "souls," including God, the ἀρίστη ψυχή, are neither "Ideas" nor αἰσθητά, but stand midway between the two realms that the conception of the soul enables Plato to offer a solution of the problem of the "cause of γένεσις and φθορά".

The long examination of the exegesis of the "Marburg school," and particularly of Natorp, leads up to a triumphant criticism which ought to give the *coup de grâce* to the whole attempt to read Neo-Kantianism into Plato on the strength of wilful mistranslations. (Or can it be, as Mr. Levi seems once at least to hint, that the mistranslations are not wilful, and that the real secret of the "school of Marburg" is simply ignorance of the Greek language?).

I am not sure that the case against Natorp and his followers might not be put even more forcibly than Mr. Levi himself has put it. He says quite truly that the Plato of Natorp is a Plato who has been taught Kantianism at Marburg. He might also have said that Natorp's Plato has unlearned at Marburg the most important doctrine in which the Plato of the Academy was at one with the Kant of Königsberg, the doctrine of the radical disparateness of sense and thought. It is just *because* sense and thought are disparate (or at least so both Plato and Kant thought), that in "ontology" we have to recognise a real difference between the "Forms" and the sensibles which "partake" of them. The figure which Cohen and Natorp have labelled "Plato" is not even a Plato converted to Kantianism.

The "mathematical" interpretation of Plato comes off better at Mr. Levi's hands, though he regards it as only doing justice to one side of Plato's thought, and classes it along with the "pantheistic" and "logico-methodological" interpretations as "immanental," *i.e.* as denying the Platonic χωρισμός of Form from sensible.

I do not feel sure that this estimate is wholly correct. I admit that in one or two of his comments on Milhaud Mr. Levi makes a real point, and I am not quite sure that I myself should now like to express myself wholly as I did years ago in a paragraph which is quoted on p. 238 as an illustration of the "mathematical" type of Plato-exegesis. But I do not see that this exegesis involves denying any kind of χωρισμός which can really be ascribed to Plato. To give an illustration. The number 2, we know, is a Platonic εἶδος. Now the number 2 is the number of all "pairs," and a "pair" is a class with individuals which are not classes as its members. My right hand and my left hand are the members of a certain pair, and this pair itself is a class which is a member of the "class of all classes which are pairs". The number 2 *is* this "class of classes which are pairs". My hands are the members of a class,

not the class itself, and that class again is an entity of a different order from the "class of all pairs". Thus there is a real χωρισμός between the number 2 and any pair, and between the pair which is the class of which my hands are members and my hands themselves. Is not this enough to explain why on Aristotle's showing the Platonic εἶδος is "separate" from the "mathematicals," and both from sensibles?

Mr. Levi's own exposition of Plato, in the second of his essays, has throughout the merit of being a careful attempt to explain Plato in a genuinely historical way, but I think he is still haunted by certain prejudices which are really due to the bad nineteenth-century habit of forgetting that the meaning of a great philosophy cannot be properly understood if it is studied out of relation to the actual scientific thought of the society in which it arose. In fact, the great merit of a work like that of Milhaud is precisely that it does take the actual scientific problems and methods of the age of Socrates and Plato as the point of departure for inquiry into the meaning of the Academic philosophy.

Milhaud may be open to a good deal of criticism in the details of his exegesis, but he has the imperishable merit of having seen, after a century and more of misconception, where the beginning must be made if Plato's thought is to be grasped. The two chief points which I should be inclined to criticise in Mr. Levi's essay are his assumption that the whole conception of εἴδη was a discovery of Plato, and his way of using the *Philebus*, the *Timaeus* and the testimony of Aristotle. As to the first point. It is, at any rate, a great gain in historic insight that Mr. Levi properly insists that the Platonic εἶδος is not an "hypostatised general notion". He accepts, however, from Zeller the view that Socrates was busied solely with the "general notion," and thus correctly infers from *these* premisses that the origin of the theory of Forms is not to be found in the teaching of Socrates. Plato must have reached his belief in the εἶδος by the route of "aesthetic intuition" *before* he came under the influence of Socrates at all. The original Platonic εἶδος and the "aesthetic intuition" by which it is apprehended are set before us in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, which are thus treated as much earlier works than, *e.g.*, the *Phaedo*, in which we have further developments due to the influence of Socrates and his quest of the "universal". Now I grant that this is, at any rate, a more rational theory than that of the development of the εἶδος out of an "hypostatised concept" (which latter is, in fact, nonsense), and I congratulate Mr. Levi on the courage with which he has drawn the inference necessitated by his theory about the dates of the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*. If they expound Platonism as yet un-Socraticised, they must be the youthful compositions that he holds them to be. But I should have said that it ought to be as clear that, on stylistic and other grounds, the *Phaedrus* cannot be an early dialogue, as it is that the *Theaetetus* cannot be, in spite of the assertions of the "Marburg school," an earlier work than the *Phaedo*. Any man who main-

tains either paradox seriously has really put himself out of court as a Greek scholar.

Now when we turn to the *Symposium* we are at once struck by the fact that Plato quite definitely connects the "aesthetic intuition," on which Mr. Levi properly lays stress, with certain critical incidents in the career of Socrates. According to his account a personal "vision" had a great deal to do, not indeed with the first formation of the theory of μέθεξις, of which a very different history is given in the *Phaedo*, but with the doctrine of the ascent to the Form of Beauty. But this vision came not to Plato himself, but to Socrates, and it came before Plato's birth. It has been common in the nineteenth century to treat this representation of the matter as a mystification, but no one has ever given any tangible reasons for such a view, and it was evidently not the Academic tradition. It is quite clear that Aristotle, for example, only knew of one "Platonic theory," that which he has described in Bk. *A* of the *Metaphysics*, and that his statements about the thought of Socrates are mainly based on the *Phaedo*, which he, therefore, rightly or not, regarded as historical. In fact, I believe it would be safe to say that though Aristotle repeatedly alludes to the *Phaedo*, and in one famous passage directly describes its most important thesis as "what Socrates says in the *Phaedo*"; (*De Generatione*, 335 *b* 10), he never expressly speaks of any statement drawn from the dialogue as a tenet of Plato. Mr. Levi reminds us that in *Metaphysics M.* the theory of the "ideal numbers" is distinguished from that of those who "first had said that the Forms are". He interprets this phrase as a reference to the *Phaedo*, and it is possible that he may be right. But he should have observed that this passage does not attribute the doctrine of the *Phaedo*, if that is what is meant, to Plato at all. On the face of it, the writer of *M.* is *distinguishing* what Aristotle knew as "the doctrine of Plato" from something earlier and cruder. It is, therefore, at least well worth our while to try the hypothesis that Plato's accounts of the theories and the "rapts" of Socrates are the truthful narratives they purport to be. On that view we could do full justice to all Mr. Levi urges about the experiences in which the mystical strain of the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* has its origin without having to make the strange assumptions that these experiences are those of Plato in the days before he—the nephew of Charmides, remember! —had come under the influence of Socrates, and that the connexion of them with, *e.g.*, Socrates' service at Potidaea is a simple fiction. (I think Mr. Levi would perhaps have been more willing to try this hypothesis had he known, as he clearly does not, that Proclus, who had the library of the Academy at his disposal, definitely identifies the "friends of Forms" mentioned in the *Sophistes* with Italian Pythagoreans, and repeatedly insists on the point that the representation of Socrates in the *Parmenides* and *Phaedo*, as holding the μέθεξις theory from his early youth, is historically accurate. It is safe to say that this was the view taken in the continuous Academic tradition, as it appears to have been the view of Aristotle.)

As to the use of the *Timaeus* and *Philebus*, Mr. Levi follows the common practice in assuming that these dialogues represent Plato's own most intimate thought at the time when they were written. I am afraid I cannot believe this, and I think it idle to try to discover in them either the "ideal numbers," or, as Mr. Levi even seems to suggest, still later developments of Platonic thought. We must remember that both dialogues are in form imaginary conversations, dated in the fifth century, and that, as it is quite easy to prove, the discourse of Timæus in particular is imagined to be delivered not many years after Plato's own birth. (This would follow from the way in which the famous Hermocrates is described as a young man whose friends are confident that he will yet do great things, and there are many other indications to the same effect.) We should naturally expect that this dramatic dating would set limits to the extent to which Socrates and Timaeus can be used to express Platonic ideas. The existence of such limits is manifest in both dialogues. It is certain that Plato must have held the theory of the "ideal numbers" and their formation from the "one" and the "great-and-small" at least as early as 367 (since Aristotle simply identifies this theory with "the doctrine of Plato"), and equally certain that the *Philebus* must have been written long after that date. Yet in the *Philebus* Plato makes Socrates work not with the "one" and the "great-and-small," but with the antithesis of ἄπειρον and πέρας, which Aristotle expressly says was Pythagorean and not Platonic. So with the *Timaeus*. I am prepared to urge —though I naturally cannot give the proof here—that one of the most famous features of the dialogue, its astronomical theory, is not the theory which Plato himself held when he wrote the dialogue, and I believe it can be proved that Aristotle was well aware of this fact. I regard it then as a mistake to look in either of these dialogues for any closer approximation to Plato's own views than could be plausibly ascribed to fifth-century precursors. In particular, I am sure that neither dialogue contains a single word about the "ideal numbers". We must remember that Plato did not depend on his writings as a means of teaching his ideas to his pupils in the Academy, and that it was his work in the Academy, not the composition of his dialogues, which must have appeared to him the main business of his life.

There are two other minor historical points on which I could wish that Mr. Levi would reconsider his position. I regret that he should countenance the quaint theories which have made Antisthenes of all men into an epistemologist and represented much of Plato's most important logical work as a refutation of him. So far as I know the only evidence for these speculations is the assumption that the allusion of the *Sophistes* to ὀψιμαθεῖς γέροντες who deny the possibility of contradiction must be meant for Antisthenes. As though there might not well be many persons answering to the description in an age which could produce Euthydemus and his brother! (And is it likely that Antisthenes would be called a

γέρων in 399, the year in which the Eleatic of the *Sophistes* is supposed to be speaking?)[1] I am sorry also that Mr. Levi should countenance the notion that Plato in his "later theory" replaced μέθεξις by μίμησις as the relation between Form and Sensible. It is plain from Aristotle, who expressly says that μέθεξις was the Platonic, μίμησις the Pythagorean, word that Plato to the last talked of μέθεξις and, in fact, it and its equivalents, μετοχή, μετουσία, remain the recognised terms of the whole Platonist succession down to the very last of the Neo-Platonists. The reason why the words μετέχειν, μέθεξις are avoided in the *Timaeus* is childishly simple. The chief speaker is a Pythagorean astronomer, and μίμησις, as Aristotle says, was the Pythagorean formula. Also, as Aristotle sensibly adds, the difference is merely verbal. In fact, so far as statements about the nature of the εἴδη are concerned, there is no difference whatever between the *Phaedo* and the *Timaeus*, nor should we expect to find any when we remember that the *Phaedo* professes to describe views held by Socrates in the middle of the fifth century, and the *Timaeus* to report a discourse delivered about twenty-five years later. That Plato's *own* theory had undergone a development which makes it widely different from that of the *Phaedo*, we know, not from the *Timaeus*, but from the testimony of Aristotle and other members of the Academy.

With these reservations I strongly commend Mr. Levi's careful study to all lovers of Plato. In the main it impresses me both by its scholarship and by the soundness of the author's judgment. But I am not quite sure whether the writer has fully grasped the important point that the "ideal numbers" are, as is clear from Aristotle, just the integers, neither more nor less. I am half afraid that Mr. Levi supposes the integers to be what Aristotle calls the μαθηματικά.

The main purpose of the study of Plato's treatment of Time and Becoming is to show that even in the *Timaeus*, taken as representing Plato's maturest thought, there is an unsolved problem. The world of "becoming" is after all not explained in terms of the eternal εἴδη. The two still, after Plato has done his best, stand over against one another, and Plato's doctrine remains a "two-world" philosophy. "The problems stated by Parmenides (*i.e.*, in Plato's dialogue) remain unsolved." In a sense, this is, no doubt, true. Plato has never shown why there *must* be a realm of temporality. He has merely shown us that the eternal and the temporal are compresent and interpenetrant. *Why* this should be so is, I imagine, more than any philosophy can say.

It may be doubted whether Plato's inability to go further justifies treating his doctrine as a "two-world" one. If all the

[1] Also it must not be forgotten that the conversation of the *Sophistes* is feigned to be held only a few weeks before the death of Socrates. Antisthenes was at this time one of the "inner circle" of Socratics, as we see from his presence in the *Phaedo*. This makes it unlikely that the *Sophistes* should contain a contemptuous attack on him.

phrase means is that Plato rightly refuses to identify the eternal with the temporal after the fashion of our "cheap and easy monism," that, no doubt, is true. But if it is meant that, after all, the εἴδη are supposed to be suprasensible "things," that seems to me a mistake. The root of the whole matter is the disparateness of thought and sense from which follows the distinction between the finality of mathematical demonstration and the provisional character of all empirical science. If sense could be sublimated into thought, or if thought really could "posit" its own data, as the Marburgians do vainly talk, temporality could be swallowed up in eternity. Because this cannot be, the sensible world exhibits everywhere the traces of what Timaeus calls ἀνάγκη, base or brute "conjunction" for which we can see no reason. However far back you may push your scientific hypotheses they always include the assertion of "conjunctions" which are not "connexions," as Hume rightly said. Yet the further back you push "explanation," the less prominent does "conjunction" become, and the more prominent "connexion". If we could see with God's eyes, presumably we should see "connexion" everywhere and "conjunction" nowhere. But it is only God Himself who can see with God's eyes, and thus for all our philosophy ὄν and γένεσις must remain distinct. Whether Plato would have put it exactly in this way no one can tell, but this seems to me to be the natural way for us to express what he was concerned to say. If the distinction of "two worlds" is taken to mean more than this, it cannot, I think, be found in Plato, though even to ascribe it to him in its extremest form is less of a misunderstanding than the attempts to make him into a Spinoza, or an amalgam of Spinoza and Berkeley.

Mr. Levi's essays are a valuable proof that in Italy, as elsewhere, Platonic exegesis is beginning to shake off its "dogmatic slumbers". It might move a little faster, but *eppur si muove*, and that is the main thing.

A. E. Taylor.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1919-1920. New Series, vol. xx. London: Williams & Norgate, 1920.

This volume of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* presents an attractive table of contents, most of the papers dealing with topics of present-day interest and controversy. Prof. Ward's Presidential Address has for its subject the method of philosophy. The question of method, he thinks, is one which urgently demands discussion at the present time, because while it remains unsettled it bars the way to further progress. And no doubt a real difference as to method must have this effect, since it will prevent the exponents of the divergent methods from reaching any common ground. Whether the difference between Prof. Ward and the thinkers whom he has specially in view in the later part of the

address—Bradley and Bosanquet—depends essentially or predominantly on a difference of philosophic method is not perhaps so clear. But at all events Prof. Ward thinks so, and the question is one which it would certainly be well to have cleared up. Prof. Ward begins by pointing out that, in accordance with the Aristotelian distinction between *notiora nobis* and *notiora natura*, the problem of attaining philosophical first principles is an inverse one. He reminds us of the way in which philosophers were long misled by the ease with which an abstract science like mathematics was able to attain indubitable first principles and a demonstrative method; and, further, of the way in which Kant brought out the difference in this respect between the method of mathematics and that of philosophy. Yet, in spite of Kant, his idealistic successors seemed to take once more as their ideal of philosophical knowledge the development of the whole structure of reality out of a supreme principle, the Absolute. And in the philosophy too of our leading English "Neo-Hegelians" (if we are to call them by that name) it is the Absolute that figures as the standard or ideal by which all finite experiences are tested. How, then, do we arrive at this conception of the Absolute? Along one line of reflexion it seems to be equivalent simply to the universe or all-inclusive whole, along another to the ideal of a perfect being or God. In the philosophy of the Absolute these views seem to be fused: from the elementary logical demand for self-consistency in the real there somehow emerges the conception of an absolute "Experience, individual and perfect". "These seem giant strides to accomplish by a principle 'so absurdly simple,' to quote Mr. Bradley, 'as the law of contradiction'." Prof. Ward then comments more particularly upon the procedure by which finite things, as being only parts of a larger whole, are found to be involved in contradiction and seem to lose their reality even as parts, becoming only adjectives of the one reality, the Absolute. And he shows how this process of dissolution reaches its climax when the finite centres themselves in which the datum experiences of our whole philosophising take place yield in their turn to the same inevitable fate. "If only," says Prof. Ward later, "the so-called 'divisions' of Reality into finite centres of experience were recognised as themselves real—real in a sense quite different from appearance, in short, as real in the sense in which the Absolute itself is real; if, in other words, they were regarded as creatures who have their part in carrying on the work of creation, being endowed with the 'main miracle' of will . . . in that case, certainly, we should have less ground to dissent from their doctrine." I was rather struck by this sentence, because it suggests that the difference between Prof. Ward and the "Neo-Hegelians" is not so extreme as might at first sight appear. The appearance of extreme opposition is due in part certainly to the fact that the opponents on each side use expressions—the self an 'appearance,' 'real in the sense in which the Absolute itself is real'—which have an air of paradox or absurdity to those on the

other. Yet Dr. Bosanquet, for instance, speaks of self-consciousness as "the clue to the typical structure of reality," and Prof. Ward would surely admit that there is a sense in which the finite centre, simply because it is finite, is less real than the Absolute. Probably a still more serious cause of misunderstanding is that phrases like "an Absolute Experience" tend to suggest, and are no doubt taken by critics to mean, something far more positive and rigid than those who use the phrases really intend, or, at any rate, have any logical right to intend. In view of the ordinary usage and associations of a term like "experience," such phrases, it seems to me, simply invite misunderstanding.

There are no fewer than three 'Symposia' in the volume, the Oxford Congress of Philosophy accounting for two. A comparison of the three inclines one to think—if an outsider may venture the suggestion—that the Society might profitably devote some consideration to the best method of conducting a 'symposium'. The usual practice of the Society seems to be this: A writes the first paper, B with A's paper before him writes the second, C with A's and B's papers before him writes the third, and so on. This method has its drawbacks, as will presently appear. One of the Oxford Symposia, to which six writers, French and English, contribute—on the 'Problem of Nationality'—follows a different method: the contributors (apart from a single reference) appear to have written quite independently, with the advantageous result that each addresses himself directly to the subject and gives his own view of it. The contributions of MM. Halévy and Mauss, and Sir Frederick Pollock are specially pointed and useful inasmuch as they seek to limit and define the place of nationality as a political principle. M. Halévy argues that the principle if made simple or absolute becomes really a principle of revolution rather than of settled peace, and that to meet the real complexity of the facts we must also take account of the principles of natural frontier and balance of power. Sir F. Pollock, who is in general sympathy with this attitude, argues that there is no one simple way of determining nationality, and that the most important factor after all is that of common tradition and institutions, that is to say, the political factor broadly understood. M. Mauss prefers to consider the problem in a more concrete form—the place of nations in political development. Using the term nation in a somewhat restricted sense, he holds that the full development of national life, in existing nations as well as in peoples that are not yet nations, is still in large measure a task to be achieved. Recognising this, he looks beyond the nation, not to an empty cosmopolitanism which is only the counterpart of individualism, but to the development of a true internationalism which will establish right relations between the nations: in his view the beginnings of this development are already plainly visible. The remaining three contributors treat nationality rather as a single force, M. Ruyssen and Prof. Gilbert Murray speculating on the possibilities of keeping it within due

limits, while M. Johannet takes a rather gloomy view of its significance: "Pratiquement la vogue de l'idée nationalitaire en 1920 est le signe d'une recrudescence de rivalités impérialistes".

The other Oxford Symposium has for its subject: 'Is the Existence of the Platonic ΕΙΔΟΣ presupposed in the Analysis of Reality?' Mr. Joad leads off with the affirmative answer, which Miss Stebbing also maintains in a more qualified way, while Mr. Lindsay and Prof. Hoernlé act the part of critics. When we are told that Mr. Lindsay finds himself in "fundamental disagreement with almost everything in Mr. Joad's paper" we are prepared for criticism of a polemical kind. Mr. Lindsay's main criticism (in which Prof. Hoernlé concurs) appears to be that Mr. Joad ignores the fact that general notions are used in judgment, and thereby becomes unable to distinguish those which have no objective counterpart (*e.g.*, phlogiston) from those which have such a counterpart. But is error in judgment, we may ask, so much easier to explain than error in conception? Prof. Hoernlé's criticism does more, I think, to further the ends of discussion. He points out that there is no real dispute about the propositions on which the 'realists' lay so much stress, *viz.* that "the possibility of my being able to know a thing depends upon there being a thing for me to know, which is something other than my knowing it" or that "no conclusion as to the status of an entity follows from the fact that the given entity is the object of a mental act"; and he tries to clear up the confusions which make the assertion of these propositions seem important.

The remaining Symposium proposes the question: "Is the 'Concrete Universal' the true Type of Universality?" The natural text for the discussion would have been, as Prof. Dawes Hicks points out, the chapter in Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures, but Prof. J. W. Scott puts a meaning of his own on the question, and practically identifies it with the question of the objectivity of knowledge. His general line of argument is that knowledge is objective only if the known object is the same for different minds, and this identity of the object throughout its several appearances is what he means by concrete universality. Mr. G. E. Moore tells us that this argument seems to him "to have hardly anything to do with the question," but, instead of dealing with it briefly and proceeding to discuss the question properly at issue, he devotes his own paper wholly to a detailed (and unsympathetic) criticism of Mr. Scott's. Prof. Wildon Carr, following this unfortunate example, finds Mr. Scott's thesis "of great interest" and proposes likewise to take his "lead entirely from it". Thus it is only in the final paper that we come to the question proper, as most students of philosophy would understand it, and even then Prof. Dawes Hicks is naturally hampered by the fact that his colleagues have been discussing something else. Comment upon this method of conducting a 'symposium' is needless. The perversity of it is the more to be regretted because the argument of the final paper shows very

plainly that a careful discussion of the subject proper is eminently desirable. After quoting from Hegel the following passage: "Caius, Titus, Sempronius . . . are all men. That they are so is not merely something which they have in common, but something without which these individuals would not be at all," Prof. Dawes Hicks comments as follows: "The passage illustrates with sufficient clearness the confusion which Hobhouse [has recently sought] to exhibit [between a universal and the concept of it]". Hegel himself explains his meaning by adding that "it would be nonsense to suppose that Caius, without being a man, would still be brave, learned, etc."—a statement which seems too obvious to be guilty of subtle confusions.

I will now remark briefly on some of the ordinary papers. Mr. Cator's paper on 'The Nature of Inference' is interesting because it shows a former disciple of Bosanquet in sharp revolt against his master's logical and metaphysical theory. Some of the theses which he would now maintain are as follows: "That there are for thought, no things which being given something else different from them necessarily follows. . . . That no logical connexion can be at once pure and synthetic. . . . That the Absolute taken as meaning the all-inclusive reality has no character." For logical necessity of connexion Mr. Cator would now substitute a psychological tendency to fuse together things which can barely be distinguished. "Thought's working principle is that a thing is what it is only just not." Thought is "an activity of which the characteristic nisus is to mediate between differents by the interposition of just-nots, separately imperceptible, cumulatively perceptible". The theoretical difficulty which he now finds in the ideal of logical system is well brought out in the following passage: "Given a jigsaw puzzle complete but for one piece, or an animal complete but for one bone, or a universe with but one gap in its completeness, could we say with certainty what the missing element must be? No; because the absence of the piece makes the ground of determination itself indeterminate precisely in the direction in which it is required to be determinate."

Mr. G. E. Moore's paper on "External and Internal Relations" is argued with his usual acuteness, and states very carefully what he takes to be the real issue and what his own view is. Unfortunately he seems to attribute to those who hold the doctrine that relations are 'internal' a view which one cannot believe that they do actually hold. According to Mr. Moore the doctrine implies "that any term which does in fact have a particular relational property, could not have existed without having that property," *e.g.*, if Edward was in fact the father of George he could not have existed without being the father of George. Why the doctrine that relations are 'internal' should commit us to a fatalism of this sort it is hard to see. At the end of his paper, in speaking about the formula that a relation is grounded in the natures of the related terms, Mr. Moore gives as one of its possible meanings this, that,

in the case of every relational property, "the term [which possesses it] has some quality without which it could not have had the property"; and he goes so far as to say that the formula taken in this sense "may quite well be true". One can only regret that he did not make this formula so interpreted the starting point of his discussion.

Prof. J. A. Smith's paper on "Giovanni Gentile" seeks by a sympathetic account of the main tendency of that philosopher's thinking to enlist our interest in him and in the general movement to which he belongs. It seems clear from the account that Gentile makes an advance upon Croce, but it is not so clear that either the one or the other improves upon the Hegelian original. Wh n we read a sentence like the following: "This all-dissolving but also all-creating or re-creating thought is thought *a priori* and absolute, is the act or reality of thought at its highest," we seem to be back at the kind of language which Green felt to be so unconvincing.

In a paper on "Impulse, Emotion, and Instinct" Mr. Shand endeavours to clear up some of the confusions in which these controverted topics of psychology are involved. The primary aim of the paper is to show generally how emotion is distinguished from impulse, and more particularly how the primary emotions are distinguished from the elementary or instinctive impulses. As regards the questions at issue between McDougall and himself—questions as to how much the instincts, defined in view of their actual character and mode of operation, can be used to explain—Mr. Shand seems to me to have the great advantage of being more concerned to express the actual facts than to fit them into a simple theoretical scheme.

Mr. Ginsberg discusses the question "Is there a General Will?" mainly, though not exclusively, with reference to Bosanquet's teaching on the subject. He is evidently anxious to be accurate in statement and objective in criticism, but I am afraid that disciples of Bosanquet will find him wholly unconvincing. He expresses himself, for instance, upon the distinction between the real and the actual will as follows: "I should say that a thing is either real or not real, and that, therefore, the actual will is just as real as the 'real' will, if by the latter we mean the permanent or standing will, though the former is relatively to it transitory. If, on the other hand, as seems to be the case, by the real will is meant a completely rational will with a definitely articulate organic system of purposes, then such a will is not real at all, but ideal". But of course to bring against Bosanquet's doctrine such dilemmas as 'either simply real or simply not real,' 'either simply real or simply ideal' is merely to beg the question, and to beg it not only against the doctrine but against the facts.

Mr. C. C. J. Webb's paper on "Obligation, Autonomy, and the Common Good" deals in an interesting way, though too briefly, with the basis of obligation. Accepting the Kantian doctrine that "the essential feature of our moral consciousness" is "the sense

of obligation," he would base this authoritative character of morality, not upon a mere common good or general will, but rather upon an absolute factor "which may perhaps be best described as the sovereignty of God."

In a paper on "The Problem of Truth and Existence as treated by Anselm" Mr. A. E. Davies contends that Anselm's treatment of the problem has been generally misunderstood, in that his proof of the existence of God has been represented as purely *a priori*. The aim of the whole argument, it is here maintained, is to verify that experience of faith in which God is actually apprehended, and this is done by showing (1) that consistent thought about existence involves the thought of a Being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist—an argument in which, instead of trying to pass from thought to existence, Anselm throughout presupposes the distinction between them as ultimate—(2) that this Being is identical with the God in whom faith believes, since anything less would not be God.

Miss Beatrice Edgell's paper on "Memory and Conation" compares the views of Ward, Semon, and Freud, in regard to memory.

Mr. Geikie-Cobb's paper on mysticism seeks to distinguish between a false or inferior form of mysticism which finds a basis in unconscious vital and mental forces and the true mysticism which draws inspiration from a higher source. "The function of philosophy," he thinks, "when mysticism comes before it, is to accept the *data* of the latter as it does the *data* of the sensuous order, and then to find a place for them in its system of thought." In view of the incommunicable character of the mystical experience it would seem that the philosopher who is to undertake this task must himself be a mystic, but this is not expressly said.

Of the merits of a paper on "Buddhist Metaphysics in China and Japan" I am unable to judge.

H. BARKER.

VI.—NEW BOOKS.

Lectures on Modern Idealism. By Josiah Royce. Yale University Press.

It was a curious consequence of the preoccupation of the British Press with the War that the death of Royce was almost unnoticed in this country at the time when it occurred. Yet his was a name which might, one would have thought, have attracted the notice of journalists even then, in consequence of the very decided position taken up on the side of the Allies by the man who, since the death of William James, had been undoubtedly the foremost figure in the ranks of American philosophers. Indeed, as the editor of the volume before us tells us, Royce "was destined to articulate the American conscience at a time of moral perplexity". These posthumously published lectures, in which he gave, to quote his editor again, "an unbiassed and trustworthy study of German idealism" is "all the more notable" as coming from one who "showed no hesitancy in characterising Germany as 'the wilful and deliberate enemy of the human race' when she, in his opinion, assumed that rôle". "Germany was thus judged, not by one who disparaged and belittled, but by one who knew and cherished the ideals of her past." For Royce was in a very real sense a follower, though an independent follower, of the German idealism discussed in these pages.

It is indeed no very "modern Idealism" with which they deal: only that of the immediate successors of Kant, with Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Of this they give an admirably clear and suggestive account.

The first and second lectures deal with the Kantian conception of knowledge and of the self, which lay behind this whole movement of thought. It is rightly emphasised here that while the self "to whose categories," according to Kant, "all natural facts conform" "one inevitably conceives as common to all those men whose intelligence we accept as essentially a guide to our own" (p. 23), yet it is never by Kant himself "viewed as any absolute or as any superhuman mind that views all the facts of nature at once". The difficulty of the whole Kantian position is well put on page 61 in the remark that "in order to reach his epistemology, as he usually states the latter, one has to accept his ontology, while after one has once accepted the epistemology, anything but a wholly problematic ontology is excluded". Is it, by the way, quite a correct representation of Kant's doctrine of freedom to say that "the practical reason in passing moral judgments, inevitably says 'I am, for I ought to be, the origin, the source of my own deeds'"? Should it not rather be "I am the source of my own deeds, for I ought to act thus and not otherwise"?

The account of Schelling and Hegel should be especially useful in calling attention to the importance assigned by these philosophers to facts which it is sometimes, as it would seem, thought that it has been reserved for others to emphasise; for example, the unconscious element in the self (p. 120) in Schelling, or the plurality of selves (p. 174) in Hegel. Throughout the lectures one meets with sayings which suggest interesting trains

of thought or associate with a striking phrase some important aspect of the philosophy under discussion. Some of these may be quoted. "Future historians will look back upon the history of idealism as being that of the dissolution of the classic Protestantism" (p. 3). "The philosopher is more frank than common sense with his antitheses. He does not invent the paradoxes; he confesses them" (p. 93). "The ideal hero of Hegel's *Phänomenologie*, name him *Weltgeist*, or call him by a more familiar word *Everyman*" (p. 188). "One may charge Hegel rather with having too hastily overlooked the possibility of discovering a deeper reasonableness in many things which now appear to us to be accidental than with having been a merely blind partisan of the reasonableness of whatever happens!" (p. 225). "I am very willing then to hear people condemn the *a priori*; for I notice that they do so on *a priori* grounds" (p. 254). Royce's own attitude in respect of contemporary controversies in philosophy is briefly described on page 258: "Personally I am both a pragmatist and an absolutist . . . I believe each of these doctrines involves the other, and . . . therefore I regard them not only as reconcilable but as in truth reconciled".

There are several misprints. On p. 7, l. 8 from the bottom, it seems that for 'metaphysical' we should read 'physical' and that 'metaphysical' should be inserted in the next line before 'researches'. On p. 63 the date of the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is given as 1871 (for 1781); on p. 172, l. 6 from the bottom, for 'as' read 'is'.

C. C. J. W.

Das Denken und die Phantasie. Psychologische Untersuchungen nebst Exkursen zur Psychopathologie, Aesthetik und Erkenntnistheorie. By R. Müller-Freienfels. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1916. Pp. xii, 341.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading. In the author's opinion the popular meanings of *Denken* and of *Phantasie* give a rough indication of the scope of his work; and that is enough for him. Indeed, he does not try to analyse the contrast between *Denken* and *Phantasie* until he reaches page 253, and even then he seems indifferent to the issue for he is content to leave it after five pages of somewhat perfunctory discussion in which he concludes that the difference between the two consists solely in the *Wirklichkeitswert* of the former. What is more, he is barely consistent in these pages; for he is prepared to call primitive folk-lore imaginative on the ground that it has no *Wirklichkeitswert* for *us*, while he also maintains that children are unimaginative because their so-called imagination proves only that *they* are lacking in the critical faculty which distinguishes reality from illusion.

His intention, in fact, is to show, on strictly psychological grounds, and ostensibly without prejudice to any theories which are but partially psychological, that our thinking processes are not affairs of *Vorstellungen* (in the sense of reproductions), but are phenomena of response, reactive processes with a strong feeling-tone. *Vorstellung*, when it occurs, is relatively unimportant. Thinking itself is *Einstellung*, or *Stellungnahme*.

This line of thought, of course, has many prophets to-day, and our author freely acknowledges his debt to James and Schiller among English-speaking philosophers, to Binet, Ribot, and others in France, and to many psychologists and philosophers in his own country. On the other hand, he claims (most justly, I think) that he has worked the problem out for himself according to a single fundamental principle. The nature of this principle

and of the author's introspective method appears very clearly indeed in his first main chapter (pp. 41-90), and this chapter, in many ways, is the most original, and the best, in the book. Here he undertakes a systematic description of all the primary *Vorstellungen*, beginning with the sense of smell and ending with the sense of sight; he describes his own experience with the most meticulous care, and with very great skill; and he succeeds throughout in seeing himself with his own eyes and without borrowed spectacles. In the result, while he admits that some *Vorstellungen* are reproductions, he denies that many are, and he endeavours to explain away many of the cases in which reproductive *Vorstellungen* are supposed to be obvious matter of fact. He insists, for example, that internal articulations in the way of sound must be sharply separated from auditory images, and he gives some interesting examples to show that many 'auditory images' are really *illusions* in which some sound in the neighbourhood is misinterpreted and taken to be a subjective memory-image. He applies this type of argument to all the senses, and even in the sense of sight he concludes with Ribot that 'les représentations visuelles sont toutes motrices'. In a word, he substitutes affective-motor *Einstellung* for the *Vorstellungen* of classical theory in all the principal varieties of sensory knowledge.

The obvious reply to this analysis is that our author is a 'motile' who has generalised far too rashly and uncritically from his own experience. He lays himself open to this reproach, I think, but I am debarred from criticising him effectively in this regard since I also am a motile in so far as I am anything, and therefore I have to take the reproach on trust. I cannot help thinking, however, that the author makes his case far too easy by arguing, at a pinch, that a *Vorstellung* is not, properly speaking, reproductive unless it is an *exact* reproduction. I wonder what he would make of the case of Lieut. Jones, for example, who tells us, in *The Road to En-dor*, that he was able to visualise an ouija-board upside down (although he had never seen it in this position), and so was able to outwit his friends in the ingenious test they set him. Such visualising is not exact reproduction, but it is certainly not an affective-motor phenomenon.

Our author then proceeds to give us chapters on Analytic Attention, Reification and Typifying in Perception, Judgment and Idea in Perception, and The Abstraction of Ideas. These chapters are always careful and interesting, and he supplements the discussion of one of them in the penultimate chapter of his book by a more elaborate account of the relations between Language and Thought. His principal contentions, however, seem to be reached in his sixth chapter in which he criticises the theory of Associationism, and in the seventh, eighth, and ninth chapters in which he deals with purposive thinking in detail. This latter triad of chapters is perhaps rather discursive and diffuse. At any rate it does not add so much as it claims to the position he has already sketched in outline, but the chapter on Associationism is very closely argued, and very well worth reading. Let me quote some sentences from its conclusion (pp. 241-242).

"We must reject altogether the theory of well-rounded, deposited ideas which range themselves in series like dominoes. The elements of consciousness are phenomena with quite elusive boundaries. They are rather a general tendency and setting towards something-or-other, than anything clearly determined, and it is only occasionally that they assume determinate forms in words or images. . . . The contents of consciousness are waves in a river, and the element which is the bearer of ideas is *feeling* whose tendency towards fuller inclusiveness and whose propensity to spread is a manifest piece of fact. . . . The problem of advance in knowledge is therefore not that of linking together "pictures" already painted, but one of purposive dissociation"

This bald statement, to be sure, may seem very commonplace nowadays.

It should be noted, therefore, that Herr Müller-Freienfels tilts with living philosophers, and disdains a combat with shadows.

The digressions into psycho-pathology, æsthetics, and theory of knowledge which are promised in the sub-title of the book, do not occupy very much space or interfere with the argument. As the author of two works on æsthetics, Herr Müller-Freienfels is naturally at home in that field, and his examples are well chosen. His remarks on psycho-analysis are to be found principally in his eighth chapter, and do not pretend to probe very deep. And he is to be congratulated on the restraint which keeps his argument within the domain of psychology. He has no intention of developing his psychological results into a metaphysical theory, although he is aware, of course, that these results are bound to affect the philosophy of mind. Still, except for his short concluding chapter (modestly printed in small type), and for a rather apologetic section at the close of his fourth chapter, he sticks to his last. And his book is none the worse for that.

JOHN LAIRD.

The Origin of Man and of His Superstitions, By CARVETH READ, M.A. Cambridge University Press. Pp. xii, 350.

THIS very interesting book meets a long-felt want on the part of British psychologists, as well as of British students of folk-psychology in particular. It comprises in part material which now sees the light for the first time, and in part work which the author has already published, mainly in the *British Journal of Psychology*. The latter constitutes by no means the least important part, and most readers will be glad to have the various valuable papers from the *Journal* collected together and presented as parts of the whole to which they belong.

Starting from his hypothesis of the descent of Man from a branch of the larger anthropoids, which took to an animal diet—a 'wolf-ape,' *Lycopithecus*—and in so doing departed from the habits of the anthropoids by becoming dwellers on the ground and hunting in packs, Mr. Carveth Read traces first, in Chapters I. and II., the various physical and mental changes which were involved in this departure, arguing that the new life afforded an opportunity for, and demanded, precisely those modifications of body and of mind which differentiate Man from the other anthropoids. He passes on to a consideration of Belief and Superstition (Chapter III.), Magic (Chapter IV.), Animism (Chapter V.), the relation between Magic and Animism (Chapter VI.), Omens (Chapter VII.), the Mind of the Wizard (Chapter VIII.), Totemism (Chapter IX.), and Magic and Science (Chapter X.). The hypothesis of the 'wolf-ape' and the hunting pack may be regarded as representing a thread on which the various topics are strung, very loosely it must be confessed. The whole makes a very excellent book, not so comprehensive as Wundt's *Elemente der Völkerpsychologie*, but in many respects much more satisfactory.

At several points the discussion is of great interest for general psychology. That being so, it seems almost ungrateful to suggest that in certain instances a fuller treatment than that given would perhaps have been desirable. In Chapter II., for example, we get a discussion of the psychology of the hunting pack. Now, if the hunting pack is to be taken as representing the first human society, its psychology should obviously be of high significance for social psychology in particular, as well as for psychology in general. Unfortunately—at least so it seems to us—the discussion is rather too general to be helpful. Various vexed questions of the instinct level might have been treated in a most illuminating way

from this point of view. That the author is awake to this particular line of argument is indicated by his references in the chapter to both Freud and McDougall. He appears to have missed a golden opportunity. Of course the exigencies of space necessarily imposed limitations, but a detailed consideration of the social nature and tendencies of man as he now is, in relation to the characteristics of the hunting pack, would have been exceedingly valuable. In Chapter III. the treatment of Belief is open to the same kind of criticism. One would have imagined that the psychological foundation of the chapter, and indeed of the whole book in one important aspect, must necessarily be laid in a systematic psychological treatment of Belief itself. Apparently it has not seemed so to the author, and one result is that the reader is to some extent left guessing as to the exact sense in which 'belief' is used, and the precise psychological phenomena covered, right through the chapter. It is true that a definition of 'Belief' is given on page 76, but the definition is obviously not meant to be a rigorous one, nor is the psychological analysis which it prefaces intended to be at all searching. We cannot help thinking that this is a pity. The distinction drawn between 'perception beliefs' and 'imagination beliefs' is an interesting one. Is there also a 'conception belief,' and, if so, how is it related to these? How is 'superstition' related to 'make-believe'? What are the conditions upon which differences in degree of conviction depend? Many such questions remain unanswered.

As we have said, it seems ungrateful to ask for more when we have got so much. The book as a whole is a very valuable contribution to psychology. It gathers together from many sources facts, observations, and theories, bearing upon magic, animism, totemism, and the like, which have not hitherto been easily accessible to the psychologist. It interprets these facts and observations in an illuminating, often in a convincing, way, and always with a fine sanity of judgment. The reader feels throughout that theories are made to wait on facts, not, as in some books that could be mentioned, facts sought and selected in order to support ready-made theories. Several of the chapters are of quite special interest, notably perhaps those on "Magic," and "The Mind of the Wizard," respectively. The last represents a fine piece of psychological analysis, and is in itself sufficient to give high value to the book. The first starts with a distinction between Magic and Animism drawn by Westermarck, and too often forgotten by the psychologist to the great detriment of some parts of his science. This distinction—between the mechanical and the volitional explanation of processes outside the natural or familiar—is accepted by the author. The two types of explanation are also different, he maintains, in their origin. Magic arises as belief in certain mysterious forces from the confusing of coincidence with causation, whereas Animism arises from a confusion between dreams and ordinary experience. The chapter goes on to trace the course of the evolution of Magic, the development of its main types, and its final dissolution. The chapter on Animism is not so striking as either of these chapters, and the same is true with regard to the chapter on Totemism. In both cases this inferiority should be set down to the difficulty, complexity, and obscurity of the subjects, rather than to the fault of the author.

Altogether, as may be gathered from what has been said, Mr. Carveth Read's book is a very welcome addition to the library of the psychologist, filling a place which no English work has hitherto filled, and filling it adequately.

JAMES DREVER.

The General Principle of Relativity in its Philosophical and Historical Aspect. By H. WILDON CARR. London: Macmillan & Co., 1920. Pp. x, 165. 7s. 6d. net.

Zur Einstein'schen Relativitätstheorie: Erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtungen. Von ERNST CASSIRER. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1921. Pp. 134.

Both of these books aim at giving the philosophical background of Einstein's theory, but adopt somewhat different methods of doing so. The greater part of Prof. Carr's work is occupied with a historical account of some of the main speculations that have been put forward with regard to the nature of space, time, and matter. The Zenonian paradoxes, the atomic theory of Democritus, the vortex theory of Descartes, the Newtonian system of absolute space and absolute time, Leibniz's view of space as the order of coexistences,—all of these are briefly and interestingly presented. Students of philosophy will be particularly grateful to Prof. Carr for the account of Descartes' physical theories and of Newton's fundamental views, which are often not included in their knowledge of the history of thought. The anticipations of the theory of relativity in Descartes' conception of motion as purely relative, and in Leibniz's view of space as no objective entity, but a mere order of confused perceptions, are clearly pointed out. Prof. Carr's own leanings are, as is well known, towards a Leibnitian view of reality, but this does not prevent him from giving a sympathetic account of the other great systems of thought which he describes. This whole part of the book forms an interesting and useful introduction to the study of relativity. The section devoted to the theory itself covers ground which has recently become very familiar, and Prof. Carr's presentment of the theory is in some respects less clear than some others which have been published; it may be doubted whether it will remove any of the doubts which many people feel about the intelligibility of the theory. One must, for instance, be well advanced in the relativist frame of mind to be able to understand such a passage as the following. (Prof. Carr has supposed two persons to travel from London to Edinburgh by trains going respectively thirty and sixty miles an hour.) 'Let us go back to the two railway journeys. According to the classical mechanics, one is double the velocity of the other. According to the principle of relativity, the velocity of each is identical because in each train the observer is at rest. The difference is in the space and the time. These are elongated for the traveller in the slow train, shortened for the traveller in the express. To common-sense this appears contradictory, but reflection will show that it is a simple alternative to the common-sense view, and logically an exact equivalent. It is simply equal to saying, what is also fact, that in our two journeys neither I nor you moved at all, but our destination moved to us, and in doing so traversed double the space in double the time in coming to me that it did in coming to you' (p. 122). Or again, it is not obvious why Prof. Carr should say that 'gravitation is a phenomenon which is connected'—'essentially connected' is apparently meant—'with a rotational system' (p. 143).

In the last chapter Prof. Carr expresses his conviction that the relativity-theory finally cuts the knot of the Zenonian paradoxes and the Kantian antinomies by allowing us to think of the world as in reality non-spatial and non-temporal. The world is infinite, but 'infinity is not the affirmation of space, but its disappearance' (p. 152). The world is an infinite number of non-spatial, non-temporal monads. The general contention of the book may perhaps be said to be that the theory of relativity confirms the truth of Leibniz's scheme of the universe; and there can be no doubt that its affinities are with some such scheme.

Cassirer does not follow the historical order, but groups his reflections under such subjects as 'measure-concepts and thing-concepts,' 'the empirical and conceptual foundations of the theory of relativity,' 'the philosophical concept of truth and the relativity-theory,' 'Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry'. His discussion shows, however, as might be expected, a wide knowledge of the history of modern speculation on the subjects which interest both philosophers and men of science. The general point of view is Kantian, and though the machinery creaks occasionally in the process of fitting the new views into the Kantian system, the attempt is on the whole not unsuccessful. The book leaves on the present reviewer, however, rather the impression of a skilful use of the vocabulary of a particular system than of a mind really at close grips with the facts. The crudities of Einstein's philosophy appear on the whole preferable to this rather too smooth exhibition of a method which, one feels, could with equal facility prove anything to be reconcilable with anything else. One of Cassirer's main objects is to show that the theory of relativity in some respects only carries to a further point tendencies which have been at work throughout the history of modern science, *e.g.*, the tendency to be interested in measurements or in laws rather than in 'things' having the objectivity which common sense assigns to bodies; and he is able to show by well-chosen quotations from the works of leading scientists that this is so. But whether there is any sense in talking of measurements which are not the measurements of objective entities, or laws which are not the laws of their behaviour, is a question to which he gives no satisfactory answer. A point which is brought out well and with full and interesting documentation is the mutual influence exercised on one another by epistemological theory and physical theory, and it would be hard to find anywhere so good an account of the way of thinking which leads many physicists to suppose that on philosophical grounds, apart from experimental discovery, position and movement in space must be purely relative.

A conflict may be noted between Prof. Carr and Cassirer about the position of Lorenz's theory as against that of Einstein; the former says (p. 130) that experiments have disproved the truth of Lorenz's view, the latter says p. 36) that an experimental decision between the two views is impossible, and that Einstein's is preferable solely on epistemological grounds, *i.e.*, in virtue of the Leibnitian 'principle of observability.' The latter seems to be the position of most physicists.

One of the points on which Cassirer most strongly insists is that the effect of the relativity-theory is not purely destructive of absolutes; in declaring space, time, and movement to be relative it leaves us something that is absolute—'those relations and those particular size-values which . . . maintain themselves not only for one system, but for all systems' (p. 41), *i.e.*, not only the velocity of light, but the entropy of a body, its electric charge, etc. (p. 34). 'The object is not reached and known by passing from empirical determinations to what is no longer empirical, the absolute and transcendent, but by uniting the totality of the observations and of the measure-determinations given in experience into a closed whole' (p. 41).

Like Prof. Carr, Cassirer emphasises the fact that the relativity-theory is in a sense a return to Descartes's abandonment of the dualism of space and matter (p. 61). An interesting passage is devoted to the difficulties in reconciling the supposed properties of ether (p. 70). One of the most interesting chapters is that on Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry; the author has nothing new to say, but he gives an interesting account of the various phases of thought on the subject. His work concludes with a useful bibliography.

W. D. Ross.

La Filosofia di Giovanni Locke. By ARMANDO CARLINI. Vallecchi, Florence. Vol. I, pp. xciv, 287. Vol. II, pp. 379.

This monograph on our greatest English philosopher by an Italian author is significant of the force and direction of the present philosophical movement in Italy. The book is a critical and historical study of the first importance, original in its standpoint, profound and comprehensive in its treatment. The only work to which it is comparable is Prof. J. Gibson's *Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations* (1917). Prof. Gibson's book is not included in the Bibliography which Signor Carlini has compiled in his Introduction although the omission of it is noticed as an Erratum at the end of the second volume. The reason no doubt is that Carlini had completed his study so far as its general design is concerned before he knew of it. The bibliography ends with the date 1912. It is proof, however, of the wideness of the author's reading that he refers to and quotes from an article by Prof. Gibson on Locke in this journal in 1896.

To present Locke's philosophy to Italian readers can be no easy task. Locke's terminology offers no difficulty to us for the simple reason that he has imposed it on our language to such an extent that we are inclined to regard his meanings as standardising our terms. In philosophy, in fact, we feel called on to explain whenever we use one of Locke's terms in any other sense than that which he gave to it. But when Locke is translated into a foreign language there is a peculiar difficulty, one which cannot be removed by a glossary, for it is continuous. We cannot but sympathise with our author therefore when he says: "*Mind* (il soggetto auto-cosciente) non corrisponde esattamente nè a *spirito* (come opposto a 'materia'), nè a *mente* (perchè *mind* è anche *volere*); *understanding* è piuttosto *intelligenza* che *intelletto; consciousness* (consapevolezza di sè, riflessione interna), in inglese, è diversa da *conscience* (che ha un significato piuttosto morale)," etc. These are difficulties, however, which, to some extent, apply to all authors in every age. The real difficulty in interpreting as distinct from translating Locke is of a different nature. A first and indispensable condition for a true valuation of Locke's philosophy is the historical reconstruction of his thought. It is to this task the author has primarily devoted himself and we can congratulate him on having achieved a notable success.

The most remarkable thing about Locke is his philosophical detachment. His method is original. He shows an almost complete lack of interest in the systems of philosophy and in the philosophical theories around which the main controversies of his age were raging. He is possessed with the feeling that the philosophical problem is not abstruse, that it is easy of solution if we only go straightforwardly and directly to the study of our ideas and of our mental processes, without obscuring everything in a smoke-cloud of logical, metaphysical or philological definitions. In fact he devoted himself exclusively to the study of his subject without regard to what others had done or were doing. It has sometimes seemed incredible that he should not have read the works of his great contemporary, Hobbes, whose theory of knowledge had such striking points of resemblance to his own, yet the way in which he refers on occasion to the writings of Hobbes, whom he joins with Spinoza, show not only that he was unsympathetic but that he must have been positively unacquainted with his philosophy. A characteristic story is told of Locke in regard to Newton, the authority for which for the moment escapes my memory. Newton he read and admired warmly but before committing himself to the consideration of the philosophical bearing of his discoveries he asked

a mathematician friend whether he could assure him that it was safe to assume the correctness of Newton's mathematical demonstrations.

Signor Carlini has had to aim, therefore, at revivifying the historical period in which Locke worked. He has striven to place us in, and make us breathe, as it were, the philosophical atmosphere which Locke's predecessors and contemporaries created, rather than to set before us the definite doctrines they held. We are made to feel the life of the world in which Locke's thought found expression.

What is particularly admirable in the general treatment is the way in which the author manages to combine and weave into one fabric an exposition of the doctrines and their historical setting. Thus in his first part, entitled "The Formation of Locke's Philosophy," he begins with an exposition of the treatise on "The Conduct of the Understanding" and follows it immediately with a discussion of Locke's relation to Bacon, to Descartes, and to Hobbes. This leads to an illuminating chapter (one of the best in the book) on the philosophical influences and directions in seventeenth-century England. We are then shown how naturally the problem of the origin of ideas arises.

The second of the four parts into which the book is divided deals with the theory of knowledge. The third part deals with the polemical writings and the minor doctrines. It is in some respects the most important part, and it is certainly the most original and interesting. The famous polemic against innate principles in the first book of the Essay, is not, according to our author, mainly or directly concerned with the definite doctrine of innate ideas as we find it formulated by Descartes and his followers. It comprehends these philosophers no doubt, but if it be read as a simple criticism of anything Descartes, or any particular Cartesian, actually propounded, we must pronounce judgment against Locke for complete misapprehension. On the contrary, Carlini argues, what Locke has in mind is that widely accepted but generally vague and indefinite notion of a kind of light of natural reason, a voice of conscience, implanted in the human mind. It was implicit rather than actually expressed in current theories. It is the basal idea of the natural theology, very generally and uncritically accepted in the seventeenth century, which became definite and pronounced in the Deism of the eighteenth century. It was against this theory that Locke's polemic was directed. The only criticism of a direct nature which he engaged in was against the philosophy of Malebranche and his followers. The Vision in God and the occasional causes were doctrines in every sense repugnant to him.

The fourth part of the book deals with the later development of Locke's doctrine in the theories of Berkeley and Hume and in the philosophy of Condillac. In an appendix the author has compiled a useful descriptive list of the chief works written in direct criticism of Locke from his own time down to times present.

H. Wildon Carr.

The Messsage of Plato. By E. J. Urwick. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1920. Pp. xii, 263.

Prof. Urwick's title-page is not a little misleading. What he is really setting himself to expound is the "message" of the Vedanta, and the great superiority of Vedantism as a "way of life" to Christianity, a religion about which he does not seem to be very well informed. That the "message" of the Vedanta is also the "message" of Plato he asserts very confidently, but it is not hard to convict him of being wrong out of his own mouth. His method of exegesis consists, in fact, of a combination

of the *suppressio veri* with the *suggestio falsi*, both, of course, practised in the absolute good faith which comes from propagandist enthusiasm unchecked by any infusion of historical sense. This may seem a hard verdict, but I will proceed at once to submit evidence in justification

The book, apart from the assault on Christianity in the irrelevant final chapter, purports to be an exposition of the *Republic*. Its main thesis is that the "philosopher" of the *Republic* is a non-social Yogi who has risen above the necessity of practising the civic virtues and is following the "higher path" of aiming at the spiritual suicide of absorption into "Brahm". Of course Prof. Urwick must know that neither in the *Republic* nor anywhere else in Plato is there one word about "absorption" of the philosopher's selfhood in the impersonal. Here, then, is the *suggestio falsi*. Also he must know that on his own showing the *Republic* demands that the philosopher should be trained in the whole of the highest science precisely that he may be fitted for his task of ruling with adequate knowledge and insight. Yet he asks us to believe that the philosophers of the central books of the *Republic* are intended to be self-centred adepts who have left the stage of social duty behind them and are going in for what Schopenhauer calls "will-less contemplation". Here is the *suppressio veri*.

After this it is not surprising to be told that Plato cared nothing for anything which we call science and was not even serious in his show of being concerned with questions of education and government. One naturally asks, why then did Plato make it the business of his life to found the Academy? We happen to be rather fully informed about the kind of science pursued in the Academy. Plato and his personal associates, Eudoxus, Theaetetus, and others whose names are all known, worked at planetary theory, the geometry of irrationals, solid geometry, conic sections, and the foundation of what we now call the Infinitesimal Calculus, as well as at the problem of zoological classification. I submit that this *is* what we call "science," and though Mr. Urwick has a right to his opinion that interest in science prevents mankind from enjoying the vision of God, he has no right to foist the opinion on Plato. Even if Plato's works did not teach expressly that science *reveals* the divine, the absurdity of Mr. Urwick's thesis would be adequately demonstrated by what we know of the actual achievements of the Academy, just as the absurdity of the thesis that Plato was not really interested in 'politics' is sufficiently proved by the arduous and dangerous part he played at Syracuse. If Plato had been the kind of man Mr. Urwick supposes, why did he, at the age of sixty, attempt to direct the political education of Dionysius II? And why was the Academy so active, a few years later, in the "liberation" of Syracuse? Of course I need hardly dwell on the *historical* difficulties of the assertion that there is any connexion between Platonism and what Mr. Urwick calls "the Indian philosophy". (He does not seem, by the way, to know that there is any Indian philosophy other than Vedantism. Has he never heard of the Sankhya?) It is as certain as can be that before Alexander there was no way by which Indian philosophical speculations could have reached the West. The idea is really refuted by asking the simple question in what language we are to imagine the communication as taking place. Nor do the best authorities on Sanskrit literature seem to regard the Vedanta philosophy as having anything like the antiquity Mr Urwick ascribes to it. It was really his duty to make out his case for the existence of the Vedanta in the Vth (or possibly the VIth) century B.C. He is content to dispose of the difficulty in a few lines by asserting in his *Preface* that some Sanskrit literature (he seems to assume without proof that Vedantism may be found in the oldest hymns of the Veda) is six thousand years old!

There is a great deal more that might be said, but I think I have said enough to show that, as an interpretation of the *Republic*, a book which exhibits so complete an ignorance of the historical background of Plato's life and thought and proceeds on such arbitrary exegetical principles is not worth the paper on which it is written. Mr. Urwick speaks very disrespectfully of a whole series of modern students, Grote, Jowett, D. G. Ritchie, Adam, Dr. Bosanquet, Prof. J. A. Stewart. I should not like to adopt all the opinions of any of these distinguished men, but at least they have all been scholars, and one of them, Grote, a scholar of the very highest eminence Mr. Urwick has still to learn what scholarship means, and I will add, what proof of a statement means. You are not in the position to have a right to confident views of your own about Platonic exegesis unless you *begin* with an adequate knowledge of the Greek language and literature (such as would, *e.g.*, prevent the making of the foolish remark that the name P thagoras is Indian and means Pitta [? Pitá] Guru, "Father Guru"), and a sound understanding of the social and intellectual life of the Greek communities in the period 450-350. To dogmatise without this knowledge is at bottom charlatanism. It is because Mr Urwick's book is one long dogmatising without knowledge that I feel bound to put it on record that of all bad books on Plato his is the very worst. It is highly discreditable to the firm which publishes it that they should "push" such wares by the impudent "puff" which appears on the wrapper.

A. E. T.

The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism. By W. B. Pillsbury. Appleton, N.Y. and London, 1919.

Prof. Pillsbury tells us in his preface that this book "was suggested by contact with the American Greeks returned to Greece to fight in tho Balkan War". He points out very clearly that nationality is not a matter of race or of language. "If you are to know," he truly says, "to what national group an individual belongs, the simplest way is to ask him". In what is perhaps his best chapter, that on 'hate as a social force,' Prof. Pillsbury observes that "in the attitude of the native American to the war, one was struck by the vastly greater effect of hate and resentment against the cruelty of the German than of sympathy with the victims," from which he deduces the consequence that "the war as a whole constitutes a definite refutation of the German doctrine of frightfulness". The "influence of a common hate" not only makes for national unity but plays a not unimportant part in the development of the universal system of social levels. It is also seen in the socialistic opposition to war—less as a "source of suffering" than as "an instrument of the capitalistic class devised to keep labour in subjection". When a nation becomes the victim of a war of aggression "hate is still the most important factor in national defence," and "while it is not true that had there been no war or if wars were to cease there would be no nationality, it is certain that coherence is emphasised where there is opposition". While there is much truth in these remarks, it is perhaps worth observing that at the beginning of the late war, hate (even in the very general sense here used) of the Germans was not the prevalent sentiment among Englishmen nor was it among the principal motives which roused the nation to enter into the struggle.

The following chapter on 'Nationality in History' is weak. The history of the middle ages in particular is not well understood and the

influence of the universal claims of the Holy Roman Empire in delaying the accomplishment of national unity in Germany and Italy is not even mentioned.

Chapter v., on nationality in the process of naturalisation, is interesting; an American writer has here special opportunities of observing relevant facts. Prof. Pillsbury laments the prevalence among Americans of an ignorant conceit of superiority which makes them unfair to foreigners, but remarks that by this attitude "the process of naturalisation is hastened". He notes the readiness with which the German immigrant, "usually better trained in languages" than the Englishman, and "keen to acquire a new one," soon "adopts the speech of the new home and gradually loses his own".

A chapter on 'the Nation and the Mob Consciousness' is sensible. The author clearly distinguishes the nation from the mob, and wisely points out that, even as regards the mob, "one is justified in the statement that a man in a crowd is somewhat similar in his acts to the man hypnotised, not that he is hypnotised". We should remember, he adds, that "in one sense all that we do is done through suggestion". But it is very questionable whether suggestion is really "nothing more than habit on the one hand and association of ideas on the other".

In dealing with "the national mind" Prof. Pillsbury does well to remind us that "to explain the consciousness of the social whole in terms of the relation of the individual consciousness to separate elements is to attempt an explanation by means of something that is itself far from fully known". If he does not himself throw much light on the problem of a "national mind" he is careful to avoid the extremes of denying the existence of any such thing on the one hand and making it a mind additional to those of the citizens on the other. His attitude to the project of a League of Nations is marked by a similar sobriety. He is wholeheartedly in favour of the formation of such a society and holds that no reasonable objection to it can be based on the psychology of nationality. But he also thinks that it is not likely that "the sentiment of loyalty to separate nations would ever be greatly reduced" and that, if it happened, the reduction "would be a much to be deplored result".

Prof. Pillsbury's remarks on the emphasis laid on different aspects of freedom in different countries, and especially in this country and in the United States (pp. 42, 229), are worthy of note and throw light on some recent developments of American legislation which are apt to astonish Britons. He has a just comprehension of England's difficulties in respect of the Irish problem, and many of us perhaps will be inclined to agree to his pessimistic conclusion that "no solution proposed holds any great promise of success".

One may doubt whether it is generally true that the Englishman of a quarter of a century ago "gloried in being Teuton"—whatever may have been the case with a certain group of historical scholars; and may wonder whether indeed the Germans were not disastrously misled by mistaking in this instance an academic fashion for a national sentiment.

The absurd use of the phrase 'Platonic love' on page 120 is unworthy of a cultivated writer. I have noticed slips or misprints of 'cleanliness' for 'uncleanliness' (p. 44), 'prosecution' for 'persecution' (p. 75), 'nation' for 'state' (p. 273); and wish that Prof. Pillsbury had enlightened my insular ignorance by explaining his allusion to 'the devotee of Peruna' on page 201.

C. C. J. W.

Knowledge, Life and Reality. By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. Yale University Press, pp. xxiv, 549. 15s. net.

Before the publication of this book Prof. Ladd's philosophical opinions were expressed in a series of monographs dealing with particular questions. The present work represents his attempt to express in "semi-popular" form the philosophical system to which he is led by considering together the conclusions of these inquiries. This system seems to be largely determined by certain presuppositions which he elaborates, the first of which is his view of the nature of the functions of philosophy. These are, Prof. Ladd thinks, to examine the categories of the positive sciences and to synthesise their conclusions; we are told, however, that this synthesis must be of such a nature that it is "in accord with humanity's most important and persistent ideals" (i. 8), that is, man's moral, æsthetic and religious ideals; and later Prof. Ladd asserts that no system which is other than monistic will achieve this, since he thinks that to attempt to explain the world as the product of two independent principles—whether they be matter and mind or good and evil—is to deny the possibility of an explanation. Philosophy must discover "a supreme Reality which may serve to explain and interpret both kinds of existence," (*i.e.*, the existence of matter and mind) "in their reciprocal relations and forms of behaviour" (p. 58).

The second group of presuppositions are those connected with the nature of knowledge. Prof. Ladd thinks that the only knowledge which may be regarded as certain is knowledge of ourselves; and this knowledge reveals the capacity to will as our dominant characteristic, the characteristic indeed which serves as a criterion of whether or not an entity is to be regarded as a self. The volitional aspect of our self enters into the state of knowing; for Prof. Ladd thinks that there is no such mental state as a pure act of cognition: there is always also a volitional element present in addition to feeling. Indeed he believes that "only beings that have wills of their own can know. And the beings which these wilful beings know as other than themselves, are known only as they are recognised in terms of opposing wills" (p. 67). That is to say, they are known only as they are selves And here we come upon a tenet which Prof. Ladd repeatedly enforces as to the nature of our knowledge, which would seem to introduce a scepticism at least as great, if not greater, than that of Kant which he so much deplores. Starting from the premiss that all our knowledge must be human knowledge—a proposition harmless in itself since it is a tautology—he interprets this to mean that the objects of our knowledge in order to be known by us must behave more or less as we know ourselves to behave: that is they must be more or less self-like.

At this point we make the transition from his presuppositions to the results of his system. That objects of all kinds are more or less self-like is being progressively established by science, in as much as the causal laws according to which they behave are becoming more and more definite. Now to be a cause is, according to Prof. Ladd, to will in accordance with an idea; indeed we only come at the conception of cause through the knowledge of this process as it occurs in ourselves. It is easy now for him to pursue his unifying ideal, and the stages by which he proceeds are familiar, for they are more or less common to those philosophies which envisage the universe in terms of ethical Idealism. Scientists, he thinks, have a faith in the unity of the physical universe, in the sense that there is some one Force or Will which will account for all the conclusions reached by the different positive sciences. He believes that this ideal is being gradually approached although its attainment is still very distant.

He believes that there is a Being of the World whose spirit is immanent in the physical universe (it is on this account that physical entities appear self-like) and which is realising a plan therein the nature of which it is for the scientist to discover, that is to say in so far as he is a metaphysical scientist; and all scientists are bound to be more or less so—preferably more than less, thinks Prof. Ladd—if they do anything more than observe phenomena. He then considers the ethical, æsthetic and religious ideals of man. In each case he gives an extremely interesting account of their psychological development, and proceeds to discover what "ground" (to use his own term) they have in reality. These psychological discussions lead him to the conclusions that ethical, æsthetic and religious states of consciousness have always been present in the constitution of the human mind in a less or greater degree of development, and further that their history shows them to be evolving steadily towards certain ideals, which may be characterised. The ethical ideal, he thinks, is that of ideally good people (by which he means those who possess the virtues to the greatest extent compatible with their harmony) living together in a society. The æsthetic ideal is the recognition and appreciation to the greatest extent of the æsthetic qualities (such as sublimity, proportion, grace, prettiness) in the physical universe and in man. The religious ideal is that of monotheism, *i.e.*, the belief in the existence of a personal God, combining within himself the ideals of ethics and æsthetics, and worthy of our worship, whose spirit is immanent in the universe, in the sense that he is progressively realising himself therein. Such are man's ideals, and since they are part of his experience they demand an explanation by philosophy. Is the universe of such a kind that they may be realised; and is there any reason to believe that they are not merely man's ideals, but ideals of the universe apart from man? Yes, thinks Prof. Ladd. The physical universe from which man is evolved must itself possess in some degree those qualities which constitute man a moral being, since it would otherwise have been impossible for it to produce them in man. Also, he thinks there is empirical support for the belief that the physical universe shares man's moral characteristics; for, he argues, biologists speak of the improvement of species as a result of what would *prima facie* appear to be nature's wasteful and painful methods, and sociologists have no doubt that nature favours right conduct. Similarly he thinks we observe more and more the beauty of nature's processes; how what would appear to be ugly is only a necessary condition of something beautiful, and how nature is succeeding in producing in itself more and more those qualities which give rise to æsthetic appreciation. Finally our belief in God is justified because such a Being must exist in order to explain our experience. The universe appears to us as a planful, moral and æsthetic unity of such a kind that it must be the work of a mind which is itself characterised in this way, which is manifesting itself in the universe. God must exist in order to unify our experience.

M. Lebus.

Université de Louvain. Annales de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie. Tome IV. Louvain, 1920. Pp. 623.

The reappearance of this handsome Year-Book is welcome evidence of the courage and vigour with which all classes in Belgium are addressing themselves to the work of relieving the injury done to national life by the infamous German invasion and occupation. To the sentimentalists of Oxford who are so eager to resume public relations with the *Herren*

Professoren who applauded this villainy I recommend the prefatory note in which it is explained that the absence of all contributions to experimental psychology, a leading feature of former Year-Books, is due to the thoroughness with which the invaders destroyed the Louvain laboratory and all its contents.

Space permits of no more than a brief summary of the contents of the volume.

M. Defourny. *Aristote et l'éducation.* [A full account of the educational theories of Aristotle marred by strange historical misconceptions. It is absurd to suppose that aliens at Athens, like Aristotle and his pupils, were interested in propounding a scheme for the reform of Athenian education. The whole course described in the *Politics* is patently meant not for any existing community but for the little aristocracy of Aristotle's dreams in which the "goodness of a man" and the "goodness of a citizen" are the same. Nor was there any such educational "crisis" at Athens in Aristotle's lifetime as the author imagines. It is quite false to say that Athenian education had ever been regulated by the State, and the legend of the demoralisation of society by the "sophists" has long been known for the idle tale it is. M. Defourny actually carries back the supervision of the *ephebi*, as fixed just before Aristotle's death by Lycurgus, to the age of Solon! Aristotle's relation to Plato is also quite misconceived. Plato was *not* an enthusiast for Spartan "education". In the *Republic* itself Sparta is given by name as an instance of a community where things are already going wrong from "neglect of education". In the *Laws* we are told that the Spartan system, though professing to teach "virtue," only teaches one subordinate virtue, and not the whole of that. Again it is ludicrous to accuse Plato of making "conquest" or "military process" the end of the State. It is from the *Laws* that Aristotle has borrowed the saying that it is peace which is the real serious business of life. And it shows either lack of knowledge or want of candour to dwell on the "secondary school" system of Hellenistic times without mentioning that the very idea of the "secondary school" was introduced into Greek thought in the *Laws*.]

G. Colle. *Les quatre premiers livres de le Morale à Nicomaque.* [A poor summary of Ethics I-IV with unfavourable criticisms, mostly due to misunderstanding. The article is not worthy of its author.]

R. Kremer. *Remarques métaphysiques sur la causalité.* [A good explanation of the Thomist doctrine. The author might have pointed out that its sources are Plotinus and Proclus rather than Aristotle.]

E. Janssens. *La morale Kantienne et l'eudémonisme.* [Criticises Kant's hostile attitude to all forms of Eudæmonism. The author rightly says that Kant's account would be very unfair if taken as a description of the doctrine of Aristotle or St. Thomas. He forgets that Kant had probably never studied either of these philosophers and that the "eudaemonism" he attacks is that of the eighteenth-century British "moral sense writers". As against Hutcheson or Hume I think it would be easy to show that Kant's complaints are justified.]

F. De Hovre. *Pestalozzi et Herbart.* [Perhaps the best essay in the volume. A careful study of the educational theories of both thinkers and of the influence of Pestalozzi on Herbart. The writer's conclusion is that neither can be safely neglected by the modern "pedagogue".]

P. Nève. *La philosophie française à la veille de la guerre.* M. D. Wulf. *L'œuvre d'art et la beauté.* [Extract from a forthcoming volume on Æsthetics. A good defence of the objectivity of beauty against Lipps, Vernon Lee, Croce and others. But why is "pragmatism" called an "Anglo-Saxon" way of thinking? It came from America, to be sure, but the United States is not, and probably does not consider itself,

"Anglo-Saxon". And it must be by a slip that Lotze is described as an "Hegelian".]

Yves de la Brière. *Le droit international chrétien.* [That war should be, as far as possible, prevented, or, if that cannot be, limited to cases where one party has a *iusta causa*, by a "League of Nations," is fully in accord with the teaching of Christianity. But, in the writer's opinion, a League of Nations *must* have the Pope as its head. I am afraid the British Empire could show a *iusta causa* for declining to enter the League so constituted.]

E. Duthoit. *Un sociologue catholique: Henri Lorin.* A. D. Sertillanges. *L'idée de création.* [Very brief but admirably lucid.] J. Maritain. *De quelques conditions de la renaissance scolastique.* [The condition chiefly insisted on is that every "philosophical principle" of Thomism, whether primary or subordinate, shall be insisted on. In philosophy, as distinct from science, there must be no concessions to the "moderns". The consequence of this will be that the rigid Thomist will come to understand the "moderns" better than they understand themselves and so to extract truth from their errors. I own I should have been more impressed if the writer had spoken of Descartes with decent courtesy and had abstained from lamenting that the peace of Westphalia secured political rights to French Protestants.]

A. E. T.

An Introduction to Sociology for Social Workers and General Readers. By. J. J. Findlay. Manchester and London, 1920. Pp. viii, 304.

Prof. Findlay has written an excellent introduction to Sociology. It is well balanced, lucidly written and shows throughout a philosophical detachment in face of the many burning questions that are touched upon with fine judgment. The book is especially interesting by reason of the fact that it has been written in the midst of the present great upheavals of social organisations, with all their possiblities of disaster and hopes of progress, and the author has not neglected the opportunities offered by them to the philosophical sociologist. He bases his sociology frankly upon psychology, and is content to pass skilfully over the difficult question of the boundary between these sciences. Perhaps the most severe criticism that could be made is that he has not used his psychological groundwork sufficiently; and this defect is due to his not having attained a sufficiently definite psychological position, and is perhaps attributable to the state of psychology rather than to any deficiency on the part of the author. It is illustrated by his discussion of the gregarious instinct, which leaves the reader uncertain whether he accepts or repudiates it as a constituent of human nature. His polemic against the gregarious instinct seems to have been prompted by Mr. Trotter's riotous application of the conception as the key to all sociological problems, which naturally enough tends to provoke a reaction against all such speculative application of psychological conceptions. The author's general attitude may be described as sanely and optimistically democratic. It is well illustrated by the following passage—"Every day it becomes more clear that one of the chief tasks of statesmanship will hereafter be concerned not so much in governing the people by superior authority as by organising in harmonious schemes the manifold groups devoted to occupation, to locality, to culture; and by using these, in friendly rivalry with each other, for the highest purposes of national and international advancement".

W. McD.

The Psychology of Persuasion. By William Macpherson, M.A London, 1920. Pp. 256.

This is a brightly written popular exposition of the methods and rôle of 'persuasion' as a factor in social life. The word 'persuasion' is used in a wide sense to include all that is more technically called 'suggestion,' as well as appeals to reason and sentiment. The author does not aim at psychological precision or subtlety, but there is little or no serious fault to be found from the psychological standpoint. He has brought together many interesting illustrations of the principles he expounds.

W. McD.

I Primi Scritti di Kant (1746-1760). By Augusto Guzzo. Naples, 1920. Pp. vii, 126.

The author reviews successively the early 'pre-critical' writings of Kant from the essay on the *True Measure of Vis Viva* to the *Reflections on Optimism* called forth by the famous earthquake of Lisbon. There is a conditional promise of a continuation in which Kant's work from 1760 to 1781 will receive similar treatment. The criticisms are made from the general standpoint of a non-theistic spiritualistic pluralism. One may doubt whether the whole point of view is not too far removed from that adopted by Kant at any period of his thought to make such criticism specially valuable. But much of Kant's 'pre-critical' work is excellent reading, and most of it is much less generally known than it deserves to be.

A. E. T.

The Psychology of the Future. By Emile Boirac. Translated and edited with an Introduction by W. de Kerlor. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. N.D. [1918]. Pp. x, 322.

In his *Psychologie Inconnue*, of which a second edition appeared in 1912, and his *Avenir des Sciences Psychiques* (1917), which also Dr. de Kerlor has now translated, M. Boirac showed himself to be one of the most philosophically competent, level-headed, and scientifically-minded of the writers on psychical subjects, and his books richly deserved to be translated. He tends indeed a little too much to classification, and the invention of technical terms, as if he thought that they were very important and really contributed to rendering a subject more scientific, and what is more serious, though he has evidently experimented and claims to have had considerable success, he nowhere gives an account of his experiments full enough to enable his reader really to appraise their value. This would appear to be an error of tactics, for however great the confidence a writer may inspire by his sobriety and candour, the subject is not yet in such a condition that writers on it can rely entirely on the impression of good faith and competence which they may produce. The translator has equipped the book with some illustrations of M. Boirac's methods, though they are not expressly stated to be his; he has also taken some liberties with the text, mostly by way of omission. The translation cannot be pronounced good; errors like *ignorer* 'ignore' (p. 57), *assistants* 'assistants' (pp. 150, 206), *être parti de*, 'to be a partisan of' (p. 94) are inexcusable.

F. C. S. S.

Le Néo-Réalisme Américain. By René Kremer, C.SS.R., Louvain, Institut de Philosophie, 1920. Pp. x, 310.

It was no slight task Father Kremer of Louvain set himself when he undertook to give to the world a complete account of the doctrines, antecedents, and affiliations of American 'Neo-Realism'. For not only is the literature extensive, scattered, controversial and not easily rendered coherent, but, as he himself notices in quoting the complaints of James and Santayana (pp. 21, 106), it is too often couched in a repulsive and illiterate style. Nevertheless he has read, collated and considered everything, and so produced an exhaustive work which will be found a good and trustworthy guide through the labyrinth. The more so that his attitude towards his subject is one of neutral interest; he interprets and combines neither in a hostile nor in an apologetic spirit, and even the conviction he is bound to hold, *viz.*, that all this new realism, in so far as it is true, is only a re-discovery of the old truth delivered to S. Thomas Aquinas, is not obtruded. The book is a credit to the philosophic school of Louvain.

F. C. S. S.

The Field of Philosophy: an Introduction to the Study of Philosophy. By Joseph Alexander Leighton. Second, revised and enlarged, edition. Columbus, O.: R. G. Adams & Co., 1919. Pp. viii, 485.

So long as philosophers attempt to teach philosophy by narrating its history, there will probably be a continuous flow of 'Introductions' to philosophy. For as such histories must be necessarily highly selective, each professor will want to make his own, and they will all grow antiquated, because, when new points arise and new issues become important, the old selections will always be found to have omitted the anticipations of them in the earlier philosophising. The present work, which attempts to include too much, and so is rather too crowded and compressed, follows in the main the path of safety along conventional lines. But it has the merit of being clearly and simply written, from a moderate rationalist standpoint; which, being interpreted, means, without too pedantic a regard for consistency. Prof Leighton is anxious to exhibit the religious 'God' on good terms with the philosophic 'Absolute,' and hedges judiciously on the burning questions, new and old.

F. C. S. S.

An Examination of William James's Philosophy: a Critical Essay for the General Reader. By J. E. Turner. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1919. Pp. vi, 76.

Mr. Turner's attitude towards William James's philosophy is neither very profound nor very consistent. His interest in philosophy has apparently a religious motive, and in the last chapter ("Religion and the Subconscious") he applauds James's fundamental contentions.

'Certainly it is in the sphere of religion, if anywhere, that Pragmatism comes into its own; for here at least we can never exclude for a moment the practical results of our principles; here it is eternally true that 'By their fruits ye shall know them'" (p. 65).

Nevertheless, Mr. Turner is "sincerely of the opinion that James is not 'on the side of the angels'" (Preface, p. vi.). The only ground for this opinion seems to be Mr. Turner's personal affection for the absolutist conception of truth. He makes the curious assertion that the coherence-

theory of truth "is one which James does not appear to have dealt with at all" (p. 26); presumably because James himself prefers to deal with it in the more concrete form of monism. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr. Turner fails to understand the pragmatic alternative to that strangely incoherent theory; and has not realised the sceptical implications of his own assertion that "it is an almost obvious commonplace that no system of pure principles, and no high ideal, will 'work' in our actual world; what 'works' there is never truth, but compromise" (p. 14). In Mr. Turner's view, if theories do not fit facts, so much the worse for the facts—even if they *really are* facts. But surely there is *some* point at which neglect of facts ceases to be an adequate expression of our devotion to the truth?

H. V. Knox.

Space and Time in Contemporary Physics: an Introduction to the Theory of Relativity and Gravitation. By Moritz Schlick. Translated by H. L. Brose. Introduction by F. A. Lindemann. Clarendon Press. Pp. x, 88.

This little book, by the professor of philosophy in the University of Rostock, may be confidently recommended to all those who want an accurate and non-technical account of the concepts of Einstein's theory of relativity, and the reasons that have rendered some such overhauling of traditional physics indispensable. One very great merit of the book is that it really is consistently relativistic from beginning to end. After reading many expositions of the theory one has an uneasy feeling that a view which recommended itself at the outset by its success in laying the ghosts of absolute space, time, and motion, has ended by becoming obsessed with them in its cosmological speculations. This *may* be due simply to verbal carelessness in the writers; but it is liable to produce great bewilderment in the reader. Prof. Schlick does devote a chapter to Einstein's later cosmological theories about the finitude of the world, but he manages to express himself in such a way that they appear to be—as, I believe, they really are—quite compatible with the most complete relativity of space, time, and motion. The book ends with a chapter on the connexion of the new theories with epistemology and the psychology of sense-perception. The author regards the extreme phenomenalism of Mach as possible; but he holds that it is not necessitated by the facts, and that it is unduly restrictive of the possible contents of the physical world.

The translator is to be congratulated on presenting the British public with a valuable introduction to this vitally important subject in an agreeable and accurate form.

C. D. Broad.

Hauptlinien der Entwicklung der Philosophie von Mitte des 19 Jahrh. bis zur Gegenwart. Harald K. Schjelderup. Kristiania: Jacob Dyswad, 1920. Pp. viii, 278.

This work in its original form was awarded the Monrad gold medal by the University of Christiania; the translation into German has been accomplished by the author himself, and it certainly inspires confidence in his ability to interpret the numerous philosophers of that race who are dealt with in his sketch of the modern developments of thought.

He recognises that his task has both an artistic and a scientific side—artistic, because every philosophy is the expression of a distinctive

personality, an individual achievement—and scientific, because the movement from one system to another is co-determined by the general tendencies of the environment, economic, scientific, cultural and religious, as well as by the previous history of philosophy itself. He takes the function of the historian, here as elsewhere, to be that of the observer and reporter —not of the critic or the judge. His treatment is, as far as it can be so, purely objective, although here and there one may get a glimpse of his personal sympathies. There is an over-emphasis, perhaps, of materialism, positivism, pragmatism; English philosophy in general hardly receives sufficient justice; Green, Bradley, Sidgwick, Bosanquet, Bertrand Russell are all out of the picture; in pragmatism, Schiller has the barest mention. On the other hand, the psychological tendencies in modern thought and their influence on both science and philosophy are clearly recognised; admirable outlines are given, for example, of the work of Fechner, Wundt, Guyau, Münsterberg and James. The purely scientific aspects and influences are also skilfully handled;—atomism and energetics, the relativity theory (the earlier "special" relativity of Einstein, not the later "general" relativity), the evolution-theories, vitalism, etc.

The Introduction describes "the collapse of speculative idealism," and the remarkable upward movement in science in the earlier part of the nineteenth century; the main work is divided into four sections of varying length, (1) the development of natural philosophy from Materialism to Energetics; (2) Inductive Idealism; (3) Positivism; (4) Neo-Idealism and Neo-Romanticism. In the second section, the chief figures are Fechner, Lotze, von Hartmann and Wundt; in the third, on positivism, there are various subdivisions,—the foundations of positivism in Comte and Mill; the correlativism of Laas and Schuppe; the biological and pragmatist development in Spencer, Mach, Avenarius, and James; the idealistic trend in Lange and Vaihinger; and finally the "transformation of values" in Nietzsche. The last section refers mainly to Münsterberg's metaphysic of values, to Bergson, and to James' mysticism.

The more recent movements are treated sympathetically, especially the main trend back to a more direct and immediate appreciation of reality, to the "fresh, bright morning-world of our childhood and of the young races"; it is shown in pragmatism, "an uncritical, popular philosophy," yet a movement of great interest to the historian as a "very typical sign of the times"; in the anti-rationalism of Vaihinger's philosophy of the "as if," with its reduction of thought to fiction; in Windelband and Münsterberg's definition of the sphere of philosophy as the world of values, treated "not as facts, but as norms"; and in Bergson's treatment of thought as "an annex of the world of action".

The counter-movements are not given the space or even the mention that they may be thought to deserve; but—with that reservation—the volume should prove a most useful guide through the maze of modern philosophy.

J. L. M.

La Psychologie Française Contemporaine. By Georges Dwelshauvers. Paris: Alcan. Pp. xi, 256.

At the suggestion of the late Th. Ribot the author of this book has striven to do for French psychology what Ribot himself had done for the German and English psychology of the last generation. He has obviously spared no pains to carry out his task and has produced a survey of French psychology well calculated to support the claim, "que le sceptre de la psychologie, réservé à la France depuis le xvie siècle, n'a pu lui être

enlevé et qu'il appartient sans conteste, aujourd'hui comme à l'époque classique, au pays de Montaigne et de Pascal, de Descartes et de Malebranche, de La Rochefoucauld et de Vauvenargues". The survey starts with the work of Maine de Biran and ends with that of Bergson. The several chapters trace the main currents of psychological thought: the inspiration of Maine de Biran, the contributions of Jouffroy and the eclectic school; the opposition thereto expressed in the positivism of Comte, in the sociological psychology of Durkheim, Lévy Bruhl and Le Bon, in the rational psychology of Cournot and Renouvier and in the neo-Aristotelianism of Ravaisson; the development on the one hand of a scientific psychology by Taine, Ribot, Binet, Janet, Paulhan and Tarde, and on the other of a philosophical psychology by such representatives of idealism as Fouillée, Lachelier, Hannequin and Lagneau, and of a psychology of religion by Boutroux. In the final chapter the author gives not only a summary of Bergson's philosophy and psychology but also an interesting criticism of his leading psychological ideas.

The stream of thought is thus shown to have had many and varied currents, but from the survey certain features emerge for the reader as characteristic of contemporary French psychology: (*a*) the influence of vitalism which manifests itself again and again in the dynamic treatment of consciousness, in the repudiation of the attempt to view mental phenomena as elements and compounds, and in the rejection of mechanism; (*b*) the faith in the method of self-observation, whether it be simply as a source of psychological data, as in Maine de Biran, Taine, Binet, or as a source of philosophic truth, reflexion, "the thought of thought," as in Lachelier and Ravaisson; (*c*) the interest in the concrete psychology of human beings as persons, witness the "Essais" of Taine, the character study of Fouillée and Paulhan, the use of pathology and experiment by Ribot, Binet and Janet as methods subserving this interest rather than as methods for studying detached psychological processes; (*d*) the close connexion between psychology and speculative philosophy and religion and again between psychology and art.

M. Dwelshauvers appears to have no knowledge of present day English psychology. It is always alluded to in terms which can only fitly refer to the psychology of James Mill or to that of Spencer. Similarly his references to German psychology are restricted to physiological and experimental work. To expect such knowledge is perhaps to expect too much from one who has made such a detailed study of the writings of his own countrymen, but its absence entails the loss of interesting parallels in the development of psychological thought.

A greater consistency in the practice of inserting dates and lists of principal works would increase the value of the book, which is one to be heartily recommended to all students of contemporary psychology.

BEATRICE EDGELL.

Spiritualism and the New Psychology. An Explanation of Spiritualist Phenomena and Beliefs in Terms of Modern Knowledge. By MILLAIS CULPIN, with an Introduction by Prof. LEONARD HILL. London: Edward Arnold, 1920. Pp. xvi, 159.

Dr. Culpin's book is intended as a counterblast to modern credulity and the willingness to ascribe any puzzling psychical phenomenon to the agency of 'spirits'. It attacks these tendencies by an 'explanation' constructed out of the theory of dissociation and the theory of the 'unconscious' (after the fashion of Freud) and fused together by an ingenious suggestion of his own that the malingerer may grow into an

hysteric by a 'repression' of the knowledge of his own deceit, so that "a man believing firmly in his own honesty may yet practice elaborate trickery and deceit" (p. iii). With this explanation he traverses the whole field of the 'occult,' in a simple and attractive, though rather elementary, style, and finds no difficulty he cannot surmount. It is clear throughout that his practical experience of the subject has been derived from the study of 'shell-shock' cases, while his theoretic convictions are those of a very advanced irrationalism, which comes out well in the conclusion that "the ideal human mind would be perfectly integrated, there would be no logic-tight compartments, all its complexes would be apparent to the consciousness, all memories available when needed, all emotions assigned to their proper cause and all instincts recognised and well directed; and the owner of it would find life in our world intolerable" (p. 157). But if so, what is the use of argument? And if "it is useless to attack rationalisations in an effort to penetrate a logic-tight compartment; as soon as one defence is broken down, another is built up" (p. 131), does it not occur to Dr. Culpin that beliefs which are necessary to the carrying on of life cannot in the long run be declared 'false'? Prof. Hill's Introduction, though it hardly strengthens the argument of the book, provides an excellent and typical specimen of 'medical materialism'.

F. C. S. Schiller.

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F. Sedlák, *Pure Thought and the Riddle of the Universe*, Vol. I., *Creation of Heaven and Earth*, London, G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., pp. xv, 375.

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A. A. Robb, *The Absolute Relations of Time and Space*, Cambridge University Press, 1921, pp. viii, 80.

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Ch. Lalo, *L'Art et la Vie Sociale*, Paris, G. Doin, 1921, pp. 378.

VII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY (the title is shortened as from 1921). xvii. (1920), 16. **H. W. Wright.** 'The Basis of Human Association.' ["Is personal communication carried on through discussion, co-operation and emotional concord."] **L. J. Henderson.** 'The Locus of Teleology in a Mechanistic Universe.' [Reply to Holt in xvii., 14.] **K. S. Miller.** 'The Logical Necessity of a Constant in the Concept of Space.' [Argues against Relativity from the assumption that absolute change is inconceivable.] xvii., 17. **H. T. Costello.** 'Professor Dewey's "Judgments of Practice".' [Distinguishes truth-claim, truth, use and verification, but urges against Dewey considerations he would himself insist on.] **F. C. S. Schiller.** 'The Place of Metaphysics.' [Shows historically that the notion has always been ambiguous, and that three conceptions of the relation of metaphysics to the sciences had been in vogue according as metaphysics had (*a*) claimed to determine the principles of science, (*b*) to be independent of the sciences, or (*c*) to systematise scientific principles. The first alternative having been confuted by the history of the sciences, and the second demanding for metaphysics a distinctive subject-matter and method, which it failed to establish, it is open to the third to raise the question of *value* both about the real and the known, and to introduce an allowance for the *valuer;* with the result that metaphysics actually achieves what it desired, by undoing the abstraction from values and personality which was assumed in the sciences.] **J. E. Turner.** 'The Bases of Croce's Logic; A Criticism.' [Concludes that since "science 'is composed of pseudo-concepts,' it must falsify the pure concept, falsify 'the universal that is truly universal,'" which, nevertheless, it establishes!] xvii., 18. **R. S. Lillie.** 'The Place of Life in Nature.' [A plea for recognising alongside of the mechanical and calculable "in nature an element making for the production of novelty," while admitting that "to call this novelty-producing or creative element in reality 'volitional,' or to ascribe to it consciousness, purpose and ethical intention, is in a sense to anthropomorphise nature".] **L. E. Hicks.** 'Shall we Exclude Elementary Judgments from Logic?' [*Versus* R. C. Lodge.] xvii., 19. **S. P. Lamprecht.** 'Ends and Means in Ethical Theory.' [Admits the great value of pragmatism, but thinks that it "has failed to emphasise the importance of intrinsic goods".] **A. W. Moore.** 'Some Lingering Misconceptions of Instrumentalism.' [In W. Fite and G. P. Adams.] **R. H. Dotterer.** 'The Distribution of the Predicate.' [Defends it against Toohey.] xvii., 20. **E. S. Brightman.** 'Modern Idealism.' [Is hopeful about the outlook for 'personalist' idealism as opposed to 'speculative'.] **T. de Laguna.** 'The Lesser Hippias.' [Defends its authenticity.] xvii., 21. **S. P. Lamprecht.** 'The Need for a Pluralistic Emphasis in Ethics.' [There is "neither one unified *summum bonum* nor one single course of right conduct," because "the goods of life are utterly incommensurable" and "we must recognise an ultimate pluralism of goods which no pious wishes can synthesise into a simple monism" by any formal principle. There

results "a pluralism of obligation or duty, such that it is impossible to maintain that one and only one, among several possible choices, is alone morally right".] **S. Cody.** 'Enlarging the Scope of Mental Measurement.' [Sensible comment, from a practical point of view, showing up the composite character of the 'general intelligence' tests.] **H. W. Carr.** 'Dr. Wildon Carr's Theory of the Relation of Mind and Body.' [Reply to **J. E. Turner** in xvii., 10.] xvii., 22. **A. O. Lovejoy.** 'Pragmatism as Interactionism,' I. [Apropos of *Creative Intelligence:* discovers a 'shift of emphasis' in pragmatism to the efficacy of intelligence which makes mechanistic naturalism its chief enemy. However it also repudiates dualism and denies the existence of any specifically 'psychical' element in experience or behaviour, so that it seems to come out finally as "an anti-mechanistic materialism".] **H. H. Parkhurst.** 'The Obsolescence of Consciousness.' [Man dotes upon consciousness as something "cherished for its own sake" and desires it "in maximum intensity and duration entirely irrespective of any end to be accomplished". Yet it is always slipping from him into the unconscious as habits and traditions grow up. This conduces to efficiency, but is none the less deplorable.] **J. E. Turner.** 'Relativity, Nature and Matter.' [Criticises Eddington's article in MIND, No. 114.] xvii., 23. **H. B. Alexander.** 'Philosophy in Deliquescence.' [A tirade against academic professionalism which has 'abdicated the inheritance of Plato' and shinks from intervention in live issues.] **A. O. Lovejoy.** 'Pragmatism as Interactionism,' II. [Shows that pragmatism cannot dispense with the 'psychical' side in behaviour, because intelligent action, 'practical judgments' and 'plans of action' all imply the presence of the future (and of the past) in thought. Consequently psycho-physical dualism is *not* avoided, and the 'efficacy of intelligence' involves a form of interactionism which should be developed further.] **A. R. Chandler.** 'The Nature of Æsthetic Objectivity.' [It is an aspiration towards which actual æsthetic judgments may converge, and is to be found by looking "forward into the richest and most harmonious forms of possible experience".] xvii., 24. **D. S. Robinson.** 'Reality as a Transient Now.' [Dialectical criticism, objecting that it cuts off the past and the future, makes progress impossible, reduces to solipsism, and concluding that "the attempt to find a standing-place of certainty on the rock of the now in the stream of time is utterly futile".] **A. A. Roback.** 'The Scope and Genesis of Comparative Psychology.' [The term should neither be equated with *animal* psychology nor dropped from the *Psychological Index*, but kept for comprehensive surveys of the psychological field.] **P. H. Weber.** 'Behaviourism and Indirect Responses.' [Contends against J. B. Watson that in his notion of the *substitution* of one reaction for another there still lurks a reference to consciousness, purpose and value.] xvii., 25. **L. Buermeyer.** 'Professor Dewey's Analysis of Thought.' [Criticism of *How We Think* as not being sufficiently detailed in its analysis, though Dewey's view of the nature and function of thought is accepted.] **M. W. Calkins.** 'The Metaphysical Monist as a Sociological Pluralist.' [Contends that these two persons may be one.] **H. Alexander.** *A Lover of the Chair.* [Review of a book by S. B. Gass.] xvii., 26. **E. E. Sabin.** 'Giving up the Ghost.' ['Mind' is a 'ghost,' "like gravity, sickness, or vital principle, simply an abstract name for certain concrete desirable relationships," but now "this most stubborn of ghosts must make room for what is valuable—a description of consciousness as a unique relationship which may maintain on occasion between a living organism and its world".] **L. P. Boggs.** 'A Glimpse into Mysticism and the Faith State.' [Regards as the essence of mysticism a pleasurable emotional state of relaxation in which antagonistic ideas have dropped away.] xviii. (1921), 1. **G. P. Conger.** 'Santayana and

Modern Liberal Protestantism.' [Even this need not swallow Santayana's reduction of religion to 'myth'.] **B. H. Bode.** 'Intelligence and Behaviour.' [Reply to Lovejoy in xvii., 22, 23. Contends that "the road of progress does not lead through the psycho-physical problem at all but around it," and that "unless we abandon the category of interactionism we are back on the level of mechanistic naturalism, from which the position of instrumentalism is intended to provide a means of escape". By taking the 'psychic' as "a distinguishable aspect, but not a separate link, in the chain of causation," the efficacy of intelligence and the denial of interaction can be combined.] xviii., 2. **S. Unna.** 'A Conception of Philosophy.' ["The final test of a philosophy is its power to satisfy an æsthetic demand, a passion for order and harmony and lucidity."] **R. C. Lodge.** 'Modern Logic and the Elementary Judgment.' [Reply to Hicks, xvii., 18.] **E. E. Slosson.** 'Eddington on Einstein.' [Review of *Space, Time and Gravitation.*]

Revue Néo-Scolastique De Philosophie. Louvain. xxiiᵉ Année. No. 88. November, 1920. **M. de Wulf.** *L'Individu et le Groupe dans la Scolastique du xiiiᵉ Siècle.* [Social theory was the last part of philosophy to be developed by the scholastics. Their serious study of it begins with William of Moerbeke's translation of Aristotle's *Politics*, c. A.D., 1250, This is followed by Guibert of Tournai's *Eruditio regum*, the *de regimine principum* of St. Thomas, etc. The fundamental thesis of all scholastic social philosophy is that the state exists for the good of the citizen, not the citizen for the good of the state. The ethical foundation of this theory is the conception of the infinite worth of "personal happiness," a conception naturally enforced by the theological doctrine of the redemption of the soul by Christ. Society is necessary simply because the individual cannot attain the supreme personal felicity of knowledge and love in a solitary state. (This, though the author does not say so, is of course a reversion to the Platonic standpoint; cf. *Republic*, 369 b.) Unlike Aristotle, St. Thomas or Dante does not regard the "city" as the supreme social organism, but rather the *provincia* (St. Thomas) or the *regnum* (Dante). This is, of course, due to the actual political developments of the thirteenth century. Since the "community" exists for the service of the individual, its good = the personal good of each and all of its members. *Non enim cives propter consules nec gens propter regem, sed e converso* (Dante). From this non-Aristotelian individualism follows the belief of the schoolmen in imprescriptible 'natural rights' independent of the 'state'. The sacrosanctity of these rights depends in the end on the metaphysical position that the single person, unlike the collective 'personality' of the state, is a substance. (Possibly M. de Wulf exaggerates a little in what he says about the non-Aristotelian character of these ideas. The emphasis on the claims of the individual is new, but, as M. de Wulf of course knows, it would be easy to cite texts from the *Politics* which contain the germs of the theory of 'natural rights'.) This line of thought is worked out by the jurists and canonists who brought the state or the church under the principles of the Roman law of corporation, since the Roman view of the corporation is that it is neither more nor less than an association of individuals. This refusal to ascribe real personality to a corporation shows the eminent sanity of the political thought of the schoolmen. Metaphysically the unity they ascribe to a social group is simply a *unitas ordinis*, *i.e.*, unity of the members in functioning together for certain specific ends. The view that the middle ages knew nothing of the worth of the 'individual as such' rests on a misunderstanding of the whole doctrine. The comparison of the church or the state with a human body,

common from the time of John of Salisbury onwards, is meant for no more than an analogical illustration, like Tennyson's comparison of the "mob" with a milliped. The metaphysical doctrine of the individual person as a substance is thus the very foundation of the ethics and social theory which protect 'personal' rights against the encroachments of the 'leviathan'.] **E. Gilson.** *Météores Cartésiens et Météores Scolastiques.* [A learned and interesting examination of the degree to which the *Météores* of Descartes is influenced by scholastic Meteorology and the points in which Descartes departs from the tradition. The article, of which the present issue contains only the first part, is too technical for summary here, but should not be overlooked by any student specially interested in Cartesian Natural Science.] **W. Jacobs.** *Quelques Observations sur la Synthèse Asymétrique.* [Deals with the light thrown by recent experiment on the reticular structure of crystals.] Note on the Oxford Philosophical Congress. Obituary of the well-known Austrian philosopher, Otto Willmann (*d.* July, 1920). Reviews (one of *A History of Mediæval Political Theory in the West*, by **R. W.** and **A. J. Carlyle**). List of recent publications.

VIII.—NOTES.

"COMMON SENSE AND THE RUDIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY."

In the October number of MIND (under "New Books") Mr. L. J. Russell makes some appreciative references to my book on "Common Sense and the Rudiments of Philosophy," while indicating—what I fully admit—that its discussion of philosophy *is* rudimentary and needs developing. (Page 14 contains reference to problems "reserved for a future treatise". On this I have been for long, and am still, at work.)

Unfortunately two of Mr. Russell's criticisms are based upon (doubtless unintentional) misquotations. The worst case is the first, where he quotes me as saying that the mental image "begins to exist when something handled or seen is recognised, not merely as similar to what we have handled or seen before, but as the very same thing which we previously recognised," and adds the query, "On what, then, is the recognition based?" The words actually contained in my book (on p. 17) are "previously perceived," not "previously recognised," so that my critic has here sub-consciously created the fallacy which he indirectly charges me with!

In the other case it is said that "sense-data" (the critic quotes) are described by me as giving us our fundamental knowledge of the physical world. The sentence referred to (on p. 79) does not mention "sense-data," but reads, "It is, however, in referring to material objects of visible and tangible dimensions that touch and sight give us our fundamental knowledge of the physical world". In a subsequent sentence, I say, "We at least believe that we perceive, not merely sense-data as such, but things themselves through the immediate sense-data".

Now I certainly should not say that touch and sight *are* sense-data. In the first place, these terms mean something more than actual touching and seeing. In the second place, actual touching and seeing mean something more than the immediate sense-data of the respective senses. "Touch" and "sight" signify permanent aptitudes, or capacities, on the part of the individual, for touching and seeing, and cover all his successive personal experiences of these orders. Some of these experiences are evoked by stimuli, such as being pushed or struck, or seeing an infuriated bull approaching, which enforce attention independently of our own wills. Others—the more important sort for scientific observation—proceed from a deliberately inquisitive or explorative attitude; from touching with intent to ascertain the nature of the thing touched, or focussing the eyes on something with a similar purpose. In the latter case we solicit fresh and clear sense-data from something already vaguely sensed and consciously referred to as outside ourselves, with the object of knowing it better. In both cases, however, the conscious reference to externality accompanies the sense-data felt, and it is only because it does so that touch and sight can be said to "give us our fundamental knowledge of the external world".

While sense-data (or particular passing sensations of specific sorts) are, for psychology, exactly what they appear to be to the person who has them, for epistemology they *mean* much more than they *are*. They are taken as signs of real relationship between the percipient and the per-

ceived. The relation is, on one side, essentially cognitive, but it indicates the circumstantial spatial relations of actual contact with, or direction of the eyes towards, the object. These relations may be observed to subsist when two persons shake hands or take hold of the same rope, or when one person sees another looking at the same object which has attracted his own attention.

CHARLES E. HOOPER.

ANGLO-AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY FOR CENTRAL EUROPE

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1*st February*, 1921.

TO THE EDITOR OF "MIND".

SIR,

In connexion with the above Library, we are endeavouring to supply the various university libraries on the Continent with the scientific journals they urgently need.

Among the periodicals for which we have received a pressing demand MIND is frequently mentioned, and I very much hope that you will be good enough to publish this letter in your columns, so that any of your readers having copies of your journal from 1914 onwards may hear of our appeal. Any numbers of the periodical which readers may feel they can dispense with, will be most gratefully welcomed.

The Library is entirely non-political and non-sectarian, its sole object being to enable humanity at large to benefit in the future, as it has done in the past, from the research of European scholars. Such research has been brought almost to a standstill from the fact that European centres of learning have been cut off since 1914, first of all by the blockade and more recently by the exceedingly unfavourable position of the foreign exchanges, from English and American thought.

I fervently hope that some of your readers may be able to help in supplying the literary needs of Central Europe. A copy of the prospectus of the Library will gladly be sent to anyone desiring a fuller account of its work and objects.

I am, Sir,
Yours very truly,
B. M. HEADICAR.
Hon. Secretary.

INVITATION FROM THE SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE DE PHILOSOPHIE.

Monsieur Xavier Léon, President of the Société Française de Philosophie, has sent the following letter to Professor Wildon Carr, Honorary Secretary of the Aristotelian Society (107 Church Street, Chelsea, S.W. 3), as representing the English Societies which took part in the Congress of Philosophy at Oxford in September, 1920.

Paris, le 28 *Février*, 1921.

CHER MONSIEUR WILDON CARR,

J'ai le plaisir de vous informer que, dans sa réunion du 24 Février, la Société française de philosophie a décidé adresser aux Sociétés anglaises de

philosophie qui l'ont invitée à participer au meeting d'Oxford l'offre de venir à Paris assister à une session extraordinaire de la Société française de philosophie qui sera donnée en leur honneur.

Elle a attendu, pour pouvoir leur faire cette offre, d'avoir l'assurance qu'elle pourrait publier les mémoires présentés : elle avait fait, à cet égard, une demande de crédit au ministère compétent. Elle a eu tout dernièrement la satisfaction de voir cette demande accueillie et elle s'est aussitôt réunie pour prendre la décision que je m'impresse de vous communiquer.

La date proposée serait la semaine qui sépare le Noël du premier jour de l'an, époque à laquelle nos collégues sont en vacances et n'ont pas d'examens à faire passer comme au mois de Juillet. J'espère qu'elle vous conviendra.

Notre ami E. Halévy qui doit venir bientôt à Londres s'entendra avec vous sur les modalités de la participation. Dès maintenant je puis vous dire que nous comptons organiser quatre sections distinctes : Logique et philosophie des Sciences ; Psychologie et Métaphysique ; Morale et Sociologie ; Histoire de la Philosophie. Les mémoires présentés ne devraient pas dépasser quinze pages d'impression.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir transmettre l'offre de la Société française de philosophie aux Sociétés qui l'ont si gracieusement reçue l'an passé et auxquelles elle adresse son souvenir reconnaissant.

Croyez, cher Monsieur Wildon Carr, à mes sentiments cordialement dévoués.

XAVIER LÉON.

MIND ASSOCIATION.

The Annual Meeting of the Association will be held in Cambridge on Saturday, 9th July. The hour and place of meeting will be announced in the July number of MIND.

NEW SERIES. No. 119.] [JULY, 1921.

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY AND INSTINCT PSYCHOLOGY.

BY G. C. FIELD.

MOST students of Psychology are introduced at an early stage in their studies to the Fallacy of the Faculty Psychology. It is explained to them that this consists in dividing up the human mind into different faculties and explaining the different kinds of conscious experience or mental activity by referring each to its appropriate faculty. It is pointed out that the faculty for any kind of action merely means the fact that we are capable of it, and to say, for instance, that we can speak because we have a faculty of speech is merely repeating the same thing twice over. It is no explanation at all, any more than it was when Moliere's doctor explained that opium produced sleep because of its soporific qualities. And the student is very properly warned against the frequent tendency to take such sham explanations as giving us real knowledge. It is generally assumed that the fallacy in this particular form is finally disposed of. But the warning against it is valuable if it makes us keep our eyes open for a possible recurrence of the same fallacy in a different form. And I propose to ask here whether there is not a great danger for certain lines of speculation in modern Psychology of erecting Instinct and the instincts to the same false position as was formerly occupied by these 'faculties'.

I would suggest that the fundamental error of the Faculty Psychology lay in thinking that it was possible to explain, to use Dr. McDougall's phrase, mental function by and in terms of mental structure, whereas, as a matter of fact, it is only possible to talk or think of mental structure at all in terms of

mental function. The distinction between function and structure is, of course, fundamental, whether we express it in Dr. McDougall's phraseology, or talk, in Aristotelian phrase, of the distinction between permanent dispositions and the activities in which they express themselves. But in using it there are two things which it is essential to remember. In the first place we must remember that the only evidence we have or can have of the existence of any permanent disposition, of any piece of mental structure, is the activity which we observe in others or experience in our own consciousness. And more important still is it to remember that the only way that we can think of or describe the permanent dispositions is in terms of the activity. We can only speak of it as the disposition to this or that activity. We can only describe a tendency as the tendency to act, think, or feel, in this or that way. The tendency or disposition by itself is an X, an unknown quantity, which simply means nothing to us unless and until it is expressed in terms of the activity to which it leads. This is just the difference between a mind and a machine. We can look at a machine at rest and observe its shape and the way in which its parts fit into one another, and that helps us to understand why, when it is set in motion, it works in a certain way. And this knowledge that we have of it at rest may be something more than and different from our knowledge of what it does when at work, and is then, so far as it goes, a true explanation of what it does. But the mind is not like this. We cannot examine it while at rest. We only know it when in activity, in our own conscious experience or in the perceivable actions of other people, and its permanent structure can only be deduced from and described in terms of these forms of activity.

The application of these considerations to the Faculty Psychology is obvious. How does it apply to the treatment of Instinct?

Take any ordinary definition of Instinct. An instinct is often defined in some such terms as these:—An inherited or innate tendency to act in a certain way, normally conducive to the preservation of the individual or the welfare of the species, without previous experience and without foresight of the end to be attained. Such a definition tells us generically that it is a tendency to action, and specifically it tells us (i) how it got there, *i.e.* that it was inherited or inborn, (ii) what results it normally produces, *i.e.* the preservation of the individual or the race, and (iii) negatively, that the action takes place without, or if we cannot quite accept that, independently of certain other kinds of mental activity or

conscious experience, *i.e.* foresight of the end to be attained, and previous experience of the action. Other more elaborate definitions may modify this in unessentials, may expand it or may add to it by describing other forms of mental activity which are supposed necessarily to accompany actions of this kind, as when Dr. McDougall maintains that they are accompanied by a specific emotion, or Mr. Shand asserts the invariable presence of a feeling of impulse. But from all these definitions one thing emerges clearly, that we can only describe or think of any such tendency in terms of that to which it is a tendency. We cannot examine it or describe it by itself, or say anything about what it would be like when it was not actually issuing in action.

To say, then, that any action is instinctive or due to Instinct gives us valuable information. It tells us, if the definition is sound, something about the preconditions of the action, something about its probable results, and something about the conditions which accompany it and about the conditions which do not necessarily accompany it, although they may accompany other actions whose external physical features are similar. But it does not explain the action by describing something else different from the action, in the sense that we can explain a particular motion of a machine by describing the permanent structure of the machine. This 'something else' in the case of Instinct, can only be thought of as that which leads to the action. We think of Instinct as something in our innate mental structure of which all that we can say is that by virtue of it a person or an animal performs certain actions without previous experience and without foresight of the end.

But now what happens when we cease to talk about Instinct and begin to talk about the instincts? What information does it convey to us when we are told that a certain action is due not only to Instinct but to some particular instinct? If such a statement is to give us any real information, it must tell us something more than the general facts which are conveyed to us by saying that the action is instinctive, and what is more important, it must tell us something more than we can gather from an inspection of the action itself. Thus if we see bees building cells and some one tells us that they do this because they have a cell-building instinct, the word "instinct," it is true, tells us something important about this action, but the word 'cell-building' is entirely superfluous and tells us nothing at all that we did not know already from the inspection of the action. Particularly it must be remembered that, when we are speaking of

our own actions or of those of beings like ourselves, the ascription of an action or of any kind of conscious experience to any particular instinct must, if it is to give us any genuine information, tell us something that cannot be derived from an inspection of our own consciousness at the moment of the experience.

The case is different when we ascribe two or more qualitatively different actions or different experiences to one and the same instinct. What could such a way of speaking mean? What information is it supposed to convey to us? The question must be carried further back, and we must ask how, if we are going to speak of different instincts at all, we are going to classify the instincts and on what principles we are to distinguish one from the other. The question seems to lie at the root of a great deal of discussion on the instincts, and yet it is difficult to find anywhere any satisfactory answer to it. Thus psychologists dispute about the number of different instincts which we are to recognise: James distinguishes nineteen, McDougall a dozen, while Trotter, in his *Instincts of the Herd*, says that there are really only four. To decide such disputes the essential preliminary would seem to be a clear and definite statement of the *principium divisionis*, of the standard of what makes one instinct.

It is clear from what has been said that there is only one way of distinguishing and classifying the different instincts, and that is by distinguishing and classifying, on some principle or another, the different forms of activity to which they lead. And these may be classified in different ways according to the exact point in which we are specially interested.

Thus, if our interest was primarily biological, we might classify instinctive forms of activity by their external results. We might perhaps start from two great classes of instincts, those which tended to the preservation of the individual organism, and those which tended to the preservation of the species. The former class might again be sub-divided into those which tended to preserve the individual by aiding it to gain food, those which tended to preserve it from the attacks of possible enemies, and so on. This would be quite a scientific method of division. If we classified instincts on this principle and then ascribed some particular action to one or other of these instincts, the information that we should be giving about the action would be (*a*) that it was instinctive in the sense defined above, and (*b*) that it tended to produce certain results beyond itself. Or we might adopt another principle of division, and classify instincts by the resemblances in external form of the actions which they produced. Thus

we might distinguish the cell-building instinct of the bees and the web-making instinct of the spider, the instinct of flight from danger and the instinct of immobility in face of danger. But all these divisions tell us nothing about the instincts themselves—they are simply descriptive distinctions between the different visible features of actions which we declare to be instinctive.

If our interest was primarily psychological, we might attempt to classify the different kinds of instinctive action by what they felt like, by the difference in the conscious experience which accompanied them. The possibility of doing this obviously depends upon what we think about the psychical accompaniments which always and necessarily are found with instinctive action. If, for instance, we hold with Mr. Shand that the invariable accompaniment of instinctive action is a feeling of impulse, then it is clear that this will give us a valuable test for distinguishing instinctive action from other kinds of action, but will not give us any guidance in classifying the different instincts. For the 'feeling of impulse,' whatever it may mean, does not differ *qua* feeling of impulse from one kind of action to another. It can only be distinguished as a feeling of impulse *to* this and that kind of action. And so we should be back once more at the difference between the external features of the different actions as our only principle of division.

If, on the other hand, we adopted Dr. McDougall's view that instinctive action was necessarily accompanied by some emotion, we might seem to have got a valuable principle of classification. For emotions differ in kind, and we might therefore classify different kinds of instinctive action by the different emotions with which they were accompanied. But we should have to guard against the danger of imagining that such a principle of classification gave us more information than it really did. It would not, for instance, enable us to decide whether a particular emotion always accompanied a particular kind of action, whether, for instance, the emotion of fear and the instinctive action of flight were necessarily connected with one another. That would be a matter of fact to be decided on the evidence in each particular case. Our principle of classification would be once more simply descriptive. We should have to group together all actions which were, as a matter of fact, associated with this particular emotion, and we could, if we chose, apply to this group the name of a particular instinct. But the ascription of a particular action to this instinct would tell us that the action was, in fact, accompanied by this emotion, and it would tell us no

more than that. I am not concerned here to discuss whether instinctive actions are in reality always accompanied by a particular emotion. As a matter of fact, the available evidence seems to me decisively against this view. But the assertion that it is so is perfectly intelligible, and if it were true it would give us a perfectly intelligible system of classification.

Perhaps a word should be said here about another possible principle of classification which might be legitimate for certain purposes within the biological universe of discourse. We might group together all the types of instinctive action which were in the same historical line of descent. Supposing we found reason to believe that one sort of instinctive action had developed by imperceptible variations in succeeding generations into another sort, we might, for purposes of historical exposition, group together all the successive forms of this. But the grouping would have no application outside these limits. Above all, in no intelligible sense of the word could we say, neglecting the variations, that the actions were the same or due to the same instincts. It is possible that man has developed by a series of variations out of an amœba. But if we said that, because of this, we might expect men to act in the same way as the amœba, and still more if we said that, in any sense of the word, man was the same as the amœba, we should be talking meaningless nonsense.

Finally, there is another theoretical possibility, though it is doubtful whether it is ever realised in fact. If we found types of behaviour, differing both in their external features and in their psychical accompaniment, which nevertheless were always found together in all cases in which they occurred, and if we found that the strength of the tendency to the one type always varied in exact proportion with the strength of the tendency to the other, we should have some justification for supposing that there must be some deep-rooted connexion between the two in the permanent mental structure. In such a case we might be justified in speaking of them as being due to one and the same instinct. But we might equally well—for it would tell us just as much or as little—say that they were due to two different instincts which were necessarily connected with each other. For the point would be that they were somehow connected so that if we found the one we might also reasonably expect to find the other in the same individual.

In all these cases, we are speaking, as we must do, of the permanent disposition in terms of the activity to which it

leads. But now suppose that it is a question of two entirely distinct types of behaviour, with no felt resemblance in the conscious experience which accompanies them, and not always or generally found together. In such a case we cannot possibly speak of them as being due to the same instinct. Not only is there no evidence of any kind for it, but it is strictly meaningless. It involves speaking of an instinct, not as that which produces a certain type of behaviour, but as a definite thing within the mind, of which we can have some idea apart from the behaviour which it produces, and which may show itself in entirely different kinds of behaviour or conscious experience. And this is unintelligible. Such an idea cannot be thought out. We only think it has some meaning because we escape our own notice in the illegitimate use of physical and mechanical metaphors in dealing with things of the mind. It is exactly the fallacy of the Faculty Psychology. It involves thinking of the mind as a machine which we can look at at rest or at work. It involves the idea that we can understand and think of mental structure or permanent disposition apart from mental function or activity, and can explain the latter by, and in terms of, the former. And this is just what we cannot do.

And yet, as it seems to me, there is a great danger in psychological thinking of falling into this error. And I believe that it can be clearly detected in certain modern psychological discussions, where it threatens to put the whole line of investigation on the wrong track, and to lessen or destroy the value of the results which might be or have been reached.

I find it, for instance, prominent in the writings of Freud and his school. They tell us that many very different forms of behaviour are due to one and the same sex-instinct. But it is impossible to find in their writings a clear and satisfactory statement of what they mean by this one instinct, of what their standard of unity of an instinct is. We could understand it, for instance, if they ascribed to the sex-instinct any kind of behaviour which was accompanied by or influenced by some stimulation of the physical sex-organs. This would be a perfectly intelligible criterion of the working of this particular instinct, though it might be difficult to make a similar principle the ground of classification in other cases. But it is evident that they extend its meaning much more widely than this. Dr. Ernest Jones, for instance, speaks of the localisation of the sex-instinct in the sex-organs as occurring only at a relatively advanced stage of development.

It was perhaps considerations of this kind which have led Jung and his followers to replace the special sex-instinct by the general *libido*.

We may find the same way of speaking in writers who have been influenced by Freud without adopting the whole of his views. For instance, in Dr. A. G. Tansley's *The New Psychology* we find throughout phrases like the following:—"the use of energy *belonging to a primitive instinct* in what is commonly called a 'higher channel,'" "a large amount of *sex energy* is, of course, constantly diverted to other channels," "the use of the energy *derived from* a primitive biological instinct in higher conations belonging entirely to the mental sphere". [Italics my own.] As I am not writing a criticism of this book, I do not wish to discuss whether these expressions are merely occasional lapses into a loose use of language, or whether they represent a point of view that underlies the whole thought of the author. But let us consider them as they stand and ask what they can mean. If we are asked to think of the psycho-physical organism as something endowed with a limited amount of energy which can be released in different directions in different circumstances, the description has some meaning for us. Only then we cannot talk of the energy of or belonging to or derived from this or that particular instinct. The energy 'belongs to' the whole individual and is only applied in this or that form of instinctive behaviour. Any other way of speaking involves the unintelligible notion of the energy as something which can be divided up into little bundles, each quite distinct from the other, perhaps even qualitatively different, and each the property of a particular instinct, which can use it itself or hand it over to some other impulse. And this involves the fallacy that we have been considering, of thinking of 'the instinct' as an individual thing in itself.

We find, perhaps, the most striking examples of the tendency I am criticising in a different field, the field of the so-called Social Psychology. It is claimed by many workers in this field that a great increase in our understanding of social phenomena is to be looked for in an application to them of our knowledge of the instincts of human beings. It cannot be said that, judged by results, the success of this line of approach has so far been very striking. And this is hardly surprising if the investigators start from such radically misleading assumptions about the nature of the instincts as those which I have been attempting to criticise. That in too many cases they have so started seems certain. I will illustrate

my contention on this point by a brief examination of some of the arguments in a recent book of popular Social Psychology, Mr. Trotter's *Instincts of the Herd*. The treatment of the instincts in this work seems to me to illustrate better than any other example the ways of thinking against which I am protesting.

The first point to notice is Mr. Trotter's classification of instincts. He objects to the tendency of some authors 'to ascribe quite a large number of man's activities to separate instincts' as being 'based upon too lax a definition or want of analysis'. There are really, he maintains, only four main instincts, the instincts of self-preservation, nutrition, and reproduction, and the herd-instinct. He nowhere tells us what is his principle of division or his criterion of what makes one instinct, so that we are forced to try to discover this from the classification that he gives us. But on looking at this it is impossible to escape the impression that he is unwittingly using more than one principle of division.

Take, for instance, the 'instinct of self-preservation'. Self-preservation is not, of course, one single kind of action, the same for all creatures in all circumstances. We have to look, therefore, for the principle of classification in this case in the results. Every 'inherited mode of reaction' which tends towards the preservation of the life of the individual organism would, on this principle, be ascribed to 'the instinct of self-preservation'. It might be asked why, on this principle, the 'instinct of nutrition' should not fall under 'the instinct of self-preservation,' as a sub-class. For clearly the taking of food is as necessary for the preservation of the life of the organism as, say, protection from the attacks of enemies. We need not, however, press that point, for the most interesting thing is the relation of the herd-instinct to these other instincts. If we are classifying instincts by their results, we have to ask ourselves what are the results of the tendency of certain animals to congregate together in herds or packs. And we find, as Mr. Trotter himself points out, that the biological result of the tendency is, in some cases, protection from external enemies, and in others increased capacity for hunting and catching prey. So that it is clear that, if we adopted this principle of classification consistently, we should ascribe the instinctive 'herd-activities' in some cases to the instinct of self-preservation and in other cases to the instinct of nutrition.

The fact that the herd-instinct is distinguished from the others shows that in speaking of it Mr. Trotter has slipped over to another principle of classification. But what exactly

this is it is difficult to discover. In one passage he seems to suggest that all actions are due to the herd-instinct which do not necessarily "favour the survival of the individual as such, but favour its survival as a member of a herd". This would be once again to put the principle of classification in the results, and not in anything in the psycho-physical structure itself. But it is difficult to see how this can be intelligibly applied. Take the primary gregarious instinct itself. The tendency, say, of cattle to congregate in a herd favours their survival. To say that it favours their survival as members of a herd is simply an identical proposition. And to say that it does not tend to favour the survival of the individual as such, is meaningless. It would be as reasonable to say that the tendency to run away from danger did not favour the survival of the individual as such, but only of the individual as running away from danger.

Judging by the variety and diversity of actions which he ascribes to the herd-instinct, he seems really to ascribe to it any kind of behaviour which is in response to any stimulus arising from the relations of the creature to the other members of the group or society in which it lives. It is obvious that such a classification of forms of behaviour would have a limited value for certain purposes. It would serve to mark off the field of investigation at the beginning of our inquiries. But, in doing this, it would by itself tell us nothing. It would merely ask a question or suggest a problem. It would not be in any sense an explanation of all the different kinds of reaction to the herd or the group which had been observed. Above all, it would not enable us to attach any meaning to the notion of a single herd-instinct which was somehow the same thing whatever the difference in the kind of behaviour that it caused. The only things which are the same are some of the most general features in the circumstances in which the different actions take place.

Mr. Trotter, however, evidently thinks that the ascription of any kind of behaviour to the herd-instinct gives us a great deal of valuable information. And he describes many social phenomena which he claims to explain or make intelligible by referring them to this one herd-instinct. The list of all the different forms of behaviour which are due to the herd-instinct is a truly remarkable one. In it we find gregariousness in the limited sense, the tendency, that is, to join together in groups, the tendency to imitate the actions of other individuals, the susceptibility to leadership, the dislike of innovation, the respect for old age, religion, altruism, and many other forms of behaviour. Among these latter we find

the antagonism to the spread of altruism which may sometimes lead to its violent suppression. "This," Mr. Trotter writes, "is a remarkable instance of the protean character of the gregarious instinct and the complexity it introduces into human affairs, for we see one instinct producing manifestations directly hostile to each other—prompting to ever advancing developments of altruism, while it necessarily leads to any new product of advance being attacked." All this certainly seems an overwhelming amount of work for one instinct to get through. And it becomes more and more difficult to understand what possible meaning there can be in talking of one instinct in all the different cases, unless we are thinking of an instinct in a way which, as we have seen, is wholly illegitimate and ultimately unintelligible.

Consider it in the light of particular instances. We find what is usually called the gregarious instinct strongly developed in cattle. Without, so far as we know, feeling the slightest affection for, or indeed interest in, one another individually, they yet are impelled by an irresistible tendency to keep constantly together in a herd. And on the other side let us set an instance of altruism in the highest development, say, the Good Samaritan, who out of the purest love and sympathy and human kindness, succours the wounded traveller. What can be meant by saying that the cattle and the Good Samaritan are acting under the influence of the same instinct? We might ask, further, what is meant by saying that the Good Samaritan's action is due to instinct at all. If it simply means that it proceeds from his inherited character, that he was born with a sympathetic and pitiful nature, no one would object to the statement, except perhaps those fabulous monsters, the 'rationalisers' or 'intellectualists,' with whom Mr. Trotter, like certain other psychologists, delights in carrying on a continual skiomachy. If, on the other hand, it is meant that his actions were, like the cattle's, not the result of the feeling of love and sympathy, or that they were taken without foresight of the end, then it is, of course, a simple misdescription. But even if this question is satisfactorily answered, the first difficulty remains. When we are dealing with two different types of action, whose external features and whose conscious psychical accompaniment are entirely different, what possible meaning can there be in saying that they are due to the same instinct? Under certain circumstances we might find it useful for certain purposes to treat different actions as due to the same cause, even though we could have no idea of what that cause was in itself apart from the actions. If we always found

gregariousness and loving sympathy combined together in the same individuals and if the two always varied in intensity in the same proportion, there might be some point in it. If we could understand the Good Samaritan's state of mind better by studying the habits of cattle, or if the study helped us to breed or educate Good Samaritans, or to judge what people would be likely to show themselves Good Samaritans, or how the Good Samaritan would act in other circumstances, there might be some reason for classing the two kinds of behaviour together. But obviously none of these conditions are fulfilled in this case. And the assertion that the cattle and the Good Samaritan are moved by one and the same instinct remains not only unprovable but unmeaning.

I do not wish, in all this, to appear to deny that the social phenomena to which Mr. Trotter calls attention are worthy of careful study from a psychological point of view, or that they are in many cases acutely observed and well described by him, even though with a considerable degree of exaggeration. But I do maintain that there is nothing to gain and everything to lose by lumping them together in an undiscriminated mass, as the products of the herd-instinct. And I maintain further that the actual description of the phenomena themselves could be equally well carried out by an observer who had never heard of the herd-instinct and who did not use the term 'instinct' at all, and that the only addition that is made by talking about the herd-instinct is the addition of an empty name which tells us nothing and obscures much.

It would be difficult, perhaps, to find another such instance of a whole book based throughout on this modern form of the Fallacy of the Faculty Psychology. But there are traces of it in the work of many writers. There is reason to suspect its influence, for instance, even in the work of so careful a writer as Dr. James Drever. When he writes in his *Instinct in Man* of the gregarious instinct, as seen, *e.g.* in the behaviour of cattle, that its impulse 'takes the form' of active sympathy at the human level of development, it is very difficult to attach any meaning to this which can be accepted as intelligible consistently with the principles that have been laid down. There may be such a thing as a felt impulse to keep together in a crowd in the cattle. But we can tell from our own experience—for we certainly at times feel such an impulse ourselves—that it is an entirely different thing from the feeling of active sympathy, that the two are not necessarily found together at all, and that still less do they vary in intensity with each other. That being the case, it is difficult

to see what can be gained or what can be meant by ascribing them to the same instinct.

May we not, again, suspect the presence of this fallacy in a great deal of the controversy about the exact number of the instincts, between the 'splitters' and the 'slumpers,' to use the lively American description? If it were simply a question of classifying the different forms of instinctive activity, we could only criticise a view on the ground that the activities themselves had been wrongly described in some way or other, or else on the merely practical ground that the principle of division employed was not the most convenient for the purposes of the particular investigation. But I think that there is a good deal more than that in the controversy as it is actually carried on. And I confess to an uneasy feeling that the distinguished psychologists who have taken part in it may be found to have been wasting their time over one of M. Bergson's 'questions qui ne doivent pas se poser'.

Supposing that the principles laid down above were accepted, how should we proceed in our investigations into Instinct and instinctive action? We should begin, in the first place, by an examination not of 'the instincts' but of instinctive behaviour. And by 'behaviour' I mean not merely the physical movements of the body, but any kind of activity, physical or mental, the 'behaviour' open to inspection by introspection just as much as that open to inspection by sense perception. The first task would be a correct description of that, so far as it was possible, and so far as it was necessary for our purposes. We should then have to decide what characteristics of behaviour should be taken as the essential mark of instinctive behaviour, and what other accompanying characteristics were invariably found with these. The first problem, if the description was correct, would be mainly a matter of practical convenience, and the second a matter of correct observation and description. From this point of view we should see in its true proportions the problem of the extent of the field of behaviour to which we applied the term 'instinctive,' the question, for instance, whether we were going to confine it to action in the sense of bodily movements, or were going to extend it to any form of conscious mental activity, emotions or desires or anything else. This would become partly a question of fact, whether certain bodily movements and certain forms of conscious experience were necessarily connected together, and partly a question of convenience, whether the use of the same term for different kinds of behaviour did or did not tend to obscure differences which were actually there and lay too much stress

on comparatively unimportant resemblances. So far as we did attempt classification and division it would be on one or the other of the principles which we have recognised as legitimate. Above all, we should studiously avoid the Fallacy of the Faculty Psychology of attempting to describe what we know in terms of what we cannot know, and of putting forward the latter as in any sense an 'explanation' of the former.

I will conclude with what to some may seem the most debatable proposition that I have yet put forward. The moral of this seems to me to be that these and many other confusions arise from the premature attempt to emancipate Psychology as a separate science from Philosophy. I do not mean by this, that Psychology should or can be treated merely as a branch of one of the other recognised divisions of Philosophy. I mean that a separate science can only be pursued as such if, as a general rule, its assumptions and categories are accepted and used without the constant need for a critical examination of them. But in Psychology, as it seems to me, we have not yet arrived anywhere near the point where there is anything like a general agreement or a clear realisation of these assumptions and categories. And therefore it is essential that, for the present, throughout our psychological investigations we should preserve the philosophical point of view which examines assumptions and criticises categories, a procedure which in a science that has arrived at an independent status would be unnecessary and indeed, in general, a hindrance only.

II.—STATEMENTS AND MEANING.

By Alfred Sidgwick.

In view of the lack of connexion—noted by Dr. Schiller in Mind, No. 118—between the different parts of the three-sided discussion of 'Meaning' in No. 116, there may perhaps be room for an attempt to re-state the question from a starting point which is common to us all. Something will at least be gained if by this method the points at which the divergences arise should become clearer.

We all agree, I suppose, in recognising the difference between meaning as a quality of assertions and meaning as a quality of facts observed—as when it is said that a certain look of the sky or change of wind *means* a change of weather. I propose here to raise no inquiries about the latter kind of 'meaning,' but only about the meaning which belongs to assertions as such, and which sometimes fails to belong to statements; linguistic meaning and its interpretation, as contrasted with the interpretation of facts.

Various purposes might lead us to make a study of linguistic meaning, and the purpose we happen to have in view will naturally influence the course of the study. We might, for instance, want to know the way in which the customary meaning of words changes and develops, and then we should find an etymological dictionary useful. Or we might be interested in the simpler task of discovering the correct or the technical meaning of words that are strange to us—words like *agnail* or *zedoary*. But here the purpose proposed is that of inquiring into the conditions of meaning, specially in order to note the chief sources of those misunderstandings which are so notoriously troublesome in discussion. Misconceptions of meaning will thus be our chief centre of interest; and since meaning is a two-sided affair we shall have to think not only of the case where an audience puts a wrong interpretation on a speaker's statement, but also where the audience rightly complains that a statement is ambiguous in one of two ways: either because the speaker vacillates

between two meanings or because he fails to recognise a distinction which is thought by the audience important. Of these three branches of defective meaning the first may here be called *mistakes*, the second *vacillations*, and the third *shortcomings*.

I.

Mistakes of meaning are broadly divisible into those which are simple or careless, admitting of prompt remedies, and those which are subtler, more excusable, and therefore more persistent. Such a distinction does not pretend to be anything but rough, and its purpose here is to allow us to pass lightly over the least interesting and difficult part of the subject. Perhaps the simplest of all mistakes are those which are due to ignorance of the customary meaning of words; and they are so easily corrected or avoided by reference to a dictionary that we need not here say any more about them. Almost on the same level of simplicity would come those which are due to well-established double or plural meanings—what used to be called 'equivocal' words. Here the difference between the meanings of a word in different contexts is as a rule plainly marked. The word *fine*, for instance, has three different meanings as applied respectively to the weather, a distinction, and the result of proceedings in a police court. In these different contexts the meaning of the word is noticeably different, so that a dictionary can make the three meanings clearly distinct. Plural meanings of this sort seldom mislead anyone, and never seriously or persistently, since it is as easy to recognise such mistakes as to recognise a pun. We can all see at a glance the influence of context upon meaning to this extent.

Plural meanings of a rather more troublesome kind are those where two opposite ends of a scale shade off into each other and we encounter the familiar difficulty of drawing the line. What generally causes misunderstanding here is the existence of some hidden difference of standard. Pairs of words like *good* and *bad*, *hot* and *cold*, *long* and *short*, depend for their application on variable standards, and we often fail to see at first what standard a speaker has in mind. As a rule, however, it is not difficult to get such mistakes set right by a little explanation; and in many cases we avoid any mistake by asking for the explanation beforehand. When the tired pedestrian is told he has 'not far' to go he naturally wants an answer expressed in miles or minutes before feeling any wiser. He is annoyed, rather than misled, by the vague statement.

But there are some special cases of hidden standard where misunderstanding is more difficult to avoid. One, for instance, is where the standard of strict accuracy is contrasted with a looser treatment, and in the name of strict accuracy a statement is made which seems paradoxical. Here the unusual standard is difficult to keep in view not for want of being openly stated but by its appearance of being impractical, or even meaningless, so that the audience can hardly accept it seriously. Some of the statements in Einstein's theory might perhaps serve as examples, but let us take one that will be more familiar to logicians. Suppose it be said that, strictly speaking, all definite words are indefinite. We may dismiss at once the formal and superficial objection that this statement is void of meaning because it is self-contradictory, by explaining that it speaks only of *so-called* definite words. It tells us that the commonly accepted distinction between definite and indefinite words has only a limited value and that if pressed too far it misleads us. Even when further explanations[1] are given, the difficulty is that at first it seems such a far-fetched piece of truth that it is better neglected—like the truth that it is possible to produce the complete works of Shakespeare by drawing letters of the alphabet at random from a bag.

Now if we try to generalise about differences in 'point of view' we are led to an extended conception of the influence of context upon meaning. When we think of the context of a word we commonly think only of the other words in the statement in which the word occurs, and by difference of context accordingly we commonly mean difference of subject matter; *e.g.*, the difference between 'fine' weather and a 'fine' distinction, or between 'foot' as a part of an animal, and 'foot' as a measure of length. But it is not only single words that have a variable context which affects their meaning; the same is true of statements also. The whole meaning of a statement—the whole intention of the speaker—is far from being always evident by mere inspection, however careful, of the statement taken by itself. We require to know in addition "what he wants to do with it," as in De Morgan's example[2] of the Cambridge Professor when asked to admit that the whole is greater than its part.

[1] *E.g.* (1) that only descriptive words are here spoken of, since it is only to them that the distinction between definite and indefinite can apply; (2) that the whole value of definiteness in a descriptive word consists in the completeness of description it gives when used as predicate; and (3) that descriptive words, so used, necessarily give an incomplete description of the subject, whether 'sufficiently' complete or not.

[2] *Formal Logic*, p. 264.

Some light may be thrown upon this difficulty by remembering that all reasoned thought consists in the application of general rules to particular cases; a truth that, I suppose, underlay the old syllogistic system and was obscured by its accidental accretions. But anyhow this account of the nature of reasoned thought seems true, since particular facts are related to the general rules they come under exactly as facts are related to their interpretation; and all reasoned thought is, directly or remotely, concerned with the recognition and interpretation of facts. Whenever a critic thinks he discovers something definitely wrong with a piece of reasoning he has no other resource, if he cares to explain his dissent, than to find fault either with the facts on which the reasoning is based or else with the interpretation put upon them. There may be a 'downright' error of fact, as where false statistics are given, or again there may be a gross misinterpretation of a fact, as where an eclipse of the sun is taken as presaging calamity; but there are also an immense number of reasonings where the truth of a statement of fact cannot be judged until we know what inference is intended to be drawn from it. No one can tell, for instance, whether it is true or false that a certain dish is wholesome until we know whether the statement, *as made at a particular time*, refers to ordinary healthy people or to some one not quite so healthy, with whom it might disagree. This further question and its answer thus become part of the meaning of the statement; and not only a part of it but the finally decisive part as regards the question whether the statement is true or false. All other doubts about its meaning sink into insignificance beside this one, since this remains for settlement even when all the others are settled. So long as it remains doubtful the other inquiries give no decision. It is sometimes forgotten that every dispute between two parties takes place on a *particular* occasion with all its own set of circumstances.

The way in which the truth of facts is dependent upon the inferences for which they are used may become clearer when we remember that the only facts that can ever come before us for judgment are facts as conceived or stated. For the purpose of judging the truth of a fact there is no such thing as a 'fact-in-itself'. It is always some one's conception that we have to deal with; it may be our own conception or it may be some one else's as indicated by a statement. And facts, as we all know, admit of being conceived in a variety of ways dependent upon the selection that happens to be made among their various aspects. Every fact is composed of details some of which must inevitably be left out of sight

in conceiving it, thus emphasising the remainder; and the required emphasis rightly shifts according to the purpose—the inference—for which the fact is conceived or stated. The same fact thus becomes true for one purpose and false for another, just as the same food may be meat or poison according to the person who eats it. Think of any conjuring trick where an audience is deceived. The fact as seen by them consists of a selection among the total number of details, and the conjurer has succeeded in getting them to overlook some details that were important, thus emphasising the wrong set. The deceived audience actually did see part of what happened, and so far as that goes the fact as conceived by them is 'true'; and yet it is at the same time false, since they are deceived by it. They have conceived the fact in a way which has led them to a false inference.

This example, however trivial in itself, illustrates typically the tempting and excusable errors of fact into which we are constantly falling, but it fails to illustrate directly the mistakes of meaning to which a statement is liable, since a conjurer's audience does not report what it sees but watches the operations in silence. The difference is, however, accidental. We may, for instance, imagine a serious committee making a report of the 'facts' observed at a spiritualistic séance. Or if this also be considered a trivial affair we may find other examples in scientific research. There, just as in watching a conjuring trick, mistakes are made by overlooking important details. But the importance of a detail is a quality than can only exist in relation to some inference drawn from the fact. When a mistake is made the fact as it is conceived allows of one inference, but as it ought to be conceived it allows of another; so that the fact is true for the former purpose and false for the latter. We cannot, therefore, call the statement of it either true or false till we know which inference is intended; and when the fact is stated the intended inference thus becomes part of the meaning of the statement.

Thus the doctrine that every statement has a context on which its meaning depends is based upon the familiar experience that different ways of conceiving or describing the same occurrence bring it under different rules of inference, and so make it a fact for some purposes and a delusion for others, the 'purposes' here referred to being the various inferences that the fact may suggest or justify. The only thing that stands in the way of our regarding these different purposes as different contexts with a difference of meaning dependent on them is our common superficial view of meaning as something inherent in words and forms of sentence, so that 'the'

meaning of any statement can be discovered without respect to any *arrière pensée* that may be in the speaker's mind. This is a rough and ready procedure, useful enough in its way, and corresponds exactly to the function of dictionaries and grammars. In fact it only breaks down at the point where the value of these aids to understanding ceases; that point being precisely where the serious mistakes of meaning, as contrasted with the trivial ones, do actually arise.

II.

Vacillation between two meanings, when it occurs in the early stages of an inquiry, is if not entirely harmless at any rate almost unavoidable as a temporary condition. But as concerned with the failure of meaning in disputes the chief harm of vacillation is in connexion with accepted truths, where it takes place between a meaning which makes a statement undeniable, and a meaning which makes it nearly but not quite true, and therefore on occasion importantly false. On such occasions the effect of the former kind of interpretation is to hinder us in learning the defects of the statement when taken in its latter and commoner meaning. We are tempted to use the undeniable statement as a refuge from troublesome doubts, and to fall back into the other interpretation—in which the statement is questionable—as soon as the doubts blow over. Thus the doubts do not get a fair chance of being sufficiently recognised.

The classical instance of this shifty performance is to be found in the use that is made of the Laws of Thought in Formal Logic. The assumption they there surreptitiously involve is that the distinctions we use are unquestionable; that what is called A must deserve that name, and that the line between A and not-A is beyond our power to criticise. But they do this in the guise of axioms which are undeniable only because they are tautologous. No one can deny, for instance, that A is A, but when we try to interpret this axiom for application in actual cases it does nothing whatever to settle the question whether we have before us a genuine case of A or not. What it does, rather, is to obscure our vision of this useful doubt, and therefore to check our efforts to meet it. Similarly no one can suppose that A is not-A except when we begin to apply the distinction in difficult cases, and the attempt to hide this difficulty from ourselves by repeating the Law of Contradiction in its undeniable form is sometimes only too successful. There is even an instance where a philosopher of some standing[1] has persuaded himself that the

[1] Mr. F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 136 (1st edition).

Law of Contradiction provides for us an "absolute criterion". Ultimate Reality, he tells us, is such that it does not contradict itself. Incidentally he here forgets that it is only in *statements* that self-contradiction is possible, and that, since ultimate reality does not make statements at all, it is free from all danger of making self-contradictory ones. But passing this over, and trying to put some meaning into the doctrine, we see that it at least involves the belief that a self-contradictory statement is necessarily *false;* or in other words that ultimate reality is bound by the present conditions of human language. If he had said only that the *meaning of statements* is thus limited we could all agree with him; we could agree that a self-contradictory statement has no meaning and therefore makes no intelligible assertion. But what has this admission to do with the nature of Reality, unless we confuse the abstract, tautologous Law of Contradiction with that Law as applied in actual cases? When we are trying to state any fact, why attempt to hide from ourselves the doubt whether what we take to be A may not be better described as non-A, or as something between the two? The undeniable and tautologous Law of Contradiction does nothing but avoid meeting these doubts.

The effect of this bad habit may further be seen in the reasoning by which the confusion is officially supported. Against the above criticism only one defence has ever been attempted, and it is complacently repeated on each new occasion. The commonest form it takes is to say that whatever objections may be raised against the Law of Contradiction these very objections tacitly assume its validity. But why 'tacitly'? In fact they assume its validity in the most open manner possible; they recognise the Law of Contradiction as one of the conditions of intelligible *language*, and since any critic of the Law wishes his remarks to be intelligible he naturally observes those conditions in expressing them. Part of his contention is that a self-contradictory statement is devoid of meaning, and if the Law of Contradiction were interpreted as saying no more than this its 'validity' would be above suspicion. All that is claimed is that the Law in its tautologous interpretation gives us no help in understanding the facts of the world; that the moment we apply the Law of Contradiction to facts it speaks of *so-called* A, and therefore ceases to be necessarily true. It cannot guarantee any case of 'A' against being wrongly so called. Nor, for instance, can it prevent our recognising *change* as one of the most real and important facts of our experience. That the conditions of our existing language prevent our expressing clearly what

happens when a change occurs is perhaps to be regretted; but to say that the ultimate nature of things is dominated by the present limitations of our power to describe them is to assert more than we can seriously pretend to know. Perhaps less fettered means of expression will some day be discovered, and meanwhile a denial of the reality of change leads us nowhere and would merely stultify all human effort. Dogmatic assertion about Reality is never necessary—since we may contentedly call any of our beliefs a working hypothesis—but a dogma which tries to ignore the need of having a working value can hardly pretend to be even a genuine belief. Perhaps a better hypothesis is that the Eleatic tricks of argument are only a development of a futile though ingenious verbal game.

The intellectualist use of the Laws of Thought is, however, only one rather extreme example of a temptation which exists in subtler forms wherever a rule claiming to be universal is obstinately defended against attack. We are all accustomed to the use of rules of inference which are admittedly rough and vague, and the admission carries with it some readiness to question the rule's value in particular applications. It is not, therefore, rules of this looser kind that tempt us to vacillate between tautology and faulty generalisation; the temptation arises specially with rules that claim certainty. The stronger our belief in a rule's strict universality the more inclined we are to explain away instances that appear to contradict it. Now to explain away what looks like an exception to a supposed rule is to raise questions of definition. The supposed rule being 'if X, then Y,' an apparent case of X without Y can only be accounted for—so as to save the face of the rule—by claiming that the case in question is wrongly described as X. And since wrong description of a fact is common enough this method of defending a rule is often justified in particular instances. But it is not an easy matter to fix the limit to which the method can be usefully carried, and there is a temptation to carry it on to the point at which the whole meaning of the rule evaporates. For as soon as *by definition* we deny the correctness of the predicate X in all cases which are not Y, the rule becomes a mere tautology.

As further examples of supposed axiomatic rules we may take Jevons's 'Substitution of Similars' and Mill's inductive canons. Jevons put forward his axiom in the form "whatever is true of a thing is true of its like," which in its most natural interpretation tells us that from likeness in one respect (or in many respects) we may safely infer likeness in another. But in view of the notorious fact that false analogies are

possible we see at once that the word 'likeness' must not here be taken in its ordinary wide meaning. And by pressing for closer definition we find that in order to save the face of the rule it is only 'sufficient' likeness that can be spoken of. And then what the rule in effect solemnly tells us is that likeness sufficient to warrant an inference is sufficient for that purpose. How does such a rule give us any information when we try to apply it to a given inference which is disputed?

As to Mill's inductive canons, their vacillation between two meanings is not so directly managed by definition, but the only defence by which their 'truth' can be supported is of essentially the same kind. Interpreted in any sense in which they are applicable in cases of doubt—in any cases therefore in which a rule is called for—they are misleading; they are risky generalisations. And in order to take from them this element of risk in application the only way is to interpret them so that they become inapplicable and therefore devoid of information. If, for instance, we ask what is meant by the "one circumstance" which the method of difference so glibly speaks of, no one can tell us. What looks like one circumstance may always be in fact two, or more. A circumstance can always be analysed, if we think it worth while, into innumerable parts each of which is also a circumstance. The important question, before we know whether the inference is sound, is whether we have carried the analysis far enough. The canon tells us only that *if* we have done so the inference is justified. In other words it tells us that sufficient analysis is sufficient. We might have guessed that without the help of the canon, but it does not help us to solve any doubt about a given inference.

Our glimpses of causation come somewhere between supposed axioms and consciously rough rules. A rule that X causes Y claims to be universal but does not make the claim with quite as much assurance as an axiom. Although fifty years ago science was often inclined to be dogmatic, there must now be very few of those engaged in research who do not recognise the endless subtlety of causation to the extent at least of being aware that there is always room for a more discriminating view of any particular event than we have reached at a given time. In so far as we do recognise this, and therefore regard our causal inquiries as always incomplete, we welcome exceptions for the sake of the problems they set. But the old Adam of dogmatism dies hard and still has some effect in those departments of science where there is most risk of taking a too abstract view of the facts. In a laboratory we are forced to pay more attention to the

individual things we deal with than, for instance, when we theorise about the facts of a world-wide industrial system of immense complexity, and simplify our view by making sharp divisions between classes like producers and consumers, or between capitalists and the proletariat. It is easy to make out that 'capitalism' is an evil thing if we are content to *define* the word so as to include only the evils of the system.

III.

A meaning may be said to suffer from shortcomings when it needs further elucidation; when the definiteness of a statement is not sufficient to give to a particular audience a clear conception of what the statement is intended to assert. No situation is commoner, and for the most part it is easily dealt with, at any rate where the assertor is willing to face criticism. But sometimes when an assertor is asked to choose between two meanings he fails to understand the point of the request. Through ignorance of some of the relevant facts he fails to see an ambiguity which is seen by the audience, and he therefore cannot sympathise with their need for more explanation. They seem to him to be raising merely verbal points in a spirit of logomachy.

It is here that the common distinction between verbal and real questions loses its value. Doubts about an assertor's meaning, when raised by a critic who discovers ambiguity in them, are in a sense verbal—as referring to the meaning of a word—but they are also real because they arise from knowledge (or supposed knowledge) of facts which the critic thinks important. They thus raise questions of fact though on the surface they are questions about a meaning. It is their false appearance of being merely verbal that gives a shifty assertor his chance of escape from criticism by pretending to condemn the question as a quibble, or by offering to lend the critic a dictionary or an elementary text-book. The assertor then pretends that the question 'What do you include under X' is answered by giving the dictionary definition of that word, while in fact that is not what the critic is asking for. What his question really amounts to is a claim to have found the dictionary definition insufficient for the occasion. He claims that the word X is used in the statement so as to obscure the important distinction between AX and BX. The importance of the distinction consists, he alleges, in the fact that the statement is true if X is taken to mean AX only, but false if it is taken to include BX. The only way in which such criticism can be straightforwardly met is by discussing the question whether the distinction has or has

not the importance claimed for it. Even when the assertor has no wish to shuffle, but only dislikes the trouble of the inquiry, a mere assumption that the critic is mistaken does no more than evade the issue that is raised.

What helps to give this kind of evasion some plausibility is the difficulty of seeing that a statement thus challenged has, for those who find it ambiguous, *no meaning at all* until the ambiguity is removed. We naturally think of an ambiguous statement as having a meaning though not a perfectly clear one ; especially where, as often happens, each word in the statement is familiar and 'definite' and the form of the sentence is grammatical. To say that the statement has *no* meaning therefore seems on the face of it absurd.

The puzzle disappears, however, as soon as we remember that we are here considering a discussion between two parties on a particular occasion. From this point of view it does not matter how much meaning the statement may have for other audiences on other occasions. What matters is that here and now its meaning has entirely vanished for the time. The critic, let us suppose, knows very well that AX is Y, but doubts whether BX is so; if the latter assertion is made he will dispute it. Meanwhile he cannot find out, without the assertor's help, whether it is made in the statement or not. As between those two parties, therefore, the statement fails to answer the only question that is asked, and so might just as well be expressed in an unknown language. And if it be said—as Formal Logic insists—that a statement about the general connexion between X and Y must be intended to cover every sort of X, the answer is that in the interpretation of doubtful language there is no such necessity. Most statements, and especially those that are disputed—do not bear unmistakably on their face the full meaning that is in the speaker's mind. Life would not be long enough to allow of such explicitness of expression except where the statements are of an unusually simple and uncontroversial kind. As things are we habitually compromise between too much and too little explicitness, wishing on the one hand to avoid insulting or confusing our audience by excess of explanation, and hoping on the other hand that the risk of being misunderstood is negligible. A speaker's actual meaning is thus usually more or less a matter for guessing or judging as best we can, and the rigid rules of meaning laid down in Formal Logic become ludicrous if they claim authority to say what *must* be intended on a given occasion.

Remembering, then, that some of the intended qualifications of a statement are usually left unexpressed, the critic

cannot be blamed for asking whether a particular qualification is intended or not. To him the difference between AX and BX seems important, and if he is wrong in thinking so he would be glad to know what his error is. His only alternative indeed is to give a flat denial of the original statement without first trying to find out what the assertor means by it. And while either method may in the end lead to further explanations the latter has at least no visible advantage. Indeed a critic who makes reasonable allowance for difficulties of expression will usually do more towards harmonising conflicting views than one who pedantically takes his stand on the strict letter of the statement. There can be no harm in giving the assertor a chance of amending the form of his assertion.

But in any case shortcomings of meaning, when due to a definitely seen ambiguity, are for the time destructive of meaning altogether. When and while we see an ambiguity in a statement we can see *no* meaning there. We are in effect asked to accept we know not what assertion, with all that may be remotely implied in it.

The general result of the above remarks may be shortly summarised as follows. Our attempt has been to find the sources of the plausibility of certain lapses of meaning which are liable to occur in discussion between two parties. For convenience we have distinguished roughly three main divisions of the subject: the mistakes made by an audience in interpreting a speaker's statement; a speaker's vacillation between tautology and rash assertion, under pressure of criticism; and a speaker's failure to understand the charge of ambiguity brought against his statement. In all three branches of the inquiry we find the same need of keeping clear the distinction between meaning as it exists loosely for people in general, and meaning as required to constitute a clear issue between the parties to a dispute. The former view of the nature of meaning takes no account of a statement's special context, or the thoughts that happen to be in the minds of the disputing parties. It corresponds to the rough general account that is given of the meaning of separate words by a dictionary; and it assumes that a statement's meaning is decided simply by the dictionary-meaning of the words used in it and by the form of the sentence. For the purpose of our present inquiry this view

of the nature of meaning will not suffice. The meaning which constitutes an issue between two disputing parties is a more complicated matter. Instead of being known to us through our acquaintance with words and forms of speech, it is only suggested to us by such acquaintance, and is not capable of being decisively known by means of it. Ignorant or careless misunderstandings are indeed occasionally met with, but little difficulty or logical interest attaches to them.

The context of a statement, we have found, is often excusably doubtful until further explanations are given. In this respect it differs from the context of a word, since the latter is found at once in the sentence in which the word occurs. The most serious mistakes of meaning arise from wrong assumptions on the part of an audience as to the inferences (or corollaries) intended by a speaker to be drawn from a fact or a rule asserted by him. Unless we reckon a statement's corollaries as included in its meaning, our view of its meaning stops short at the very point where difference of opinion is most likely to be hidden, and where accordingly the statement may escape needed criticism. On the other hand it is also notorious that when we do try to read between the lines of a statement we are liable to see behind it corollaries that were not intended. Recognition of these two opposite risks is a first step towards their prevention.

As regards vacillation, the chief motive for it is the speaker's excessive devotion to some belief which he has accepted uncritically. There is always a temptation to simplify our general views—*e.g.*, our views about particular causes and effects—by ignoring exceptions. And many speakers feel a desire to defend by any available means a view to which they have committed themselves. When better means are not forthcoming they are tempted to use for this purpose the simple plan of so defining the words of the statement as to make its denial a contradiction in terms. What they then forget is that a statement the denial of which is self-contradictory, and therefore devoid of meaning, is for that very reason devoid of meaning itself. The first and fundamental condition of meaning in a statement is that acceptance and denial of it shall be equal possibilities until a choice is made between them. In other words, a statement makes no assertion unless it claims to answer a *question* which has meaning as expressing real doubt. So that a statement which cannot be questioned is one that makes no assertion and is an empty form of words.

A speaker's failure to see an ambiguity which his audience sees is, we found, due to a difference in the view of the *facts*

that is taken by the two parties. This does not mean that it is impossible for an ambiguity to arise from the 'double meanings' which so many words have, but only that this simpler kind of ambiguity is so easily corrected that it is hardly worth considering here. The ambiguity that really causes trouble—and against which we can never be finally secure—is that which occurs where different views are taken of the importance of the distinction between AX and BX. It follows from what was said above about a statement's context that the predicate term in any statement of fact (S is X) and the antecedent term in any statement of rule (if X, then Y) are always the middle term of a syllogism. They must in fact be so if either statement is to have a meaning at all, since a descriptive name has no meaning unless something can be inferred from it, and a statement of rule has no meaning except so far as it contemplates being applied in particular cases. That is why a statement found to be ambiguous is for the time entirely devoid of meaning. Whether it be a statement of fact or of rule, the audience distinguishes between two possible inferences from it, one of which seems to them false while the other seems true. And until a clear indication is given of the inference actually intended by the speaker the question that is nominally put before them for acceptance or denial is a sham one. Their only possible answer is Yes *and* No till the speaker can make up his mind to choose between the two suggested meanings.

The liability of our statements to be found ambiguous, then, corresponds exactly to the incompleteness of our knowledge of facts and of the rules that, applied to the facts, throw further light upon them. When the critic of a statement is right in his claim that the distinction between AX and BX is important, the position between the disputing parties is that the assertor is given a chance of learning something new to him. It is therefore only the dogmatic assertor who can resent or try to evade the question as to his meaning. Anyone who realises the difficulty of reaching truth welcomes the accusation of an ambiguity in his statement. For even when he disputes the importance of the critic's distinction, that dispute itself turns upon a question of fact that requires settlement.

Taken together, these views of meaning may help to explain some of the expressions that have been used by

pragmatists about the nature of truth. Pragmatism preserves consistently the distinction between truth and reality, regarding the former as a quality attaching to assertions, not to things or events. And since assertions are recognisable—and open to criticism—only in the form of statements with a meaning, the question whether a given assertion is true cannot begin to be considered so long as there is any doubt about the statement's meaning. Now we have seen that though a statement is always made by putting words together, its meaning is not decisively found by putting together the separate word-meanings. The question "what the assertor wants to do with it" is the decisive factor, and uncertainty on this point is the chief effective source of misunderstandings. That is to say, we must consider the *consequences* of a statement in order to find its meaning. It is only in this sense that truth is concerned with consequences. Meaning depends on consequences, and truth depends on meaning; but that is very far from saying that the question whether an assertion is true depends on whether we approve of the consequences of believing it. No pragmatist, even though he recognises the occasional value of 'bias' in the attainment of truth, can ever have wished to deny its much more frequent misleading power. Whatever may be the shortcomings of pragmatism, a disregard of the most elementary and best-known sources of error is not among them.

Another doctrine that has given trouble is that all recognisable truth is *truth for a purpose*. This has sometimes been taken as denying that the search for truth can ever be free from sordid interests. Here again an excuse can be made for the mistake, since pragmatists do insist on the necessity for taking an interest in a question before we can try to answer it. Unfortunately both purpose and 'interest' are words that are capable of a low interpretation which may naturally raise suspicions. But the mistake may also be made less extravagantly by giving the pragmatist credit for some loftiness of intention and supposing him to mean that when the purpose is respectable enough every other consideration must give way to it. Under this misconception of pragmatism its doctrine is supposed to be useful in Christian apologetics; as saying, for instance, that if the fear of hell helps us to lead good lives, that would be a satisfactory proof of the real existence of hell.

It is arguable that one or two expressions used by William James give some excuse for this supposition, but even then it does not follow that any such doctrine is essential to pragmatism. At any rate, if we take 'purpose' as meaning

inferential purpose we are free to understand the pragmatist view as merely condensing what has here been said about the effect of the context of statements upon their meaning. If it be true that the meaning of a statement depends on what the assertor "wants to do with it"—that is to say, on the assertor's "inferential purpose" in making the statement—then the inference is an essential part of the assertion made by him. His statement may be true for that purpose while it is false for another; or *vice versâ*. In other words, its truth or falsity depends upon the meaning given to it. The purpose of a statement thus becomes indistinguishable from its meaning; and since there cannot be truth without meaning there cannot be the recognition of a truth without taking account of its purpose. Similarly 'interest' need mean no more than the desire to solve a difficulty or remove a doubt. Pragmatism emphasises the fact that every assertion, as such, is an answer to a question—an attempt to remove a doubt that exists before the assertion is made. So that a statement which professes to be strictly undeniable thereby confesses its lack of meaning and its failure to assert anything at all.

It is of course admitted that a statement may be true even though you or I do not understand its meaning, but unless or until some one understands it there is no *recognition* of its truth. About unrecognised truth, as such, pragmatism has nothing to say. Since truth, for pragmatism, is a quality of assertions, not of things, its recognition requires a statement and a person for whom that statement's meaning exists.

The commonest attitude of our minds towards any truth we recognise is that we understand some but not all of the purposes (inferences) for which it may be used. Thus room is left for the progress of knowledge, successful new uses of old truths being in effect new truths, and the failure of old truths in new uses being needed limitations of their value. So long, therefore, as any truth serves the purposes for which we use it there is nothing to complain of, and when we find a purpose for which it does not serve we are still acquiring further knowledge; we have learnt a further piece of truth which also has its purpose. A 'truth' from which nothing at all could be inferred would only be a statement without meaning.

III.—LITERARY TRUTH AND REALISM, THE ÆSTHETIC FUNCTION OF LITERATURE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY (I).

By P. Leon.

The realistic movement in literature is now past its heyday, and if it is not true to say that a reaction has set in against it, it is at any rate beyond the self-conscious stage, and its contribution to literature and criticism, though not precisely analysed, is taken as granted, with acquiescence but without insistence. Such terms as "real," "true to life," "living," or their longer and more disguised equivalents, still form, as they did long before its advent, the staple of written as well as oral criticism. If, in the attempt to elicit what underlies these terms, metaphysical and logical theories have been summarily and roughly stated, indulgence may be asked on the ground that, though some philosophical standpoint is necessary for the proper understanding of the problem, the conclusion here drawn does not wholly depend upon the particular principles employed.

The above-mentioned terms all seem to imply a reference to an external reality and a demand for conformity with it. To begin, then, from the beginning, some reflection on our commerce with this reality, and on the meaning of this reference, will be desirable. The intelligence as dealing with the real may be characterised as theoretic (scientific and philosophical), practical (economic and ethical, to use recent terminology), and æsthetic. In this last aspect it traces in the real, connexions variously described as tragic, comic, grotesque, bizarre, etc. "Contrasts" seems the most comprehensive term (here we but name the problem, allowing a general definition to follow rather than precede the particular inquiry). But there is a stage antecedent to this differentiation of aspects, and at this first stage the real has been said either to be feeling or to be given us in feeling. Fewer difficulties ensue if we say that at first we apprehend reality unanalysed, and the object, together with our relation to it, can be characterised only by a specific modification of our

feeling. The important point is that it is in this way and in this way only that we grasp the whole of any object, beginning and end in one, at any moment of time (say "London" or "Aristotle's Ethics"), as contrasted with our piecemeal reference to it, which is spread over a period of time. This holds true even when the apprehension has been reached or at least modified by discursive reflection and learning. It is in this way also, if at all, that we grasp the totality of reals in religious, mystical, or cosmic emotion. We have here a starting point which we never leave and which is also a final stage, and since it is the only communion with totality, it is rightly considered basic, the alpha and omega of experience. It is this that "intellectualists" are said to falsify and to it all judgments are referred whenever conformity with reality is demanded. For what we are here given is deemed reality par excellence. But if at this point the intelligence is dowered with all the riches of the universe, it is also extremely poor. Having everything, we yet have nothing. For we can say nothing about our possessions. As soon as we begin to do this, we select and abstract. As theoretic, the intelligence tears out general characters from their concrete context, traces universal connexions, forms laws and systems, never, of course, exhausting any whole; as practical, it concentrates on ends and means, on those characteristics of reals which make for their acceptance or rejection. At the very least, that division is involved which is necessitated by discursive thinking and talking, and that divorce from totality which is required to constitute relevance in any universe of discourse. Falsification is entailed by taking the part for the whole, and modification at least by the very fact of diremption from the whole. A corrective is supplied by opposition of a different abstraction or by supplementation, and both are effected by a continual return to the stage where we have apprehension of totality. It is this return and beginning anew that would seem to constitute all testing of judgments by comparison with "reality".

Now, leaving creation or invention out of the question, and granting that the poet (this term will have to stand for every artist in words) deals with the reality with which the scientist deals, if the æsthetic intelligence also operates by abstraction, in insisting on taking literature as an account of anything and on testing it as such, we shall have to allow for the abstraction at least. Literature does involve abstraction and modification, and what determines these is relevance to a situation or effect. This is obvious from many considerations: we may reflect on the manipulation of facts

by the writers of historical dramas and novels and by the literary or rhetorical historians among the ancients; or we may point to the saying that in actual life there is neither tragedy nor comedy and no climax, and to the attempt of Zola and others to dispense with these on the ground of their distorting influence. Zola also protested against the omissions of certain writers and provided his grime novels as a corrective and addendum. He saw, in fact, that abstraction was involved in two ways: (*a*) in obtaining any æsthetic effect at all, and (*b*) in obtaining a particular effect. For the same material seen from different angles, or submitted to a different abstraction, may be variously a tragedy, a comedy, a tragi-comedy, etc. The truth of this is well illustrated by a whole species of writing which we may perhaps class as "supplementary literature," corresponding to variations on a theme in music. The characters or situations of one writer are taken up by another, and by means of certain rearrangement, or by supplementing what may be considered an omission, a quite different effect is produced, there being all along an accompanying reference to the original work. This is not always parody. The dramas of the different Greek tragedians resulting from different handling of a common tradition, look almost like rejoinders to each other and sometimes were this. In this light we may regard the treatment of ancient themes from a modern standpoint.

Necessary and obvious as this abstraction is, nevertheless the desire for the wholesale conformity of the impression we get from a book with the impression we get from life seems inexpugnable and, together with its inevitable disappointment, it is attested in many ways. Young people especially, as we are warned, form false ideas about life from books, and are rendered discontented with it. This is no doubt an evil, and is due to not knowing what to look for in literature. The poetic discontent with life is familiar and results from the discovery that life is not a poem, not even a bad and very long epic. In Flaubert's Madame Bovary the whole drama centres upon a woman's desire that life should be a romantic novel. To a certain extent we are all Don Quixotes riding forth with the craving to meet with the adventures we have read of. Yet meeting with these adventures will never satisfy us, and the craving can be allayed in one way only, by re-reading the particular books or by applying to life the æsthetic abstraction and selection and so producing similar or different æsthetic works ourselves.

The same demand appears in many different forms, but we may sum it up as a requirement for the conformity of

the impression left on us by a work of literature with the normal view of life. Stated in this way, many objections can be urged against it. In the first place, each man's view of life is unique and the normal view is not properly anyone's. Then, any individual's mind is at different times either at the level of almost mere animal sensation, or at the stage of apprehending totality, or, departing from that stage, the mind enters on its abstracting work and is preoccupied either by scientific or practical interests at different times. With which of these experiences is the conformity to be? Only the second can be called a complete view of the whole of life, but no duplicate of this experience can be expected. We may return from our abstractions to it, but we cannot expect these, the parts, to be the whole. Literature which, like science, abstracts without exhausting, cannot give us totality any more than science can. Nor can we demand that the æsthetic experience should conform with the purely theoretic or ethical experiences, unless we think that it is the same as these. Is the conformity to be, then, with our normal æsthetic view? But even when, by exclusion, we take up the purely æsthetic attitude towards the whole or any whole, we still have a total which can yield every æsthetic effect, tragic, comic, etc., effects which obtain their individuality by isolation, but which, in the lump, collapse into the continuum of undifferentiated potentiality. To demand conformity with this, or to require a differentiation to be the same as, or like, the undifferentiated, would be absurd. It would be equally absurd to require conformity or identity between one differentiation and another, *i.e.*, to expect a particular effect (*e.g.*, the tragic) to conform with a different effect (*e.g.*, the comic), or the tragic of a particular kind to conform with the tragic of another kind. We can only demand, then, that an effect shall conform with itself, be itself, which is no demand for conformity at all, and means the giving up of reference to or comparison with anything. Again, the æsthetic function of the intelligence, in the majority of people, is dormant or weak or not receptive of a great variety of effects. The treatment of life that makes the most general appeal is the humorous or grotesque, and often of the Rabelaisian kind. But it involves as much arrangement and abstraction as does the treatment of life as a tragedy or magnificent pageant, and though it is as justifiable as any other treatment, it cannot be set up as the only right one. The impression of life left by a writer's works (say mainly tragic) will not always conform even with his own view of life, because, firstly, his tragedies are invented and are

not slices of actual life, secondly, if they were this, they would there at any rate be weakened and blunted by being in a context mainly non-æsthetic or at any rate non-tragic, thirdly, because the writer's attitude is not always æsthetic but sometimes theoretic or practical.

This reference of whole to whole as between a work of art and life is seen, then, from the nature of the æsthetic intelligence to be impossible. A similar reference is applied to parts, and is involved in the use of such terms as "improbable" or "impossible," at any rate if taken strictly. Certain characters in literature are said to be impossible, or abstractions, or unreal; certain coincidences are condemned as unlikely: or, on the other hand, Meredith and Henry James are praised for their exact analysis of characters and minds, as if this were the essential merit of their works; and the novelist or poet has been said to be the best psychologist. He may be; but the exactness of the analysis, whatever its value, does not constitute the essence of the artistic merit, and the question is whether it can be judged as exactness or accuracy. It has been assumed that the imaginative writer is dealing with an actual particular, and since judgments about actual particulars can be criticised by testimony and the evidences of the senses, his work, too, should allow of the same test. But the assumption is not legitimate. The imaginative writer imagines. He is not talking about Smith or Jones whom we know or can get to know. Confirmation or refutation can come only from knowledge of universal connexions, and for the criticism to be really as authoritative as it pretends to be, our knowledge would have to be much more axiomatic than it is, and reality would also have to be more of a system. We do not possess an exact ethology to tell us in detail what a human being can or cannot do, and much, if not the greater part of, reality is mere brute fact. If we cannot see why some of it should be as it is, we cannot say either that it could not be different. Horace disapproves of the painter in whose picture "a woman fair to the waist were to end foul in the tail of an ugly fish;" but our knowledge cannot assure us of the impossibility or even the improbability of such a phenomenon.

To apply such criticism at all involves taking characters in literature generically or as types, and to this there are strong objections. If we urge that Othello or Macbeth ought not to be made to act thus, because a jealous man or a murderer would not act in that way, the answer is that they are not, the one a jealous man, and the other a murderer, but Othello, jealous if we like, but only in that particular and

perhaps unique way, and Macbeth who murdered a king, and behaved in that particular way. Shakespeare is not analysing a jealous man or a murderer but Othello and Macbeth, and they are what Shakespeare has made them. Then there can be no further argument. No number of laws can assure us that those concrete individuals in those particular circumstances will not act in that particular way. Part of the peculiarity of their characters may be those very actions we object to. In actual life our judgment on men does not generally prophesy their future, but rather waits on it for its own completion. As no verification is then possible either by evidence or deduction from universal principles, the question of truth, reality, probability and possibility is really finished with.

The literature of the "type" has long since been condemned both on the score of truth and of art, but the theory that art gives us the universal in the individual is sometimes supposed to be different from that which says that it gives us the typical. It is hard to see that it is different or that it is not an abuse of logical terms. But if it means that we are presented with an attribute inherent in an individual stripped of irrelevant detail which obscures that attribute, art will still have to be condemned, judged by the realistic standard. For in concrete reality, qualitatively, no detail is irrelevant or insignificant absolutely. It qualifies both the whole and the parts. Therefore, so far as the universal can be presented in the individual, not only does the one suffer by being crushed (for it is always too large for the individual), and the other by being magnified, but both are modified by the stripping of the irrelevant detail. For the very obscuration is an essential quality, and its removal causes the colours to be more pronounced and glaring as it were, and the forms to stand out harder and more clearly defined than they are in reality. This may not be an æsthetic defect; but it is a defect if the test of reference to reality is admitted.

It is not of course always admitted, even by those who use the terms "probable," "possible," etc. History, it is allowed, is a network of coincidences and improbabilities, and is full of extravagant and unlikely characters. In life we meet with people who, we sometimes say, are unreal or as much abstractions as the thinnest character in a poor novel. Again, the life in literature is said to be more probable and more real than actual life. But as nothing can be more real than the real, the terms in the above cases are obviously abused. They are used to denote æsthetic qualities, those of being striking or of possessing a certain order and unity, and of

course there is nothing to be objected to this, except that we may protest against misleading terminology.

Zola's *Le Roman Expérimental* is the *locus classicus* for the view of the function of literature here examined. His mere statement of the ideal of literature as an experimental science or as a science at all, is enough to throw light on its real nature. It is sufficient to ask which part of the novel is the datum, which the analysis, which the new conditions introduced, the result, the hypothesis, the verification and proof. At the most it could bear an analogy with the mere setting forth of an hypothesis, but this is not the whole of scientific investigation and still less is it experiment. What Zola actually does in his novels, is to incorporate assumptions or conclusions or data of science. But this is to make use of science, not to contribute to it as he thought he was doing. If science were more demonstrative than it is, we could refute or confirm some of Zola's assumptions, and that is all his relation to science. He made use of police reports, statistics, medical journals, etc.; and the scientist has to do this. But he does this in order to prove some universal connexion. But what does Zola prove? He merely restates, and wrongly, since what in the scientific datum may be a conjunction in a concrete, in his novel, to be considered from the point of view of information and knowledge at all, will be treated as a universal connexion. Thus if *L'Assommoir* is to be taken as the description of a particular case, it is a mere re-hash of Zola's original information, and anyhow it is not accompanied by the evidence, which is the most vital thing; if its import is general, then it is a generalisation from that information without argument or proof, and presented not as a system of general propositions, but as an attempt at exhausting a concrete whole by means of singular judgments, which is absurd. For Zola would not admit his book presented a particular aspect only of a social class. He would say he gave the truth about that class. But how could he give all there was to be said about a whole social class, and that, too, in what has at the same time to be the history of a few particular families?

Yet novels are sometimes spoken of as valuable contributions, at least in the way of material, to psychology or sociology. But can they be this? As a matter of fact the psychoanalyst makes use of the records of actual dreams, not of dreams in a novel, the sociologist of statistics of poverty and not of the descriptions of it in novels, the doctor of actual cases of delirium tremens, not of Zola's picture (Zola made use of the doctor's description). Nor could this be otherwise.

We must repeat, literature does not admit of verification. It is professedly not an account of the actual and it professedly does present us with the concrete. If, then, it is to be treated as an account at all, verification would only be possible if reality were such that every feature in a concrete were there necessarily, by a necessary connexion with every other. If literature is a science, everything in it must be looked on as a case of "a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter". The scientist does of course make use of testimony, and descriptions or enumerations of the details of a concrete. But of course this concrete must be actual. By information we do mean information about the actual, and what does not admit of verification or questioning is not information.

Moreover, those descriptions the scientist uses are such as are relevant to his science; or at any rate that is all in them that can interest him. But to what science are the details in some realist novels and the order in which they are presented relevant? They are intended, apparently, for all the different sciences, and the novel should then ideally be an undigested miscellany. In fact, as they did not admit the claim of æsthetic relevance (because, as they said, this involved falsification) and as they did not look to any particular science, the utterances of delirium, where there is no conscious selection or arrangement, should have been the strict ideal of the realists. If they do not quite come up to it, this is because, in spite of their protestation, they were actuated by æsthetic motives. As Brunetière observes, they had the making of good Vaudevillists. This is particularly obvious in *Nana*, the value of which Zola himself imagined was that it brought damning evidence against a social class, but which is interesting because in most of it grotesque of a high order is achieved.

It is because there is an essential difference between the theoretic and the æsthetic activity that imaginative works digressing into reflection or information are difficult. If the main motive has been æsthetic, the information may be discounted or passed over as information without our enjoyment suffering much; but if the work is passed on to the theoretic intelligence as material, the æsthetic influence cannot so easily be discounted. Reordering, different emphasis, and elimination are essential; above all the æsthetic lingering on points that are to the theoretic intelligence meaningless is offensive. Virgil's *Georgics* for the practical farmer would be an unmitigated nuisance. Lucretius' science is less of an offence to the poet than his poetry is to the scientist, and Plato's philosophy suffers more from his literature than

his literature from his philosophy. In modern novels, often so ambitious to satisfy the theoretic interest, the conflict is most acute. On the one hand they deal with concrete persons and their story, on the other hand with general problems, psychological or sociological. Now as no number of general problems will exhaust anything that will look like a concrete, and on the other hand not everything in a concrete can be relevant to a general problem, there is continually a discrepancy between the two kinds of interest. Besides, a general problem we want stated in a way that will admit of argument, and the latter can always be eluded in a novel or play, under the plea of particularity, which yet not being of the actual, is beyond the criticism of evidence also.

As History in a way attempts to exhaust concrete reality, literature, it might seem, should be compared with it. Now when this comparison is made, it is obviously not the history which, like science, traces universal connexions, nor the history which is a criticism of testimony, that is thought of, but the history which tries to give a picture. Very often such history is obviously moulded by æsthetic motives. Livy wrote melodrama, Tacitus macabre, and Thucydides has been accused of being a Greek tragedian. And it is a question whether, when personal idiosyncrasies and prejudices of politics, morals, religion, etc., have been eliminated, the æsthetic factor which influences at least the arrangement and emphasis, can be eliminated also. If history tries to avoid it, does it not become mere criticism of testimony, or chronicle, or a picture plus an appendix of corrigenda et addenda which, if incorporated in the main body, would make any picture impossible? Still, without laying down the ideal of finality or absoluteness for a synoptic view or æsthetic effect, criticism on the ground of truth is here possible, just because history does deal with an actual individual concrete and not with an imagined generalised concrete.

Besides, literature would seem to be much more ambitious than history. It does not always confine itself to a particular period or place, and we should have to claim for it the function of a generalised picture of the concrete universe. Indeed it has been said that while science abstracts, art gives us the individual and, by implication, the whole. It is true that it builds up a concrete, but not a whole, if that whole is anything outside the work. Literature has its own abstraction, that required for æsthetic order, and it abstracts as much as science. There is, as we have seen, only one way of apprehending totality which involves no abstraction at all;

but all we can say of this is that it is a mere point of contact with reality.

It remains to be seen whether, in our many particular judgments on literature, we do consistently demand truth or conformity with reality, or whether a different interpretation of them is not possible. We have already seen how "probable," "possible" and "real" are used to denote æsthetic qualities. Some other cases may help. When we condemn the coincidences in the *Vicar of Wakefield*, we do so not really because such coincidences may not occur in real life; they very well might. But a world in which there is such continual interference by the *deus ex machina* is too mechanical to produce any genuine æsthetic effect. So the drama of intrigue and of elaborate cycle and epicycle of plot is faulty, not because it is unreal, but because it can produce nothing more æsthetic than the bothered surprise felt at the explication of a Chinese puzzle or at the performance of a piece of jugglery. On the other hand the supernatural does not jar or obtrude itself in Homer or Coleridge's *Ancient Mariner*, because no æsthetic defect results. There may even be good novels without "real" characters. It may be hard to decide whether Hardy's heroes and heroines are persons or world forces; but for the aesthetic effect for which they are used, the question does not arise. Many so-called impossible characters in novels or plays are really mad or at least so capricious or imbecile that we cannot take an interest in what they do or say. Or generally they are not what the author intended them to be; and this is the important point. For, once we enter the world of any imaginative work, we do not get out again to compare it with our own world; but in it we do pass valuations just as we do in ours. These valuations are suggested and invited by the author himself. This is done either by the expressed commentary of the writer or by the requirements of the situation or æsthetic effect. Either the author himself declares, or the whole work demands that such a person be taken to be of a certain sort, *e.g.*, heroic, knavish, foolish, clever, etc., and this person must strike us as being what he is intended or required to be, or else the effect cannot be produced. This is the real conformity demanded. To take one example: It is not very serious to urge against Prince Muishkin's eight-page harangues in Dostoievsky's *Idiot* that in real life brevity is enforced by interruption even in the most patient and polite conversational company; for even if that were the case, deture from reality in one direction or another is necessary. Again, to decide whether such an extraordinary character is

possible or not, we might want more experience of human beings than we possess; or we might think that nothing is impossible or improbable in human character, and that close scrutiny shows every one to be extraordinary; at any rate we find in history stranger characters than Prince Muishkin. But we can all say what we think of him, and if his actions struck us as foolish from any point of view, his speeches as unctuous or empty, and himself as a shallow salvationist, that would affect our appreciation of the novel considerably. We should not be able to regard the Prince as the Man-God with wisdom and love so great and simple that to ordinary men it appears idiocy, and yet they turn to it instinctively each in his time of stress. And if we did not regard him thus, the whole novel would be out of shape. There can be no situation, no contrast, no movement, no novel in fact, except to the man whose mental and moral equipment allows him to judge the Prince as Dostoievsky did.

Differences of literary appreciations, as Burke observed, are to a large extent not due to difference of æsthetic outlook or endowment. Melodrama is not melodrama to the man who enjoys it, but drama, and this it would perhaps be to us too, if the hero and heroine seemed to us good and the villain bad instead of their all appearing equally stupid nonentities. What makes the difference is wider experience and keener and more critical insight in human affairs. Hence it comes that, as we grow older, we cast aside the favourite books of our youth, without necessarily changing our literary taste. To produce work which will make a lasting appeal, a writer must then possess right sense and right feeling to enable him to judge of men and appraise them aright. At any rate he must possess these if he is to appeal to men endowed with these qualities. But the latter are only necessary conditions, not the essence of his artistic power. They concern the means only, necessary to produce the æsthetic end in a certain medium and appealing to certain men. And our valuations are not the æsthetic criticism or appreciation itself, though they are in a subordinate way inevitable. It is through them and after them that the other is attained. And about it little can be said, and it is a fact that criticism and literary history, except when purely technical, have little relevant to say. The opinions of the author, his moral outlook, his biography, the history of the times, etc., are discussed at large, but they are not to the point. Of course we can usefully name, compare, and classify different effects, attempt the interpretation of one art through another or of one literary work through criticism which is

itself another artistic creation, and in history trace the emergence of new effects if there are such. We may say that pathos, for example, and the inclusion of the comic within the tragic are comparatively modern. It is true that every æsthetic work is unique, but so is everything else, and naming or classification has its use here no more and no less than elsewhere.

In this way we can interpret the realist movement itself so as to discount the implications of its name. It was valuable not as a revolt against what was untrue or unreal and not because it yielded more truth and reality itself, but because it broke down limits to the æsthetic activity, themselves based on no æsthetic grounds. Just as there had been no reason why the dramatis personæ should be mainly royal or classical or mythological, or why their minds should be confined within a limited range of ideas and subjects, so, later, there was no reason why in tales and novels the characters should be mainly mediævalist or have a peculiar attitude to nature and their souls, although there was no reason why they should not. New fields were opened for the old æsthetic effects, and thus new creation, instead of imitation, was possible. At the same time new æsthetic effects emerged. The grime literature, for example, when successful, was justified in its comparative exclusion of the good and pleasant, because thus it extracted a peculiar development in gloom, not present in that form before. It was something new, too, to dwell on the contrast between the baffling pointlessness of life and the expectation of purpose or system cherished by the writer or reader. That was the working out of the mood of interrogation. In so far as these effects were well worked out they were justified; but their justification does not lie in the fact that life is either grimy or pointless any more than the justification of Æschylus' tragedies lies in the fact that Destiny really works in the way in which it works in them.

We conclude, then, that the essence of literature is to create what we prefer to call certain contrasts, using also such terms as order, movement, measured development; and our enjoyment lies in the contemplation of these. That and nothing else is its significance.

This may seem to bring the Muses down from their heights, and it will certainly shock the moralist and didactic view which in general is openly condemned and latently assumed by most critics. It is admitted that in literature we cannot expect metaphysics in the way in which we do from a philosopher, and also that it is not a sermon, or didactic in

any way. Such dicta as that poetry is the criticism of life or the noble expression of noble ideas, may perhaps seem old-fashioned. But yet we cannot easily rid ourselves of the idea that the value of a literary work and our appreciation of it, are in some intimate way connected with a philosophy and *lebensanschauung*; that if the work does not preach, it at least shows us or makes us aware of the significance, value, intensity, nobility of life: and to the philosophically minded it might appear that through literature we have perhaps the best loophole into the nature of ultimate reality. But the truth behind such ideas is one that can be put into a tautological judgment. "Significance," "value," "intensity," "nobility," are used in an æsthetic sense, *i.e.*, "interesting," or "striking"; and æsthetic qualities cannot be spoken of in terms of ethical qualities, except so far as we always speak of one thing in terms of another, which is a gain as well as a loss to the understanding. We mean, then, that literature shows us life as interesting, or, more precisely, not life, but the life in the story, drama or poem, and this is the same as saying that an æsthetic work is æsthetic. Every view that in any way attempts to resolve the æsthetic activity either as creative of order, contrasts, etc., or as contemplative of these, into a statement or implication that anything is this or that, *i.e.*, into any act of attribution or predication, must be condemned.

For if an author's general opinions and philosophy are materially connected with his work, as they must be for him to teach us anything directly or indirectly about the meaning of anything, how is it that when they clash with our own opinions, that makes no difference to our appreciation? Why do we not contradict? If we do not have the views on psychology and the pre-existence of the soul, which Wordsworth had when writing the "Ode on Intimations of Immortality," that poem does not prove or show to us anything about life's origin or goal or value. But yet we enjoy it, and the question of psychology or the problem of pre-existence or of the value of life does not occur in the enjoyment but only in subsequent analysis, and is dismissed again in a second æsthetic reading. The same may be said of Shelley's atheism or pantheism and Browning's optimism, at any rate as long as they write poetry and not mere argument or dogma. If in spite of the obsoleteness of Æschylus' belief in the working of Ate, his tragedies, which are developments of that one theme, still appeal to us, that is because the æsthetic interest is in the mere contemplation of the rhythmic development of the theme, and is entirely indifferent to its intellectual or

moral significance. Hardy presents us with a universe which is the plaything of a blind or malignant Aphrodite enthroned as omnipotent Fate, while in our world Aphrodite is a powerful but subordinate deity. In Dostoievsky we get a vision of life as an Inferno seen through blood, out of which Love, the Redeemer, leads us to a beatific Paradise; but neither his pessimism nor his optimism may convince or enlighten us. Again, how, we may ask, can we enjoy reading a man who mocks at the things we most reverence, and although Jingoism, especially that of other nations, is to us an abomination, how can we enjoy even *Deutschland über alles ?* The mere putting of these questions is tainted with the vice of referring the artistic work to an outside reality. Strictly speaking, the author mocks not at our world but at the world in his book, and so do we; the world and the mockery are created *pari passu*. The Deutschland that should be *über alles* is the Deutschland in the song, and so it should. As far as our immediate appreciation goes, Dostoievsky sees an Inferno and Hardy a fateful Aphrodite not in the world, but in the world of their books, and so do we; and, what is really to the point, such a world deploying itself in that particular way is æsthetically striking or interesting.

Whatever the author's general view or synopsis of life is, all that matters is that he should be able to make correct particular valuations or at least such as agree with ours. He must recognise a good, brave, bad, clever or astute man when he sees one, and his valuations of his own characters, expressed or implied, must be ours. For it is only through, though not in, these, that we get the æsthetic appreciation. To that extent we do not commit ourselves to what is ordinarily meant by art for art's sake. The great writer does need great wisdom and profound insight into life, at least as a necessary condition to the possibility of his appealing to wise men; and so literature is in some way a criticism of life. But, and this is important, the wisdom and criticism are not such as can be expressed in general judgments or formulæ. If we are not careful we shall soon refer to external reality again. Those valuations are not on general qualities; they are on concrete wholes, those in the book. Ours, too, should be this, and if we make them anything else we do so at our own risk, and in any case we are getting away from the essential interest of the work, which is not even in the particular valuations but in the contrast or movement presented, the valuations being only a means, though of course we intend here a distinction not a division between end and means.

We can from the analysis of an author's different works extract a body of general opinions, and from a knowledge of the man or his biography we may feel sure that our formulation is correct. Every author, as every other man, no doubt holds some general opinions, even when not explicitly formulated, and he must hold them sincerely. He cannot manufacture them *ad hoc*. If Hardy had "got up" his pessimism from Schopenhauer's books, and used it as a working hypothesis to compose gloomy novels, these could not have been what they are. These particular opinions are necessary conditions for the production of this particular work. But so are many other things: that the author should have been born in a certain place, live in a certain period, marry or be unmarried, or divorced, etc. The artistic product is an essence distilled from his complete personality and experience; but it itself is not these, and the æsthetic interest in it is not an interest in the writer's personality, experience, and thought or any part thereof. It is not really an appreciation of his wisdom, penetration, sensibility, etc. These have to have been there, but they are all subsumed under the æsthetic function, and we do not notice or value them until their absence interferes with our enjoyment, *i.e.*, interrupts our æsthetic absorption and activity.

When we speak of a certain function or faculty working, we do not, of course, speak of an independent and isolated entity; we mean that the whole man concentrates in a certain activity, and all his other interests are contributory but subordinate. That contribution in subordination will be possible in appreciating a successful work of art. The intelligence *qua* theoretic and ethical is content not to be roused to contradiction; its satisfaction is quiescence. But if the writer shocks our value judgments, or in a running commentary makes general reflections, or by labelling or obtrusive implication invites us to judge his work as testimony, then that subordination is broken and interests non-æsthetic are brought into prominent action. The view of art for art's sake is wrong in so far as it suggests that the æsthetic act can exist in splendid isolation instead of being concreted in the whole personality and requiring the whole of the individual's experience; it is, however, right in insisting that the æsthetic appreciation is of æsthetic qualities and of no other. The division is wrong; the distinction is right.

When, then, the æsthetic activity, from the point of view of literature at any rate, has been seen to be the creation and contemplation of contrasts, movement, development, and has been marked off from everything else, we cannot ask for or

explain its significance, value or reality in such a way as to confound it with the theoretic or ethical intelligence. It is itself, and its significance or value can be discussed only in the same way as that of thinking, or the moral life, or experience as a whole.

(To be continued.)

IV.—REALISM AND IMAGINATION.

By Joshua C. Gregory.

If Charles Lamb could be induced to discuss "Space, Time and Deity" he would approve of the order of statement in this essay. Its propositions have not been matured but brought "to market in the green ear". It discusses "defective discoveries, as they arise, without waiting for their full development," and, like the minds which Lamb preferred, is "suggestive merely". The arrival of a great system of thought is a time for passing suggestions to and fro. Before it can be fully understood and justly appraised there must be a period of twilight when we perceive dimly and think fitfully. Minerva cannot be "born in panoply": she must be panoplied step by step. Attempts to understand, suggestions arising from these attempts, criticisms hesitatingly based upon these suggestions, are all this essay pretends to give.

Geographical travelling is relatively independent of its starting-point: a circuit of the globe begun at London need only differ in order of visitation from a circuit begun at New York and the same scenes are experienced whatever the order of visitation. Geographical routes are fixed and geographical starting-points merely entries into them. One circumstance connected with geographical travel, however, prepares us for a fundamental distinction between geographical and mental routes. An estimate of London by a Chinaman will differ from the estimate by an American because the two have different mental eyes. Their mental models are different: the one compares London with Oriental life, the other with life in the Western limit of civilisation. Mental starting-points determine the nature of mental routes because they provide for thought its primary models of comparison. Alexander remarks that a theory of knowledge whose point of departure is the mental image will differ from a theory of knowledge which begins with the facts of perception.[1]

If the thinker begins with memory and is dominated by the

[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, Book I., pp. 24-25.

circumstances of memory he will incline to a theory of perception which accepts these circumstances as typical; if he begins with perception he will incline to model memory on perception rather than perception on memory.

When an incident or a scene is recalled in memory the mind seems, whatever the truth may be, to REFER to the past through a mental, or memory, image. A dream of the past event or object SEEMS to disclose in the mind a power of referring to it by picturing it. The picturing seems to be done by the mind and the memory-image to form part of it. Since we remember because we have first perceived, perception seems to be essentially a bestowal on the mind of the power to form a mental image to represent what has been perceived. It is then an easy step to suppose that this imaging is also concerned with what IS BEING perceived. When the mental route runs from memory to perception, the inquirer naturally assumes that an image, an "idea," stirred in the mind by the perceived object, is the direct or immediate object which he perceives.

When the mental route runs from perception to memory, when perceiving is the primary model and not remembering, a perceived image, so to speak, is replaced by a remembered object: memory is as much an actual interview with the object, though under different conditions, as was the original perception. In perception, our sense of life, remarked James, knows no intervening image.[1] Perception seems to face the physical object directly and if, there is no intervening mental image there, none is available for memory. Modern realism adopts this route, models all knowledge on perceptive experience, and describes remembering as a method of perceiving past events or objects formerly perceived.

Images may be anticipatory as well as recollective. The hesitating realist is troubled by the logical demand to make anticipation a method of perceiving the future: "Forecasts of the future," writes Laird, "are certainly not the future itself . . .".[2] He condemns realists to maintaining a contrast between images and perceived things which shall not interfere with their identity of status.[3] He observes the letter of this law by regarding memory as the mind's awareness of past things themselves;[4] he seems to fail in this observance when anticipation requires an explanation from him. The realist soon realises that, if remembering is perceiving past things and anticipating is perceiving future things, time and space

[1] *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 12.
[2] *A Study in Realism*, p. 51.
[3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 65.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

must be accommodated to this view. This accommodation seems less urgent for the past than for the future: it is less disturbing to believe that we can continue to perceive events which have happened than to believe in our ability to perceive those which have not yet occurred.

Lossky, whose intuitional theory of knowledge requires the presence of the object in memory and anticipation, realises that, on realistic principles, "Every element of reality, even a fleeting event in the far-off past, remains eternally one and the same, identical with itself".[1] He also realises that ontology must construct a theory of space and time to dissipate the apparent impossibility of events separated from the knower by space and time being present in his acts of judgment.[2] Alexander, in *Space, Time and Deity*, has attempted to conform space and time to Lossky's ontological demand. He is compelled to this attempt because, like other modern realists, he regards remembering as perceiving past things: "The percept of him and the memory of him are two different appearances of him which in their connexion reveal the one thing, the man, whom we know to be to-day by perceiving, and to have been yesterday by remembrance".[3] He is compelled to this attempt because he regards anticipating as perceiving future things: "Expectation is precisely like remembering except that the object has the mark of the future".[4] The manipulation of space and time to which he is thus forced may be a crisis for realism. A system of thought can usually choose fundamental assumptions which strongly resist criticism but is usually liable to be more open to successful challenge when it is driven into deductions from these assumptions. Alexander's space-time may make the fortune of realism, but it MAY mar it.

His ontological remedy for the realistic affront to common sense, seems, at first sight, to be desperate. Common sense stares when a memory is declared to be as much a physical object as a percept, even with the qualification "in so far as it obeys the laws of physics".[5] This deduction is enjoined if a past event or object is PERCEIVED in memory, for the image IS the event or the object under a different aspect. The homogenisation of percept and image, thus enjoined, is secured in part by composing them both of space-time, which is the stuff of which all things are made, whether as substances or under any other category.[6] Space and time, even when

[1] *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge:* Duddington's Trans., p. 272.
[2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 274. [3] *Space, Time and Deity*, Book I., p. 114.
[4] *Loc. cit.*, Book I., p. 115. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 114.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 341.

fundamentally and irrevocably conjoined into one ultimate entity which takes the place of the absolute in idealistic systems,[1] seem to be poor material for constructing a universe, and thus, from the start, the provided ontological remedy seems desperate. Mere ultimate identity of composition out of space-time is not enough to confer the status of a physical thing upon the image, since there are non-mental objects, like universals or numbers, which are not physical though they are composed of space-time.[2] The remedy seems to become more desperate still when the physical status of the image is connected with its location in the same place as the object of perception: "the image of a town belongs to the actual place of the actual town".[3] Forcible hands seem to be laid on space, as they certainly are upon common sense notions of it, when the memory picture of the Sphinx which rises in a mind in London is said, or apparently said, to occupy a place in the Egyptian desert.

Similar location in space need not be similar location in space-time. When two rectangular axes, X and Y, are used to define positions in a plane two points may be equidistant from the X axis and unequally distant from the Y axis. If the X axis represents tridimensional space and the Y axis represents time, the two points represent events or objects located similarly in space but differently in space-time. This seems merely to defer, by one step, the final collapse of the assumption that anything once perceived as present can be perceived as past (remembered), for bilocation in space-time apparently duplicates the object. Obviously, the relations between space and time in space-time cannot be so simple as the above representation implies.

"The real existence is Space-Time, the continuum of point-instants or pure events." These "pure events" are "not qualitied": if a qualitied event, like a flash of red colour, be stripped in supposition of all its qualities and bared down to space and time there remains the concept of the "pure event".[4] All other existents are groupings of these bare events, whirlpools within the ocean of Space-Time which they compose, crystals in and inseparable from this matrix, and their qualities are correlated with groupings of these motions.[5] Now if these point-instants or bare events be regarded as corpuscles stripped of their materiality the bilocation difficulty, the apparent duplication of the object to serve perception and memory, still remains. The grouping of point-instants which

[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, Book I., p. 346. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 99. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 48. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 183.

is the perceived Sphinx with its own location in space-time seems also to be the remembered Sphinx with its different location in Space-Time. The Sphinx, be it noted, can be simultaneously perceived by one mind and remembered by another. The relations between space and time cannot, therefore, merely allow to the point-instant the mode of existence represented by the conceptual baring of a corpuscle down to its space and time.

Laird, arriving at similar conclusions from similar realistic premises, concludes that the Mont Blanc which Smith remembers has its place in Switzerland exactly like the Mont Blanc which he perceived. He indicates the line for ontological revision of space and time when he adds "if the temporal and spatial meaning of imaged things should never be identified with the spatial and temporal meanings of present perception, it is possible to maintain that the 'memory-images' which Smith is said to recollect during his narrative are 'images' whose date is in the past and whose place is in Switzerland. . . ".[1] The same object is to have one location in space and more than one date. The dating must in some way be connected with perspectives through which the object can be apprehended as past when the apprehender is not perceiving nor located for perceiving. The object, as before, must not be multiplied, as an object, by its datings. Again it is evident that special relations between time and space are ontologically requisite.

It is easier to grasp the necessity for such special relations than to understand how "Space, Time and Deity" endeavours to supply them. The correspondence between points and instants is one-many: one instant occupying many points and one point occurring at more than one instant. These repetitions of time in space and of space in time,[2] understood as Alexander understands them, may give the first cue to the nature of these special relations. Is the space of the Sphinx, so to speak, spread continuously through time with its earlier and later which are, as it were, the past and future of physical time itself,[3] so that it can be either expected as future later, or remembered as past, earlier? Succession from past to future through the present belongs properly to psychical time, but by defining a moment of physical time as present by its relation to an observing mind, physical time, which properly only contains earliers and laters, may be spoken of as having past, present and future.[4] If "in total Space-

[1] *A Study in Realism*, p. 30.
[2] *Space, Time and Deity*, Book I., p. 48.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 45. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

Time each point is in fact repeated through the whole of time . . ".[1] the grouping of points which is the Sphinx may be mentally interviewed as present (perceived), or interviewed as past (remembered)—the two interviews corresponding to the earlier and later which time can confer on the same object or event. If the later in physical time is the present in relation to the apprehending mind, apprehension of the later is perception and of the earlier is remembering. If the earlier in physical time is the present in relation to the apprehending mind then apprehension of the earlier is perception and of the later anticipation. Alexander illustrates the difference in dates in space, in a perspective from any instant when a human percipient is supposed to be at the point of reference, by our apprehension of Sirius nine years after the event.[2] "The position of Sirius is occupied by some time or other through infinite time":[3] Lossky's "fleeting event in the far-off past" thus seems to be secured in an eternal identity with itself by the perpetuating effect of time. This perpetuating effect seems to depend on the indissoluble union between space and time, on their indispensableness to one another, on the temporality of space and the spatiality of time,[4] on the supplying by space of a "second continuum needed to save time from being a mere 'now,'"[5] on the converse relation to this, on the presentation of space which we apprehend with different dates,[6] on space being variously occupied by time as time is spread variously over space.[7]

It is difficult to accept the statement that pastness is a datum of experience, directly apprehended.[8] It seems inconsistent with it to say that reflection is needed to discover the different dates with which the space we apprehend is presented.[9] We do not realise directly that we see Sirius as it was nine years ago. If all physical events are anterior to our apprehension,[10] and if, in remembering, the object is before my mind bearing the MARK OF PASTNESS,[11] all perceived things should, it would seem, appear to be past. There is, of course, a difference between remembering and dating: in remembering there is conceiving and "in addition the act of remembering it, the consciousness that I have had it before"[12] and Cæsar's death may be dated without being remembered.[13] We should, however, it would seem,

[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, Book I., p. 81.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 70.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 113.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 96.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 113.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

date all physical events in the past if they are actually previous to our apprehension of them and if they bear upon themselves the mark of pastness. Perhaps we simply ignore "pastness" till we are compelled in some way to apprehend it directly. Laird avoids the difficulty by supposing that earlier events are not themselves perceived but signified by the fact which is.[1] Recollection, however, seems to him to be direct acquaintance with the past itself:[2] we remember the very things we perceived.[3] But he shirks Alexander's direct apprehension of pastness: "a dated memory is something that we remember in its context".[4]

One apparently curious consequence of Alexander's version of space and time is an apparent contemporaneousness of past, or future, and present: "In memory or expectation we are aware of the past or future event, and I date the past or future event by reference to the act of remembering or expecting which is the present event".[5] It appears strange to learn that "The past object is earlier than my present act of mind in remembering".[6] It is difficult to pass from the conception that the space occupied by the Sphinx confers upon it the unity underlying its appearances, which are then its appearances in perception, to the conception that the volume of space-time occupied by it confers this unity upon it,[7] when its appearances are in remembrance as well as in perception. It is also somewhat perplexing to learn that in the present act of remembering "both its object and what we may call its mental material (the past act of mind which experienced it) are past".[8] This suggests that we remember the OBJECT BEING PERCEIVED, which would explain the dependence of recollection upon previous perception. It is, however, apparently inconsistent with Alexander's denial to the mind of any power to "contemplate its own passing states"[9] to admit to its remembrances past processes of perceiving. Remembrance and perceiving differ, according to Alexander, in their methods of securing the compresence, or togetherness, of the non-mental object and the corresponding mental process in the apprehensive situation: in imaging the act of mind is provoked from within, "in sensory experience compresence with the physical revelation of a physical thing is brought about through the direct operation of the thing upon the senses."[10] Compresence, the togetherness of object and mental process, begins in perception with

[1] *A Study in Realism*, p. 48. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 52.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 55. [4] *Ibid.* [5] *Space, Time and Deity*, Book I., p. 95.
[6] *Loc. cit.*, Book I., p. 114. [7] *Ibid.*, p. 115. [8] *Ibid.*, p. 126.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 17. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

the physical object, which is then joined by the mental process; in remembering it begins with the mental process which is then joined by the object. This preserves the dependence of remembrance upon previous perception, but a serious difficulty seems to arise at this point. No action of the mind is possible without its object.[1] There is an object in perception; there is also an object in remembering. The provoking of the act of mind from within is obviously conditioned by the existence of the object, without which there can be no process of remembering. This may simply appear strange because of the common sense prepossession in favour of the mind's private power to recollect when it is out of perceptive range of the object. But constructive imagination appears to be impossible if, like all mental processes on realistic assumptions, it must have non-mental objects and if there can be no action of the mind without its object. Error is a crucial problem for realism because it seems to involve apprehension of non-mental objects, independent of the apprehending mind, which are not there. Human inventiveness, analogously, seems to involve the contemplation of objects which reality does not provide. Laird regards the "imaged Gorgon as a combination of elements which the mind has put together".[2] This seems to stir the mind from the contemplative rôle assigned to it by realism into a somewhat startling manipulation of reality. This manipulation, perhaps, must not be too rigorously compared with the constructive hand which arranges bricks into a house. It is more a selective apprehension of reality which corresponds in conscious contemplation to combining and separating things in physical manipulation: "Images, in a word, are parts of the physical world imaged, and that is what we discover through the fancy".[3]

Alexander says of the illusory object that it is non-mental and chosen from the world of things.[4] Constructive imagination or invention resembles illusion in its contemplation, common to both, of objects which are not directly supplied by an independent reality. When Alexander adds "The object, with which the mind is brought into compresence by virtue of an act initiated by itself, is transferred from its place in the world into a place to which it does not belong,"[5] though he is speaking of error, he describes the cognate operations of constructive imagination. Imaginative construction like "The illusion is a transposition of materials".[6] Realism cuts out

[1] *Space, Time and Deity.*, Book I, p. 25. [2] *A Study in Realism*, p. 81.
[3] *Ibid.* [4] *Space, Time and Deity*, Book II., p. 214. [5] *Ibid.* [6] *Ibid.*

the causal action of the object on the mind and apparently replaces it by a causal action of the mind on its objects. Fancy, Alexander adds, distinctly including invention with illusion, HANDLES physical things in thought.[1] Again, however, the strict comparison of mental procedure to a fashioning hand is avoided: illusory appearances, and also, presumably, fanciful combinations, are perspectives of the real world seen under abnormal conditions.[2] The "dislocation of elements in reality," illusion in its naïve form of misinterpreted perception, is "a mentally distorted perspective of the real".[3] It seems, at first sight, to be possible that "the mind squints at things and one thing is seen with the characters of something else,"[4] but it also seems curiously complaisant of non-mental reality to submit to perspective views which misrepresent it.

Homer describes the Chimera as a monster with a goat's body, a lion's head and a dragon's tail. In imagining (imaging) this composite creature, on Alexander's principles, processes are stirred in the mind corresponding to these three separate portions of it as objects. The perspective of the apprehending mind unites for it these three objects into one, as the tip of a distant spire might appear to protrude from a chimney when an observer sees them in line. Now, such perspective combinations as that of the chimney and spire are limited by the relations of the objects combined, and, as an observer at any point of space is limited to certain possible appearances, an observer situated anywhere in space-time is presumably limited to certain illusory appearances or imaginative combinations. If, however, there is an infinity of perspectives,[5] there is, in principle, no limitation upon possible imaginative combinations. In practice, there would seem to be such a limitation upon a finite human individual because he cannot indulge in the whole infinite range of perspectives. This limitation may exist, though it offends our sense of freedom in imagining.

There seems, however, to be a more serious difficulty in the realistic account of imaginative combinations. The chimney-spire combination is only possible in certain very sharply defined lines of vision: it is not possible to see the spire protrude from the chimney when the observer moves out of these lines. The Chimera, on the other hand, seems to be permanently possible as an object of imagination. It seems as though either we were able to assume the necessary perspective with great ease or that the combination of images constituting the

[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, Book II., p. 221. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 216.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 225. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 216. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

Chimera were presented as an appearance in all our perspectives. The difficulty may be apparent and not real. Failure to realise the full significance or nature of our perspectives of the world may be responsible for a failure to realise the truth. We are not always thinking of the Chimera and doubtless our mental preoccupations may actually prevent us, at certain moments, from thinking of it. But a suggestion so easily brings the Chimera before the mind when that mind is familiar with it that it seems to be an appearance presented by many of its perspectives. If this be so it is not conclusive against realistic interpretations of fancy or imaginative combinations but it is a point which requires discussion and elucidation.

V.—DISCUSSION.

THE MEANING OF 'MEANING'.

May a 'critical realist,' whose sympathies in this discussion are mainly with Mr. Russell, explain how in his opinion the sensationalist-behaviourist theory ought to be enlarged, so as to meet the objections of Dr. Schiller and become intelligible to Prof. Joachim?

I start from a concrete example. Suppose I hear the sound of an explosion. The explosion is a physical event, taking place at a distance from my body. The sound, on the sensationalist view, is a state of myself, occurring in or in close connexion with my body. As my only access to the explosion is through the sound, I react to the latter as if I had to do, not with a state of myself, but with the actual distant event: in other words, I objectify the sound. From the outset I never take it as a state of myself—although in truth it is one—but solely as a revelation, almost a sensuous embodiment, of the external event. Its sharpness, suddenness, loudness are regarded as characters of that event.

The sound has thus not so much acquired, as become converted into, a *meaning*. That, here, which means is the sound as a state of myself—and it is thus *I* who mean; that which is meant is the physical explosion; and the meaning, which is present to my mind in that a state of myself carries it, is the objectified sound. Here (since we are dealing with the lowest of cognitive faculties, sense-perception) is the place where meaning first comes to exist for the mind.

It will be objected that, on this theory, the function of meaning or intending, since it depends on the bodily reaction to the explosion, lies without the mind, and is represented within it only by a sensuous state. This is so, and is the behaviourist aspect of the doctrine; but if it seems to contradict experience, I would point out that, in the case considered, the bodily reaction, which is one of excitement and straining towards the object, itself contributes sensuous elements to the state, which constitute the feeling of intending; but which become an awareness of the intending only when we turn our attention to ourselves, and use them to mean that act, as we used the sound to mean the explosion. When we do not thus use them, they simply modify the sound, and give to us our total feeling of having to do with an external event.

Now, to mean something is to conceive or rather treat it as not

wholly revealed to the mind at the moment. The real explosion has characters (how many of them!) which the mere sound is unable to express. Hence, when we see as well as hear an explosion, and the flash and smoke and flying fragments are added to the sharp, sudden noise, it is possible for these so disparate sensuous states to mean the same thing. Sight, sound, odour, vibration all serve merely to bring before us the one homogeneous external occurrence, which is what they all mean. And their merely sensuous characters of luminosity, sonority, etc., sink into insignificance beside the intensity and the spatial and temporal values, in short, the revealed *nature of the activity*, which is their true meaning.

The enlargement of the sensationalist-behaviourist theory which appears necessary is, then, to recognise that the sound as a meaning is distinct from the sound as a sensuous state, and that distinct from both is the external explosion which is the thing meant, and without the existence of which this meaning would have no meaning.

From the doctrine as thus sketched it follows, (1) that when I see an explosion the same meaning essentially is presented to my mind as when I hear it; (2) that when I think of an explosion by means of mental images, it is still the same meaning that I have present to me, and the mental images do not mean the sensuous sights and sounds as such but *what* was seen and heard; (3) that even when I use the word 'explosion,' I do not mean by it the mental images or the visual and auditory sensations, but—strange as it may seem—the same external occurrence.

We can now see how far Dr. Schiller is right in his contention that meaning is personal. If it takes a body and a sensuous self to hear and react, and if the sense of intending is the feeling of his bodily straining towards the object, then it is indeed true that the function of meaning presupposes a self. It is another question whether the sensuous sights and sounds require to be absorbed into the "swirl" of his personal existence, as Dr. Schiller appears to desire. He would, I fear, be quite unwilling to construe the act of meaning in the way I have indicated, and his preference is for a self that is not concrete or sensuous, but that shoots out intellectual *a* particles and "swirls". And, since such a self cannot be known by the ordinary processes of cognition, it has to be apprehended in a back-handed way by that disreputable *bonne à tout faire*, experience.

If I am to make out a case for the sensationalist theory, evidently I must explain how it deals (as I myself hold it) with the difficult question of our knowledge of the self. Of the 'I,' I mean; for I am not one of those who believe that the 'I' and the empirical self are different persons. And this question requires to be treated first from the point of view of psychology, and then from that of theory of knowledge.

It seems to me a great mistake to imagine that, because sensuous

states are concrete and definite, they cannot be states of the self. But Dr. Schiller thinks he has 'experienced' a deeper self than they, and caught it in the act. I suspect (following in this William James, and despite Dr. Schiller's *caveat*) that what his attention really fastens on is some obscure bodily sensation—if not the tension in his head-muscles, then the rush of blood in his arteries, or *some* form or detail of the sense of his body—not the activity of awareness or a punctiform existence that exercises it; these things, as James—keen observer that he was—had at last the courage boldly to declare, are illusions, and we *cannot* be aware of anything psychical that is not more or less concrete and sensuous. What is non-concrete and non-sensuous is always a *meaning*, a sense (if I may risk the word) of that unfathomed beyond which we cannot contemplate but can only intend.

We have no difficulty, in the case of some sensuous states—*e.g.*, pain—in recognising that they are states of ourselves. Really light, sound, colour are just as much so; but we are apt to overlook it, because we are so in the habit of using them to signify objects. At the moment when we hear a sound, it is (usually, at least) taken as a meaning—as a 'given' external event. But at the next moment we can, if we will, become aware that this sound which rings in our ears, this brilliant light which fatigues our eyes, is not merely an external occurrence or the sign of one, but, at the same time, a state (it may be an exhausting one) of our own being. A moment ago, when we heard the external sound, it was an 'enjoyment' (not 'enjoy*ed*,' for that illegitimately brings in contemplation into the midst of the enjoyment, and what we contemplated was exclusively the external object); it has now become an object of 'contemplation'. But by what mechanism? As, before, it contemplated, or enabled us to mean, an external occurrence, so now it is itself contemplated and meant as an internal occurrence; and I can only suppose that, as before what contemplated the explosion was the sound as a state of the self, so what now contemplates the sound is another, slightly later, state of the self which, presumably, is a reproduction of the sound. In other words, we contemplate the sound as a state of the self by means of a mental image. If this supposition is correct, we should have here—in 'introspection'—the same three categories of the thing meant, the state that means it, and the meaning, that we had in sense-perception; but since the thing now meant is a sensuous state, and since that which means it is another sensuous state as closely similar to it as a mental image is to a sensation, the chances are that the meaning would much more exactly hit off the thing meant than in external perception, where we have to do with things relatively alien to our own nature.

According to this view, the self is really characterised by sounds and colours—"the soul is dyed by the thoughts," as Marcus Aurelius has it; you have a blue soul, or a little blue corner in your soul, when you look up at the sky, etc. This, however, is perhaps to attribute too great adequacy to our retrospective cognition of the

self; the blueness may be only a rough, undiscriminating way of apprehending those inconceivably fine activities which make up the tissue of the soul, and of which we catch a glimpse from without when we perceive (or should if we perceived) the dance of atoms in the brain. Blueness, in short, *quâ* irreducible, may be a mere appearance to introspection, and what really "swirls" in Dr. Schiller's brain may be the aether.

I trust it will now be intelligible to Prof. Joachim how an advocate of this theory can hold that a visual picture may be 'inside the skin,' and be 'a physiological event'; in such wise that "one day we may hope—by skilful vivisection and preparation, and by using the appropriate chemical reagents—to observe the images as they occur inside another person's skin". Precisely so. It is not his own projected visual sensations which this happy physiologist would observe, it is what they mean: namely, the event, whatever it be, occurring at that point of the person's nervous system. And if the physiologist should chance to have pointed his instrument at the place where the physical correlates of consciousness occur, then, in very truth, that event would be identical with the event which the owner of the consciousness observes when he looks back at a visual sensation that occurred a moment before.

Ex uno disce omnes. If Prof. Joachim has found it possible to understand my explanation, he will, I think, be able to attach a meaning everywhere to Mr. Russell's theory as I have amended it; and will no longer be able to object that we are maintaining something which we cannot possibly think.

C. A. STRONG.

VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Nature of Existence. By J. M. E. McTaggart. Vol. I. Pp. xxi, 310. Cambridge University Press, 1921.

Dr. McTaggart is one of the few writers of eminence at the present day who seriously believe that important results about the universe as a whole and about our probable position and prospects in it can be reached by pure metaphysical speculation. He is impenitently 'pre-Critical'. His book is of fascinating interest; it is not easy, but, like all his work, it is written with crystalline clearness. In some of the later chapters, *e.g.*, the important ones on 'Determining Correspondence,' the argument is difficult to follow because he has to express in words certain complex logical relations which simply ask for translation into symbols. It is a remarkable achievement for a writer to have kept his head among all these complexities without the help of elaborate symbolism. The book in many ways recalls the best type of Scholastic metaphysics; a comment which in the eighteenth century might have been regarded as an insult, but which will be taken as a very high compliment by all properly instructed persons at the present time. In this volume the arguments and the results reached are all *à priori* and highly abstract; but a second volume is promised in which they will be applied to give probable information about more concrete problems.

I will first give some account of McTaggart's general method. The argument throughout is deductive, and is of the ordinary type. It is not dialectic in Hegel's sense. McTaggart thinks that there is no antecedent objection to such a type of argument as Hegel's, but that the categories do not in fact have the kind of relations needed by that method. The earlier categories are not rejected in whole or in part at later stages; it is merely shown that they cannot be the whole truth and that they must be supplemented in certain definite ways. As regards the premises they fall into two different classes: (*a*) Ultimate Empirical Beliefs and (*b*) Synthetic *à priori* Propositions. Only two of the former are used, *viz.*, one to prove that something exists, and a second to prove that the existent is differentiated into parts. It is held that the latter can also be proved *à priori*. An ultimate empirical belief differs from a synthetic *à priori* proposition in that the object to which it corresponds may be private to the person who has the belief (*e.g.*, it may be himself or one of his *sensa*). McTaggart gives at the

end of the book a list of all the notions that are introduced in the course of the argument; it would be desirable to add a list of the premises, with the section in which they first occur. There is evidently no need to defend such a method from the charge either of paradox or of sterility, assuming that the new premises really are self-evident and really are synthetic. The result of the argument is that Reality as a whole or every part of it must have certain properties. It may then be possible to *prove* that certain characteristics which are commonly thought to belong to Reality as a whole or to some parts of it (*e.g.*, Space and Time) cannot do so. And we may be able to suggest that such and such a characteristic with which we are familiar belongs to every part of Reality or to it as a whole, because this is the only characteristic that we know or can imagine which does fulfil the necessary conditions. But at this stage there enters an empirical factor, *viz.*, the *de facto* limitations of our perception and imagination. Hence such positive results are never absolutely certain.

The first two chapters attempt to prove that in dealing with the existent we are dealing with the whole of reality. Neither reality nor existence can be defined, but the latter is a species of the former. Real substances and events (which, as a matter of fact, are substances in McTaggart's sense) exist, and the qualities and relations of existents exist. It is also assumed that the qualities, relations, and parts of existing qualities and relations exist. It has been held that propositions, characteristics in general, and possibilities can be real without existing. In answer to this McTaggart denies the reality of propositions, and deals with alleged real but non-existent characteristics as follows. Let x be any characteristic. Then either some existent has x or no existent has it. If the former, x exists; because it is a characteristic of a real substance. If the latter, every existent is non-x. Non-x is therefore an existent characteristic. But it contains x as a part, and the parts of existent characteristics exist.

This seems to me a most doubtful argument. The word 'part' is highly ambiguous. Is it certain that in *every* sense of part the parts of an existent characteristic exist? Doubtless if men exist and man is a rational animal it is reasonable to say that rationality and animality exist. But x is not a part of non-x in the sense in which rational and animal are parts of human; for what is the other part? What sort of a characteristic is 'non'?

The question of propositions leads to a theory of truth and falsehood. I think McTaggart somewhat mistakes the grounds on which Meinong, *e.g.*, believed in objectives or propositions. McTaggart always takes the position against which he is arguing to be that propositions are what judgments correspond to. He then objects that, since the truth or falsity of the propositions will itself depend on their correspondence or non-correspondence with facts which are not propositions, propositions are a useless *tertium quid*. I am inclined to agree with his conclusion, but I am sure

that most believers in propositions never held that the relation between them and judgments was one of correspondence. Meinong's view simply was that objectives are the *immediate objects* of judgments or Annahmen, just as *sensa* are supposed to be the immediate objects of sensations. Meinong's reason for believing that there are objectives was that all judgments have immediate objects —expressed by the phrase 'that so and so . . .'—and, since many judgments are false, these objects cannot in general be facts. For this reason many of McTaggart's arguments about propositions seem to me to be somewhat beside the mark. The essential question is: Can we deal with false beliefs if we accept nothing but judgments and facts? McTaggart holds that we can. A false belief is defined as one that has non-correspondence to all facts. Now every belief professes to refer to some fact, and it does refer to a certain fact on which its truth or falsehood depends. I take it that the point is that every belief does refer to a definite object either by perception or description. It then asserts something further about this object, *i.e.*, it asserts that the object is not only a constituent of the fact by which it is referred to but also that it is a constituent of another fact of a certain kind. If it is not a constituent of any such fact the judgment is false.

The remaining difficulty that has to be faced by such a theory as McTaggart's is to analyse true beliefs about the non-existent. Such beliefs are always about implications of characteristics. But McTaggart thinks he has proved that all characteristics exist, by the argument about negative characteristics discussed above. Hence any true belief about the implications of characteristics that do not directly belong to any existent does nevertheless correspond to a fact whose constituents are existent characteristics.

The second Book deals with Substance. It is neither analytically nor synthetically *à priori* that something exists. Nevertheless it follows, by an argument like Descartes' *Cogito*, from empirical premises that each person grants for himself. Next, everything that exists must have some quality beside existence. For there are other positive qualities; and, for every positive quality q that is denied of any s, a negative quality non-q must be asserted. (This would only prove that there must at least be negative qualities in every substance.) It is argued, however, that every substance must have at least two positive qualities, *viz.*, existence and the quality of being 'many-qualitied'. (The latter, however, is a second-order quality. It has not therefore been proved that any substance need have more than the one positive first-order quality of existing. And the last is merely analytic, since existence is part of the definition of substance.) In § 59, however, a different argument is used. If something existed and had no other property it would be 'a perfect and absolute blank; and to say that only this exists is equivalent to saying that nothing exists'. This argument seems to me to play on the ambiguity of 'nothing'. It *would* follow that 'nothing' in the sense of 'no thing' exists. But

then we are warned that 'something' here does not mean 'something' but only *etwas*. And nothing (= no thing) is not contradictory to something (= *etwas*). I think that McTaggart would have done better here to make his proposition synthetic and *à priori*. If he is to be taken literally he is making it analytic, and this seems to be a mistake.

It is further assumed that there are at least three incompatible qualities. It follows from this that every substance has at least two negative qualities since it must have the negatives of at least two of these.

Quality as such is indefinable. Qualities are either simple or non-simple. In the latter case they are compound (like 'black-and-blue') or complex (like 'vain,' which involves several simpler qualities in relations other than the merely conjunctive tie). The nature of a substance is the compound of all its qualities of all kinds and orders. It appears to me that the nature of a substance so defined would be an impossible aggregate, since it would have to contain itself as a part. It is strongly asserted that all non-simple characteristics must ultimately be analysable into simple ones, although these might in some cases be infinite in number, and therefore no human mind might be able to perform the analysis. In this, as we shall see, characteristics are sharply contrasted with substances. The chief discussions on this point are to be found in §§ 64 and 175. In the former we are told that 'if we ask what any particular quality is—what we mean when we predicate it of anything—the answer is, in the case of every quality that is not simple, that this depends on what the terms are into which it can be analysed'. In § 175 it is said that 'to be aware of a characteristic is to know its meaning,' and that 'we cannot be aware of a compound characteristic without being aware of the simple characteristics of which it consists'. Lastly the possibility of a characteristic being real and simple depends on its 'being a universal, or being significant'.

Now I would like to begin by pointing out the extreme ambiguity of 'meaning'. (i) There is a person's meaning—'what we mean when we predicate'. (ii) There is the meaning of words. (iii) There is the meaning of characteristics. This is supposed to be of two kinds:—(*a*) the meaning of simple characteristics, which apparently depends on the fact of their being universal (*cf.* 'being a universal or being significant'); and (*b*) the meaning of compound characteristics. The latter is assumed to consist of analysability into simple characteristics with meaning in sense. iii (*a*). McTaggart speaks as if such analysability were the only sense in which compound characteristics could have meaning. This can hardly be true if the meaning of a simple characteristic be just its universality. A simple characteristic does not have meaning in sense iii (*b*) and does have it in the sense of being universal. But a compound characteristic, whether analysable or not, is universal and therefore would seem to have meaning in the same sense in

which a simple one has it. I suppose therefore that McTaggart's position must really be that universality is necessary but not sufficient for a simple characteristic to have meaning, and that the additional factor—whatever it may be—is not present in compound characteristics which are not analysable into simple parts. Now, so far as I can see, the only factor required to give meaning to a simple characteristic beside universality is that someone shall mean it, *i.e.*, shall take up a certain mental attitude towards it. In fact it would seem best to say, not that simple characteristics *have* meanings, but that they are capable of *being* the meanings of persons. If this be accepted I think McTaggart's argument against characteristics which are not analysable into simple ones might be put as follows: Every characteristic must be capable of being the meaning of someone; a compound characteristic can only be the meaning of a person who knows its analysis into simple characteristics; therefore a characteristic that was not analysable into simple ones could not be meant by anybody; therefore there could be no such characteristic. Now, I am by no means convinced by this argument. I can see that a characteristic must be universal, but I do not see why it need fulfil any other condition. This condition is independent of its analysis. Again it is by no means obvious to me that I cannot mean a compound characteristic without knowing its analysis. I seem to mean something when I use the word 'justice.' But I certainly do not know the proper analysis of justice. To be aware of a complex universal and to be distinctly aware of all its constituents seem to me to be two quite different things, and I do not see why the first cannot happen without the second. If this happens I can *mean it* without being aware of *its meaning* in sense iii (*b*). If it be incapable of analysis into simple parts it *has* no meaning in sense iii (*b*). But this does not prevent it from *being* someone's meaning; it places it in no worse position than any simple characteristic, for this equally has no meaning in sense iii (*b*). Thus to McTaggart's assertion in § 64 that such a compound universal 'would be nothing in particular, and we should mean nothing by predicating it,' I should answer as follows. Such a characteristic would *be* itself; the fact that it had no simple factors would distinguish it from all which did have them; and it would be distinguished from all other characteristics of the same kind by having a different, though equally interminable analysis. Moreover, by predicating it, we should not 'mean nothing' but should mean *it;* and we can mean it, though it has no meaning in sense iii (*b*), just as we can mean 'good' though 'good' has no meaning in this sense, if it be a simple predicate. (I think that the fact that simple predicates have no meaning is obscured by the two facts that their names always have a meaning and that people who predicate them have a meaning. The meaning of the word and of the people is the same, *viz.*, the simple predicate, which *has* no meaning but *is* the meaning of the name and of the people who use it. If it still be insisted that even simple predicates have a meaning,

this appears to amount to nothing more than the statement that they are universal. And, in this sense, characteristics with an interminable analysis would equally have a meaning.)

We can now pass to Substance. A substance is defined as an existent which has characteristics but is not a characteristic. In this sense there seems to me to be no doubt of the reality of substances, and no doubt that at one end of every series of existent characteristics there comes a substance. McTaggart points out that many things are substances in this sense to which that name would not usually be given (*e.g.*, a flash of light, or the group composed of a flash of light and a chair). Once it is seen that the admission of substances amounts to little more than the admission that there are particulars and that no complex of universals is a particular, there should be little difficulty in accepting McTaggart's conclusion.

One interesting and important point that is made is the following. If S has the quality P there is a relation between S and P; but this is a derivative relation. S, which is P, is not a complex composed of S and P related by the 'predicative relation'. I think that the distinction drawn by Mr. W. E. Johnson between relations and 'ties' is important here. The connexion between a substance and its qualities seems to be a tie and not a relation in Johnson's sense. Ties cannot be reduced to relations, for the latter require ties.

McTaggart holds that relations are not reducible to qualities, though every quality involves a relation and every relation involves in its terms the quality of standing in that relation. There is thus an infinite hierarchy of derivative qualities and relations. The qualities which a substance has independently of its relations to others are called *Original*. Its original qualities + those that are immediately derived from its relation to others are called *Primary*. There is no reason why two substances should not agree in their original qualities, but McTaggart holds that no two substances can agree in all their primary qualities. This principle he calls the *Dissimilarity of the Diverse;* it seems to me highly plausible. It follows that every substance must have an *exclusive* description. This however may involve a reference to other substances; if this reference cannot be got rid of ultimately, substances will not necessarily have *sufficient* descriptions. A sufficient description of S is one that involves nothing but characteristics. *E.g.*, it would be a sufficient description of S if it were the only substance that has the original quality *q*, or if it were the only substance that has the relation R to substances with the original quality *q*. Now McTaggart holds that it follows from the fact that every substance has an exclusive description that it must have a sufficient description. Suppose A is the substance that has R to B, B is the substance that has S to C . . . and so on. If this series finally returned to A the description would be sufficient for A could be described as the substance which has R to the substance which has S to the substance which has . . . to the sub-

stance which has W to A itself. If the series never returns to A it will be infinite. Now the existence of A requires that of all the substances that are required in its exclusive description. Therefore the series must be completed for A to exist.

So many of McTaggart's arguments depend upon infinite regresses that it is a pity that he has not devoted a chapter to the question which of such series are vicious and how precisely they differ from those which are harmless. The objection here is that the existence of A requires that of all the later terms, and 'therefore requires that the series be completed, which it cannot be' (§ 100). We must remember that it is not the mere infinity of this series to which McTaggart objects. If there were an infinite number of simple substances the regress would be harmless; but he holds that there are no simple substances. McTaggart distinguishes two senses of infinity, *viz.*, the infinity that consists of having an infinite number of simple parts, and that which consists of having no simple parts. I notice that he speaks as if the two sorts exclude each other. So they would, of course, if 'part' were unambiguous; but it is not. McTaggart evidently holds, *e.g.*, that the current mathematical doctrine is that a line consists of an infinite number of simple parts, *viz.*, points. Yet it would be equally true to say that the current mathematical doctrine is that a line has no simple parts. We must distinguish between two senses at least of part and whole, *viz.*, the sense in which a point is part of a line and the sense in which a little line is part of a bigger one. In the first sense we mean by 'part' a term or constituent in a related complex which is of a different nature from its terms. A point is a part of a line in the sense in which McTaggart is part of Trinity. In the second sense we mean by 'part' something which is of the same nature as the whole. I do not know of any other examples of this sense of part and whole except extensive magnitudes. Let us call parts in the first sense 'constituents' and in the second sense 'components'. Then the current mathematical view, as I understand it, is that a line has an infinite number of simple constituents and no simple components. Now the existence of a line implies the existence of all its components; obviously the existence of a line an inch long implies that of its first half inch, and this implies that of *its* first quarter inch, and so on. And there is no end to this series. Any line is therefore in the position in which a substance would be on McTaggart's view if no substance had a sufficient description. Nor does the fact that a line *also* has an infinite number of simple constituents help matters; for none of these constituents are terms in the series of its components. For my own part I cannot see any objection to the existence of one substance requiring that of an endless series of others, or to the existence of a line requiring that of an endless series of non-simple components. Anyhow the two must stand or fall together. It therefore does not seem to me certain that every substance must have a sufficient description.

The next very important subject is what McTaggart calls

Extrinsic Determination. This is introduced in Chapter XII. and further explained in Chapter XIX. The principle amounts to this. Suppose that there is a certain substance which in fact has at a certain moment the characteristics X, Y, and Z. We can imagine a substance with Y and Z unchanged but with X′ substituted for X. But we have no right to suppose that this substance could exist; we have no right to suppose that if one attribute had been different the others could have been the same. We can go further than this. If the substance A has in fact X, Y, and Z and we imagine X absent or different we are *ipso facto* imagining the universe to be different, for it is a characteristic of the actual universe to have the substance A as a part at this moment. We therefore have no right to assume that *any* feature of the universe would have been the same as it actually is. Now one feature of the actual universe is that it contains the substance B; we therefore have no right to suppose that if A were in the least different from what it actually is any other substance B could be the same. The principle then is that if we suppose that any feature, however trivial, in the existent had been different from what it actually is we have no right to suppose that any feature, however pervasive and important, would have been what it actually is. Extrinsic determination is thus universal and reciprocal, and it is a connexion between characteristics which are actually present in substances. Intrinsic determination, on the other hand, is merely an implication between characteristics as such which enables one to infer that if the first is present in one kind of substance the other will be present in the same or a different kind of substance. It is neither reciprocal in general, nor, so far as we know, universal. I think that the principle of extrinsic determination must be admitted, though of course we must be very careful not to slide from the negative statement that we cannot be sure that if anything had been different anything would have been the same to the positive statement that we can be sure that if anything had been different nothing would have been the same. The only practical difficulty that seems to arise is in the application of such ideals as perfect gases or perfectly rigid bodies to the actual world. This is dealt with by McTaggart. We do say: If this lever had been perfectly rigid (which it is not) it would have behaved in such and such a way (which it only approximately did). And we argue from the behaviour of the hypothetically rigid lever to the actual lever. The solution is that we are allowed to conceive hypothetical substances and they will have any attributes that are intrinsically connected with those which we ascribe to them. We cannot be sure that if this had been perfectly rigid it would have been a lever; since 'this,' which is a lever, is not perfectly rigid, and therefore nothing perfectly rigid can be 'this'. Still, it may be easier to see the intrinsic connexions of characteristics in simple hypothetical cases than in the complexities of actual substances. And once we have seen them we can apply them to the actual substances in which these char-

acteristics occur. It must be noticed that this implies a special view about empirical laws. We must assume that the only difference between a law of nature and an *à priori* law is in the way in which they are discovered and proved. We must not hold that an *à priori* law is an intrinsic connexion between attributes as such, whilst a law of nature is something peculiar to the existent world. For if we were to assume the latter we should have no right to suppose that the laws of nature would connect the attributes of hypothetical substances or conversely. It is essential that laws of nature shall not be regarded as properties of any existent substance, *e.g.*, the universe, for then we should have to say that if any characteristic were different from what it is the universe would be different, and therefore we could not be sure that the empirical laws connecting characteristics would be the same. The view that all laws are of the same character has, I think, rarely been combined with the view that no laws are merely properties of the existent universe; most philosophers (*e.g.*, Prof. Bosanquet) who have held the former have combined it with the contrary of the latter.

An important and difficult notion in this book is that of Groups of Substances. A group is a collection of substances or of collections of substances or of both. It is not the same as a class, because it cannot be defined, but can only be described through its members. All groups have several members and no group is a member of itself. Two classes (*e.g.*, animals with cloven-feet and animals that chew the cud) can have the same members, but two different groups cannot have exactly the same members. The members of a class form a group. The members of a group may be related in all sorts of different ways. *E.g.*, Smith, Brown, Jones, and Robinson may be a bridge-party and a business firm. All members of a group are parts of it, but groups have parts which are not members of them. Thus Kent is both a member and a part of the group of English counties, whilst Canterbury and Wessex are parts without being members of this group. In what sense is this true? The meaning of membership of a group is clear; Kent is a member of the group of English counties because in enumerating this group it has to be mentioned; Canterbury and Wessex are not members because they do not have to be mentioned. The great difficulty is as to the sense in which (*a*) Canterbury, (*b*) Wessex, and (*c*) Kent itself is a part of the group of English counties. Canterbury is a part (in the sense of a component) of Kent. If Kent be a part, *in this sense* of the group of English counties, it will follow that Canterbury is a part of this group. But if (α) Kent be not in any sense a part of the group, or (β) if it be a part, in the sense of a constituent but not in that of a component, it will not follow that Canterbury is a part, in any sense, of the group. Jones is a constituent of a bridge-party: Jones's front teeth are components of Jones; it is certainly not obvious that his front teeth are parts of the bridge-party, either in the sense of components or of constituents. We had therefore better turn to the question of Kent. Is Kent a part of the group

of English counties, and, if so, in what sense? Kent is a component of England, so are Canterbury and Wessex. Now in Chapter XVI., where McTaggart discusses compound substances, he does say that a compound substance is each of its sets of parts. Hence England is the group of English counties. If 'is' = 'is identical with' it would of course follow that Kent, Canterbury, and Wessex are all components of this group. For they are all components of England. But 'is' here cannot mean 'is identical with'. For England is also the group of English parishes and extra-parochial places. This is a different group from the group of English counties, and England cannot be identical with two groups that are different from each other. Hence 'is' must here stand for some peculiar relation. Let us call it the relation of 'being adequately analysable into'. Then England is adequately analysable into the group of English counties, and Kent is a member of this group. Wessex and Canterbury and Kent are components of England. Thus there seems to be one sense in which Kent, Wessex, and Canterbury are all parts of the group of English counties, *viz.*, they are all components of a substance which can be adequately analysed into the group of English counties.

We have thus given a meaning to the statement that Kent is not only a member but also a part of the group of English counties. This meaning, however, assumes that we are dealing with a spatial or temporal whole, or something very much like it. The sense in which England is adequately analysable both into the English counties and the Kingdoms of the Heptarchy is that the members of each of these groups exactly fit together to make up England. Most compound substances and most groups, however, are not of this kind. Take the group composed of Smith, Brown, Jones, and Robinson. This is an adequate analysis of a certain compound substance on McTaggart's view. Smith is a part of this group; so are his front teeth; and so is the group composed of Brown and Robinson who are, let us say, brothers-in-law. Now in what sense is this group of four men an adequate analysis of a certain compound substance? Evidently not in exactly the sense in which the counties of England and the Kingdoms of the Heptarchy are adequate analyses of England. Smith, Brown, etc., do not just 'fit together' to make up the substance in question. I think the sense in which this group is an adequate analysis of the substance in question is the following. The substance does include all the relational complexes of which Smith, Brown, Jones, and Robinson are the only constituents, *e.g.*, the bridge-party and the business firm which they form. It also includes many other relational complexes of which they are not, as such, terms, *e.g.*, the complex composed of Smith's teeth and Brown's thumb in their mutual relations. But the constituents of all other complexes contained in the compound substance are either constituents (or components) of Smith, etc., or are complexes whose constituents are some of the four men, or are complexes whose constituents are some of

these men and constituents (or components) of some of them. The original group seems to be all the relational complexes whose constituents are just Smith, Brown, Jones, and Robinson, and nothing else; and Smith is a part of it in the sense that he is a constituent of all these complexes. Smith's teeth are a part of it in the sense that they are a component of a constituent of all these complexes, though they are themselves neither components nor constituents of these complexes, so far as I can see. To work all this out in detail would take us beyond the limits of a review. I will therefore confine myself to the following general remarks. Although McTaggart recognises groups whose members are not components but only constituents, he unfortunately confines himself almost entirely to groups whose members are components when he is discussing the notions of Content, Sets of Parts, etc. This is most unfortunate. A component of a component of x is a component of x; a component or constituent of a constituent of x is in general neither a component nor a constituent of x. Thus statements which are highly plausible about a whole of composition, like England, and about a group of components, like its counties, are often highly paradoxical when applied to compound substances which are not wholes of composition. I am sure that all this part of the book needs to be carefully worked over again with the distinction between components and constituents kept clearly in view. Even if all components be constituents, many constituents are not components. Here I must leave the matter.

We now come to the divisibility of substance. McTaggart holds it to be self-evident and synthetic that all substances are complex, in the sense of having parts which are substances. This, he holds, narrowly escapes leading us to a contradiction. Happily, however, the contradiction can be avoided by one and only one assumption. This assumption has therefore to be accepted, though it is not intrinsically self-evident; and it leads to highly important and desirable consequences about the universe as a whole. I simply cannot make up my mind as to the self-evidence of this principle. If all substances be wholes of composition I think it would be self-evident. It might be said that this would not prevent them from being also wholes whose constituents were simple. (*Cf.* the line which has no simple parts, in the sense of indivisible lines, and an infinite number of simple parts, in the sense of points.) In the case of lines and durations, however, I am inclined to take Whitehead's view that the genuine parts are simply shorter lines, whilst the points are entities of a different logical type, definable in terms of the components and their relations. It is not, however, clear to me that all substances are wholes of composition, especially if the reality of time be denied, as it is by McTaggart. So I must just take the complexity of all substances as an hypothesis. Why does it lead to difficulties?

Take, *e.g.*, a certain straight line S, three inches long, and let us assume that it has no simple parts. The three inch-lines AB, BC,

and CD form a set of parts of S. So do the lines AX, XB, BC, CD. The latter set is said to be *sequent* to the former. Since S in fact has an unending series of sets of parts the existence of S requires the existence of each of these sets. S, being a substance, will have a sufficient description. Each set of parts of S, for the same reason, will have a sufficient description. Hence any sufficient description of S requires that there shall be sufficient descriptions of all S's sets of parts. Now often X requires Y without implying Y; this practically means that you can infer from X *that* there must be a definite Y but cannot infer from it *what* in detail this Y must be. In such a case X is said to *presuppose* Y. If you know that ABC is a triangle you know that it is either isosceles or scalene, but you cannot tell which it is. If in fact it is scalene we say that it presupposes scaleneness. Hence a sufficient description of S either implies or, if not, presupposes sufficient descriptions of the parts in all S's sets of parts. Now X may presuppose Y and presuppose Z, whilst Z implies Y but Y does not imply Z. *E.g.*, if ABC be in fact an equilateral triangle, its triangularity presupposes both isosceles and equilateral character, but the latter implies the former. In such a case there is no need to mention both presuppositions; it is enough to say that it presupposes the equilateral character. This is called the Total Ultimate Presupposition. Now the alleged difficulty about substances is that their sufficient descriptions must and cannot have a total ultimate presupposition. Let us suppose that L is any set of parts of S, and M a sequent set. A sufficient description of the parts of M implies a sufficient description of the parts of L. Hence the latter is no part of the total ultimate presupposition of the description of S. But every set of parts has another which is sequent to it. Therefore the sufficient description of S has no total ultimate presupposition. The only solution is that there must be a sufficient description of S which *implies* sufficient descriptions of all its parts. This means that there must be some intrinsic connexion between a sufficient description of S and certain sufficient descriptions of all its parts, so that the latter could be inferred from the former. As regards this contradiction I can only say (*a*) that I am not persuaded that every substance must have a sufficient description, and (*b*) that I do not see that it has been proved that if X has any presuppositions it must have a total ultimate presupposition. I should have thought that the latter was merely a question of logical elegance. It is inelegant, but not fallacious, to define a square as a figure with four equal sides and four right angles. It is an inelegance that can, and therefore ought to be, avoided. In the present case we have an inelegance which cannot be avoided, but I do not see that this converts it into a logical contradiction. Why could an opponent not equally retort to McTaggart that there must be and yet cannot be a total ultimate *implication* on his view?

However this may be, McTaggart holds that if contradictions are

to be avoided substances must be subject to a certain sort of relation called *Determining Correspondence*. This is introduced in Chapter XXIV. and exemplified in Chapter XXVI. The reader who finds the abstract account difficult should pass to the examples and then return to Chapter XXIV. in the light of them. I am going to put the definition of determining correspondence in my own words and symbols, because in § 197, where it is first introduced, McTaggart's statements are hard to follow, and one of them (*viz.*, that the relation is one-one) is inaccurate, as the question raised in § 199 shows. It seems to me that the following expresses McTaggart's meaning. Let K represent the relation of a part of a substance to the whole substance. Let κ_x be the class of sets of parts of the substance x. Then the statement $\alpha \epsilon \kappa_x$ means 'α is one of the sets of parts of x,' and this means that the members of α just fit together to make up x. Let R be a relation of determining correspondence for the substance A. Then there is a set of parts of A (call it α) with the following properties. (i) The domain of R consists of the parts of the members of α, *i.e.*, anything that has R-correspondence to anything is a part of some member of α. We can write this in the form $D'R = K''\alpha$. (ii) The co-domain of R consists of the members of α and the parts of these members; *i.e.*, everything to which anything has R-correspondence is either a member of α or a part of some member of α. This can be written in the form $\breve{C}'R = \alpha \cup K''\alpha$. (iii) R itself is not (as McTaggart mistakenly says) assumed to be a one-one relation. What is assumed is the following series of propositions. (1) R, with its co-domain confined to α, is one-one, (2) R with its co-domain confined to $R''\alpha$ is one-one, (3) R with its co-domain confined to $R''R''\alpha$ is one-one, and . . . so on. (iv) If x is a member of the set of parts α, and β be any set of parts of A, then the parts of x which have R-correspondence to the members of β form a *set of parts* of x. This may be written :—

$$x \epsilon \alpha \,.\, \beta \epsilon \kappa_A \,.\, \supset_{x,\beta} \,.\, K'x \cap R''\beta \epsilon \kappa_x.$$

(v) If $u R x$ and $v R y$, and x is a part of y, then u is a part of v. This may be written in the form $R \mid K \mid \breve{R} \subset K$. (vi) If some part of x has the relation R to y then there is a sufficient description of y, which includes this fact about y, and implies a sufficient description of the part of x in question.

If all these conditions be fulfilled sufficient descriptions of the members of the particular set of parts α will imply sufficient descriptions of parts within parts of A to infinity. Let us see how this comes about. Suppose, *e.g.*, that α contains just the two parts B and C of A. Then by (i) the domain of R consists of the parts of B and the parts of C. By (ii) the co-domain of R consists of the parts of B, the parts of C, and B and C themselves. Hence R correlates the parts of B and the parts of C with B and C themselves and with their parts. Now B is a member of α, and the group [B, C] is a set of parts of A. Hence from (iv) the parts of B which have the relation R to B and those which have this relation to C

form a *set* of parts of B. But R here has its co-domain confined to α and is therefore one-one; hence we can speak of *the* part of B which has R to B, *the* part which has R to C and so on. [*Cf.* (iii) (1)]. Thus B breaks up into a set of two parts, one correlated with B and the other with C. These may be written in McTaggart's notation as[1] B ! B and B ! C. For precisely the same reasons C breaks up into a set of two parts, one correlated with B and the other with C. These may be written C ! B and C ! C. Now since B ! B and B ! C fit together exactly to make up B, whilst C ! B and C ! C fit together exactly to make up C, and B and C themselves fit together exactly to make up A it is clear that the four parts B ! B, B ! C, C ! B, and C ! C, fit together exactly to make up A. Hence they are a set of parts of A. We can therefore apply (iv) to them. Take B, to start with, as before. It is a member of α. And the group just constructed is a set of parts of A. Therefore by (iv) the parts of B which have the relation R to the members of this group form a *set* of parts of B. Now here R has its co-domain limited to R"α. For R"α is the class of things that stand in the relation R to the members of α. And the members of α are B and C in the present example. Hence R"α is the group B ! B, B ! C, etc. Now by (iii) (2) R with its co-domain thus confined is one-one. Hence we can speak, *e.g.*, of *the* part of B which has the relation R to B ! B. This can be written B ! B ! B in McTaggart's notation. The result is that B splits up into the set of four parts B ! B ! B, B ! B ! C, B ! C ! B, and B ! C ! C; whilst C splits up into the set of four parts C ! B ! B, C ! B ! C, C ! C ! B, and C ! C ! C. The eight form a new set of parts of A, and the process can be repeated indefinitely.

So far we have not needed to use assumptions (v) or (vi). Assumption (v) is needed for the following reason. Since R in general is not assumed to be one-one it would be possible, apart from (v), that, *e.g.*, B ! B (*i.e.*, the part of B that has the relation R to B) should be the same as B ! B ! C (*i.e.*, the part of B that has the relation R to the part of B that has the relation R to C). But by (v) we see that B ! B ! C must be a part of B ! B since B ! C is a part of B. Thus (v) secures that at each stage *each* part of the previous set of parts is divided. Assumption (vi) is of course essential for avoiding the difficulty which McTaggart finds in infinite divisibility. Granted (vi) it follows that a sufficient description of the set α (*i.e.* of B and of C) implies a sufficient description of B ! B, B ! C, C ! B, and C ! C. On the same assumption this in turn implies sufficient descriptions of B ! B ! B, etc., and so on for every stage in the division.

A class such as α is called a set of *Primary Parts*. It is clear that a set of primary parts of a substance A is $\breve{C}$'R – D'R, where R is a relation of determining correspondence for A. This means that it is a set of parts to which things stand in the relation R, but which themselves do not stand in the relation R to anything.

Certain further refinements and generalisations are introduced by

[1] $B ! B = (\imath x)(x \mathrm{KB} \,.\, x \mathrm{RB})$; $B ! C = (\imath x)(x \mathrm{KB} \,.\, x \mathrm{RC})$; and so on.

McTaggart; but anyone who has followed my account of determining correspondence will easily understand these, and no one who has failed to follow it is likely to understand them at all. The upshot of the matter is that if a substance has a set of primary parts a sufficient description of these will imply sufficient descriptions of sets of sequent parts within parts to infinity, and the alleged contradiction will be avoided.

In Chapter XXVI. McTaggart discusses a number of suggested illustrations, and rejects them all except one taken from perception. B and C are here percipients who perceive each other, themselves, and their parts. It is assumed that they perceive nothing else and that perception is the sole activity that they have. It is further assumed that the part of x which perceives y is a part of the part of x which perceives z, provided that y is a part of z. With these assumptions B ! B ! C, *e.g.*, is the part of B which perceives the part of B which perceives C. Again, B ! B and B ! C are, respectively, the part of B which perceives B, and the part of B which perceives C; and these are supposed to be a complete set of parts of B. Obviously B and C are percipients whose powers and limitations differ a good deal from ours; but one can anticipate the application that will be made of this example in Vol. II. in favour of a spiritual pluralism.

I will confine myself to two remarks about determining correspondence (1) I am not sure that I clearly understand the important assumption which I have numbered (vi):—'if *some* part of x has the relation R to y then there is a sufficient description of y, which includes this fact about y, and implies a sufficient description of the part of x in question'. Let ϕ be a set of properties of y, which do not include the fact that some part of x has the relation R to y. Let the property ϕ, together with the proposition $(\exists w) . w\mathrm{K}x . w\mathrm{R}y$, be a sufficient description of y. The latter proposition is equivalent to $y\breve{\mathrm{R}}\,|\,\mathrm{K}x$. We will suppose that y is *the* substance which has the property ϕ and the relation $\breve{\mathrm{R}}\,|\,\mathrm{K}$ to x, *i.e.*,

$$y = (\imath z)\{\phi z . z\breve{\mathrm{R}}\,|\,\mathrm{K}x\}.$$

Now suppose that this sufficient description of y intrinsically determines a sufficient description of $x\,!\,y$. What exactly will this mean? It seems to me that it must mean that there is a certain set of properties ψ, such that (*a*) anything that has them is identical with $x\,!\,y$, and (*b*) such that if anything (*e.g.*, z) has the property $\phi z . z\breve{\mathrm{R}}\,|\,\mathrm{K}x$ we can infer that $x\,!\,z$ will have the property ψ; *i.e.*,

$$(\exists\psi) : \psi w . \equiv_w . w = x\,!\,y : \phi z . z\mathrm{R}\,|\,\mathrm{K}x . \supset_{zx} . \psi x\,!\,z$$

If this be the right interpretation assumption (vi) may be written

$$y\breve{\mathrm{R}}\,|\,\mathrm{K}x . \supset_{x,y} . \therefore (\exists\phi,\psi) : \psi w . \equiv_w . w = x\,!\,y : \phi z . z\breve{\mathrm{R}}\,|\,\mathrm{K}x . \supset_{zx} . \psi x\,!\,z : y = (\imath z)\{\phi z . z\breve{\mathrm{R}}\,|\,\mathrm{K}x\}.$$

If this be not the right interpretation I confess I do not know what is. Now a difficulty that strikes me is that McTaggart evidently holds that only *some* sufficient descriptions of y will intrinsically determine a sufficient description of $x\,!\,y$, whereas I should

have thought that *any* sufficient description of y would have done this. For if ϕ be any such description of y it is surely an *exclusive* description of y to say that it is 'the part of x which has the relation R to that substance whose sufficient description is ϕ.' And this description is also *sufficient*, for it contains no substance but x, and x—being a primary part—is supposed to have a sufficent description. Does McTaggart mean that there is always some sufficient description of x ! y which does *not* involve the fact that it is the R-correlate of y? If so, he ought to have said so. His examples in Chapter XXVI. do not accord with this view of his meaning. His view seems to be there that, if C has a sufficient description, B ! C (*i.e.*, the part of B which perceives C) is sufficiently described as the part of B which perceives the substance which has this sufficient description. If this be all the description of B ! C that is in view, assumption (vi) becomes trivial, so far as I can see. And it is certainly not meant to be trivial.

(2) Doubtless the intention of McTaggart's argument and his examples is ultimately to suggest that the universe must consist of spiritual substances in certain specially intimate cognitive or other relations. It has struck me (I am probably wrong) that all his requirements would be equally well fulfilled if every substance were (or were correlated with) an ordinary extensive magnitude like a straight line. Take a straight line AB. Bisect it; it consists of the set of parts AX, XB. Bisect these in turn; they consist respectively of the sets AY, YX, and XZ, ZB. The four are a new set of parts of AB. This process of bisection can be continued *ad infinitum*. Moreover, any part in this infinite series of sets of parts has a simple sufficient description. It can be described as, *e.g.*, the mth member of the nth successive bisection of AB. If then there exists *any* sufficient description ϕ of AB it would seem that every part in this infinite series could be sufficiently described as, *e.g.*, the mth member of the nth successive bisection of the substance with the property ϕ. Is anything more than this needed, and if so, why precisely?

I must close this long yet inadequate review. McTaggart's book contains, beside what I have noted, admirable discussions on causation and on the basis of induction. I have chosen to describe and discuss its hardest and most original parts. To me it is very difficult to follow highly abstract arguments and to estimate the evidence of highly abstract principles. I therefore express no final opinion as to whether the author has succeeded in proving important conclusions. That he has produced a monument of deep thinking, clear writing, and acute criticism is beyond dispute.

C. D. Broad.

A Study in Realism. By JOHN LAIRD, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the Queen's University of Belfast. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1920. Pp. xii and 228. 14s.

UNTIL quite recently Realism among English thinkers has been a ferment and a point of view rather than a philosophy fully thought out. Its literature consisted mostly of scattered papers, in which its fundamental principles were, one by one, set forth amidst polemics against Idealism, or else were applied, in a tentative and experimental way, to this or that special problem. But the year 1920 has changed all this. It has given us Prof. Alexander's monumental Gifford Lectures on *Space, Time, and Deity*, which Realists can proudly match against Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* or Bosanquet's *Principle of Individuality and Value.* And, on a much smaller scale of ambition and performance, but still as a most valuable addition to the critical examination and defence of Realism, it has given us this present book of Prof. Laird's.

Laird is, I think, unduly modest when, in his Preface, he disclaims having attempted "more than an underling's work". He has done work of a kind which urgently needed to be done, and if his is an underling's way of doing it—well, let us have more underlings! Realism has long stood in need of just such a patient examination of its hypotheses as it here receives at Laird's hands. Moreover, the book's literary quality makes it a delight to read. Laird has a turn for neat epigram (*e.g.*, "intelligence at the helm is worth a whole cargo of instincts"), and his wide reading supplies many a happy allusion and apt quotation. We may be glad, too, that he has not, in writing, sought to efface the prickly vigour of his temperament, the natural combativeness of which is but imperfectly chastened by the humility of the Preface. In general, he is a blend of robust common sense and analytical subtlety. If he owes the former to his Scotch descent, he surely owes the latter to his Cambridge training. He suggests—shall I say?—a Reid sophisticated by Russell.

In his Preface (p. viii), Laird declares his firm belief "that realism is a truly philosophical theory of knowledge" and can be consistently sustained throughout the whole territory of knowledge. What, then, is this theory of knowledge? The answer to this question may be summed up in the following eight assumptions from the Introduction (pp. 8-14):—

(1) Things can be known as they really are.

(2) Subject to proper precautions, anything is precisely what it appears to be.

(3) These "genuine" appearances cannot contradict one another.

(4) For us human beings to have true knowledge of a thing does not logically imply that we need know all its conditions or connexions.

(5) Knowledge always implies that the mind is confronted with an object: object apprehended and process of apprehension are never identical.

(6) The object of true knowledge is in a certain sense independent of our knowing it.

(7) Indirect or representative knowledge implies direct acquaintance at some point.

(8) The plane of observation and logic is the only possible plane of truth.[1]

It will be readily seen that Laird's realism runs true to type, and that this catalogue of realistic assumptions is determined throughout by antithesis to the miscellaneous positions which are currently lumped together under the label of "idealism". Thus, the assumption of independence (6) challenges the *esse est percipi* principle. The assumption of the trustworthiness of finite knowledge (4) challenges the principle that nothing but the whole truth is wholly true. In other assumptions (1, 2, 7) the Lockean theory of knowledge as consisting of intra-mental representations of extra-mental realities is decisively rejected. The sharp distinction between mind and object (5) protects the object effectively against any taint of being "mental"; it cannot in any sense be said to be "made" or "constructed" by mind. Laird never tires of insisting that all so-called constructing is instrumental to "finding," and that even mental products have to be simply apprehended for what they are, after they have been produced. The same assumption (5), taken together with the last (8), shuts out Bergsonian intuition, the mystic's identity of knowing and being, the immediacy of Bradley's Absolute Experience—in short, all theories of knowledge which minimise or deny the "final truth" of the distinction between knower and known. Throughout, it is clear, realism has no room for any Absolute or Whole: such a thing is not "found" and thus is nothing, or, at least, may "logically" be ignored. For, whilst "realists need not deny that the universe as a whole is a sublime unity sempiternally perfect," they "may logically accept the facts which they find without referring to the whole which they do not know" (p. 146). In short, the realistic "defence of human knowledge" is based on the assumption (4) of "logical pluralism" (p. 149), which means that a judgment may be wholly and finally true irrespective of its connexions with other judgments, and that a physical thing may be perceived as it really is even though the mind does not perceive the whole of it. The same pluralism leads Laird to insist in the realm of values "on the full reality of good and evil as we find them" (p. 146), and to encourage the temper of a manly meliorism: "Throw a man on his own resources and he may do something worth while. Make a pensioner of him and

[1] *Cf.* also the following passage: "The assumptions of realism are that knowledge is always the discovery of something: that anything discovered is distinct from and independent of the process of recognising it: that nothing which is known is *therefore* mental except in the way of being selected by a mind: and that if any selected thing is mental or mentally tinged *de facto*, this circumstance does not affect the kind or validity of our knowing of it" (p. 181).

he will repay your alms with feeble dependence" (p. 148). These sentences make a very effective "curtain" for the chapter on *values* (ch. vii.), but they leave one wondering helplessly just what Laird would make of the truly religious temper—in Christ, for example, or in St. Francis—of its sense of dependence on God, and of our strength being weakness. In fact, these sentences are symptomatic. For all that Laird suggests in his Epilogue that our civilisation suffers from our not paying enough attention to God, his realism runs true to type in this, too, that it is weak just where most idealisms are strong, *viz.*, as a philosophy of religion. Even Prof. Alexander's discussion of Deity may fairly be said to break with every great historical religion. Realism is the philosophy of minds who either are wholly devoid of mysticism, or else, like Mr. Russell, distrust it so profoundly that they insist on keeping it at all costs out of their philosophy.

Turning now to the details of Laird's argument, it is well to remember that for him "the principal problem of this essay is to consider whether things are literally discovered by the mind" (p. 81). In fact, the whole realistic platform, set out above, consists of the assumptions necessary to support a theory of knowledge as the *discovery* of independent objects by, or their revelation to, an apprehending mind. The book is devoted to testing this theory by applying it, successively, to Things Perceived (ch. ii.), Things Remembered and Expected (ch. iii.), the Stuff of Fancy (ch. iv.), the World of Common Belief (ch. v.), Principles (ch. vi.), Values (ch. vii.), The Mind (ch. viii.). Let us pass in review the most striking points in the argument.

The analysis of perception in ch. ii. is noteworthy for Laird's sharp criticism of Russell's "sensory atomism," *i.e.*, the theory that "we perceive sense-data and we perceive nothing else" (p. 18). Laird's own view is that sense-data are as much *signs* as *facts;* that hence "we always perceive sign-facts" (p. 24); that, in other words, sense-data have meaning and that "meaning is directly perceptible just like colour and sound" (p. 27). This recognition of meaning has two important corollaries. First, it enables Laird to say that whatever we perceive carries with it a reference to *more* of the same world, which reference is our clue to the existence of a single world, though this is "only a signified thing clinging with a tag of meaning to the fragments we perceive" (p. 26). Secondly, meaning enables us to construe physical things not, after Russell's fashion, as mere classes or collections of sense-data, but as individual "continuants" signified by sense-data. Things are relatively enduring, whereas percepts are "momentary glimpses" of things, and whilst we cannot ascribe the limitations of percepts to things, we must, in principle, hold that percepts, so far as they go, reveal the positive characters of things. This theory of meaning seems to me so vast an improvement on current realistic analyses of perception, that I, for one, am not disposed to quarrel with Laird when, as a good realist, he labours to show that meaning is discovered, not added, by the mind.

The outcome of ch. iii. is that memory can, but expectation cannot, be construed as discovery. "Expectation is only the present sign of a hidden future" (p. 53). "Forecasts of the future are certainly not the future itself" (p. 51). But recollection, with strong probability, is "the mind's power of returning, again and again, to precisely the same event in the past" (p. 52). Objections to this view are met by Laird—it is his favourite strategy when in a corner: he uses it also for error (p. 103)—with the bold assertion that "it is plainly impossible to explain the fact of memory itself. Memory is possible, and that is all we need to know" (p. 59).

Ch. iv. deals with images and dreams on the principle that "images are the mimics of percepts" (p. 62), and that for realistic theory "images must have the same status as percepts" (p. 63). Laird's defence of this thesis ranges from space- and time-difficulties to psycho-analysis, and culminates in the statement that "images are precisely what they appear to be, spatial, temporal and physical, yet without a home in the perceived order of time and space" (p. 74).

Ch. v. resumes the argument of ch. ii. What we perceive is a fragment of the physical world, which latter is a "believed thing" (p. 83). Now what we believe are propositions, and, following Meinong, Laird deals with propositions in the truth of which we believe, as "asserted objectives". Personally, I cannot agree at all with Laird's sharp distinction of perceiving and judging,[1] percept and objective, but here I have no space to argue the matter. Of course objectives, like percepts, are "discovered," but more important than this vindication of realism is Laird's protest against the analyses of other realists who "cheat us with objectives and sense-data" and "ignore" the physical things, as continuants, which are bodily, so to speak, both perceived and judged. This account is held to be true at any rate for judgments of perception (other types of judgments Laird does not discuss). The principle is "we refer to things in judgment, not to objectives, precisely as we perceive things and not percepts" (p. 88). When I see a red book, the percept *quâ* fact, is "literally identical" with so much of the thing, and the objective, "this book is red," similarly is a selection from the total being of the thing and reveals it just so far, provided, of course, the objective is "a truth". Those fellow-realists of Laird's whom he here criticises may be trusted to take care of themselves. To me, Laird's doctrine appears, once more, to be a considerable improvement, but, then, it only expresses in

[1] It is worth noting that whilst most realists appear to distinguish between perceiving and judging chiefly on the ground that the former is exempt from error (see, *e.g.*, Russell's *Problems of Philosophy*), Laird explicitly extends error to "every species of apprehending" (p. 41). I am inclined to think that, after this admission, any insistence on the distinction between perceiving sign-facts and judging objectives becomes purely verbal. In saying this, I intend no pun on Laird's view which, apparently, is that the distinction comes in with "verbalisation" or the use of language.

realistic language what, in idealistic language, has been familiar to every student of Bradley or Bosanquet. The chapter ends with a most interesting examination of the Kant-Hume controversy on causality. Hume, it appears, proved invulnerable to Kant, but now succumbs to Laird. Hume's analysis is defective "because he overlooked the perceived meaning of perceived things" (p. 78). According to Laird, we perceive more than bare conjunction. We perceive connexion, but *not necessary connexion.* Both perception of physical things and experience of voluntary movement contain a causal, or rather "precausal," meaning—"a presumption which is the nucleus of a principle" (p. 99). But common sense does not discover that universal sway of uniform causal laws which science postulates. In the world of common sense, some causes may be "as capricious and irregular in their behaviour as a woman's wit" (p. 100).

Ch. vi. is devoted mainly to a discussion of the question, "what kind of being a principle or category has" (p. 106). More particularly, the problem is whether the dualism of particulars which exist and universals which subsist can be avoided. The answer is that an ultimate difference between *vérités éternelles* and *vérités de fait* remains (pp. 117 ff.). But the former, like the latter, realistically "confront the mind and reveal themselves to it" (p. 120).

Ch. vii. is a criticism, on lines by now in principle familiar, of the alleged subjectivity of value. Truth not being, for Laird, a value,[1] the discussion deals only with æsthetic and moral values, the principle being that value "can be recognised by the mind like any other quality" (p. 125). A human action, *e.g.*, is morally good in the same sense in which a cherry is red (p. 144).

So far we have followed that branch of the realistic "phenomenology of knowledge" (p. 12) which is concerned with the various kinds of objects known. Ch. viii. is devoted to the other branch, which is concerned with knowing, or, more generally, with mind or consciousness. Consistently enough with his principles, Laird holds this branch to be identical with Psychology, though he is in difficulties at once because psychologists (*a*) give widely divergent accounts of consciousness, and (*b*) are much divided over the question of introspection or the mind's observation of itself. Into the thick of this fray Laird throws himself with lusty polemical blows. His basis is: we "find" consciousness; we know what it is, for the mind can notice its own operations. On this basis he rejects the American realists' theory of consciousness as a cross-section of the objective universe defined by the responses

[1] On the other hand, "true knowledge" is for him a value, where by "true knowledge" I suppose he means the apprehension, or rather assertion, of objectives which are true. The difference on this point between Professors Alexander and Laird is instructive. And, in general, it is both amusing and amazing to watch how realists, once they go beyond the abstract generalities of their assumptions, develop profound differences from each other on nearly every concrete problem.

of a nervous system, with arguments very similar to those which Prof. Alexander employs for the same purpose. On the other hand, Laird would, I think, have to reject Prof. Alexander's theory of "enjoyment" on the same ground on which he rejects Bergson's theory of intuition, *viz.*, that ordinary self-observation is possible and suffices for knowing the mind.

There remains ch. ix., entitled "The Larger Outlook". This is the most ambitious but, to my thinking, the least successful chapter of the book. Laird acknowledges that realists have generally confined their discussions within too narrow a field, and failed "to include a conspectus of the achievements of the human spirit" (p. 180). This raises high expectations, but they can hardly be said to be fulfilled by the exceedingly miscellaneous contents of the chapter which follows. It begins with some remarks on constructive imagination in the physical sciences, and identifies such imagination with probability and hypothesis. It passes on to biology and a condemnation of Bergson's intuition, considered as a "substitute for thinking" (p. 187). Economics, history, the philosophy of history, art, and finally religious experience, are next passed in review. Much of the detail of the discussion is of a high order of interest, but the total effect is, to me at any rate, disappointing. Again and again I get the impression as if Laird, just on the point of losing himself, to his own and his readers' delight, in his subject, were forcing himself back to his nominal topic of realism, and to the making of some such point as that apprehending a construction is different from constructing it; that "anything which is known is *therefore* given" (p. 203); that art primarily just accepts the beauty revealed to man, and only secondarily expresses and constructs, *etc.* The concluding criticism of mystical experience only makes one wonder whether Laird knows by acquaintance what the mystics are talking about. He recognises himself that he is so far removed from them, that "argument is as useless as soft words before a tempest" (p. 215). But he gives us three further pages of argument all the same.

I have tried to pick out and present what is positive in Laird's book, in the hope of thus sending all the readers of this review to the book itself for the reasoning by which its conclusions are supported. In conclusion, I must content myself with one general comment. Idealism is a Protean thing which to some presents the paradoxical shape of Berkeley's *esse est percipi* and to others the rich body of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Realists are much more plausible in their criticisms of idealism in the former than in the latter sense. It is only, I think, because even objective idealists are encumbered by the historical associations of their terminology that they still seem to be in the thrall of the *esse est percipi* principle. So far as this is so, realists have created a new situation which makes it urgently necessary for idealists to overhaul their language and restate their position without some of its traditional ambiguities. Meanwhile such a realism as Laird's

strikes me as being insufficiently in earnest with its own principle that "anything is what it appears to be". In one passage in ch. ii., Laird himself speaks of "improvement in perception" as involving "transformation of the whole texture of the perceived thing" (p. 41). But his absorption in the arid task of maintaining the antithesis of knower and known makes him blind to the extent to which this "transformation" of the world perceived and believed in may be carried, by expanding its "meaning" with the help of those types of experience which, like the social and religious, we customarily call "spiritual" *par excellence.* The doctrine of "degrees of truth" reflects the dialectic of these transformations, or completer interpretations, made possible by a fuller use of the resources of human experience. The strength of idealism in this direction, and the sources of that strength, Laird hardly appears to appreciate. Nor has Realism produced any work which comes within measurable distance of challenging the master-pieces of recent idealism in this field, except Prof. Alexander's Gifford Lectures. But when Prof. Alexander comes to these topics, it is noticeable that "mind" increasingly bears the chief burden of his tale.

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

Essays in Critical Realism; A Co-operative Study of the Problem of Knowledge. By DURANT DRAKE, ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, JAMES BISSETT PRATT, ARTHUR K. ROGERS, GEORGE SANTAYANA, ROY WOOD SELLARS, C. A. STRONG. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1920. Pp. vii, 244.

THE form and method of this collection of essays by seven American professors of philosophy make it typical in more than one respect of some important tendencies in modern philosophy. The authors conceive philosophy as a subject which can be split up into a number of separate and clearly-defined problems, each of which is to be attacked in a purely empirical way. And it is this conception of the subject, no doubt, which makes possible the co-operation of a number of writers to study one question in detail. The way in which this volume has been composed marks it out as something a little different from a mere collection of papers by writers who share only a general agreement on principles. All the writers, we are told, have held the general position set out in these essays, for several years. Some of them have published separate volumes defending substantially the same view. But all the essays here published have been specially written for this volume, and are the result of much discussion between the various writers. In some cases the essays have been redrafted several times in the course of the discussion.

"Our belief in the value of co-operative effort," the authors state in their preface, "has been fully justified to our own minds by the

result"; and one need not doubt that much of the value of the theory here expounded is due to the careful preliminary discussions between the essayists. But I hope I shall not seem ungracious if I say that the authors might have distinguished between the best method of arriving at results and the best method of presenting those results to the philosophical public. I cannot help feeling that the method of exposition which they have chosen is not a happy one. Perhaps the very familiarity of the writers with one another's different modes of expression has made it difficult for them to appreciate that the reader is not in the same favourable position. But the book is not an easy one to read. To some extent the essayists share a common terminology, but each has also favourite terms of his own; the essays overlap a good deal, and are in agreement on most points, but with certain differences as regards details; the result is that it is often a matter of considerable difficulty to decide whether one essayist is or is not trying to say, in *his* terminology, just the same thing which another is expressing in his.

But these, after all, are matters of detail; let me pass on to the substance of the book. The problem selected for treatment is that of the nature of knowledge, and the discussion is confined as far as possible to that problem. "No agreement," we are told in the preface, "has been sought except on the epistemological problem . . . and, actually, the members of our group hold somewhat different ontological views. . . . We have found it entirely possible to isolate the problem of knowledge."

Of the seven essays four—those of Profs. Drake, Pratt, Sellars, and Strong—give the completest account of the theory. Most of the writers acknowledge obligations to Prof. Santayana as having done most to make clear one of their leading conceptions (that of "essence"); but in his contribution to this volume he has contented himself with giving several general proofs of realism, and does not go so much into detail as some of the other essayists. The remaining two essays defend Critical Realism in the way in which Zeno defended the doctrines of Parmenides—by adverse criticisms of other theories.

If one were to divide realist theories of the nature of perception into those which are chiefly concerned to find a philosophical basis for physics and those which want simply to do the best they can for Common-sense, then the present theory would fall within the latter class. I do not mean that the writers have any superstitious respect for the views of the plain man; they are at least as anxious to give a theory which will satisfy the physiologist as to give one which will square with Common-sense. None the less, Critical Realism is, I think, in several important respects nearer to the common-sense view than a good many other theories of knowledge.

Common-sense seems to assert (*a*) that we do perceive real physical objects and (*b*) that the *way* in which each individual perceives them depends to some extent on subjective factors.

But the difficulty is, of course, that there is an apparent contradiction between these two assertions. One philosopher after another has triumphantly fastened on this fact, and has pointed out to Common-sense that it really must give up one or other of the two. And poor Common-sense, which has of course never reflected on the matter, has nothing to say. It does not really like the simpler accounts of the matter which are offered by a Berkeley or a Prof. Holt; the first abolishing real objects and leaving us with nothing but ideas, the second asserting that all the qualities which anybody ever perceives really are out there in space. But it has no reply to give when it is challenged to state its own view in clear and unambiguous terms. Something like the theory of "representative perception" seems at first sight to provide a refuge; it at least recognises real physical objects *and* subjective differences of perception; but the theory of representative perception has proved unable to withstand philosophical criticism. First and last then, between idealism, subjective or objective, and a realism either too naïve or too sophisticated, Common-sense has had a bad time of it.

The writers of this volume, however, have convinced themselves that none of the simpler theories give a correct description of the actual situation in perception; in their striving after simplicity these theories have falsified the facts, and Nemesis overtakes them when they attempt to account for error. Common-sense *does* seem, after all, to be right in *both* the assertions it makes; only it makes them in vague language, it is not in possession of the conceptions necessary to state such a position clearly. In order so to state it, the present writers think, a new conception is required, which has not hitherto been employed by epistemologists. This is put very clearly by Prof. Strong in a footnote (the footnotes to this volume seem to contain the most mature expression of the theory): "I had long been convinced that cognition requires three categories for its adequate interpretation; the intermediate one—between subject and object—corresponding to the Kantian 'phenomenon' or 'appearance'. At one time I used to designate this category as 'content,' since it agrees with the current conception of a 'content of consciousness'; but, in my efforts to conceive it clearly, I was continually falling off either into the category of 'object' or into that of 'psychic state'. What was my relief when at last I heard Mr. Santayana explain his conception of 'essence,' and it dawned upon me that here was the absolutely correct description of the looked-for category."

The exact nature of this category will become clearer if we glance briefly at the reasons given for distinguishing it from both object and psychical state. It is admitted by everyone that in all varieties of knowledge, whether perception, conception, or memory, there is something immediately before the mind, something intuited or given. This entity is called the *datum* in the present volume. Our question then is as to the nature

of this datum. Now there are two well-known theories as to what the datum is: (1) that it is a psychical state, and (2) that it is the real object. Neglecting for the moment the first view, which has been the target for the criticisms of realists of all schools, let us consider the objections which the present writers bring against the second view.

The paradoxical results which follow from a thorough-going acceptance of naïve realism are well known, and a careful summary of them is given by Prof. Drake in the opening essay. It is not only that those results are repugnant to Common-sense; they also fit in badly with what physiology tells us of the mechanism of perception; and they make it difficult to give a reasonable theory of error.

But if the datum is not a real object, what is it? The answer of Critical Realism to this question seems at first sight rather startling; to quote Prof. Strong, "the datum . . . is recognised not to be psychological, and, since we have shown it not to be physical, the chances are that it is logical, an entity of the peculiar type belonging to logic." But this way of stating the position is, I think, unnecessarily paradoxical; by calling the datum a logical entity Prof. Strong means simply that it is not an existent, but a universal. Profs. Drake and Sellars use the term "character-complex" to express the same thing, and Prof. Pratt often speaks of it simply as a "meaning". But most of the writers admit that Prof. Santayana's term "essence" is perhaps the best; it is worth while therefore to quote his definition. "By 'essence,'" he says, "I understand a universal of any degree of complexity and definition, which may be given immediately, whether to sense or to thought. Only universals have logical or æsthetic individuality, or can be given directly, clearly, and all at once. . . . This object of pure sense or pure thought, with no belief super-added, an object inwardly complete and individual, but without external relations or physical status, is what I call an essence." And Prof. Strong makes this a little more definite: "These non-existents are in the broadest sense universals. Yet they vary greatly in their degree of concreteness; a centaur is more concrete than a perfect square, a perfect square is more concrete than virtue. The question will be whether a datum can be so concrete as even to have sensible vividness, and yet not be an existence, but only an entirely concrete universal, a universal of the lowest order. This would mean that the *same* datum exactly might be given to another person, or to the same person at a different time and place; *in such wise that the datum as such would not be in time and space.*"

The words which I have italicised bring out the point in the doctrine which most people will find it very hard to accept. It is certainly difficult to convince oneself that what is immediately given to sense is not in time and space. In defence of this position, however, Prof. Strong brings forward a number of argu-

ments, which merit a detailed consideration impossible to give within the limits of a review. Suffice it to say, then, that he holds that "the affirmation of locality has reference only to the physical things that the visual data bring before us, not to the visual data as such". This statement raises the question, what then is the object of knowledge, and what is the relation of the datum to the object? The answer given by Critical Realism to this question is most completely expounded in the essays of Profs. Pratt and Sellars, to which I now turn.

It is clear that if data are not existences, and yet what is known in perception is an existent world, the data themselves cannot be the objects of knowledge. In other words, knowledge cannot be a simple relation between a mind and objects. What we have, according to the Critical Realist, is an essence immediately given, which has a reference to an external object. As Prof. Pratt puts it, "the quality-group which one finds in perception is not the object of perception but the means by which we perceive". This gives us the key-note of the theory. We *know* objects by means of essences or contents which are intuited; the objects themselves are never *intuited*, they are *known*. In Prof. Pratt's words, "Knowledge . . . makes an assertion about something and is therefore always mediate in its nature. It is not just a bare experience. It means more than it is." For this reason, the writers accept, with some reservations, the description of their theory as "epistemological dualism," to distinguish it from "epistemological monism," which works with a relation of immediate awareness as the fundamental cognitive relation.

At this point it will strike the reader that the theory has a considerable degree of kinship with the theory of "representative perception," and that it tends to cut us off from the real world. This latter charge is one which the writers evidently anticipate, and are anxious to meet. Both Prof. Pratt and Prof. Sellars (whose essay is one of the most interesting in the volume) give much attention to the point. Their contention is, in effect, that the charge is a good one against the "representative" theory, because that theory offers us as datum an idea, *i.e.*, an existent, from which we could only *infer* the existence of the external object; but that the charge fails against their theory, since for them the datum is only an essence. We can know the object through the essence just because (when our perception is a correct one) the essence is the essence of the real object. So in a sense the object *is* given—but it is only given as to its essence, not as to its existence. The writers indeed admit that their view of knowledge implies "transcendence," but far from considering this to be a disadvantage, they claim it as one of the merits of the theory. It is quite clear, they say, that past events or other people's experiences cannot be directly *given* to the knower; so unless knowledge is transcendent, we cannot know the past and we cannot know other people's experiences.

The question of the relation of data to psychic states is not, I

think, so important for the theory as that of their relation to objects; I shall only touch on it briefly. And it is, as a matter of fact, a question on which the various essayists are not at one. Four of them hold that the psychic state is quite distinct from the datum; the other three contend that the two blend, and that the datum always contains all the sensations through which it is given, though it usually contains more as well. The precise points of difference and agreement are not easy to grasp from a reading of the separate essays; but Prof. Drake comes to the rescue with two footnotes, which go some way towards clearing up the difficulty.

The self (or psyche, as it is usually called by the essayists) is, of course, also a necessary factor in knowledge. But its nature is not discussed in this volume, since such a discussion would go beyond the boundaries of epistemology into ontology; and for the same reason nothing is said about the ultimate nature of physical objects.

The theory of which I have just given an outline has some very considerable attractions. There are a good many students of philosophy at the present time who would welcome a theory of knowledge which could give a clear meaning to the statement that we perceive real physical objects but that those objects may appear differently to different people, and appear sometimes wrongly. And the theory under review is not the only one which attempts to do this; one may mention Prof. Laird's recent volume as an attempt, from a somewhat different standpoint, to do substantially the same thing.

But while many people might be ready to admit that the true analysis of knowledge is possibly something like this, I do not think that many will be able to accept the detailed working-out as a very plausible account of the matter. I shall note only a few difficulties.

In spite of Prof. Strong's arguments, it is very hard to convince oneself that the datum in perception is a mere essence and, as such, not in time and space. When I try to get the matter quite clear to myself, it seems obvious that what is given is a particular existent, and not merely a bundle of loose predicates. Prof. Strong's contention is, of course, that in supposing the datum to be in space we confuse the datum itself with what it refers to; it *claims* to belong to a real object, but its connexion with the real object is only affirmed or believed by us, it is not *given*. But here I find a difficulty as to how exactly this claim is made, if the datum is only a logical universal. Take for instance the case where I perceive (or think I perceive) a red pillar-box. What is given here, it is contended, is only a universal of a certain degree of complexity; this *claims* to belong to an existent object, and if there really is such an existent object there, then my perception is correct. My objection to this is that the theory cannot explain the meaning of the phrase "if there really is such an existent object *there*". It is obviously not enough that there should be a pillar-box somewhere; the pillar-box must be in the place I perceive it to be in, if my perception is

to be correct. But how, if what is given is only a universal, can it contain a reference to a particular point in space? Some existent or other surely must be given as well, if we are ever to be able to attach our universals to real things in a real (and not merely conceived) space.

All the essayists however seem to be agreed that existence can never be given. To a great extent they rely, to prove this, on the fact that we can know past events, which obviously cannot be present to us as existent. But Prof. Drake, at least, goes further than this and seems to contend that there is an *a priori* impossibility that existence should ever be given. "The objects themselves, *i.e.*, those bits of *existence*, do not get within our consciousness. Their existence is their own affair, private, incommunicable. One existent (my organism, or mind) cannot go out beyond itself literally, and include another existent." Surely to say this is to beg the whole question of the nature of knowledge; at this time of day the matter cannot be settled by using spatial metaphors.

But throughout the book the writers seem to employ far too confidently the distinction between essence and existence. At times one would almost suppose one was reading Spinoza; and as in the case of that philosopher, the separation of a thing's being into two parts, its existence and its essence, seems doubtfully legitimate. The essayists are right, no doubt, in trying to separate their epistemological discussion from questions of ontology; but it is not easy to discuss any question at all without having settled questions of logic, and the present book seems to call for a discussion of the relation of universals and particulars as an essential preliminary. In some of the present essays, at least, the existence of a thing appears, like substance in Locke, to lie entrenched behind its qualities.

Finally, one would desire from Critical Realism a more careful consideration of the question whether there may not be different types of the knowledge-relation (to use a term which the writers reject). Throughout the book the term "knowledge" is used rather loosely; it usually means perception, but one is often uncertain, in any particular context, whether it is being employed simply as equivalent to perception or in a wider sense. (This criticism does not hold so much against Profs. Sellars and Strong.) But is it not quite possible that, even if our knowledge of past events is only mediate, we may have immediate knowledge of *some* things? To prove that there is some knowledge which is not immediate awareness is not the same as to prove that immediate awareness never can be knowledge.

The essays of Prof. Lovejoy and Prof. Rogers do not directly expound the new theory, and interesting as they are, I must pass them over with a bare mention. Prof. Lovejoy examines Pragmatism as held by Prof. Dewey, and attempts to show that Critical Realism has good claims to the adherence of Pragmatists. Prof. Rogers's essay on *The Problem of Error* is a criticism of the accounts of error given by idealists, neo-realists, and pragmatists; it is written in a fresh and pointed manner.

It is impossible, within the limits of a review, to do justice to all the argument, always vigorous and often subtle, which this book contains. But this matters the less since these essays (and it is the fate, one is sure, their authors would desire for them) will certainly form the starting-point for much discussion.

ALAN DORWARD.

Wirklichkeitslehre: Ein Metaphysischer Versuch. Von HANS DRIESCH. Leipzig: Verlag von Emmanuel Reinicke, 1917.

THIS work, it is said in the Foreword, is metaphysical in the strictest sense. It is not a Theory of Knowledge, substituted for a metaphysic. "It claims to be metaphysic as science, to treat of the real scientifically. It does this in full consciousness of the inadequacy of human reason to the task. Our knowledge is everywhere fragmentary, and above all is it so here. But the fragment is better than nothing, and that fragmentary knowledge of the real is possible, it is the aim of this work to show."

This statement gives the general standpoint, especially distinguishing the theory from all those for which logic furnishes the key to the nature of reality. Agnostic it might be called on the ultimate questions, *e.g.*, Monism or Dualism, yet claiming a value for probable propositions, where demonstration is impossible; in some respects confessing to irrationalism, yet through the conception of the real as primarily "Wissen," guarding against a Bergsonian form of irrationalism, in spite of some affinity with Bergson. We find at the end that in regard to the "higher stages" of the doctrine of reality there are no certain conclusions. The object was, however, "to prepare the way for these as questions that have meaning and justification," to show that they "must emerge at the end of a theory of the real," *e.g.*, the problem whether the dualism of experience is ultimate, the problem of a timeless becoming. The point of view is qualified by the peculiar outlook of the writer in which he supposes himself to be somewhat isolated amongst contemporary thinkers.

At the close of the Foreword he refers to the character of his work as "erdenflüchtigen," and as strange to an age which inclines to identify the moral with the merely social, the "inner-worldly" in the sense of spatio-temporal conditions with the real, and explains his standpoint as involving the position that the kingdom of man in the deepest sense is "not of this world".

"In our time philosophy should seriously bethink herself, that the earthly is only a small part of her domain. And this not merely on theoretic grounds—for the much-be-lauded "Inner-worldliness" has led to that deification of the state, the terrible results of which our generation has experienced." The book was entered upon in 1905, but not published till 1917. From the author's doctrine of order it derives the method of approach to

metaphysics, though only, he observes, as regards the most general principles of order. It is not dependent on any special logical method. His doctrine of the starting-point of philosophy is at least, however, of great importance for the succeeding stages. This is the basis—"I experience and have knowledge of something"—or simply, "Ich habe etwas," the consciousness of this original "*I*" being raised above the distinctions of unity and multiplicity, and of time. It is thus not to be likened to the Cartesian first act of thought. This is what Prof. Driesch describes as his solipsism of method—not of theory—carrying with it a sharp distinction between immediate objects which belong to the original fact, and mediate objects which the *I* is driven to postulate, on account, in the first instance, of the fact of becoming in the field of consciousness. The full significance of this method is brought out in the little book, *Wissen und denken* (1919). For the metaphysician it means fundamentally that there is no object except in relation to consciousness, materialism in any form being thus rejected. The sciences may work independently in their own sphere, but, for philosophy, chemistry must always be "*my* chemistry". Further since this "methodic solipsism" is a solipsism of knowledge it is bound up both with the conception of knowledge as the original and type of all relations, and with the culminating speculation concerning the whole as "thinking upon itself and desiring to complete its thought, and working at this task through me and those like me, in actual temporal existence". And when adjusted to the philosophy of history which develops from the author's theory of life in the individual and the whole of which it is member, the doctrine of knowledge leads to the position that in the evolution of man and society the only sure direction of advance is in the line of advancing knowledge. It would seem (though this is not explicitly stated) that we are to see in the growth of knowledge the expression through the process of experience of the reality whose nature can only be conceived under the category of knowledge. Why this expression is so imperfect, is a question the answer to which is given, if at all, in the considerations which lead to provisional dualism. Prof. Driesch thus attempts to reconcile the extreme opposition between systems which make consciousness as thought their starting-point and those which start from the experience of becoming, or whilst ascribing in some sense reality to the process he endeavours to avoid the results of a consistent philosophy of change. The peculiar form he gives to this combination is determined by that biological philosophy for which he is probably best known in this country through his Gifford lectures, 1907-8. To understand his theory of reality we have then to bear in mind his "Philosophy of the Organism". The passage to this philosophy from logic takes place, on the one hand, because in the organic world there is best expressed that ideal of ordered unity, wholeness, which is the aim of logic. In the organic being we have the completed unity which it is the function of thought to seek. The goal

of thought would be to see the universe itself as such a whole. The relation of logic to metaphysics is, however, not so simple as is suggested by monistic systems of metaphysics. It is only possible here to refer very briefly to the stages through which we pass from the first act of consciousness to the positing of objects which are not merely "als ob" independent, which have more than the assumption of independence made for the worlds of nature and the soul—the first order of mediate objects. The further objects are beyond the contents of thought as "für mich," they have also an independence "an sich". In the first instance this is only a wish or an ideal of logic which wills to rise above itself, in the double Hegelian sense of "aufheben," and in the end the metaphysical undertaking remains a wish. In the strict sense there cannot be a refutation of idealism, and Kant does not really prove the existence of an "An sich". The spirit of Driesch's metaphysic is indicated in his question—Granted the impossibility of a dogmatic metaphysic, why would not Kant admit as legitimate a speculative metaphysic? There is, however, he holds, a quality peculiar to metaphysical propositions, *viz.* a certain "Tönung," which distinguishes them from all logical propositions, and in this there is the hint of a special metaphysical faculty. In the notion of "Tönung," Driesch admits that he makes a concession to ontologism. For in this peculiar quality lies the significance of "wirklich," as something which is more than related to the *I*, and with it goes the distinction between the real and the apparent. In spite of the emphasis he lays on this quality, Driesch does not treat it as the chief criterion of truth (or truth that "makes itself manifest"). The criteria of metaphysical truth, "wahrheit," include those of logical validity, "richtigkeit," and more. Not only the principles of economy and non-contradiction are required, but also the test that reality must be such as both to account for experience and to be more than experience, and this is much harder to apply, and less certain.[1] Our conception of reality, it appears, must be adequate to making possible the system of knowledge, but it has also to give meaning to experiences which are beyond the sphere of logic—as we find at the higher stage of metaphysics. Illustration of Driesch's method of applying the principle that the conditioning must not be poorer than the conditioned in its degree of manifoldness may be found in his treatment of the spatial relation. He concludes that "near" has the same significance for reality that it has for nature; geometry is not merely subjective but sign of a definite structure of relations in the real. But even in the sphere of nature apart from personal subjective experience there is a kind of becoming which is not experienced in spatial relations—*viz.*, the spaceless becoming of that which Driesch describes as "entelechy," in his philosophy of the organism, and which, as he considers himself to have scientifically proved, must be regarded as a factor of nature. The

[1] *See Wissen und Denken*, vii., 4 and 5.

Spinozistic doctrine that every quality of substance in the sphere of its unfolded being—natura naturata—has a spatial aspect, is on this as well as on other grounds rejected. In the connexions of organic nature, only the effects of becoming, and not the preceding stages, are marked by the relation of contiguity. The becoming of a whole presents itself only in an uncertain and fragmentary way in the spatial system. Again the metaphysical significance of becoming must be such that to earlier and later, as conditions of nature and the soul, correspond distinctions in the real; γένεσις is more than "schein". Becoming is taken as more fundamental than time. It is ultimately on the ground of this law of method, the maintenance in reality of the degrees of the manifold in becoming, that we can affirm "Ganzheit" of reality; *i.e.*, that kind of wholeness which is an actual element of the structure of the real experienced by us under the form of temporal becoming. In the principle of "ganzheit" the demand of logic for an ordered system has its metaphysical justification. It is in the development of this conception that Prof. Driesch brings out the full results of his biological philosophy, and taking the clue of the spaceless stages of becoming in the individual, makes an exceedingly interesting attempt at an interpretation of the history of life and human history by a free use of the idea of an "entelechy" guiding the evolution of larger wholes. He fails however to trace any unmistakeable signs of a real evolution corresponding to that of the growth of the individual to the goal of maturity, either in the development of the species, or history, whether of the animal race or of humanity as a whole. On the one hand there is no discernible goal in phylogeny, and the immense variety of species together with their arrested development remains a mystery. On the other hand, there is in the sphere of human history, in the first place, no sufficient ground for taking races or nations as intermediate wholes: the main lines of advance have been common at least to great groups of peoples. He does not admit a ground of real distinction in the contribution of the national ἦθος to culture. This is part of his hostility to Hegelianism. A history of the essential line of evolution we have in the sciences, philosophy, art, could be written without any reference to political or national conditions, though in this line we ought to see the true source of all history. For what is gained here cannot be lost, so long as there is memory preserving the past in the present. In the second place neither can the evolution of the super-personal be traced in the history of humanity as a whole. So-called historic laws concern the results of fortuitous cumulation of conditions, not connected in an evolutionary way. Yet there are many impressive signs of "wholeness" even in the inanimate world. Only the spell which Darwinism exercised over the latter half of the nineteenth century blinded us, in Driesch's view, to the truth of that concept of the harmony of nature with the conditions of life which Darwinism itself does not destroy. In the organic world there are the facts at least of reproduction and inheritance. But

though the totality of life might be conceived as a self-evolving whole, yet, inasmuch as there is no temporal goal for such an evolution, its ultimate nature would have to be sought in the sphere of the spiritual. Turning to human history Driesch finds a striking harmony between social need and individual vocation, and between functions mutually related, as those of teacher and taught, and also in what Hegel calls the "List der Vernunft," over-riding individual purposes for common ends.

If some of these speculations appear fantastic, we are on firmer ground in his interpretation of the moral consciousness in its two expressions, duty with its attendant phenomenon of remorse to which great significance is attached, and sympathy indicating individual membership of a whole. Any consistent monadism is then disproved, it is argued, by history. As earlier noticed, however, the only undeniably evolutionary line is the growth of knowledge, and all steps of "progress" in ethics, art, politics, etc., result from this. In general, then, although no scientific proof of a real evolution in history as a whole can be given, it is concluded that this conception is the ideal of a scientific history. The evolutionary conceptions are regarded both as logically required by the facts, and as justified in the sphere of individual biology. The category of the super-personal, however, can only be applied to the whole of history, if we allow the conception of a non-spatial process, fragmentary phenomena or by-products of which are experienced in their spatial expression. The total human process would then be at the most only a part of history as evolution, with no earthly τέλος. At the least the total fact of human existence on earth might signify only a single stage in the evolution of the unknowable. Since all that is non-evolutionary in this sense, is regarded by Driesch as in the most essential respect "Zufall," with its special forms of error and evil, the treatment of the problem of "Zufall" is obviously of the first importance. In its simplest interpretation "Zufall" seems very near to Aristotle's τύχη; it is all that is not intelligible in relation to the whole teleologically conceived, it is "nicht-ganzheit". It is, moreover, in the end referred for its source to the material, ὕλη. Very characteristic of Driesch's standpoint is the combination of the criticism of knowledge, for which—since knowledge is the original relation—the question is, why the whole is not truly reflected in the mind of every individual knower, with the criticism of practice, for which evil and pain are more formidable obstacles to monism than error, since they are not only "nicht-ganzheit" but "gegen-ganzheit". The analysis of error suggests that the knower, with his foreknowledge of order, and the known are parts of a single whole, whilst the nature of wholeness is obscured. Why is knowledge only pure in the case of the pure or categorical concepts of order, the original signs—this, such, different, etc., and the Kantian categories which, as follows from Driesch's [1] solipsistic starting-point, are not primordial,

[1] *Cf. Wissen und Denken*, v., 5.

but must be postulated if nature is not to be chaotic? If knowledge is the original relation, why is it clouded in the case of empirical universals?

The suggested solution is that this occurs because the acquisition of knowledge is bound up with materiality, the sense-organs, the nervous system. In the application of this explanation to the case of memory, Driesch, as he observes, agrees for the most part with Bergson. The universality of the relation of knowledge discloses itself, however, in the mind's consciousness of this limitation. We are then brought up against the ultimate problem—What must be the nature of reality to account for this experience shot through with dualism—as "nicht-ganzheit," error and evil? Either there must be a corresponding dualism in the real, or wholeness in reality—together with a fundamental incapacity of the "I" to comprehend the whole. The latter alternative might seem to be favoured by Driesch's statement of the one proposition that is metaphysically certain, *viz.*, "Reality is such as to make possible knowing individuals, who, in spite of all the chance and error of their experience, posit and give value to the conception of the world-order". But neither thus would dualism appear to be avoided. The strongest argument for a rejection of Spinozistic, and of other forms of, monism, Driesch finds in the fact that certain manifestations of chance, *viz.* disease and evil, are not only negatively lacking in organic character, but positively hostile to it. In this metaphysical distinction between error and evil, he is again opposed to Hegelianism. Dualism, then, is the last word of a completed experience, metaphysically interpreted, a dualism which recognises not only the combination of "Ganzheit" and "Zufall" but the fundamental unintelligibility of "here" and "now". This opposition must be carried over into the original relations, as an opposition of the same character. There is, however, what Driesch calls a higher stage of metaphysics at which the problem is considered from a somewhat new standpoint. It is this part of the work which is perhaps most independent of tradition as well as most speculative, and in which the method may appear most vulnerable to criticism. It is here that answers are suggested to questions which the general method recognises as unanswerable.

Prof. Driesch's contention in regard to metaphysical propositions on the whole, that they may have legitimacy and value although not more than probability can be ascribed to them, appears just, if the metaphysical impulse does, as he argues, proceed from the necessities of thought—an argument which would be more convincing if not hampered by his solipsistic starting-point. The further position of the higher metaphysic, that the questions to which not even a probable, but only a speculative, answer can be given, are still within the province of metaphysic, seems also valid, if philosophy is concerned not only with man's nature as a logical being, but with the effect upon his consciousness of the totality of his experience. It is in this light that we may understand Driesch's

treatment of the facts of suffering and death, his paradox that the knowledge of death opens the door to the highest metaphysic. The argument rests on the position that all higher suffering, especially philosophic suffering, suffering for knowledge, although subjective feeling, yet most clearly refers to conditions which are bound up with the original conceptions of relation, whole and not-whole, and that suffering pervades all experience, only disappearing in pure logical-mathematical, and perhaps in æsthetic, contemplation. There is an immediate connexion between the feeling of pain and the original relation of knowledge. Suffering, then, is fundamentally real for experience, increasing in proportion to knowledge. In any estimate of Driesch's treatment of suffering as an original fact, we must bear in mind the positions, that consciousness is primordial, the relation of knowledge original, and this relation always attended with suffering, the source of which asserts itself as the non-wholeness of things, their anti-organic character. Suffering it would seem logically involves reconciliation—at least this would be a logical consummation. The speculation then reasonably follows—that death restores that wholeness for which all experience groans and travails in pain. Further the special form of vitalism which Driesch adopts, together with his theory of consciousness or "Wissen" as reality and the principle of the conservation in the real of the degree of the manifold of experience, permit, in his view, the thought that the beginning and end of life may mean a transition from and to a state of being beyond becoming. But this is only speculation. We do not know whether matter may not be the principle of individuation. It is, however, in the sphere of knowledge and its promotion that we are to recognise the only really progressive acts of the individual, his only experience of the non-earthly. "Knowledge alone is the light in the darkness" of human history. In this and the exercise of charity it would seem some reality is given to life. All other so-called ends are either vain, or are at best means, *e.g.* social justice, material betterment.

The idea of the whole as thinking upon itself and thinking through individual minds is in some form almost as old as philosophy, but Prof. Driesch's method of arriving at it and the practical outlook he associates with it have great freshness and individuality. Through knowledge alone do we approach reality. The extreme application of this view in the depreciation of the practical life as only a hindrance to the advance of knowledge, in which Driesch departs from the greatest of his predecessors in the exaltation of the theoretic activity, does not seem altogether consistent with the preliminary treatment of human history as at least the sphere in which the moral consciousness testifies to membership of a whole and the correspondence of individual and social needs signifies the workings of the universal in humanity. The practical, as a field for the evolution of the spirit of the whole, would appear to be not less essential than the theoretic to the end of that "transformation" of appearance through which it is brought nearer reality, if I may borrow the phrase of another philosophy. A further interpreta-

tion of the practical experience of the relations of persons, as a part of the growth of real knowledge, seems required but is not given; for the speculations suggested by such phenomena as are investigated to-day—as "telepathy," etc., which Driesch considers to be worthy of philosophic interest, concern only the extension of knowledge in the strict sense.

The question which keeps recurring at every stage of this book in which two great lines of thought are so interwoven, is—Does the whole conception of metaphysics here set forth stand or fall with the solipsistic starting-point and method? If so, the superstructure would indeed appear to be weak in respect to its foundation, since *I* only posit the first stage of mediate objects, nature and other selves, "as if" independent, in order to make first experience, *e.g.*, of the fact of becoming, intelligible, whilst the second stage of mediated-mediate objects, thought of as utterly real in themselves, are posited on account of the needs and aspirations of logic. But a logic which starts solipsistically would have no strength for the metaphysical task, if even it feels the need of comprehending experience at all or can rightly be called logic.

It may be suggested that the solipsistic beginning, which does not seem to give the truth of first experience, whether from the psychological, logical or practical standpoint, is *not* essential to Driesch's metaphysics as a whole though an idealistic point of departure *is* essential. But space forbids the working out of this possibility. As regards the final question of Deism, Atheism is definitely rejected, because in Driesch's view, without the conception of God in some form, the real cannot be conceived; but the problem of Pantheism or Theism is left open. Genuine Pantheism, it is argued, must be of the Bergsonian type or creative—"Dieu se fait"; and the only freedom possible, in the metaphysical sense, is the freedom of the whole, as creative. To this conception, it may be added, the whole tenor of the work seems to incline.

The problem of the dualism of the real, is once more faced with the question, "Does Zufall proceed from God,"—"nicht-ganzheit, from ganzheit"? It is suggested that the question is at least not meaningless. In this form the paradox appears perhaps more intolerable than that of the unmoved source of movement, or the uncaused cause, but it is of the same kind. The statement of the conceivability of the question does not, however, seem consistent with the rejection of the Hegelian principle of contradiction as fundamental irrationalism.

The reader of this remarkable book, the interest of which it is not possible to convey in a short notice, is constantly reminded by something indescribable in its rugged style and point of view, that there is some relation between a philosophy and the time to which it belongs. It appears as if conceived in the spirit of a Stoic of the latter days of the Roman Empire, who might feel himself to be thinking in an age of civilisation which is possibly passing away.

HILDA D. OAKELEY.

VII.—NEW BOOKS.

The Letters of William James. Edited by his son, HENRY JAMES. In 2 vols. Longmans, Green & Co., 1920. Pp. xx, 348, and xii, 382. Price 42s. net.

THE publishers' announcement on the paper cover describes the contents as "A selection from the letters of the late William James covering the period from his boyhood to the time of his death. The great majority of the letters are informal and intimate, while those of a wholly technical or polemic character have not been included." The editor has "added such notes as seemed necessary in the interest of clearness"; but has "tried to leave the reader to his own conclusions" (Preface, vii.).

To readers of MIND these *Letters* emphatically stand in no need of recommendation; though naturally philosophers will regret the omissions which consideration for the interests of a wider public no doubt made inevitable. What we chiefly miss is indications of the manner in which James came by those fertile ideas as to the nature and function of consciousness, which made his *Principles of Psychology* a mile-stone in the history, not only of the titular subject, but of every branch of philosophy.[1]

An exception to this last remark should perhaps be made, as regards the influence of Renouvier in shaping James's views on the "will to believe". Writing to Renouvier in 1896, he says :—

"I sent you a *New World* the other day . . . with an article in it called 'The Will to Believe,' in which (if you took the trouble to glance at it) you probably recognised how completely I am still your disciple. In this point perhaps more fully than in any other; and this point is central" (ii., p. 44).

An entry in one of James's note-books, dated April 30, 1870 (*æt.* 28), runs :—

"I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of Renouvier's second 'Essais' and see no reason why his definition of Free Will—'the sustaining of a thought *because I choose to* when I might have other thoughts'—need be the definition of an illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the present—until next year—that it is no illusion. My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.[2] For

[1] "It is not the purpose of this book to trace the origin of his ideas [in the *Principles*] or their influence on contemporary discussion. But any reader who will glance at Prof. Perry's annotated 'List' of his published work may see that he had written important papers by 1883, and that most of what was original in his psychology must by then have been present to his mind" (i., pp. 223-224).

[2] *Cf. Principles of Psychology*, ii., pp. 573-574. "When scientific and moral postulates war thus with each other and objective proof is not to be had, the only course is voluntary choice, for scepticism itself, if systematic, is also voluntary choice. If, meanwhile, the will *be* undetermined, it would seem only fitting that the belief in its indetermination should be voluntarily chosen from amongst other possible beliefs. Free-

the remainder of the year, I will abstain from the mere speculation and contemplative *Grübelei* in which my nature takes most delight, and voluntarily cultivate the feeling of moral freedom, by reading books favourable to it, as well as by acting. After the 1st of January, my callow skin being somewhat fledged, I may perhaps return to metaphysical study and skepticism without danger to my powers of action. For the present then remember: care little for speculation; much for the *form* of my action . . . *Principiis obsta* — To-day has furnished the exceptionally passionate initiative which Bain posits as needful for the acquisition of habits. I will see to the sequel" (i., pp. 147-148).

To Shadworth Hodgson, too, James felt that he owed much, especially in regard to the "method of attacking problems, by asking what their terms are 'known as'".[1] But it was precisely on the most fundamental questions that he definitely parted company with that writer, and above all on this "central point" of freedom. Writing to Hodgson in December, 1885, he says:—

"I have just . . . re-read with much care your 'Dialogue on Free Will' in the last MIND . . . As for the Free Will article, I have very little to say, for it leaves entirely untouched what seems to me the only living issue involved. . . . The distinctions between *vis impressa* and *vis insita*, and compulsion and 'reaction' *mean* nothing in a monistic world; and any world is a monism in which the parts to come are, as they are in your world, absolutely involved and presupposed in the parts that are already given. Were such a monism a palpable optimism, no man would be so foolish as to care whether it was predetermined or not, or to ask whether he was or was not what you call a 'real agent'. . . . The question of free will owes its entire being to a difficulty you disdain to notice, namely that we *cannot* rejoice in such a whole, for it is not a palpable optimism, and yet, if it be predetermined, we *must treat* it as a whole. Indeterminism is the only way to *break* the world into good parts and into bad, and to stand by the former as against the latter. . . . For life *is* evil. Two souls are in my breast; I see the better, and in the very act of seeing it I do the worse. To say that the molecules of the nebula implied this and *shall have implied it* to all eternity, so often as it recurs, is to condemn me to that 'dilemma' of pessimism or subjectivism of which I once wrote,[2] and which seems to have so little relevance to you, and to which all talk about abstractions erected into entities, and compulsion *vs.* freedom, are simply irrelevant. What living man cares for such niceties, when the real problem stares him in the face of how practically to meet a world foredone, with no possibilities left in it?" (i., pp. 243-245).

Of writers belonging more to his own generation, James's heart went out most to Bergson; though in writing to him, as to others, James makes no secret of the fact that "there are many points in your philosophy I don't yet grasp"[3] (ii., pp. 308-309). Here again it was Bergson's defence of freedom that most fired his enthusiasm. In a letter to F. C. S. Schiller in 1907 he says:—

"But have you read Bergson's new book?[4] It seems to me that

dom's first deed should be to affirm itself. . . . Nor do I deny that effort may be needed to keep the faith in freedom, when they [*sc.* 'deterministic arguments'] press upon it, upright in the mind."

[1] See *e.g.* letter to S. H. on p. 328 of vol. ii.

[2] See *The Dilemma of Determinism*, first published in the *Unitarian Review* for September, 1884, and republished in *The Will to Believe*, in 1897.

[3] *Cf.* ii., p. 184.

[4] *L'Evolution Créatrice.*

nothing is important in comparison with that divine apparition. All *our* positions, real time, a growing world, asserted magisterially, and the beast intellectualism killed absolutely *dead!* The whole flowed round by a style incomparable as it seems to me. Read it, and digest it if you can. Much of it I can't yet assimilate."

To Bergson himself, writing on the same day, he says :—

"O my Bergson, you are a magician, and your book is a marvel, a real wonder in the history of philosophy, making, if I mistake not, an entirely new era in respect of matter, but unlike the works of genius of the 'transcendentalist' movement (which are so obscurely and abominably and inaccessibly written) a pure classic in point of form. . . . There! have I praised you enough? What every genuine philosopher (every genuine man, in fact) craves most is *praise*—although the philosophers generally call it recognition. . . .

"I feel that at bottom we are fighting the same fight, you as a commander, I in the ranks. The position we are rescuing is 'Tychism' and a really growing world. But whereas I have hitherto found no better way of defending Tychism than by affirming the spontaneous addition of *discrete* elements of being (or their subtraction) thereby playing the game with intellectualist weapons, you set things straight at a single stroke by your fundamental conception of the continuously creative nature of reality. I think that one of your happiest strokes is your reduction of 'finality,' as usually taken, to its status alongside of efficient causality, as the twin daughters of intellectualism. But this vaguer and truer finality restored to its rights will be a difficult thing to give content to" (ii., pp. 290-292).

The ease and unfailing felicity of expression in James's letters make one wonder whether much of the labour of polishing and re-writing, to which he submitted himself in the preparation of his works, may not have been misplaced. As Prof. Santayana truly says,[1] James "didn't talk like a book, and didn't write like a book, except like one of his own". But his literary conscience was of the most sensitive nature, and would never permit him to impose on the reader the burden that belongs properly to the writer. The form of literary bad manners that annoyed him more than any other was unbridled indulgence in the peculiar *argot* of the class-room.

"I am getting impatient," he says (in 1905), "with the awful abstract rigmarole in which our American philosophers obscure the truth. It will be fatal. It revives the palmy days of Hegelianism. It means utter relaxation of intellectual duty, and God will smite it. If there's anything he hates it is that kind of oozy writing" (ii., p. 237).

Even with the limitations that the editor has set himself, there is much more of strictly philosophical interest in these vols., in the way of informal elucidation of James's views, than a few quotations could possibly do justice to. But, apart from letters bearing specially on the philosophy of religion (where, one surmises, the pruning process has been less severe), we may indicate a few passages that seem specially instructive for the serious student of James, *viz.* :—vol. i., pp. 199 f.; vol. ii., pp. 48 f. and 207 f. (on the 'will to believe'); 271-272, and 295 f. (on 'pragmatism'); 236 (difficulties as regards 'radical empiricism'); 190 (practical influence of Emerson); 323 f. ("I can't help suspecting that Driesch is unjust to the possibilities of purely mechanical action. Candle-flames, waterfalls, eddies in streams, to say nothing of 'vortex a toms,' seem to perpetuate themselves, and repair their injuries"); 344-347 (Letter and post-cards to Henry Adams on the 'second law of thermo-dynamics' in its relation to human values); 353 (on Bertrand Russell's theory of 'propositions'.

[1] *Character and Opinion in the United States*, p. 95.

"'Propositions' are expressly devised for quibbling between realities and beliefs. . . . You can get no honest discussion out of such terms").

HOWARD V. KNOX.

The Reactions Between Dogma and Philosophy. Illustrated from the Works of S. Thomas Aquinas. By P. H. WICKSTEED, M.A., Litt.D. London: Williams & Norgate, 1920. Pp. xxvi, 669.

The thanks of all students of the great Græco-Roman philosophic tradition and its influence on Christian thought are abundantly due to Dr. Wicksteed for this second series of Hibbert lectures in a field which he has long made his own by sympathetic study. He has given us a full and careful account of St. Thomas's view of the place of the soul of man in the Universe, its destiny and the journey through time by which it achieves that destiny, with an admirably full documentation in the way of ample extracts from the saint's voluminous works, as well as an often penetrating account of the origin of Thomas's views in the Aristotelian philosophy and the way in which they have been influenced by the Arabian developments of Aristotelianism. In many ways this volume would make an admirable first introduction to Thomism for a student anxious to understand one of the most living of philosophies, but perplexed where to turn for his guide through the difficulties of an elaborate and unfamiliar terminology. There is hardly any side of Thomas's multifarious activity, except, perhaps, naturally enough, his political speculation, upon which Dr. Wicksteed does not throw light. His vast reading and wide learning is shown throughout by a familiarity with the Cappadocian fathers, the great Moslem philosophers, the founders of Western Scholasticism, which makes the writer of a notice like this realise his own ignorance with a genuine sense of shame, and the learning is combined with a very real and thorough spiritual sympathy. If anyone still doubts whether Thomas is a great thinker and a great interpreter of religious truth whose work is one of the permanent treasures of our intellectual inheritance, I recommend him to give his careful consideration to this estimate passed by a student whose antecedents might be supposed to make for a bias against rather than in favour of the official philosopher of the Roman Church. Of course I do not mean to say that Dr. Wicksteed's personal attitude towards the dogmas and ceremonial of institutional Christianity is not reflected anywhere in his elaborate volume. Such complete detachment is perhaps unattainable by man, and the pretence of having attained it is commonly no more than an irritating pose. It is only to be expected that a writer of Dr. Wicksteed's known position should take it for granted, for example, that there are fundamental internal contradictions in the 'Athanasian' theology and that Thomas's scrupulous anxiety to do full justice to the whole of what he regarded as the divinely guaranteed truth ends in making these concealed contradictions patent. For my own part, I do not feel any confidence in the existence of the supposed contradictions, and I note that Dr. Wicksteed rather takes it for granted that they are there than attempts to make it quite clear what they are. (It must be remembered, of course, that the book consists of lectures delivered on the Hibbert foundation, and that a large part of the lecturer's audience would probably have been prepared to concede his position without discussion, so that the rules of the dialectical game do not require that it should be formally established.) An 'Athanasian' may be pardoned if he is occasionally sensible of a slight touch of self-complacency in the tone of the references to these

supposed contradictions, and occasionally tempted to remember Bishop Horsley's recommendation to Priestley to study the *Parmenides*. But it must be said at once that this slightly superior attitude towards 'Athanasian' theology nowhere seriously disturbs the deep general sympathy of Dr. Wicksteed for the Angelic doctor's conceptions of the character and goal of the Christian life.

It would perhaps be ungracious to confess to a certain disappointment with the conclusion of a work which one has read with admiration, enjoyment, and profit. Yet I own I do feel a little disappointed that, in giving us as much as he has done, Dr. Wicksteed has not given us more. His title raised in me the hope that he would have something to say on his own account about the permanent value for philosophical thought of the intellectual formulæ in which saints who are also thinkers have sought to express their deepest convictions about the Divine, and the permanent value for active religious faith of intellectual formulations of doctrine. I should have been glad to know not only how dogma and philosophical speculation are related in the great Thomistic synthesis, but on what terms, if any, Dr. Wicksteed himself holds they can and should live together. Does he recognise that theological dogmas have any rightful place in human thought, and if so, what is that place? In his lectures as he has given them to us Dr. Wicksteed seems to provide no answer to this question. Perhaps he would say that his business was with St. Thomas's answer to the question, and that he was not called on to obtrude his own solution, if he has one, on the reader. I confess that, formally, this is a perfectly sufficient answer—and yet, I should have liked to know what Dr. Wicksteed himself thinks, and I fancy other readers will share my feeling.

Perhaps I may be allowed to make one other criticism. I am not sure that when Dr. Wicksteed is expounding the Peripateticism of Aristotle he is quite as thoroughly at home as he is when he is dealing with Avicenna or Averroes or Albertus Magnus. He evidently feels himself to be addressing auditors who need to be told rather carefully what Aristotle himself thought, not an audience whose general acquaintance with Aristotelianism may be presupposed. Hence I think it a pity that his account of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge should lay an undue emphasis on the points of difference between Plato and Aristotle. It is not too much to say that the general impression Dr. Wicksteed's exposition would give to a hearer to whom it came as a first introduction to Aristotle would be that Aristotle taught a kind of sensationalistic nominalism by contrast with the realism of Plato, and, in particular, that he believed, after the fashion of Mill, in "induction from experience" as the foundation of science. I do not suppose that Dr. Wicksteed himself for a moment accepts this as a correct estimate of Aristotle, but he has at least expressed himself very unguardedly. No one would gather from his statements that Aristotle regarded "induction" as a purely dialectical procedure which "points out something but does not prove it," and I am afraid that his unfortunate and not very accurate assertion that Aristotle looked on universals as products of "abstraction" wholly obscures the point that Aristotle is all through neither a terminalist nor a conceptualist but a "moderate realist," a firm believer in *universalia in rebus*. The difficulty of giving the beginner an accurate preliminary summary of Aristotelianism arises, in fact, from the want of unity in Aristotle's own thinking. It is everywhere an attempt at fusing two incompatibles, Ionian "naturalism" and the "spiritualism" of Plato. It is tempting to the expositor to seek simplification by suppressing one of the two incompatibles, but to suppress either is to transform Aristotelian doctrine into something Aristotle would not have recognised, and to suppress the Platonism is to sink just the

side of the whole about which Aristotle manifestly cared most. I think I detect the same tendency in the very careful study of the Aristotelian theory which is most important of all for the study of the great scholastics, the doctrine of the *intellectus agens* and its relations with the *intellectus possibilis*. Dr. Wicksteed expounds the rival mediaeval variations of the doctrine (Avicenna, Averroes, Thomas) most admirably, but when he indicates his own conviction that Avicenna comes nearest to the genuine sense of the master, I feel a certain hesitation in following him. I am not even satisfied that the commonly current statement that Aristotle disbelieved in the immortality of the individual soul is justified. Aristotle's utterances about the *νοῦς* which "comes from outside" and is "alone immortal" are so brief and broken that it seems to me impossible to found any dogmatic statement on them. There is nothing in his words necessarily inconsistent with a belief in personal immortality. Plato was certainly in earnest about that belief if ever a man has been, yet, as anyone who has pondered the *Timaeus* will see, Plato might perfectly well have said exactly what Aristotle has said about the perishability of everything but the *νοῦς* which is the kernel of the soul. Most of the later Platonists (notably Plotinus and Proclus) are quite explicit on the point that the "irrational" element in the soul perishes at death, but they would have been indignant if they had been told that this is any bar to the indestructibility of our personality. Hence I do not think Aristotle's language warrants any confident assertion one way or the other about his view of the "destiny of the individual"; as to his personal convictions on the point, which may or may not have been in accord with his theoretical psychology, the emphatic language of the *Ethics* about "putting on immortality" by the practice of the *vita speculativa* seems to me to have some significance as indicating Platonist sympathies. (It is worth noting that there is a really excellently authenticated story, preserved by Proclus, according to which Aristotle professed himself satisfied by the performance of a 'hypnotist' with his subject that the soul is in fact "separable from the body". The evidence for the incident is far too good to permit a hasty rejection of the tale as apocryphal.) I note, by the way, that Dr. Wicksteed is perhaps not so well acquainted with Neo-Platonism as with most of the other important sources of Thomistic thought. He makes frequent use of the so-called Areopagite, but barely refers to Proclus, the source of the 'Areopagite's' teaching, and apparently has never seen the important work of Proclus (the *στοιχείωσις θεολογική*) to which he is alluding in this single reference (p. 34).[1] It is significant that even Plotinus is cited by the pages of the Didot reprint of Creuzer's atrocious text. Dr. Wicksteed seems to know nothing of the scholarly editions of Kirchhoff, H. F. Mueller, and Volkmann. This is unfortunate, since it means that a great deal which is Neo-Platonic "common good" thus comes to appear in Dr. Wicksteed's work as if it were something peculiar to the Christian schoolmen, or perhaps to Thomas himself. I sincerely hope these remarks will not be taken as intended in any way to detract from the very great merits of Dr. Wicksteed's admirable study which I commend without reservation to every one who desires to understand the real mind of one of the greatest of Christian thinkers and to

[1] It is said on p. 34 that "a work" of Proclus "passed current" in the middle ages as *The Theology of Aristotle*, and on p. 35 that Thomas knew that this work was really by Proclus and recognised a treatise known as the *De Causis* and ascribed to Aristotle as an epitome of the *Theology*. This obscures the point that the work in question, the *Theology*, actually *is* the book of which the *De Causis* is a fragmentary Latin *translation* (not an 'epitome'), as Thomas correctly says in one of his latest works.

enter into his spirit. To all lovers of Dante this study of the philosopher whose thought is most akin to Dante's own should be absolutely indispensable, all the more that it comes from a writer who has already done so much through a long life to make Dante known and loved in our country.

For a work in which there are so many extended extracts from Latin authors the volume is commendably free from printer's errors. I subjoin a note of a few of the principal ones I have detected :—

p. 25, Plotinus died A.D. 269-70 (not 279 as stated). p. 69, l. 7, *ἀμύμων*, l. *ἀκύμων*. p. 89, l. 20, infedelis, l. in*fi*delis. p. 113, l. 14, natione, l. *r*ationе. p. 172, l. 11, calyx, l. cal*i*x. p. 179, l. 12, voluntus, l. voluntas. p. 200, l. 25, magnitudinis, l. magnitudines. p. 290, l. *ποιώμενοι*, l. *ποιούμενοι*. p. 292, l. 11, *ὕλιον*, l. *ὕλην* (as in the Oxford text of Erigena). p. 303, last line of text, cap. 67, l. cap. 69. p. 316, n. even, l. ever. p. 337, l. 15, for *ἰέναι*, l. *ἰέναι τι*. p. 338, l. 14, delete the comma after *αὐτῆς*. p. 339, l. 3, from below, read *αὐτῆς* for *αὐτῆς* and *τῷ* for *τό*. p. 348, l. 15, patetur, l. *f*atetur. p. 354, l. 27, Athenasius, l. Athanasius. p. 455, l. 12, passibilis, (?) l. possibilis. p. 479, l. 7, *ἐγκαταθήμενος*, l. *ἐγκαθήμενος*. p. 531, l. 22, ventri, l. ventris. p. 578, l. 19, egediuntur, l. egrediuntur. p. 591, l. 14, rationilis, l. rationalis. p. 617, l. 3, ferratur, l. feratur; l. 15, commestio, l. comestio. p. 637, l. 20, cap. 51. l. lib. iii. cap. 51. p. 658, l. 14 *μὴν*, l. *μὴ*.

It is a very unfortunate slip that on p. 77 the first hypostasis of Plotinus is called 'The Existent' (so also p. 335 *τὸ ὄν*), since it is notorious that the One, which is the first hypostasis, is held by all Platonists to be *ὑπερούσιον*.

A. E. Taylor.

The Rational Good : A Study in the Logic of Practice. By L. T. Hobhouse. London : George Allen & Unwin, 1921. Pp. 165.

This book is the first stage in a most courageous enterprise. Mr. Hobhouse believes, like most of us, that the great need of our time is to learn how to apply first principles to the social structure. Unlike most of us he does not stop at this point, but endeavours to meet the need. *The Rational Good* is his attempt to establish and explain the relevant first principles ; and the successors to it which he promises us are designed to furnish the application.

Here, therefore, as he says, "we are concerned with the function of Reason in practical life. We shall inquire whether there is a rational and therefore a demonstrable, standard of values to which the actions of man and the institutions of society may be referred for judgment. If we find such a standard, which we may call the Rational Good, we shall have to ask in what sort of life inward and outward is it realised, what authority and power does it possess to dominate the actual conduct of men, and what light does it throw on the relation between human aspirations and the cosmic processes among which the life of the race is numbered."

The central theme of the book is its analysis of the Rational Good in the three chapters entitled respectively "The Rational," "The Good," and "The Rational Good". The discussion of this central problem is introduced by a psychological inquiry into the extent to which rational control really does exist. This inquiry occupies two chapters, one on The Springs of Action, the other on Impulse and Control. The other questions indicated in the passage I have quoted are discussed in the concluding chapters of the book. They deal with "The Realised Good," "Applications," and "Implications".

The psychological introduction amply suffices to prove that Reason, so far from being an intruder into the human mind or a mere passenger in impulsive process, is in fact a permanent element in the control of human action. These chapters, therefore, succeed in their main design, and they supply a most timely antidote to several fashionable theories. On the other hand, they are perhaps too condensed to be as thorough as one might wish. "Impulse-feeling," Mr. Hobhouse concludes, "is completely transformed by a development, which, taken as a whole, tends to combine its centrifugal elements into an organised body, directed to comprehensive ends which are formulated in large and articulate conceptions of the significance of conduct." Quite so, but a 'ruling passion,' to put the point mildly, may simulate sovereign reason so closely that we need some further criterion than order, or even than attainable stability and comprehensiveness, in order to distinguish the two with sufficient clearness. And again, Reason, surely, may disrupt as well as unite. The desire to "see fair," to which Mr. Hobhouse refers so often, may sometimes tear a man in two, and it is at least conceivable that political disorder is more probable under a ruler of Wilson's type than under one of Clémenceau's.

In the central part of his argument Mr. Hobhouse holds that "Reason generically is the principle of connexion systematically applied" and that the Good is "a harmony of experience and feeling". (When we call a thing good we mean that it is the object of a favourable disposition.) The Rational Good, therefore, is the comprehensive consilience of the whole body of feeling experienced or capable of being experienced by any sentient beings whose behaviour may affect one another. The Practical Reason is the effort of the mind towards harmony with itself and with nature. This effort is felt to be a moral obligation by all who are not morally defective because of the fundamental similarities in our common human nature. It is irrational to treat equal beings unequally.

These are large issues, and a few meagre comments on some of them will exhaust the space at my disposal.

Nearly every one agrees that the best things in life conduce the most towards orderliness and stability. On the other hand, there is no absurdity in holding that a crowded hour of fleeting and wayward but supreme excellence might be worth half a dozen humdrum existences however great the stability of these latter might be. We have, in fact, many standards of value in addition to this tendency towards order and stability. Irrespective of their coherence with other experiences, certain experiences seem to us good, others bad. others indifferent; and even if it is always our duty to forgo any experience which we cannot bring into harmony with the rest of our lives, it certainly does not follow that the whole value of any experience is borrowed from this harmony. It is unwise, I think, to press the parallel between the logical and the moral order so closely as Mr. Hobhouse does, but even if he were right in doing so, the consequence might not be what he thinks. It may be a piece of rashness on my part to judge that Mr. Hobhouse's book is brown without putting this judgment to the test of its consistency with other judgments, but surely, when I have put it to the test, no one supposes that the whole reason for believing the book to be brown is the consistency of this judgment with the others. So here. Most of us suppose that the value of certain kinds of experience is often far more evident in itself than their tendency towards a stable harmony with other experiences; but even if this were a mistake, it would be a worse mistake to suppose that *when* this tendency has been proved, the *whole* value of the experience is derived from it.

Again, as Mr. Hobhouse admits, "seeing fair" between impulses and

between persons is an essential part of rationality in conduct. This procedure, however, seems to be rather an affair of comparing particular goods with one another than of estimating their capacity for inclusion in some coherent whole. Even if no impulses or satisfactions are intrinsically bad (and in that case it is very hard to know what we should say of ingratitude or cruelty) it surely cannot be assumed that all are equally good in themselves, and that the only pertinent ethical question concerning them is their capacity for incorporation in an orderly scheme of life. It is irrational to develop capacities which are not worth developing, and it is odd to assume that everything that can be developed is worth developing.

What is more, Mr. Hobhouse's principles seem to be peculiarly incomplete when we remember that (as he admits very frankly) we cannot hope, as the world now is, to attain the ideal of rationality. Indeed, he seems content to advise us to be as rational as we can, and although his principles nominally extend to all sentient creatures he makes no serious attempt to consider a state of affairs in which bullocks and salmon are other than edible partners in the rational harmony. It is clear, however, that even if rational harmony is a necessary feature of the moral ideal, a limited and partial coherence is, by itself, a very poor test of worth. Methodical tyranny or methodical swindling is none the better for being methodical, and a conscience that is too inflexible for the conditions of its time is not wholly unworthy on that account. It is possible, to be sure, that the maximum of systematic interconnexion attainable in human societies at any given time is also the best state attainable by these societies; but it may be doubted whether either reason or experience would support the claim.

It must be admitted, however, that Mr. Hobhouse is so resourceful, so persuasive, and at the same time so candid in the concluding chapters of his book (especially, I think, in his chapter on "Applications") that a critic can scarcely help wondering whether his principles, after all, may not be completely adequate.

JOHN LAIRD.

Il Pragmatismo nella Filosofia Contemporanea. A Critical Study by UGO SPIRITO. Florence, Vallecchi, 1921. Pp. 222. Lire 10.

This lucid and well-written book is composed of eight chapters on the historical antecedents and theories of Pragmatism, a second part on kindred currents of thought (Mach, Boutroux, Milhaud, Poincaré, Duhem, Le Roy, and Bergson), a bibliography (down to the beginning of 1920), and an index. The bibliography, though extensive, is by no means complete; it omits, *e.g. Creative Intelligence*, Vaihinger's *Als Ob*, and all Alfred Sidgwick's books, as well as some thirty articles (not all minor) by me. These *lacunæ* would not matter so much if Signor Spirito had read the whole literature he has catalogued; but this is plainly not the case. Of the pragmatist texts he has read those which have been translated into Italian or French, that is to say, most of James, and my *Studies in Humanism*—with the possible addition of Dewey's *Studies in Logical Theory*; he betrays his limitations by *not* quoting from my other writings passages that would have suited his polemic much better than those he quotes from *Studies*. Also, though he declares (p. 14) that with my *Formal Logic* the development of pragmatism is completely exhausted, he has completely shirked the logical side of the controversy.

Nevertheless, what he has read, he has read intelligently. In fact, of all the critics of pragmatism he seems to me the most intelligent; pro-

bably because he did not come to its study with violent prejudices and a desire to misrepresent, and so can justly censure the caricatures that have done duty as criticisms. When he fails to understand, the reason is in part that he has not analysed some of the conventional conceptions he uses, in part that he is not aware how successfully certain philosophic problems have so far defied solution from any point of view. *E.g.* the problem of the Self, which he declares, rightly enough, James did not solve (p. 36); but it should be pointed out to him that the opposition of 'subject' and 'object,' on which he relies, is still more manifestly inadequate, because the self must be *both*, if it can know itself and if its identity is not to be an arbitrary and unmeaning allegation. Pragmatists therefore are quite right in renouncing the use of the subject-object category as a master-key. Of course, if the ordinary subject-object relation, in which each side is taken as fixed and immovable, breaks down, the charges of 'subjectivism,' so frequently brought against pragmatism, fail with it. Similarly he fails to understand the value of methods, and the methodological function of conceptions; he tries to restrict 'philosophy' to metaphysics, and fails to see that methods are superior to them, because they are indispensable, whereas metaphysics are optional (as well as personal). In consequence, he has trouble with the ideal 'limits' of cognitive manipulation, the notions of a 'primary reality' and of an 'absolutely satisfactory' ending to the process of the real (pp. 61 f., 96 f.): he takes these ideals as metaphysical dogmas about actual entities, and, of course, finds them highly intractable and inconsistent with pragmatism. But this is precisely the way a method need not take them, and even if the pragmatic 'making of reality' should end in the absolutely satisfactory, it would be 'absolute' not in the old sense and in its own right, but only in its functional value, and *qua* giving satisfaction, and its power to do so would be its sole protection against attempts to change it. I have no desire to dwell on the weak spots in Signor Spirito's argument: such as the entirely *a priori*, unworthy, unsupported and unsubstantiated assertions that "pragmatic ethics, like those of empiricism, cannot but conduct to pure egotism" (p. 94), or that men cannot come to agree together unless their rationality is 'presupposed' as a 'universal' character (p. 90); but will merely, in conclusion, point out that his attempts to classify pragmatism as the simple antithesis to intellectualism (p. 122), or as ultimately scepticism, really will not do. Pragmatism cannot be described as the direct opposite of intellectualism, because the latter has never contrived to become a consistent system; it has left unsolved and unperceived a multitude of problems (*e.g.* truth, error, meaning, personality, value), which pragmatism has dragged to light. Again, pragmatism is so far from being scepticism that it may justly claim to refute scepticism in the only way no sceptic can evade, *viz.* practically. For no sceptic can ever allow his theory to determine his practice without practical, nor his practice his theory, without theoretic, suicide. Admittedly he cannot *act* as if all things were doubtful. While he remains an intellectualist, this fact has no theoretic consequences; but the moment he contemplates the possibility that the practical consequences of a belief are relevant to its theoretic truth, his scepticism is transcended.

F. C. S. Schiller.

Les Générations Sociales. Francois Mentré. Docteur ès Lettres. Éditions Bossard, 1920. Pp. 470.

The theoretical interest of this book lies in its advocating a basis of interpretation in historical inquiry which is the extreme opposite of anything

like an explanation by a dialectic based on the power or value of ideas. It raises the problem of historical method from the side of the succession of human beings who are concerned in actions and events, and seeks to ascertain a causal correlation between the natural divisions of such successions and the occurrences which mark for us the changes and movements of history. In a word, the question is, what we mean by a 'social generation'. The author most candidly admits that it is an elusive idea; but he effectively establishes that we are always talking about it; and so we can hardly wish to say that it has no meaning.

In the family it is plain that the parents form one generation, and the children, taken together, form a second. But the "social generation" involves an unknown *ab initio*, and the primary definition or description of it is "a group of men [including women ?] belonging to different families, whose unity results from a particular mentality, and whose duration embraces a determinate period".[1] To define the group thus described, and affirm its reality as a social force and unit, is the aim of this considerable and learned book.

At once you ask for the point of departure of any such group, and for its duration as a social entity. What is "my" generation, *e.g.*, of philosophers? "My" year, my five years, my ten years? And how long does it last? Twenty years, thirty, forty? The author, who is, as he says of Ferrari, terrifyingly learned, gives instances of dozens of such theories, and concludes primarily (p. 30, repeated p. 225) that "pure reason cannot settle the dispute". "All the solutions, equally illogical, are exposed to the formidable attacks of the sorites." All the same, nature mocks at the sorites.[2] How long does it take to produce a change? And yet historical changes live, and they have their conditions in human nature.

Thus, a man's social activity coincides normally with the time it takes to fit his son to replace him, say thirty years,[3] and here is a connexion with the idea which Herodotus followed that three generations last a century.[4] The author is fascinated, I do not say wrongly, by this connexion, and the unit of thirty years, as the interval at which the personnel of groups is entirely renewed, recurs constantly in his discussions of the "social generation". A "school," either as an actual institution or as a literary or artistic group, is a spiritual generation,[5] and is apt to be marked in its development by the rhythm of thirty years' periods, which are imposed by the chief's need of time to make his mark and establish his influence. Further, the social generations come in rushes, round certain 'decisive' years in which leading personalities enter the world. Such, for instance, was "Luther's generation" in which infinite other lives attached themselves to his, like filings round a magnet.[6] The author's treatment of previous theories (in the second and third chapters of Book I., entitled respectively "Sketches" and "Theories") hardly carries him further, beyond the abstract statement in chap. i., "The problem," than to assert, with an enormous weight of references, that the human generation does, as in the above case, display itself as a historical reality, and that the century also, the traditional unity of three generations, has a special character as representing the unity of three coexistent lives, the individual in the centre, communicating with his father and his son. I see, of course, a certain interest in this point; but, I may be dull, for I cannot detect in it any reason for ascribing a special unity of character to any special century as distinct from others. For each third part of every century is in a continuity with another century, of precisely the same order as with the other thirds of itself. The grandson would

[1] p. 13. [2] p. 30. [3] p. 34. [4] p. 17. [5] p. 39. [6] p. 166.

belong to the following, perhaps reactionary, century, by precisely the same right as to his father's, say, more progressive century; how could you characterise either century *a priori* in respect of him?

Book II., *Les Faits et l'Hypothèse*, passes from a contrast between the discontinuity of animal generations and the continuity of human ones, through the idea of series, or spiritual generations, such as a "school" of thought or of art, which has a definite founder, to the strictly historical investigations of Book III., *Essai d'Application*, devoted to tracing in the facts of successive groups and movements the actual reality of the historical generation. I should venture to guess that the moral nucleus of the work is in the author's analysis of the nexus and reactions between the generations immediately preceding and following the French Revolution. "Pour comprendre la génération révolutionnaire, il importe de marquer comment elle s'oppose à la génération précédente, comment elle la continue, et enfin comment elle préface la génération suivante."[1]

The peculiarity of the treatise is marked by the laws assumed in this historical task; the law of ages,[2] which seems to be that youth is progressive and old age obstructive, and the law of generations, that social groups progress only by renewal of their personnel out of the rising generation.[3]

Now as we saw in speaking of the century, the element of continuity seems underrated by the approach through the change of personnel. The argument reads as if every member of a social body adhered for his period of activity (say thirty years) to the precise ideas with which he began; so that the entire solid and substantial advance made by active workers during their active career is ruled out of the progress of the group, which is credited solely to the accession of younger men, which renews the group altogether every thirty years. But this renewal would not of itself be an event. The change is only one of 3 per cent. per annum; and every year is the end of such a period of thirty years. Thus the thirty years' period may occasionally call for remark, where the life of a great man is concerned; but in principle I should demur to the main conclusion, "ce ne sont pas les événements qui encadrent les générations, mais les générations qui encadrent les événements".[4] I take this to mean, in the context of the argument, that the generations are the determining relations of the events, and not the events of the generations.

No doubt ideas and habits of action need persons to bear them, and are subject to conditions arising from those persons' births, life-durations, and contacts. But the struggle for existence, we are taught to-day, is less between persons than between ideas, according to their inherent force and value. "There are no necessary men."[5]

We shall note in conclusion the curious contrast and parallelism between the author's equation of history with the *expressive*[6] series of generations in literature and art, and, say, Gentile's or Croce's equation of history and philosophy, which (without reference to them) the author,

[1] p. 400. [2] p. 267.

[3] *Ib.* It is an ingenious observation of Dromil (p. 103) that in groups governed democratically it is enough for the majority to be renewed; this about halves the interval required for a new generation to "arrive" at power.

[4] p. 451.

[5] See *Oxford Book of Mystical Verse;* Miss Underhill, *The Uxbridge Road;* Mr. Herbert Trench, Poems, I., "Apollo and the Seaman," and Alexander, *Time, Space, and Diety*, ii., 284.

[6] The search for a *dominant* series as in politics is abandoned.

as we should expect from his attitude, decisively rejects. Yet in his own account of these generations there is much that reminds us of dialectic opposition, and in a full interpretation the Italians' idea would come nearer to his than he admits. But I must continue to deny that the main difference between a Conservative and Liberal is a difference of age. And this is not a mere joke. If we were to work with the idea of generations, we should need at least two complementary impulses in every generation. This is what dialectic recognises.

The book is full of learning and literary sagacity, and of course such a sketch as this can do it little justice. I admit to the author that his period of thirty years or thereabouts has a curious prominence in history.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Les Philosophes Pluralistes d'Angleterre et d'Amérique. Par JEAN WAHL. *Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine.* Paris: Félix Alcan, 1920. Pp. 323. 15f.

This is a very enjoyable book. M. Wahl's exposition of English and American pluralisms—chiefly American—is extremely clear, and, so far as the period from 1904-1914 is concerned, very full. It is indeed so full as to suggest at times the impartiality of the publisher's circular. Thinkers great and small are treated with exactly the same seriousness; though perhaps one can gauge M. Wahl's estimate of their value (after making allowance for his design in presenting a harmonious picture) by the amount of space he accords to each. As was natural, William James is the central figure, and the study of his outlook on life occupies a large portion of the book. The way is prepared by a sketch of monistic philosophy in Britain and America in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and by an account of the various movements in the philosophic world which influenced James in his anti-absolutist campaign; and, following on the study of James, comes a history of the different pluralisms of which he was the central inspiration.

The book appears to have been written some time during 1910-1914 (though M. Wahl does not give us any direct information on the point), and sentences and short paragraphs bringing the development up to date seem to have been added in 1919 or 1920. Many of the most interesting developments since 1914—of the greatest significance for the appreciation of the tendencies inherent both in the American realisms and in the English variety for which Mr. Russell was largely responsible—are dealt with so cursorily as to suggest that it would have been better for M. Wahl to specify explicitly the time limits of his history; for, while most English-speaking readers will be clearly aware of those limits, the book may convey a misleading impression to those who have not followed year by year the whole movement: especially as the bibliography includes books and articles right up to 1920.

The best method of writing a history of such a period is not easy to discover. It is a period in which men have not hesitated to express their views before thinking them out; in which, indeed, thinking has been done in public. Changes of view are common, and the number of writers is legion. No possible avenue escapes exploration in the cold light of print. Where in other days a thinker searched in many directions and told the world only about the road which led him somewhere, in these days men spoke all their hopes. Philosophy caught the newspaper habit.

A historian cannot deal with this moving world in its completeness.

Some kind of selection is necessary. There seem two ways in which a selection can be made. Since free and public canvassing of possible roads is of the essence of the situation, one way would be to analyse the various possibilities, as a chess hand-book analyses the various openings, and discuss their various continuations. This would be the method of scientific analysis. Or, again, since this whole exploration of possibilities hitherto rejected from public consideration has as its object the attainment of truth (herein differing from the situation in the world of chess), another method would be to select those particular avenues which had temporarily attained most promising vantage points, and describe those vantage points. M. Wahl combines the two methods, but for the most part follows the second. In many of his studies of philosophic writers he is content to report conclusions arrived at, doctrines contended for, with a brief suggestion of the particular roads by which the conclusions were reached: and only in the case of William James among the pluralists does he give a full length portrait of the philosopher in the act of searching for his philosophy. It would have been impossible for him to deal as generously with any of the other pluralists, and it was perhaps unnecessary. The whole task was a delicate one, and it has been performed with great skill. Our only criticism is that he has often included for analysis particular combinations that seem of no permanent value, and that had no influence in determining the general course of development.

The contents of the book may be indicated briefly thus: A sketch fo monism in England and America (pp. 1-36) is followed by an account of the various influences making for pluralism (37-100), and culminating in the grand revolt of William James (100-176). There follow various pluralisms, grouped round Schiller (177-194), Howieson (195-209), Moore and Russell (214-234), the study of the "New Realists" occupying pp. 224-234. Pp. 239-271 sum up M. Wahl's own idea of the whole movement and its results. The bibliography (277-308) is very full for the years up to 1910, less full from 1910 to 1914, and rather scrappy in the succeeding years. This is said not by way of criticism, but for information.

M. Wahl is obviously very sympathetic to the absolutism of Bradley and Bosanquet which, he insists, is inspired by a much greater regard for concrete reality than its pluralistic critics think; but neither pluralism nor absolutism satisfies him completely. Indeed, he sees instability in both pluralism and absolutism. James and Bosanquet have a great deal in common. Both are enemies of abstractions; both condemn intellect in its formal use; both rest on individuality (though their ways divide); both start in pure experience, however differently conceived. James often comes near to the thought of an absolute. Bradley often seems to insist on finite centres of experience as fundamental. Both monists and pluralists stand at length, M. Wahl thinks, before the mystery which Perry has spoken of as the "immanence of the transcendent". Recognition of the transcendent, and recognition of the immanence of the transcendent, inspire both sides. And each side finds itself forced nearer to the things for which the other side is contending, by a perpetual dialectic movement.

In the end, M. Wahl wishes to conserve both visions. Especially does he insist on the value of the attitude of the pluralist. While the pluralist is forced at many points into affirmations which coincide with the deepest convictions of the monist, "ces éléments affirmatifs et ces coincidences ne devraient pas être conçus comme absorbant ou comme éliminant les éléments négatifs sur lesquels a insisté le pluralisme. Il faudrait qu'une telle conception ne fût pas une négation du pluralisme, qu'elle reconnût l'irréductibilité des phénomènes, qu'elle fût à la fois dialectique et réalisme, qu'elle eût le sentiment à la fois de la présence de l'objet et

de l'acte créateur de l'esprit, qu'elle pût garder de la doctrine pluraliste cet empirisme, ce volontarisme et ce mysticisme, ce sens du particulier concret, qui la caractérisent ordinairement et qui en font la valeur" (p. 271).

The book has a very full table of contents, and a good index of proper names.

L. J. Russell.

The Religious Consciousness: A Psychological Study. By James Bissett Pratt, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Williams College. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920. Pp. viii, 488.

Probably the best thing to do in offering a very short notice of a considerable book like the one before us, is simply to indicate as fairly and succinctly as possible the kind of book it is. Professor Pratt hardly needs introduction. He belongs to that line of students of the religious consciousness which includes the names of James, Starbuck, Stanley Hall and others, who have loved to approach the religious consciousness from the psychological side, to work from a very broad empirical basis, and who have plied with great effect the device of arriving at results by colligating the testimonies of various religious minds regarding their own experiences.

Prof. Pratt touches here on most of the subjects which have been the spheres of research for this method. He has discussed the religion of childhood, with the help of the testimonies of people who remember their religious childhood. He is full of the romance of adolescence, paying great tribute to Stanley Hall. He gives much attention to "adolescent phenomena," types of conversion, revivals and revival experiences, as well as to the more mature religious beliefs and practices, to belief in God and immortality, to the history of the cult, to prayer and worship; and he devotes the last quarter of his book to a discussion of the various kinds of mystic experiences and their value.

The author is abundantly true to the tradition he represents. His is not a book which has any gospel to preach or any cause to further. Its inspiration lies in the desire to be scientific. Its aim, in the words of the preface, is "to describe the religious consciousness and to do so without having any point of view". It is the work of a very excellent maker of a book. The reader is given to feel as though the author's main concern with each separate subject as it came up for treatment, had been carefully to allot to it an amount of space proportionate to its importance; its importance being gauged, roughly speaking, by the extent to which recent research has been occupied with it. Hence the book does indeed "describe the religious consciousness" as the author himself sees it; for of course he cannot prevent his own point of view—his personalism in religion, if one might name it at a venture—from shining through his treatment in places: and he does not try to. But it also does much more. It forms an admirable introduction to the vast field of modern work on the psychology and philosophy of religion. It teems with references. It has a very full index. And the device of leaving twelve blank pages in the middle of the index shows very well where the author himself has conceived that one of the main values of his work would lie.

This is not to say, of course, that the book is a mere compendium. A mere compiler, for instance, would have given us all the forty-eight definitions of religion which the author says exist; instead of, like him, contenting himself with telling us where to find them. What would be still more impossible to the compiler, the author offers us a careful forty-ninth. And this judicious frankness is characteristic of the whole work.

The reader, as he is being conducted through the vast halls of religious-philosophic-psychological thought, always feels the companionship of a vigorous mind, if a circumspect one; and of an unfailingly fresh writer. He is never for a moment allowed to feel that his guide is not interested in the value of the goods he is showing. To change the metaphor, the reader is allowed to listen, as it were, to the religious consciousness; hear it testifying of itself under all manner of conditions; but he is not for a moment left to the delusion that all testimonies are to be equally respected. He is accustomed to the thought that the investigator's business in this field is to correlate and analyse testimonies, and to seek safety in numbers of them.

It is just at this point, however, that criticism of the work (the serious sort of criticism) will be likeliest to set in. One cannot but feel how terribly all work of this sort would be cut into, were it once definitely established that there is no safety in numbers here; or were it once proved that all the usual testimonies of unsophisticated people regarding the actualities of their "conversion experiences" and the like were worthless, and that in 99 per cent. of the cases the real facts are hopelessly concealed. It is well known that all psycho-analytic work tends in this direction. The author is not intimately acquainted with this work. But he knows it; and seems at times conscious of some such possibility. In one place he pits his whole book against Freud and Schroeder, as also the whole mass of the religious testimony with which he deals. "So extreme a position as this," he says, "will hardly need any refutation for the average reader, and if it does the whole of this volume should serve as a better refutation than any explicit examination of the thesis I could give, here or elsewhere" (p. 112). And so he dismisses the nightmare. One cannot but remark the fact that no section of the book is devoted to a thorough analysis and statement of the psycho-analytic point of view, and an examination of it.

The fact is, the author does not give much space to extreme positions. He tends rather to give various points of view in respect of each subject, than to take up a single way of thought regarding all the subjects and test it against its rivals. This rather qualifies the claim of being scientific although it does not abolish it. It means that what we really have before us is not so much a description of the religious consciousness, as a description of how it has appeared to the main modern observers who have given their attention to it. It is, indeed, detached and scientific. But it will appear to many to be a detached and scientific account rather of the literature of the subject and the present state of opinion upon it, than of the religious consciousness itself. Of course, a masterly collocation such as this, of the main things currently written and read upon a theme so much in the foreground among us, was devoutly to be desired.

J. W. S.

Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, Fasc. V: Secretum Secretorum, cum glossis et notulis; tractatus brevis et utilis ad declarandum quedam obscure dicta Fratris Rogeri. Nunc primum edidit Robert Steele. Accedunt versio Anglicana ex Arabico edita per A. S. Fulton, versio vetusta Anglo-Normanica nunc primum edita. Oxonii, e typographeo Clarendoniano MCMXX. Pp. lxiv, 317.

It is good news to learn that though the war inevitably delayed Mr. Steele's accomplishment of his project of publishing the whole of Roger Bacon's *inedita*, the delay has been only temporary and there is every chance of the

undertaking being brought to completion. A work of this sort is one which the University of Oxford may fairly be said to owe to the memory of one of her famous sons, and the debt is being handsomely discharged. The present volume, apart from a few typographical errors, mainly due to faulty division of words, is in excellence of type, quality of paper and such respects worthy alike of the reputation even of the University Press and the fame of Brother Roger. The editor has discharged his task, not by any means an easy one, with his usual learning and industry. He has given us, besides a careful text of the *Secretum Secretorum* as revised by Bacon with glosses and an introductory pamphlet, a full introduction dealing with the literary history and influence of the work (one of the most curious of those fathered on Aristotle by Eastern fancy), with an English version of the Arabic text—the most direct representative of the lost Syriac original—from the pen of Mr. Fulton and a text, prepared by Mr. Henry Dakyns, of the hitherto unprinted Anglo-Norman version, *le Secre de Secrez*.

The *Secretum Secretorum* can hardly be said to have any particular interest for the student of Aristotle. It professes to be a work written by the philosopher for his royal pupil Alexander the Great, revealing the intimate secrets of philosophy which were carefully concealed from the view of ordinary pupils of the Lyceum. What Aristotle would have really thought appropriate in a treatise composed for Alexander we can, of course, only conjecture. But we may be sure that his instructions would not, like our treatise, have intermingled common-place prudential maxims with astrology, regulations for compounding the 'sovereign elixir' and for making gold, and rules for prophesying the issue of a campaign from the letters composing the names of the rival generals. Mr. Steele judges, probably rightly, that the lost Syriac from which the Arabic version was translated was an original; there never was any Greek text at all. Certainly, it would be hard to find even a faint reflexion of anything Hellenic in the thought of the treatise before us. It is further clear from one or two passages that the writer was Neo-Platonist in his theology. It would be interesting to some of us if the source of some of the statements made at the opening of the work could be traced. When we are told that Aristotle's wisdom was certified by an angel who hesitated whether to call him a man or a brother angel, is this a far-off echo of the story of the response of the Pythia to Lycurgus? And is the tale that he was taken up to the "empyrean" in a "pillar of fire" based on the story of Elijah or perhaps on the legend of the miraculous ascension of Empedocles?

All but specialist readers will probably find Brother Roger's prefatory 'tractate' more interesting than the work he is glossing. It is amusing to find him violently denouncing the "gomeralls" who confuse *μάθησις* with sorcery and consequently discourage men from studying geometry, though, as Mr. Steele reminds us, the blunder was one which he had himself made in the *opus maius* and elsewhere. His attempt to reconcile his own belief in astrology with the principles of Christianity and more particularly with the recognition of men's responsibility for their acts is highly characteristic.

I may subjoin a note of a few passages where I feel in doubt whether the printed text can quite correctly represent the author's meaning (unless, indeed, 'it is the Latin which misrepresents' its Arabic original).

P. 11, l. 31: cicius erit talis eclipsis quam *qui* vellent sapientes, etc. The *qui* seems intrusive and meaningless.

P. 16, l. 20: non fecit circulum verum set *speram*, and again, l. 22, set *spera* incipit. Mr. Steele takes this to be correct, as his abstract of Bacon's tractate shows. I am afraid I do not understand it. I suggest that the word intended is *spiram* . . . *spira*, a spiral (*ἕλιξ*). I believe that Bacon means to say that the actual path of the sun

relative to the earth is a spiral, exactly as we are told in the *Timaeus*. *Spira* is the word used by Chalcidius both in his translation and in his commentary, and Bacon, I presume, would be acquainted with that work.

P. 59, l. 25 : si sumenda fuerit *cum* medicina. The context shows that *cum* spoils the sense, which is "if medicine is to be taken".

P. 71, l. 9: calorem stomachi *incendit*. The MS. *intendit* is correct "it raises the temperature",.

P. 83, note 4 : *et requiem temporibus* should be marked here, as it is in another place, as a quotation. See Psalm cxxxi. (Vulg.), v. 5.

P. 88, l. 35 : *piscentur* is an obvious error for *pisentur* (or *pinsentur*).

P. 135, l. 1-4 : It is by an oversight that the five 'porte maris' become 'ports' in Mr. Steele's rubric ; of course they are 'gates' of the sea, *i.e.*, straits ; *ib.* l. 19, the word *querentis* has been repeated by accident and should be dropped.

P. 136, l. 4 : *prosperitate* ?prosperitate(m).

P. 144, l. 22 : demonstravi *in quid* legem meam. The *in quid*, which makes no sense, seems to be a mere dittography of the *inquit* of l. 21.

P. 152, l. 30 : *Wlt* l. Vult.

P. 174, l. 6 : mor*i*ereris l. morereris.

There are a few other places where the printed text needs some small alteration to get a 'construe' out of it. Possibly the fault lies not with the transcriber of the MS. but with the translator himself who clearly did not always understand his original.

A. E. Taylor.

Spiritualism. A Popular History from 1847. By Joseph McCabe. London : T. Fisher Unwin, 1920. Pp. 243.

It was natural that the flood of publications inspired by the wide-spread bereavement-sentiment and the demand for satisfying it should provoke also a number of counterblasts, among which those of Mr. McCabe rank high, by reason of the lucidity and vigour of their style. He is an uncompromising antagonist of every claim of the 'occult,' who finds fraud, and nothing but vulgar fraud, everywhere, and in this book narrates the history of 'modern spiritualism' from this standpoint. For this very reason his narrative is so selective, and so coloured, that there will be two opinions about its effectiveness : for unfortunately the subject is, and remains, one which generates the most violent bias on both sides, and, to seem persuasive to those who are not already convinced, a writer should appear impartial and properly conscious that no statement in the controversy should be accepted without careful testing, lest it should have been vitiated by partisan zeal in what is believed to be a good cause. Thus the whole subject resembles religion and politics in its logical character, rather than science, and there appears to be little prospect of settling the dispute about it until both parties agree to apply the pragmatic test of truth. At present this would decide *against* spiritism, simply because it can hardly be contended that the communications said to come through from the departed are sufficiently clear, copious and correct to be really trusted; but it rests with those who believe in their authenticity to improve their quality and to increase their quantity, until they become so common and so valuable practically that no one, whatever his theoretic doubts and personal distaste, can afford to ignore them. Meantime both parties might employ themselves more profitably than in dialectical discussion of evidence that must remain inconclusive, because it cannot prevail against a hostile bias.

F. C. S. Schiller.

Matter and Motion. By Clerk Maxwell. Enlarged Edition. Edited by Sir J. Larmor, F.R.S. S.P.C.K. Pp. xv, 163.

This is a very agreeable reprint of Maxwell's famous treatise on the elements of dynamics. Sir Joseph Larmor has provided it with copious notes, partly critical and explanatory, and partly referring to later experimental work such as that of Boys and Eötvös on the gravitational constant.

In addition an extra chapter from Maxwell's *Electricity* has been added, in which Maxwell explains the equations of Hamilton and Lagrange for dynamical systems. Two appendices are added by the editor, one on the relativity theory of gravitation, and the other on the principles of Least and of Varying Action. With these additions the book forms as good an introduction to the classical theory of dynamics, apart from detailed applications of it, as anyone can want. It is provided with a portrait of Maxwell; and, in these days, five shillings can hardly be better spent than in buying it.

C. D. B.

A History of the Conceptions of Limits and Fluxions in Great Britain from Newton to Woodhouse. By Florian Cajori, Ph.D. Open Court Company. Pp. viii, 299.

This book contains a full account of the controversies to which Newton's theory of fluxions gave rise in Britain up to about 1820, when the Leibnitian notation was almost universally adopted. Its main interest for the philosophical reader will be the valuable account of Berkeley's criticisms in the *Analyst* and subsequent controversial tracts. Many of Berkeley's objections were perfectly sound, and the controversy between him and his opponents, Walton and Jurin, really did force men to see difficulties which were masked by the great authority of Newton.

Prof. Cajori points out that the method of fluxions had the qualities of its defects, and that the uncritical acceptance of continental teaching about the Calculus, which began after 1820, was not an unmixed gain. The fluxion method at least involved the valuable notion of a limit, though this had not been very clearly defined. But the earlier followers of continental methods uncritically took over all the apparatus of real infinitesimals, a conception which—however convenient—simply covers confused thinking.

C. D. B.

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VIII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

British Journal of Psychology. Vol. x., Part 1. November, 1919. The greater portion of this number is devoted to a symposium on "Instinct and the Unconscious". **W. H. R. Rivers,** in opening the discussion, puts forward as the main characteristic of instinct (i) its subjection to the all-or-none principle, resulting in an absence of graduation of responses; and (ii) its belonging to the protopathic system, being normally quite dissociated from the epicritic or intelligent system. In a postscript the assignment of these characteristics is limited mainly to those instincts which subserve the needs of the individual, those which subserve the instincts of the group being epicritic, and both being innate. **C. S. Myers** would limit the application of the all-or-none principle to certain instincts and then only to their first appearances and as a "tendency". He maintains also that instinct and intelligence were differentiated out of a common origin, designating his view of mental evolution as analytic and the view of Rivers as synthetic. **C. G. Jung** accepts Rivers' application of the all-or-none principle to instincts. He places instincts among unconscious processes of which we can only be aware through their effects; but they are distinguished from those unconscious processes, *cf.* phobias, which are the results of individual experience. Intuition is also an unconscious process. "The mechanism of intuition," he says, "is analogous to that of instinct, with this difference, that whereas instinct means a teleological impulse towards a highly complicated action, intuition means an unconscious teleological apprehension of a highly complicated situation." The unconsious also includes the archetypes of apperception, *i.e.* the congenital *a priori* forms of apprehension. These with instincts comprise the "collective unconscious". The problem of instincts and that of the archetypes are at bottom the same. **Graham Wallas** maintains that instincts are best controlled, not by repression, but by being brought fully into the focus of conciousness and by being regarded as not properly belonging to the "real" self. He criticises Rivers' view that the normal process by which an adult man now controls and graduates his simpler instincts is by thrusting them into the unconscious. **James Drever,** in reply to Jung, argues that the *a priori* forms of thought are as fundamental as experience itself and cannot be studied psychologically. He says that the unconscious or subpersonal consciousness underlies at all times the conscious or personal consciousness, just as the instinctive propensities underlie the ends and purposes of our rational activities, and it is unconscious because it represents either a stage of psychical evolution beyond which we have passed by normal development, or a mass of experience upon which we have, as it were, tried to turn our backs by some more or less abnormal process of dissociation, repression, or substitution; but instinct has precisely the same psychological position and function in subpersonal as in personal consciousness. **W. McDougall** rejects Rivers' application of the all-or-none principle to instincts, and shows that while the system consisting of an associated group of ideas and the instinct-emotion connected with it may be "dissociated," the instinct

may be fully conscious in its working when connected with other perceptions or ideas.

Edward Bullough, writing on "The Relation of Æsthetics to Psychology," discusses the subject-matter of æsthetics and maintains that the fundamental problems of æsthetics are questions of psychological facts. He contrasts individual with social factors and receptive with creative aspects, and examines a way of studying the origins of art and comparative æsthetics. **Alfred Carver,** in an article on "The Generation and Control of Emotion," maintains that the function of emotion is to reinforce interest. It is most intense when impulse is thwarted. The bodily changes produced by emotion are such as to fit the organism to respond more efficiently to the situation: *e.g.* by the higher secretion of adrenin, which acts as a stimulant. The excessive outpouring of chemical excitants where no opportunity for their use is given might be expected to damage not only the glands themselves but other tissues also. It is along these lines that we may profitably look for an explanation of some of the more obscure disorders to which violent and prolonged emotion give rise. Sublimation is the more likely to be successful the more the new path resembles the old and the earlier in the life of the individual it is begun. **Joshua C. Gregory,** in "The Relation between the Word and the Unconscious," criticises various views as to the functions and relations of words and their meanings, and maintains that the relation is best regarded as one between stimulus and stimulated process—which latter may be partly conscious and is always at least partly unconscious. Thus the word itself, and not its meaning, is usually at the focus of attention, except when we are explicitly thinking of its meaning and definition.

Other articles are "The Rôle of Interference Factors in Producing Correlation," by **J. Ridley Thompson,** and "On Listening to Sounds of Weak Intensity," by **Miss E. M. Smith** and **F. C. Bartlett.** One conclusion reached by the last named is that improvability (with practice) in auditory acuity is almost wholly attributable to the subject's increasing familiarity with the conditions and to his adoption of a more consistent method of response; it is not to be regarded as primarily sensory in character.

British Journal of Psychology: Medical Section. Vol. i., Part 1. October, 1920. A considerable portion of this first number is devoted to a symposium on 'The Revival of Sub-conscious Memories and its Therapeutic Value,' by **Drs. William Brown, C. S. Myers,** and **W. McDougall.** Dr. Brown maintains that for the recovery of memories lost as a result of shell-shock, the revival of the emotion associated with those memories is an essential element for complete cure. The recall of such memories and the re-living of the emotional experiences seems to be a means of working off excessive emotion (psycho-cartharsis). At the same time Dr. Brown recognises the therapeutic value of the calm review and more purely intellectual analysis of past experiences, which he terms "autognosis" and which may result in a "readjustment of emotional values," the viewing of past experiences in their proper and unexaggerated proportions. Dr. C. S. Myers maintains that the revival of the cognitive and affective (non-emotional) elements of the forgotten experience are the only essentials for cure. He doubts whether attempted control over emotional expression ever leads to functional nervous disorder, and inclines to the view that the dissociation of emotion only comes indirectly through the dissociation of the cognitive and affective experiences connected with it. Dr. McDougall rejects the Freudian conception of an emotion as a quantum of energy, which may become attached to any idea, and then be transferred from it to another, and which in pathological cases

may work subconsciously and cause a kind of distortion of the mental processes, and which by "abreaction" may be discharged from the system. If this view is false why should re-living an emotion cure the disorder? It may make things worse, and seems to in some cases. The essential thing for relief is re-association; the emotional discharge may help to bring this about, *e.g.*, by helping to overcome repressions, but it is not always essential. Dissociation never affects an emotional centre as such; it is an idea or group of ideas that is dissociated from the mind. This continues to act on the emotional centre and because of its isolation (making drainage of energy impossible) it forms a "vicious circle or couple" with the emotional centre, always liable to exaggerated excitement by other impressions which affect the emotional centre directly. By re-association the abnormal excitability, due to isolation, is removed. Dr. Brown, in reply, points out that he himself had already emphasised the importance of re-association but that a full revival involves the emotional element as well. He claims that McDougall is really in agreement with him in thinking that the revived emotion may help to break down synaptic resistance. **Constance Long** in an article on 'Psychological Adaptation' emphasises the importance of adaptation to inner reality as well as to outer reality. The unconscious is not the mere outcome of repressions: it is the creative mind. Even dreams and phantasies are not mere results of repressions but are schemes and plans which may have a significance for problems of the self. Dr. Long suggests and discusses a division of individuals into two types, those who are orientated towards the unconscious and those who are orientated towards the conscious—not identical with Jung's types introverts and extroverts. **Ernest Jones** contributes a paper on 'Recent Advances in Psycho-Analysis'. The large number of points recently emphasised by recent work in psycho-analysis include the following: the necessity for keeping active the patient's motive for recovery; the existence of such types as (1) persons who make special claims to be treated as exceptions—traceable to some unjust punishment in infancy; (2) persons who are "broken by success," a psycho-neurosis following the final attainment of a long desired end; (3) the person who commits a crime because he feels guilty. A discussion of Narcissism follows in which Dr. Jones thus summarises the influence of Narcissism on the choice of a loved object. "The narcissistic type may fall in love with (*a*) what one is oneself; (*b*) what one once was; (*c*) what one would like to be, one's ideal; (*d*) what was once part of oneself, the child." Finally we have an account of a "new branch" of psychology which Freud has dealt with in a series of essays, and to which he gives the name metapsychology—or psychology which regards "every mental process from three points of view—the dynamic, the topographical, and the economical". A long list of important recent articles on psycho-analytic topics is appended. **C. Stanford Read** contributes an article on 'The Pathogenesis of Epilepsy,' a survey of the clinical studies of Pierce Clark.

"SCIENTIA" (RIVISTA DI SCIENZA). Vol. 38, 9-12; Vol. 39, 1-2. [September, 1920-February, 1921]. November, 1920. In a paper entitled 'Light as the Source of Life,' **Benjamin Moore** (Oxford University Biochemical Laboratory) studies the Borderland of the Inorganic and the Organic. He defends the view that natural processes everywhere appear to be controlled by the same universal law that, as soon as conditions or the field of environment permit of it, matter tends to assume more complex forms, so leading from the simplest known type, the electron, to the most complex, man. This article is interesting taken in conjunction with the following article. December, 1920. In an article entitled 'The Transmission of Physiological Influence in Nerve

and other Forms of Living Matter' **Ralph S. Lillie** (Worcester, Mass., U.S.A., Clark University) gives a valuable account of recent work in the domain of botany and physical chemistry. He holds that the power of inducing or influencing chemical action at a distance is one of the fundamental properties of matter in the organised or living state. Beginning usually at some relatively active or 'stimulated' region there is a spread, often very rapid, of chemical alteration, with which is associated a spread or transmission of physiological alteration. Mr. Lillie points out that animals locally stimulated, as by a pinprick, react as a whole in what may be called a purposive manner. In view of the fundamental nature of the properties of living material in the matter of the reaction to stimulus and the transmission of stimulus, Mr. Lillie considers the very relevant question as to whether there exist in nature other systems which show a similar propagation of chemical influence, under conditions similar to those found in the transmission of effects in vital material. He also considers the more intimate or essential structure common to all forms of living matter. If there is non-vital matter which has the power of transmission, then, since this power is found in all vital material, it is probable that the study of any unusual features of structure or constitution which are common to all vital material and to the non-vital material under consideration, and peculiar to these, will lead to results of fundamental importance in biology. The discussion of the properties of matter in the colloidal state is valuable, and new possibilities with respect to the study of protoplasm are suggested. It is stated that there is much evidence that the protoplasmic surface-layer undergoes a change of permeability and electrical polarisation during stimulation, and that upon this critical change follow the other characteristic reactions which involve the activity of the entire cell, such as, for example, contraction in a muscle-cell or secretion in a gland cell. The bioelectric variations and many other changes accompanying stimulation and transmission clearly indicate the critical importance of surface processes in these phenomena; hence the peculiarities of the protoplasmic surface-layer require first consideration in any general theory of the nature of protoplasmic transmission. Mr. Lillie points out, further, the parallel between the electromotor properties of protoplasmic surfaces and of metallic surfaces with a view to suggesting an explanation of the problem of how physiological effects are transmitted from region to region in a living cell or nerve fibre. It is interesting to observe Mr. Lillie's conclusion with respect to the reason for the striking and numerous resemblances between the phenomena of transmission in the passive metal and in protoplasm. He suggests it is due to the essential structural feature which the two systems possess in common, namely the presence of a chemically reactive thin surface-film in contact with an electrolyte-solution; explanations of the instability of the film and the tendency of a wave of dissolution, once started, to spread over the whole surface are developed. In the concluding remarks of this vitally interesting paper the writer suggests that conceptions based on a recognition of the resemblances between protoplasm and (*e.g.*) a system of numerous particles of filaments of passive iron, arranged to form a coherent structure and permeated by an oxidising solution, should lead to many important advances.

Revue Néo-Scolastique de Philosophie. xxiii. Année, No. 89. February 1921. Louvain. **P. Doncœur.** 'Le Nominalisme de Guillaume Occam: la théorie de la relation.' [A carefully documented study of the difficulties of the Occamist theory of relations, which, by the way, has left deep marks on the traditional English text-books of elementary

logic. The author explains clearly that Occam was compelled for theological reasons to maintain that his doctrine does not apply to the "transcendental" entities made known to us by revelation. *Paternitas*, for example, in God, is not the same thing as the *essentia dei*, and yet is not, as in the case of a human father, a mere 'concept,' since, on either alternative, it becomes impossible to retain the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, which Occam accepts as certain and revealed truth. This view that the 'logic of relations' is applicable only to the 'natural' world is a form of the theory of the 'double truth,' but has no connexion with Averroism, of which Occam shows no traces. The article should interest all who concern themselves with the logic of relations, whether theologically-minded or not. Perhaps there is more to be said for Occam's position than a convinced Thomist can allow?] **E. du Préel.** 'Les théories du "Protagoras" et les "Dissoi logoi".' [The writer starts from the obvious connexion of the argument about the teachability of the political art in Platos' *Protagoras* with certain sections of the anonymous διασσοὶ λόγοι. He wishes to prove that the arguments ascribed to Socrates in the Platonic dialogue must really be taken from a work by some fifth-century sophist, who is declared, without any production of evidence, to be Gorgias of Leontini. Socrates was a person of no historical significance whatever. The author seems hardly to know the strength of the case against him. No one doubts that the writer of the διασσοὶ λόγοι is merely reproducing some one else's arguments, but why should not his inspiration come from Socrates? It is now certain that Aeschines of Sphettus, like Plato, represented Socrates as arguing in the same sense, and we have therefore to ask why he and Plato should have conspired to circulate a fictitious story at a time when the supposed work of Gorgias—if it ever existed—must have been accessible to everyone. Why, again, if Socrates was a person of no importance, did Aristophanes and the other comic poets make him the central figure of their burlesques of "science"? Why did Antisthenes relate that many foreigners were attracted to Athens κατὰ κλέος Σωκράτους? Why does Isocrates in his *Helena* make a clear distinction between the philosopher who held that all ἀρετὴ is knowledge,—the precise doctrine of Socrates in the *Protagoras*,—and "Protagoras and the sophists of his day," among whom Gorgias is mentioned by name? On the view that Socrates really held the theory ascribed to him, these facts are intelligible; on M. du Préel's theory, Aristophanes, Isocrates, Aeschines, Antisthenes, and Plato are all in a conspiracy to delude the world, a conspiracy at least as old as the production of the *Clouds* in Plato's early childhood!] **P. Harmignie.** 'Notes sur le Probabilisme.' **M. De Wulf.** 'La Formation du Tempérament National au xiiie siècle.' [An extract from a volume to be published by the University of Princeton on *Civilisation and Philosophy in the Middle Ages*. The golden age of scholasticism is also the age of the beginnings of conscious nationality and national character among the European nations. The Latins and 'Anglo-Celts' are the great figures of scholasticism and their national character has been profoundly influenced by the spirit of this philosophy whose distinctive marks are (1) insistance on the metaphysical worth of individual personality; (2) devotion to 'clear' ideas and lucid expression; (3) the combination of the 'deductive' and 'inductive' methods; (4) observance of the *juste milieu*. Latin and 'Anglo-Celt' philosophy, art, literature have all retained the stamp of these characteristics; the Germans from the first have been led wrong by an *outré* "Neo-Platonism".] **E. Gilson.** 'Météores Cartésiens et Météores Scolastiques.' (Conclusion). [Why did Descartes regard the conclusions of his *Météores* as *demonstrated*? Why is he comparatively uninterested in accounts of new experiments? Because, to his mind, a

cosmological doctrine has all the demonstration possible if it "saves" the appearances. His object is simply to devise the simplest hypothesis from which the facts of the common and regular routine of Nature can be deduced. *I.e.* (though M. Gilson does not express himself so) Descartes accepts the famous account of the functions of "hypothesis" given in the *Phaedo*. A learned article which no student of Descartes' Physics should overlook.] **N. Balthasar.** 'Travaux récents de Métaphysique.' [Discussions of recent works on scholastic philosophy and natural theology.] *Comptes Rendus. Chronique.*

Logos. Anno III. Fasc. 3-4. July December, 1920. **Pasquale Gatti.** 'Il pensiero di G. A. Fichte.' [A reply to an attack upon Fichte's *Reden an die Deutsche Nation* as the source of German aspirations to *Weltmacht* and the cause of the horrors of the recent war. The author has an easy task in showing that Fichte's object in the *Reden* was nothing of the kind imputed to him. Might it not, however, be another question whether the central doctrine of the Fichtean philosophy is not the unconscious expression of a temperamental egoism which, applied to *Weltpolitik*, naturally issues in the clamour for *Weltmacht oder Niedergang?*] **I. Poiry.** 'La réforme de l'enseignment.' [The writer desires that human society should become atheistic, non-commercial, and pacificist. This is impossible without a reconstruction of the educational system. General education in future should be based on manual work and last from the age of six to twenty, higher education being reserved for the few who can profit by it. These doctrines are enunciated magisterially without discussion.] **E. di Carlo.** 'Sociologia e filosofia del diritto.' [All the social sciences pre-suppose the notion of society itself. Hence the necessity for an autonomous science of sociology, which has to analyse the "social fact" and to distinguish it from the biological or psychical fact. Sociology deals with the genus of which "economic" "juristic" facts, etc., are the constituent species. It is true that there are no "social facts" which are not facts falling under the purview of economics or jurisprudence or some other specific social science. But this is no argument against the necessity of study of the generic character common to all these specific facts. Sociology, in fact, holds the same place among social sciences as general biology among the sciences which deal with life. It is a theoretic, not a normative, discipline. Hence it is a mistake to suppose that sociology can ever replace or absorb the philosophy of law. For the latter aims at establishing an ideal of what ought to be, and even its "phenomenological" part—the study of the historical approximation of law to the ideal—presupposes that the ideal has been already determined. On the other hand the phenomenology of law deals only with some aspects of the "social" fact, not with all. Neither study can take the place of the other.] **C. Ranzoli.** Il "dato" della conoscenza e la teoria del sogno metafisico.' [The cognitive "datum" is "in" me and therefore a fact or state or element of "my" consciousness. The special character which makes it a "datum" is its "imperativeness"; it is imposed on my consciousness and cannot be produced at will, and this is true of all cognitive states. This is why they *seem* to come from a source independent of consciousness. Ordinary realism and current idealism both misinterpret this seeming independence. The true interpretation is that the mind is the "limit of the process by which universal being individuates itself. The cognitive 'datum' is reality arrived at the knowledge of itself." The arguments for an "idealistic" interpretation drawn from dreams are fallacious. A dream is only recognised as a dream by contrast with the presupposed actualities of waking life.] **A. Aliotta.** Ciò che non muore del positivismo.' [Reflections suggested by the death

of R. Ardigò. Positivism and "romantic" metaphysical speculation are equally indestructible tendencies of the human mind, and each has its justification as against the excesses of the other.] Reviews, Notices, etc.

Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica. Anno xii. Fasc. 5. September-October, 1920. Editorial note on the founder of the review, Prof. G. Canella, lost in fighting in Macedonia, 25th Nov., 1916. **G. Zamboni.** 'Il pensiero filosofico del Prof. Giulio Canella.' **M. L. Cervini.** 'Note critiche alla teoria gnoseologica e aletologica di R. Ardigò.' [A criticism of Ardigò's 'Il Vero'. Ardigò's theory is the extreme simplicist doctrine that all mental life whatever is a complex of actual or revived sensations. Sensation = feeling (sentimento) = "a psychical fact determined by the action of a stimulus on a sense-organ". This fact is called a sensation when considered as making part of the complex called the external world, a feeling when considered as part of the complex called the self. Emotions are pleasantly or unpleasantly toned sensations. Will also is a "sensation," and, like sensations in general, as much part of the "external world" complex as of the "self" complex. The difference between the "sensation of willing" and a visual sensation is of the same kind as the difference between a visual and an auditory sensation. On the basis of this "gnoseology," Ardigò argues that ethics, logic, æsthetics, science, are all reducible to physiology. Ardigò's theory of knowledge is thus a crude psychology with elements of one single kind, sensations, and a single law of interrelation, the law of Association. Truth becomes, according to him, a psychic fact; it is a quality of sensations as heat or gravity is of bodies. The critic notes (1) the impossibility of assigning cognitive value to ideas or concepts if these are mere complexes of sensations, elements which, by Ardigò's own definition, have no such value; (2) the impossibility of error if truth is a quality of sensation and all beliefs are complexes of associated sensations; (3) the impossibility of accounting, on Ardigò's principles, for the moral value set on scientific truth by civilised men; (4) the "gnoseological" solipsism implied by the view that truth is "a state of consciousness," (5) the absence of any proof of the fundamental premisses of the theory.] **A. Copelli.** 'Il giudizio teleologico in E. Kant e il concetto aristotelico di fine.' [The present issue contains only the first part of the article, which is taken up with a careful and detailed statement of the main line of argument of the 'Critique of Judgment.'] **G. Rossi.** 'L'Argomento Ontologico di S. Anselmo.' [A recent champion of the argument has maintained that the usual objections arise from a misunderstanding. By "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" Anselm has been taken to mean "the perfect". Against his argument, so understood, the familiar objection of Gaunilo and Kant would hold. But he really means "the absolute," and he is therefore right in saying that the absolute cannot be thought not to exist. In fact *Ens absolutum = esse.* Rossi is not satisfied that this view really expresses Anselm's thought. Even if it does, it leaves the ontological proof without value. In the proposition *Ens absolutum = esse,* what does *esse* mean? If it means "to exist in reality," there is a *petitio principii*; if it means anything else, the *existence* of the absolute is not demonstrated. The interpretation under discussion substitutes an intuition for an argument; unfortunately those who have not the intuition cannot be reasoned into it.] Obituary notice of Wundt, Reviews, etc.

IX.—NOTES.

"COMMON SENSE AND THE RUDIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY."

I AM indebted to Mr. Hooper for having drawn attention (MIND, April, 1921, p. 254) to two mistakes in my notice of his book (MIND, Oct., 1920, p. 488). May I correct them myself? They are both purely typographical, and crept in when I was typing my script for the printer. The proof sheets were corrected when I was away from home, and the errors remained undetected. The first is in a quotation from his book, which he has himself given correctly. The second consists in the dropping out of a page reference: "p. 79" should be "pp. 79-80."

If Mr. Hooper will make these corrections he will read what I originally wrote. I regret these mistakes, which were due solely to pressure of business when I was typing my notice; and thank Mr. Hooper for drawing attention to them.

My indebtedness to Mr. Hooper ends here. He says, "Unfortunately two of Mr. Russell's criticisms are based upon (doubtless unintentional) misquotations". I do not suppose that Mr. Hooper meant it to be so, but this seems to me to imply a charge of incompetence on my part. Criticisms ought not to be "based on" quotations. My "criticisms" (such as they were: if the reader will look at my very brief notice he will see how much "criticism" there was) were based on Mr. Hooper's whole book. It would have been better for him to say that my criticisms were "expressed through" two misquotations. My notice is too short to warrant his remark.

Mr. Hooper goes on to say that I have "subconsciously created" the "fallacy" I "indirectly" charge him with. Here again the statement errs by excess. I have charged him with no fallacy. I inquired about the basis of the "recognition" of which he speaks on pp. 17 and 18 of his book. That request for information was my only "criticism," and I am sorry that Mr. Hooper should have allowed my slip in quoting to prevent him from seeing what my request was about.

As to the other inaccuracy. Here again if Mr. Hooper will correct the inaccuracy he will read what I originally wrote. The "misquotation" in this case was not really a quotation at all. What I said was that "sense data" were described by Mr. Hooper as giving us "our fundamental knowledge of the physical world". I used "sense data" instead of "touch and sight," because I took touch and sight to be for Mr. Hooper merely the outstanding senses, and I wanted a more general word in my exposition (not criticism). When I used the phrase "give us" all I meant was that it was from sense data that Mr. Hooper seemed to start. I did not wish to use space to go into details on this point. My whole exposition and "criticism" of his doctrine occupied thirteen lines, and referred to the single question of "mental images". Mr. Hooper is of course the best judge of his own meaning, but I submit that it was perfectly legitimate for me to confess that I had been unable to gather in full detail from his book what that meaning was.

I am sorry to trespass on the space of MIND with what is, after all, largely a personal matter.

L. J. RUSSELL.

"THE MESSAGE OF PLATO."

HAILSHAM.

2nd June.

TO THE EDITOR OF "MIND".

SIR,

I have read with interest your delightfully abusive review of my book *The Message of Plato*. I should not dream of making any comment upon it, but for the fact that it is so largely based upon misunderstanding and misrepresentation, and is intended to discredit not me alone but also the publishers and the theme of the book.

First, as to the attack upon the publishers. It was not they but I who drew up the 'impudent puff' on the wrapper. Its 'impudent' meaning had not occurred to me before. When I wrote the phrase 'reveals a far deeper meaning than has occurred to most commentators,' I was thinking only of the undoubted fact that the spiritual significance of anything *is* deeper than its political or scientific or metaphysical significance. I had no thought of claiming that my interpretation had any profundity, and I was very careful to repudiate in the preface any such claim. But I now see that my note was badly worded, and I am sorry for the suggestion it contains.

Against myself your reviewer makes three principal charges. First, he accuses me of complete ignorance of Greek language and literature. Perhaps he is right; but is it not unfortunate that he gives, as his sole illustration of my ignorance, a fantastic derivation of the name Pythagoras which is not mine at all, but is merely quoted from an Indian source? I originally inserted a note to the effect that the derivation was too far-fetched to be taken seriously, but subsequently omitted this as unnecessary.

Secondly, he accuses me of wilful falsehood, in the double form of suggestion of lies and suppression of facts. With regard to the former, I am guilty because my "main thesis is that the philosopher of the *Republic* is a non-social Yogi who . . . is following the 'higher path' of aiming at the spiritual suicide of absorption in Brahm," whereas I "must know that neither in the *Republic* nor anywhere else is there one word about absorption of the philosopher's selfhood into the impersonal". My main thesis is that the *Republic* is chiefly concerned with the union of the soul with the Good as the goal of existence. Does your reviewer suggest that the language of Books VI. and VII. of the *Republic* is inconsistent with this? If he requires a specific phrase, let me refer him to the well-known passage about "reaching and mingling with real existence" as the goal of the philosopher's desire.

The suppression of truth of which I am guilty appears to consist in suppressing the fact that the whole object of the training in the higher sciences was "precisely that the philosopher may be fitted for his task of ruling with adequate knowledge and insight". It must surprise any readers of the review to learn that I have devoted many pages to discussing whether or not the training was for a political end, and that I have also given a full summary of Plato's own account of the matter, including (what your reviewer omits) Plato's description of the training as a preparation leading, by the revolution of the soul, "from a kind of nightlike day up to the true day of real existence".

Your reviewer adds sundry suggestions of ignorance, the chief of which are that I do not know that the Vedanta philosophy did not exist at all

prior to the elaboration of rival systems by admittedly late writers ; and that I do not know that "it is as certain as can be that before Alexander there was no way by which Indian speculation could have reached the West". Assuredly, if not to know these remarkable facts is ignorance, I gladly agree that your reviewer's accusation is correct.

Yours, etc.,

E. J. Urwick.

To the Editor of "Mind".

In reply to Mr. E. J. Urwick I have only to say that I have already given my reasons for my judgment of his book, *The Message of Plato*, and that I see no ground to depart from what I have written. I have not been guilty of "abuse" unless it is abuse to say frankly that one thinks a book bad and why one thinks so. Nor have I accused Mr. Urwick of "lying" ; on the contrary, in the very sentence of which he complains I spoke of his "absolute good faith". And as to my observations about the advertisement on the wrapper of his book, what I objected to in the publishers was not that they composed it but that they circulated it. As for the other points Mr. Urwick raises, on the question of the date of the Vedanta philosophy, I, who am no Sanskritist, naturally followed recognised authorities, such as, Oldenburg in *Philosophie der Gegenwart*, R. Garbe, Prof. Eggeling, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Prof. Macdonnell, in *A History of Sanskrit Literature*. The view I expressed about the impossibility of the transmission of philosophical or scientific beliefs from India to Hellas before the age of Alexander is that commonly held by all the first-rate authorities on the history of Greek thought. I think, as I have said, that as Mr. Urwick has the authorities against him on both points, it was for him to submit evidence in support of his own very different views. This he has wholly abstained from doing.

As to the fantastic derivation of the name Pythagoras, I did not accuse Mr. Urwick of *adopting* it. My point was that he did not seem aware of the *real* derivation of the name, and that this suggested a doubt of his fitness to expound a Greek author.

A. E. Taylor.

MIND ASSOCIATION.

The Annual Meeting will be held, by permission of the Master and Fellows, in the Lecture Rooms (Staircase I., Great Court) of Trinity College, Cambridge, on Saturday, 9th July.

The following arrangements have been made :—

4.0 p.m. Tea.

4.30 p.m. Annual Meeting.

5.0 p.m. Paper by Prof C. D. Broad on "Recent Work on our Knowledge of the External World". Visitors may be introduced.

8.0 p.m. Dinner. Tickets, price 8s., exclusive of wine, may be procured from Dr. Moore, 17 Magdalene Street, Cambridge, on or before 4th July. Remittance should accompany application for tickets. Tickets may be rocured by members for ladies or other guests. Evening dress optional.

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NEW SERIES. No. 120.] [OCTOBER, 1921.

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—THE EXTERNAL WORLD.[1]

BY C. D. BROAD.

THE philosophical problem of the external world and our knowledge thereof arises primarily from certain facts about the variations in the sensible appearances of what is regarded as a single physical thing. These difficulties may fairly be called the fundamental ones in the subject, because they are independent of all detailed knowledge about the physical and physiological processes which condition sense-perception. There is of course a further crop of difficulties when the assertions of the physicist and the physiologist on this subject come to be considered in detail. But it is hardly profitable to start from this end, since the alleged facts are stated in terms of the common-sense notion of physical objects and established on the common-sense assumption that perception gives us substantially correct information about such objects. Hence, if the solution of the first problem should involve any profound modification of these assumptions, the alleged facts which give rise to the second problem would need to be entirely restated. The two problems are of course very closely connected, and the relation between them may be roughly summed up as follows. When we leave out of account the physical and physiological details of sense-perception a number of alternative solutions of the first set of difficulties are open to us. When we take these details into account some of the solutions which seemed plausible

[1] Read at the meeting of the Mind Association at Cambridge, on July 9th, 1921.

become much less so, whilst others, which would have seemed at first sight needlessly complex, even if they had suggested themselves at all, may be found necessary in order to do justice to all the facts.

Now there is one general remark that may be made at the outset. Since the problem arises through the various appearances of what is supposed to be a single physical object the solution must be sought in two directions. On the one hand we must try to clear up the notion of sensible appearance, on the other we must try to clear up the notion of physical objects. There is no incompatibility between the mere facts that something appears to you to be circular and that something appears to me to be elliptical at the same moment. There is again no incompatibility between the mere facts that something appears to me now to be round and that later on something appears to me to be elliptical. The incompatibility is not between these experiences as such, but between them and the supposed facts that the something which appears to you to be circular and the something which appears to me to be elliptical are the same something, and that this is really round. Thus all progress in the solution of the problem must take the form of analysing the obscure notions of sensible appearance and of physical object. Neither of these is clearly conceived by common-sense, but it may fairly be said that we all have a considerably more definite idea of what we mean by a physical object than of what we mean by such statements as that something appears round or elliptical. (i) A physical object is conceived to be something which at least is public; it is neither yours nor mine in the sense in which certain wishes and feelings belong wholly to me and certain others wholly to you. We do of course apply possessive adjectives to certain physical objects; we talk of my umbrella as well as of my toothache. But it is clear that the possessive adjectives are used in different senses; you can never literally make my toothache yours, whilst it is only too fatally easy for you to do so with my umbrella. (ii) A physical object is conceived to be capable of appearing in many different ways at once, and again to be capable of appearing differently at different times, without having changed. This statement is by no means clear or definite. No doubt it would be commonly held that a physical object could not appear differently if it had not changed at least in its relations to something else. Still there is felt to be some important sense in which a physical object can remain unaltered whilst some of its appearances change. Conversely there is felt to be some important sense

in which a physical object can change without appearing different. These two characteristics of publicity, and a certain relative independence of appearances, are necessary but not sufficient to the common-sense notion of a physical object. They both apply to the volitions of God on Berkeley's theory, and to things-in-themselves on Kant's theory. Yet it would commonly be held that, if either of these theories were true, there would be no physical objects. The reason seems to be that, on such theories, the objects, though public and relatively independent of their various appearances, are not sufficiently like what they appear to be. I do not know that common-sense would object to physical objects having many properties which they do not appear to have and which are very different from any that they appear to have. Again, it is prepared to admit that many properties which they apear to have do not belong to them. But it demands a certain minimum of resemblance between the qualities which physical objects have and those which they appear to have. At least something corresponding to apparent shape, size, and position seems to be demanded.

Now of course the first two demands can be fulfilled in a vast variety of ways. Almost every system of philosophy except pure subjective idealism fulfils the first two. The chief difficulty is about the last. There are or seem to be very great difficulties in fulfilling it literally. But in itself the third demand is not precise; it is a matter of more or less in any case; and again the question will arise: What do you mean by saying that such and such a physical object has such and such a property? If you insist on a very literal interpretation of having such and such a quality we must deny that bodies, as conceived by science, are coloured, and that physical objects, as conceived by Mr. Russell in his *Lowell Lectures* or by Leibniz, have shapes and sizes. A class of sensa or a group of confused monads with very similar points of view does not literally have shape, size, or position. Yet it is very easy, as Dr. Moore puts it, to say that in a Pickwickian sense bodies, on the scientific theory, are coloured, and Russell's classes of sensa or Leibniz's colonies of bare monads extended. The question is: How Pickwickian may we become in our interpretations of common statements before we have to reject the notion of physical objects altogether?

As regards the meaning of sensible appearance we have almost an open field, for common-sense and natural science have no clear views on the matter at all. Naturally we find that various possible analyses of sensible appearances will

require different views about the nature of physical objects and some may even require the rejection of physical objects. Conversely certain views of physical objects demand certain types of view about the proper analysis of sensible appearances, *e.g.*, scientific theories about light, heat, sound, etc., have led to the view that sensible appearances are effects of physical objects working first on our bodies and thence on our minds. Now I might sum up the work that really matters which has been done on our subject in the last few years in the following way. It starts, in England at any rate, from Dr. Moore's *Refutation of Idealism*. I do not think, and I do not suppose Dr. Moore thinks, that that article refuted Idealism. But it did point out the scandalously ambiguous way in which the word 'sensation' was used, and led to the distinction being drawn between sensations and sensa. Now, starting from that distinction a great deal of very important work has been done on the following lines. A sensation has been supposed to be an act of direct acquaintance with a sensum. Since the sensum is no longer confused with the sensation, one ground at least for regarding the sensum as mental vanishes. It is embarrassing to say that a state of mind is round or hot or red, but we need not hesitate to ascribe these qualities to sensa. This leads to a definition of sensible appearance. When we say that the physical object x appears to us to be circular we mean on this theory that we are aware of a sensum which really is circular, and that this sensum is connected in some peculiarly intimate way with the physical object x. The essence of this theory of appearance is that whenever I judge that something *appears* to me to have the quality q there must be an object with which I am acquainted which *really does have* the quality q. This object is the sensum. It is, I think, admitted that sensa with which I am acquainted may have other qualities beside those which I notice in them; it is even held by many people that arguments like Stumpf's prove that this must in many cases be so. But it is held that, at any rate, they must have all those positive sensible qualities that they seem to me to have. In fact, if the present analysis of seeming to have a quality be accepted as complete, it is tolerably clear that we cannot literally talk of sensa *seeming* to have qualities; they just have them and we notice them.

Some such theory as this has at least the merit of giving a clear and intelligible meaning to the statement that a physical object appears to have such and such a quality. Until very lately most of us have regarded it as the only

tenable analysis of such statements. The work of Prof. Dawes Hicks and the latest work of Dr. Moore do however suggest that a very different mode of treatment is possible. I shall confine myself to developing some of the consequences of the older view, partly because this will occupy all my available time, and partly because the second has not as yet been very fully developed. It must be understood however that I think that the alternative theory of appearance is logically possible and may prove to be of great importance.

Certain objections which many people apparently feel to the theory just sketched may be removed at once. It is often objected that we are not aware of sensa and their properties, as a rule, until we specially look for them. It is a fact that it often needs a good deal of persuasion to induce a man to believe that when he looks at a penny sideways it seems elliptical. It is argued that we have therefore no right to hold that the man is directly acquainted with an object which is in fact elliptical. This is a weak argument. If the theory were that the man first becomes aware of a sensum, then judges that it is elliptical, and then infers from this premise and the laws of perspective that he is looking at a round physical object, the argument would of course be fatal to the theory. But this is quite obviously not what happens. The best analogy that we can have to the relation between our sensing of sensa and our perception of physical objects is to be found in the case of reading a book in a familiar language. What interests us is the meaning of the printed words, not the peculiarities of the print. We do not explicitly notice the latter unless there is something markedly wrong with it, such as a letter upside down. Nevertheless if there were no print we should cognise no meaning, and if the print were different in certain specific ways we should cognise a different meaning. We can attend to the print itself, if we choose, as we do in proof-reading. In the same way we are not generally interested in sensa, as such, but in what we think they tell us about physical objects. We therefore pass automatically from the sensum and its properties to judgments about the physical object and its properties. If, however, the sensum is queer, as when we see double, we notice its peculiarities as we notice an inverted letter. And again we seem to be able to detect the properties of sensa and contrast them with those which we ascribe to the physical object even in normal cases if we specially try to do so.

Having got rid of this preliminary objection, a question at once arises as to the status of sensa and their relation to physical objects. Although sensa are not sensations and

therefore are not necessarily states of mind, it does not follow that they may not be states of mind. Philosophers like Stout, who have admitted the distinction between sensations and sensa, have yet held that sensa are states of mind. It is true that they will not be acts like sensation, perception, judgment, etc.[1] But Stout, at any rate, holds that there are states of mind which are not acts. I understand that what he means by a presentation is an entity which is mental but is not an act. An act is apparently a state of mind which is directed on an object; an act may happen to be an object of another act, *e.g.*, of introspection, but it need not be so. A presentation is mental and *may be* an object, but it does not itself *have* an object. Whether presentations *must* be objects I am not quite sure, but I do not think that this is supposed to be necessary. If anything is a presentation, in this sense, bodily feelings, like headache and stomach-ache, are the most plausible candidates. Now I understand Stout's view to be that sensa are presentations and that they are of the same general nature as headaches and stomach-aches. Stout does not seem to me to state very clearly why he believes this, but I think it is possible to produce three more or less plausible arguments which have probably influenced him.

(i) If we take publicity as a mark of the physical and privacy as a mark of the mental, sensa seem to fall on the mental side. It is at least very doubtful whether two people who say that they are looking at the same physical object are ever aware of precisely similar sensa, and still less of the same sensum at the same time. This seems to suggest that sensa are mental, at any rate in the sense of being mind-dependent. If we look more closely, however, this conclusion does not seem to be necessary. The facts are much better explained by supposing that sensa are partly dependent on the positions and internal structure of the percipient's body. Since no two people's bodies can be in precisely the same place at precisely the same time it is not surprising that two men's sensa should differ. And since the internal state of two human bodies is never precisely the same it is still less surprising. This explanation not only accounts as well for the facts as the view that sensa are mind-dependent; it accounts a good deal better for some of the most striking of the facts.

[1] I understand that Stout no longer holds the views that I here ascribe to him. I have not altered the form of my statement, because the view which I am here discussing is that of his last published book, the third edition of the *Manual of Psychology*. Later developments have as yet only been revealed to a small circle of the elect at Edinburgh.

The orderly variations in the shapes of sensa as we move about are explicable if we suppose sensa to be partly conditioned by the positions of our bodies. The assumption that they depend on our minds provides no explanation whatever of such facts.

There is however a better form of the argument, which seems to me to have been somewhat overlooked by people like myself who take the opposite view to Stout. It does seem to me to be true that in certain cases our past experience and our present expectations actually affect the properties of our sensa, and not merely the judgments about physical objects that we base upon them. I will give two examples. (*a*) When I look at the staircase figure in James's *Psychology* it seems to me that it actually looks different from time to time, and that I can notice it changing with a 'click' from a staircase to an overhanging cornice. And it seems to me to change as I concentrate my thoughts on the idea of a cornice or the idea of a staircase. On the present analysis of appearance it is clear that the actual sensum must change, and not merely my judgment about physical objects; on the contrary, it is the change in my thought about physical objects which changes the sensum. (*b*) When I turn my head in a room the visual sensa of which I continue to be aware are not affected with sensible movement. If I put my glasses a little out of focus and turn my head the sensa do move. Whether they move or not seems to depend on my previous experiences and present expectations. The whole psychology of vision is full of similar cases. Such examples might seem to suggest that sensa are, at anyrate in part, mind-dependent. I think that this might be met by taking a less simple-minded view of the dependence of sensa on the percipient's body. The facts just adduced do suggest that the present sensum depends in part not only on the present state of the body but also on past states of it. Or, to put it in a more usual way, we must say that among the bodily conditions of sensa are the present traces left by past experiences. These traces, so far as I can see, may be wholly bodily. I therefore regard the first argument as failing to prove that sensa are mind-dependent, but as strongly suggesting that they are to a great extent body-dependent.

(ii) The second plausible argument which might be brought to prove that sensa are presentations in Stout's sense is the following. If we consider our various sensations we seem able to arrange them in an order, starting with sensations of sight, passing through taste and smell, and ending up with bodily sensations like headache. Now as regards

the top members of the series the distinction between sensation and sensum seems perfectly clear. A sensation of red seems clearly not to mean a state of mind which is red, but a state of mind which has a red object. And it does not seem particularly plausible to regard a red patch as mental, or to hold that when we are aware of a red patch we are really introspecting. If we now pass to the bottom members of the series the opposite seems true It is by no means obvious that a sensation of headache means a state of mind with a headachy object; it seems on the whole more plausible to say that it is just a headachy state of mind. The distinction between act and object seems to have vanished, and, since there is clearly *something* mental in feeling headache, just as there is in sensing red, it seems plausible to hold that the whole thing is mental. Now this fact about the top and bottom members of the series would not greatly matter, were it not that the two types of sensation seem to melt into each other insensibly towards the middle. It is about equally plausible to speak of a sensation whose object is sweet or to treat the whole thing as an unanalysable feeling with the quality of sweetness. Common language recognises this distinction; it talks equally of a sensation of headache and of a feeling of headache or a headachy feeling; but we only speak of a sensation of red, and never of a feeling of red or a red feeling. We talk of a sensation of smell, Scotsmen generally talk of 'feeling' a smell. Now of course the fact that all these experiences are classed together as sensations and that they melt into each other in the middle of the series encourages people to try to treat them all exactly alike. If you do this you must either hold that it is a mistake to suppose that a sensation of red *can* be analysed into an act of sensing and a red sensum, or you must hold that it is a mistake to suppose that a sensation of headache *cannot* be analysed into an act of sensing and a headachy sensum. Stout takes the former alternative, Laird and Alexander take the latter. If you take the former, sensation and sensum fall together, even in the case of sight; and, since the experience as a whole is certainly mental, you have to say that a sensation of red = a red sensum = a feeling which is red.

Now it is clear that, if you insist on treating all experiences, which are called *sensations*, alike you might equally well argue in the opposite direction, as Laird and Alexander do. You might say: A sensation of red means an act of sensing a red sensum, and similarly a sensation of headache means an act of sensing a headachy sensum. There are two remarks to be made about this. (i) I do not find either Stout's course

or the Laird-Alexander course very plausible, but if I were compelled to take one or the other I should prefer the latter. It seems to me much more certain that in a sensation of red I can distinguish an act of sensing and a red object than that a sensation of headache cannot be analysed into an act of sensing and a headachy sensum. (ii) Even if the Laird-Alexander analysis of bodily feelings could be substantiated I think that Stout would have another fairly plausible argument up his sleeve. It does not follow, as these philosophers seem to suppose, that to prove that a sensation of headache is an act of sensing a headachy sensum is equivalent to proving that a headachy sensum is non-mental. We still have the original question whether sensa are mental or not on our hands. And a supporter of Stout's view might quite reasonably argue as follows: 'Even if headachy sensa must be distinguished from the act of sensing them it is surely clear that they cannot exist when they are not sensed. An unfelt headache seems an absurdity. If this be true of headachy sensa is it not probably true of red and of all other kinds of sensa? But, if so, sensa are mental, at any rate in the sense that they only exist when someone has a sensation of which they are the object.' I think this would be a plausible argument, but I do not think it is a sound one. (*a*) As a matter of plain fact I do not find any difficulty at all in conceiving the existence of unsensed red patches, whilst I do find considerable difficulty in conceiving the existence of unfelt headaches. This suggests that there must be some important difference between the two kinds of sensa. (*b*) Moreover I think we can see what the difference is. Our main interest in bodily feelings is that they are pleasant or painful; sensations of sight are as a rule hedonically neutral. Now I am quite prepared to believe that an object has to be cognised in order to be pleasant or painful to us. It might therefore be quite true that an unfelt headache would not be a pain, and, since we are mainly interested in it as a pain, we are liable to think that an unfelt headache would be nothing. This is of course a fallacy, all that we have a right to say is that an unfelt headache would not be painful not that it could not exist.

I think, however, that there is no need to insist on the Laird-Alexander view of bodily feelings in order to deal with the present argument. It seems to me that the simplest and least doubtful way of dealing with the whole matter is the following. The word *sensation*, as commonly used, is defined not by introspection but by causation. We call any state of mind which is the immediate response to a nervous

stimulus a sensation. Now, since sensations are not defined psychologically but causally, it is surely very likely that they may include two different classes of experience, one of which can be analysed into act and object and the other of which cannot. These might be called respectively genuine sensations and bodily feelings. The mere fact that both are *called* sensations is a very poor reason for holding that the same analysis must apply to both of them. It is true that there are marginal cases where it is difficult to say into which class an experience should be put, but this ought not to make us slur over the plain introspective difference between the top and the bottom members of the series. The top members do seem to be acts with sensa as objects, and there seems no intrinsic reason for thinking that those sensa are either of the nature of feelings or are such that they can only exist when sensed. And no analogies drawn from the bottom members of the series form any logical argument against this view.

(iii) The third argument for regarding sensa as mental is their resemblance to images, which are supposed to be indubitably mental. The analogy may be admitted, though there is some intrinsic difference which it is hard to describe. But it seems to me very doubtful whether images are mental in any important sense. It is quite true that most if not all images depend in part on our past experiences and that many depend in part on our volitions. Both these facts, however, seem compatible with the view that images depend on our bodies, and do not necessitate the view that they depend on our minds. Involuntary images may depend on processes that go on inside our bodies without our volition. Voluntary images no doubt depend on our minds in the sense that they would not exist there and then if we did not will that they should; but the same may be said of a chemical reaction in a test-tube:—it would not happen if we had not deliberately put the reagent there and held the tube over a flame. No one considers that this renders the chemical reaction in any important sense mental. In the same way it seems to me likely that when we voluntarily call up an image we simply voluntarily throw some part of our body into a certain state, and this bodily change is a necessary condition of the existence of the image.

I conclude that the arguments to prove that sensa are mental, in the sense of being presentations, or in the sense of only existing when the mind is aware of them, are inconclusive though plausible. It does seem necessary to hold that they are in some sense partially conditioned by the

percipient's body, including in this the traces left by past experiences, but it does not seem necessary to bring in the percipient's mind.

We can now pass to the question of how sensa are related to physical objects. This is a long and difficult story and it will be better to treat it in the following way. Let us at once raise the question: On the present analysis of what is meant by sensible appearance what right have we to believe in physical objects, and what can we know about them? We must remember at the outset that the irreducible minimum that an entity must fulfil to count as a physical object is that it shall be common to a number of observers, that it shall be capable of presenting different appearances without necessarily undergoing any change of quality, and that it shall not be too unlike its appearances in quality. As we move about and continue, as we put it, to look at the same thing, we are aware of a series of sensa very similar to each other in shape, size, colour, etc. There are slight variations which can be noticed if we inspect carefully enough, and these variations are as a rule reversed if we retrace our steps. We need some explanation of this combination of a predominant agreement with slight and regular variations. The most plausible explanation is that the series depends in some way on two sets of conditions. One of these is relatively permanent, and accounts for the predominant agreement; the other is variable and accounts for the minor variations. If we feel an object, such as a penny, and meanwhile look at it from various points of view, the series of predominantly similar but slightly variable visual sensa is accompanied by an invariable tactual sensum. The shape of the tactual sensum is very much but not exactly like those of most of the visual sensa. It is exactly like that of the visual sensa which are sensed from a certain series of positions. As regards other qualities there is complete difference. The visual sensa have colour and no temperature or hardness; the tactual sensum has hardness and coldness but no colour. These facts again fit in well with the notion of two sets of conditions, one permanent the other variable. We have to explain the predominant agreement as to shape between sight and touch combined with the minor differences. It seems reasonable to assume a common set of conditions for sight sensa and touch sensa, combined with a different set in the two cases. Lastly when we compare notes with other people who, as we say, are looking at the same object, we find that they too are aware of a series of sensa predominantly similar to, but slightly different from, ours. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that there is a

set of conditions common to their sensa and ours which accounts for the predominant agreement of the two. In addition there are variable conditions, one set of which has specially to do with me and another specially to do with the other man. These account for the minor differences. It seems to me therefore that we have good ground for supposing that there are physical objects, in the sense of conditions which are common to us and to others and are relatively permanent, and that these, in combination with other conditions which are variable as between different people at the same time and the same person at different times, in some way condition our sensa.

These common and relatively permanent conditions might, however, be so utterly different from our sensa in their properties that it would be unreasonable to call them physical objects. The question therefore arises: Can we determine anything further about their qualities either with certainty or with high probability? I do not think that we can determine anything further with complete certainty, but I do think that we can determine something further with very great probability. It is perfectly true that a set of conditions, and especially a set which is only one factor in a complete condition, must not be assumed to resemble in qualities that of which it is a partial condition. But, on the other hand, it is equally unreasonable to suppose that the two *cannot* resemble each other. It is therefore perfectly legitimate to postulate hypothetically any amount of resemblance that we like. If now we find that by postulating certain qualities in the common conditions we can account for the most striking facts among our sensa, and that without making this assumption we cannot do so, the hypothesis in question may eventually reach a very high degree of probability. A group of visual sensa which we ascribe to a single physical object are related projectively to each other and to the tactual sensum which we ascribe to the same object. If we regard their permanent conditions as having something analogous to the shape of sensa we can explain the shapes of the various sensa as various projections of the shape of their common permanent condition. If we refuse to attribute anything corresponding to shape to the permanent condition we cannot explain the relations between the shapes of the various sensa of the group. This does not of course absolutely prove that physical objects have shape, but it does suggest that it is a very plausible hypothesis. It is a permissible one, since there is no reason why the common conditions of our sensa should not have shape; and it is a reasonable one since with

it we can and without it we cannot account for the shapes of our sensa. This appears to me to be the sense in which it is reasonable to ascribe primary qualities to physical objects.

What about secondary qualities, such as colour and temperature? We know that Locke, Descartes, and the scientists, hold that we have no right to ascribe them to physical objects, whilst Berkeley and many other philosophers have held that primaries and secondaries must stand or fall together. What is the truth of the matter? The first thing is to try to state the scientific doctrine in a clear and intelligible form. Unquestionably colours and temperatures belong to *our sensa* just as much as shapes and sizes. The assertion of the *physical* reality of primaries and the denial of the *physical* reality of secondaries comes to this. Shapes and sizes belong to physical objects in the same literal way in which they belong to sensa, and from the shapes and sizes of our sensa we can infer with reasonable probability the shapes and sizes of physical objects. Colours, temperatures, etc., belong literally to sensa; they only belong to physical objects in a derivative and Pickwickian sense. There must be something in physical objects that conditions the colours, temperatures, etc., of our sensa, but we have no reason to believe that it is colour or temperature. We have seen that there is reasonably good ground for the positive part of this doctrine; is there equally good ground for the negative part? I think that the negative part expresses an important fact but needs to be stated in a much more guarded way. (i) It seems to me certain that if physical objects literally possess shapes and sizes they must possess some other qualities related to shape and size in the same sort of way in which colour and temperature are related to the shapes and sizes of sensa. *I.e.*, shape and size imply something that can be spread out and cover an area or fill a volume. (ii) There is no obvious reason why these other qualities, which *must* be present, should not be colours and temperatures. On the other hand of course they *need* not be so; so long as they can cover areas and fill volumes they may be qualities that never belong to sensa. (iii) Whilst we found that it did help us to explain the various shapes of our sensa if we supposed that their common conditions have shape, it does not apparently help us at all to explain the colours and temperatures of sensa if we assume that their common conditions have colour and temperature. This does not prove that they do not have colour and temperature, it only shows that it is not a verifiable hypothesis and that we cannot assert it with any strong probability.

The view that I have just been stating I will call the *Critical Scientific View*. It is simply an attempt to state clearly, in terms of the particular analysis of sensible appearance which we are at present assuming, the view about the external world which is apparently held by scientists. I think it is a self-consistent theory, when stated in these terms, but I certainly do not think that it is an ultimately satisfactory one. It forces on us at once the question which I have used it to lead up to: What is the status of sensa in nature and how are they related to physical objects? The theory regards physical objects as conditions of our sensa. That physical object which is our body, in conjunction with other physical objects, in some way conditions the sensa of which we become aware; and these sensa in turn give us highly probable knowledge about the shapes, sizes and motions of physical objects, but no certain knowledge about their other properties. Now what exactly is meant by this phrase 'conditions' which I have so far purposely accepted without cavil? In the first place, what is it that processes in physical objects and in our own bodies condition? Do they produce the sensa? Or do they cause us to become aware of sensa that already exist? Or do they both produce the sensa and make us aware of them? These questions the Critical Scientific View leaves quite vague. Let us call these three alternatives respectively the *Creative Theory*, the *Selective Theory*, and the *Mixed Theory*.

The chief merit of the Creative Theory is that it reduces the number of sensa. We find it difficult to believe that all the sensa that anybody with any sort of body could sense from any place are actual existents which would have to be mentioned in any complete inventory of the universe. This may of course be the merest prejudice. If we take the Creative Theory to assert that sensa are produced by the interaction of living bodies with other physical objects, and that they last only so long as these processes go on, we avoid this embarrassment. And if in addition we suppose, as the Mixed Theory does, that the same processes cause the mind attached to the living body to sense the sensa thus produced, we reduce sensa to quite manageable numbers. We must remember however both that our objection to the existence of enormous numbers of sensa may be only an æsthetic prejudice, and that some form of the Selective Theory may be able to reduce the number to manageable limits, or in some other way to obviate this objection. The great objection to the Creative Theory as commonly held is that it assumes something like creation out of nothing as a result of physical

processes. We are liable to slur this over when we talk of our body in conjunction with foreign bodies *causing* sensa. By using the familiar word 'cause' we think we are dealing with the familiar case of a change in one existing substance being regularly followed by a change in the same or another existing substance. But this is not so. A physical process on this theory produces a sensum out of nothing, and a sensum—for however short a time it may last—is not a change in another substance but is of the nature of a substance itself. We have, so far as I know, no experience of this sort of causation and we ought to be very cautious in asserting it.

We may therefore turn to the Selective Theory. On this view the various physical and physiological processes that condition sensation do not *produce* sensa. The sensa in some way already exist. What these processes do is to determine which out of the whole set of existing sensa we shall become aware of. The pressing difficulty of the Selective Theory is to give a satisfactory account of the relation between the world of sensa, out of which certain physical and physiological processes present a selection to our minds, and the world of physical objects. What we should like to do would be to say that sensa are in some way parts of physical objects. Now the term 'part' is highly ambiguous, and again the notion of physical object is by no means definite. There is therefore a very wide range of meanings which we can give to the statement that x is a part of y, and again there is a very wide range of meanings that we can give to the statement that y is a physical object. Our best hope then is that we may find a meaning of 'part' and a meaning of 'physical object' in which it will be true to say that sensa are parts of certain entities and in which it will not be too wildly Pickwickian to call those entities physical objects. When I look at a penny from the side I am aware of a brown elliptical patch. Inside this there is a figure of Brittania. The figure of Brittania is a part of the brown elliptical patch in the most obvious and literal sense of part. Now a penny is commonly supposed to be an object which is round and brown in the same literal sense in which the sensum is elliptical and brown. It seems quite certain that the elliptical sensum is not a part of this supposed round object in the literal sense in which the figure of Brittania is a part of the elliptical sensum. If therefore there is a physical penny, and the various sensa are parts of it, it seems certain either that the sensa are not parts of the penny in the literal sense in which Brittania is part of the sensum, or that the penny is not

round and brown in the literal sense in which the sensum is brown and elliptical. Most probably we shall need to modify both the meaning of 'part' and the conception of the penny. Now I think it is best to modify as little as possible to start with, and only take 'parts' and 'pennies' in more and more Pickwickian senses as we are forced to do so by further reflexion on the facts. I shall therefore begin by working out in my own way a suggestion which is put forward rather incidentally in Alexander's *Gifford Lectures*. This suggestion entails the minimum of modification, and although I do not think it can be made to cover all the facts, I do think that it contains an important truth. In one sense of part a section of a solid by a plane may be called a part of it. In this sense a certain pillar contains an infinite number of parts of various shapes, all the shapes being conic sections of some kind and of various degrees of eccentricity. Now, taking the most common-sense view possible of a penny, it is not a momentary object; it persists through time. The penny is really to be identified not with a round brown thing at any one moment but with the history of a round brown thing through a long stretch of time. We cannot neglect the time dimension of the penny. Suppose now for the sake of simplicity that the penny keeps in the same place for ten minutes. This part of its history will be represented by a circular four-dimensional cylinder. Any section of this normally to the time-axis will consist of a set of contemporary event-particles arranged in a circle. But suppose we take a section of it which is not normal to the time-axis. This will consist of a set of non-contemporary event-particles; the more inclined to the time-axis the section is the greater will be the time-lapse between the earliest and the latest event-particles in it. If pennies do persist through time there must be non-simultaneous sections of their history and these sections will be parts of their history in the same general sense in which a section of a momentary pillar is a part of the momentary pillar. Let us call such sections *Historical Sections*, and let us call sections consisting entirely of simultaneous event-particles *Momentary Sections*. Now our notion of shape is defined in terms of Momentary Sections; we have not as a rule considered the case of historical sections. We cannot therefore say off-hand what an historical section of an object, all of whose momentary sections are circular, would look like if we could see it. It is obvious however that a momentary section is a limit of a series of historical sections as the time-lapse between the earliest and latest event-particle in the section becomes smaller and smaller.

It is therefore not unreasonable to suppose that, if we could see an historical section at all, it would look something like a momentary section, and that it would look more and more like a momentary section the smaller was the time-lapse between its earliest and latest event-particle. It seems then not unreasonable to suppose that if we could see an historical section of such an object it would look elliptical, and that the ellipse would be more and more eccentric the more historical the section was. On the other hand we might fairly suppose that the ellipse would be in some way queer, that it would not look exactly like a momentary section of an elliptical object. So much we may fairly say, considering the whole matter from the point of view of the object. Let us now consider the matter from the point of view of visual sensa. We see things by light that travels from them to us, and light travels with a very great but finite velocity. If I look at a penny from the side and take a perfectly common-sense view of what a penny is, it is certain that the light that reaches me from the nearest point must have started later than that which reaches me from the furthest point and gets to my eye at the same time. It is clear then that the light that reaches my eye at a given moment from the boundary of the penny belongs to event-particles of different dates. If we suppose that what I am immediately aware of by sight at any moment is those event-particles from which the light that reaches me at that moment started, it is certain that I shall be aware of an historical section of the penny and not of a momentary section. The section will of course be very nearly momentary, because of the great velocity of light and the small size of the penny. We have argued that, whilst we cannot say off-hand what such a section would look like, it is not unreasonable to suppose that it would look like an ellipse with something queer about it. Now the sensum of which I become aware when I look at a penny from the side *is* an ellipse with something queer about it. I could make an elliptical ring of the same shape as the sensum; but it would only look like the sensum in shape if I held it normally to my line of sight. If I laid it down flat like the penny it would not present the appearance that the penny does. Conversely the elliptical sensum is lying down flat and not standing up normally to my line of sight. No ellipse whose parts are contemporary could agree with the sensum both in shape and in situation relative to me. It therefore seems extremely plausible to hold that our visual sensa are in general historical sections of physical objects and that these sections are cut for us by the situation of our bodies with

respect to the object that we are looking at and by the finite velocity of light. Such a theory has manifestly great advantages. The various sensa always exist and are parts of the physical object in a perfectly intelligible sense. On the other hand they only exist in the way in which the various possible sections of a block of stone exist in it and we do not feel any embarrassment in supposing this kind of existence for sensa.

Doubtless some features that are stressed by this theory are necessary to explain the facts about the physical world and our sensa. At least it is evident that we must allow for the fact that physical objects are extended in time as well as in space. But it is quite certain that the theory takes far too simple-minded a view of physical objects. It takes for granted that all the sensa which we get in connexion with a penny are in one place, which is the place of the physical penny. And it hardly recognises the difficulties involved in saying that the penny is round. Presumably the latter statement must mean that all momentary sections of the history of the penny are round in the sense in which a sensum is round. The evidence for this must be that the penny looks round if you look straight down on it and that it always feels round. Now the roundness of the tactual sensa needs some explanation on the section theory. Presumably what is meant is that if we run our fingers round the edge there are no sharper and blunter features in our sensa as there would be in the case of an acute ellipse. Now when we run our fingers round a circular plane we are feeling a set of event-particles which lie on a helix in space time. If we proceed with an absolutely uniform velocity this helix will be everywhere alike, but the slightest variation in our velocity will involve a variation in the pitch of the helix. If *temporal* differences be interpreted as variations from uniform *spatial* curvature in the case of sight, it is curious that this does not happen in the case of touch. I do not think that it does happen. When I move my finger with a non-uniform velocity round the edge of a penny it does not cease to feel uniformly round. Of course we are here dealing with velocities of utterly different orders of magnitude, *viz.*, that of light and that of my finger, and we are dealing with two senses of very different acuteness. We shall have to suppose that extremely minute time-differences are registered by sight as quite marked variations of spatial curvature, whilst quite marked differences in the velocity of the finger are not registered by touch as variations in spatial curvature. All this shows that the theory thrown out by Alexander and

further elaborated here by me needs a good deal of further complication even as regards shape. It is still more clear that the theory is unduly simple-minded when we begin to consider the places of sensa as well as their shapes.

We do not only find that the shapes of sensa connected with a given physical object are different from the shape that we ascribe to the object. We also find that sensa are liable to turn up in places which are remote from the place where the object is commonly said to be. This is always liable to happen if we look at anything through a non-homogeneous medium, or if a mirror be introduced, or even if we squint. Very often the visual sensa are doubled and the two are seen in markedly different places. Now any satisfactory theory will have to take account of these partly abnormal sensa and explain how they are related to physical objects. Let us consider the case of mirror-images. These are seen as far behind the mirror as the sensa seen by direct vision are in front of it. Nothing similar can be felt in the places where mirror-images are seen, and they are apparently quite independent of any physical object that may exist there. It is thus practically impossible to combine the view that all visual appearances are historical sections of the objects of which they are said to be appearances with any simple-minded view of physical objects and their places. Mirror-images are not sections of the object of which they are images, for they are in the wrong place. They are not sections of objects on their own side of the mirror, for they seem to be absolutely independent of anything that may exist there. The embarrassment that we feel about such sensa is that they belong to certain physical objects from one point of view and not from another. They are like a certain group of sensa in a different place and they vary with these, but they are spatially discontinuous with them. We have two different criteria for assigning a given appearance to a given physical object. One is certain relations of resemblance and concomitant variation between this sensum and a certain group of other sensa. The other criterion is the compresence of this sensum with a group of others which are all in the same place. Generally these two criteria point in the same direction, but in the case of mirror-images they point in different directions and we feel puzzled.

It is pretty evident that the whole notion of 'place,' which has previously been taken for granted, needs to be carefully considered, and the subject of 'date' will also have to be overhauled. This is unfortunately a horribly difficult subject, as anyone who reads the chapters on Spatial Perception in a

good psychology book will see. It has, I think, been very much neglected by realistic writers. Prof. Whitehead has the great merit of seeing its importance, but I find his actual statements on the subject extremely difficult to understand. It is probably necessary to begin by distinguishing between various senses of being in a place. No doubt our *criterion* for saying that such and such a physical object is in such and such a physical place is that certain sensa are in such and such a sensible place. It does not follow from this that what we mean by physical place is the same as what we mean by sensible place, or that what we mean by saying that a physical object is in a certain physical place is the same as what we mean by saying that a sensum is in a certain sensible place. I cannot profess to have any satisfactory theory on the subject, and must content myself with throwing out a few disjointed remarks. Let us begin with visual sensa.

It seems to me that when I open my eyes here and now I see various coloured patches at various distances and in various directions. It appears to me to be as clear that I see this characteristic of distance as that I see the colour or the shape. I am quite prepared to believe that unless I had had experiences of movement and touch in the past my visual sensa would not now be at various distances and in various sensible places. This does not prove that there is no such thing as visual position and distance here and now, but simply that the particular visual positions and distances of particular present sensa are not wholly determined by the present physical stimulus to my optic nerve. Now let us consider tactual sensa. To get a certain tactual sensation I have to move about in various ways and thus experience a series of muscular sensations. If visual distance and direction were not a primitive factor in my experience I do not think that these muscular sensations would ever have been interpreted in terms of distance and direction. As it is, it seems to me that sight supplies the *general framework* of the notion of distance and position, whilst muscular sensations fill in most of the *quantitative detail*. Now when I am aware of a visual sensum there is a certain position of my head in which I see the sensum most clearly. If I now 'follow my nose,' as we say, I experience a series of very similar visual sensa all the time, and eventually as a rule become aware of a tactual sensum of correlated shape. The place of the physical object is essentially defined by the place where this tactual sensum is, just as the shape of the physical object is essentially identified with the shape of this tactual sensum.

Now, as a rule, when other people are aware of a visual sensum substantially similar to mine and when they turn their heads so as to get maximum clearness of vision and follow their noses, their course intersects mine and we come in contact with each other and with the tactual sensum together. Thus the place of the physical object becomes the common intersection of your course and my course when we follow our noses and both try to get the tactual experience with the minimum of muscular movement. Now take the case of the mirror. Suppose you see an object by direct vision and I see its mirror-image. If we both follow our noses we do not come in contact with each other and with a correlated tactual sensum at the same time. I get no correlated tactual sensum at all, I just walk into the mirror. Your course may intersect mine, but you get your tactual sensation long before it does so. To sum up, I think that it is only in the case of visual sensa that distance and direction are actual sensible qualities like shape and colour; tactual sensa as such do not have sensible distance. Their places are the interactions of those lines of motion that have to be traversed before the tactual experience is obtained. Owing to correlations between these series of kinæsthetic sensations and changes in visual size and distance, the former are interpreted as distances. This is quite compatible with the fact that visual distance, as an actual sensible quality, does not become developed in any detail apart from experiences of movement. Sight makes us acquainted with the attribute of distance in a very vague and undifferentiated form, touch not at all. On the other hand the detailed differentiations of distance into definite distances and of direction into definite directions is causally dependent to a great extent on experiences of touch and movement. Now it seems theoretically possible to take two different lines, starting from these facts. (i) You may distinguish visual space, tactual space, and other sensible spaces from physical Space. This seems to me to be the line that Mr. Russell takes. (ii) On the other hand you may hold that there is just one space, *viz.*, physical Space, which we learn about gradually by the intimate connexion of sight and touch. And you may hold that, although there is only one space and one sense of place, yet different sorts of objects may be in a place in different ways. A sensum and a physical object may both be in physical space but the meaning of saying that a sensum is in a certain place may be different from the meaning of saying that a physical object is in a certain place. This seems to me to be the line that Whitehead takes, if you

substitute space-time for space in my statements, as you undoubtedly ought to do. Russell's view seems to me to be a subtle form of the selective theory. A physical object just is all the sensa that anybody with any sort of body could apprehend from any position. Its appearance to a given person at a given moment is a certain member of this group of sensa. On the other hand a sensible space is a different selection of sensa, one from each of many groups that constitute physical objects. Each of the sensa is apparently held to be a particular substance which lasts for a short time. I find this theory extraordinarily difficult to grasp. It has only been worked out for the exceptionally favourable case of the visual appearances of objects seen by direct vision through a homogeneous medium. I do not understand how the effects of variations in the medium are to be stated on the theory, or how tactual sensa are to be worked in. Again the notion of sensa as substances each apparently springing out of nothing, lasting for a short time, and then ceasing to exist raises all sorts of difficulties. The theory seems to me to underrate the enormous importance of touch and movement in our notion of physical objects and their places. Lastly, I do not think that the term 'sensible spaces' is a happy one. If we are going to talk of visual and tactual spaces we ought presumably to talk also of visual and tactual bodies. We do not do this because the notion of body essentially means something neutral as between the various senses. In the same way it seems to me that there are no visual and tactual spaces; there just is physical space about which we learn through a combination of both these senses with sensations of movement.

Whitehead's theory might be called a subtle form of the Creative Theory. He does not use the word sensum, but talks of sense objects. Now an object for Whitehead is an universal, and a sense object is the lowest species of universal, *e.g.*, a particular shade of colour. The substantial side of the external world for Whitehead is space-time. What we call a sensum is a bit of space-time in which some sense-quality inheres. Now I said that the usual form of the Creative Theory suffers from the fact that it regards sensa as particulars that are in some sense created out of nothing by physical processes. Russell's theory, though predominantly of the Selective type, suffers from the same sort of defect. Whitehead's theory avoids this. To say that such and such a sensum begins to exist means for him simply that such and such a bit of space-time has such and such a sensible quality. Leaving out the time factor for simplicity, we can put it in

the form that such and such a volume of space acquires such and such a sensible quality, *e.g.*, a particular shade of redness, and afterwards perhaps loses it. The causation that he requires is not therefore the creation of a substance out of nothing but the familiar case of causing an already existing substance to acquire a fresh quality or to lose a former quality. Recognising only one sense of space and time he has to recognise different senses in which a quality inheres in a bit of space-time. When we say that the mirror-image is in a certain place behind the mirror we do not mean the same as when we say that a certain brick is also in this place. I understand his view to be that to say that a certain sensum is in a certain place is to assert a relation between this place, the sensible quality, the place where the observer is, and the places where certain other things such as mirrors and sources of light are. It is thus at least a four-term relation. It is of course very easy to think that a polyadic relation is only dyadic, especially when some of the terms, such as one's own position and the medium, are relatively constant and are taken for granted. If we were confined to quite normal visual sensa seen by direct vision through homogeneous media we might never find out this mistake, but we are forced to recognise the real complexity of the situation when we deal with unusual cases like mirror-images. When we say that a physical object is in a certain place I understand his view to be that we are asserting a two-term relation between a universal which is not a sensible quality and the place. Now very similar sensible qualities are in very much the same places with respect to many observers and many media. Such sensa are the normal visual appearances of some physical object, and the place where this object is is the place where these sensible qualities are. At any rate there is a rough approximation between the two, though when we take time as well as space into account there may be a considerable gap, as in the case of seeing a distant star. I suppose we should have to admit that on such a theory one and the same sensible quality might be in several different places at once with respect to the same observer and the same source. This, be it noted, is not the same as saying that the same *sensum* is in two places at once. I have taken a sensum all along to be a particular, *e.g.*, an elliptical brown patch. What can be in several places at once is simply that definite shade of brownness. Each bit of space in which it inheres becomes thereby a different brown sensum. This possibility seems to me to involve no difficulty, when thus explained, and to have some positive merits. It appears to fit very well the case

where I see a lot of mirror-images of the same object in different mirrors. Lastly we must note that Whitehead distinguishes between scientific objects, like atoms and electrons, and perceptual objects, like chairs and tables. In all cases, as I understand him, an object is an universal, and the substance that it inheres in is some bit of space-time. Scientific objects are, however, in all parts of space-time, whilst perceptual objects are in certain definite parts of it. But scientific objects are more especially present in certain places and times than anywhere else, and these special places and times are defined by the places and times in which certain perceptual objects inhere. What he is thinking of when he says that an electron is a quality that inheres throughout space-time is simply that it makes a difference everywhere and always. What he means when he says that it is more specially in one bit of space-time than anywhere else is that this influence reaches a maximum within a certain bit of S-T, and this contains some perceptual object such as a chair or a table.

I think that some such theory as Whitehead's forms a very promising basis for further advance. It will need a much more thorough discussion of the meanings of place, date, and inherence. And it will be necessary to modify our notions of causation very considerably. The concept of things and of causation are closely bound up with each other, as the example about the electron shows. The common view is that it is in one place but influences what happens in all others, whilst Whitehead's view is that it is everywhere where it would commonly be said to exert influence. The lines of advance that these recent speculations suggest is (i) to be much more ready to recognise multiple relations than we have formerly been. Many apparently insoluble contradictions vanish when you admit that a relation that has usually been thought to be dyadic is really polyadic. (ii) To clear up the notions of place and date, and not confine ourselves to shape and sensible quality in our discussion, as we have been too liable to do. And (iii) to recognise the intimate linkage between thing and cause. The boundaries of things have mainly been fixed for us by touch in the past, at a time when the transmissive side of nature was little recognised. We have tried to keep this sense of the limits of physical objects and to eke it out by the notion of transmission of effects through a medium. The question is whether this whole way of regarding things ought not now to be modified.

II.—SOME EXPLANATIONS.

By S. Alexander.

At the end of his article on my book, Mr. Broad invites me to clear up the difficulties which he has found in it, and with the permission of the Editor I respond to his invitation. Mr. Broad is a critic who, however keen and unsparing he may be, lays his mind alongside that of his author, and helps the author and himself and the reader at once; and if I did not feel grateful for such criticism and flattered by it and anxious to meet his wishes, I should be past hoping for. Of course I see the whole of my work together, and the reader reads it in pieces, and many things in detail may seem obscure to him which seem clearer to me. But I have no doubt that much in my book is difficult and obscure as well as questionable, and that in some places, especially where, as in the fundamental account of Space-Time, I have myself been groping in regions new to me, and fumbling for want of equipment with proper instruments, the obscurity is my own fault. However, at the risk of repeating myself, and even if I have to be a little desultory and gossipy and personal, I will do my best to explain, not every point which Mr. Broad has raised, but the major matters.

A.

The January portion of Mr. Broad's article dealt with my two initial chapters of Book I. about S-T. I begin by repeating that my account of the matter is metaphysics in the strictest sense and not mathematics or physics, and with a view to what follows I shall make some remarks about this difference. The science of metaphysics (for it is a science for me, and not directly a discussion of what is called 'life') differs from the other sciences in two ways. In the first place, it is rather descriptive than explanatory, whereas they are rather explanatory than descriptive. This affords one reason why system in metaphysics repels many people, for so much of the system looks like ticketing a great mass of ideas and arranging them in their places like specimens in a

museum. And yet there is endless satisfaction in seeing how all these things illustrate the one principle which has to be found before the arrangement can be made; and the only danger to the metaphysician is that he should be so enamoured of his principle as to misdescribe the ideas he is arranging.

Moreover, people are impatient of metaphysics because it seems to and does explain nothing. Like Margaret Fuller, it accepts the Universe. For instance, several persons have found fault with me because I do not explain why in the development of S-T, as I represent it, colours and life, etc., should 'emerge,' as Mr. Lloyd Morgan and I say. Well, that is not my business, and further I don't see how it can be anybody's business, except to note the facts and be grateful for them, or at least put up with them. Many are quite content to say it is God's doing. I should not use their language, because I think it unscientific, but I agree with the spirit of it.

This is, however, comparatively a less important difference. The main thing is that metaphysics is the most concrete of all the sciences. The statement sounds extravagant only because of the highly rarefied character of the subject matter of metaphysics. But abstract is not the same thing as abstractions. S-T and the categories are excessively abstract, as compared with life or mind or material existences; but they are overpoweringly actual. Now what I mean when I say that metaphysics is the most concrete of the sciences is, that in metaphysics no conception is employed for which it is not pointed out directly or indirectly what is the correspondent feature in actual experience. In all the other sciences, conceptions are freely used which are adopted without examination. The most obvious one is that of relation itself. It is the special business of metaphysics to examine these conceptions which are taken for granted in the other sciences and to find them in experience itself. It was a great advance towards concreteness when S and T were discovered to be, in Minkowski's phrase, shadows of S-T whatever S-T may be. But physics still speaks of number and order and things and the like; and that is the condition of its existence as an independent science.

Now these leavings of the other sciences upon which metaphysics lives are the categories; and what I have tried to do is, assuming S-T to be the foundation of the universe, to point out one by one what the experienced features of S-T are which are the categories. Whether I have succeeded is another matter, but I have tried to get rid of every abstraction, to be utterly concrete, and to show that you may use

the categories legitimately of every existent because they are the experienced features of any bit of S-T, and therefore, if my hypothesis is sound, of any existent. Therefore, in metaphysics no neutral concepts from which to deduce reality, including S and T! For if I am right, then these so-called neutral concepts, relation, number and the rest, are themselves made of S-T and presuppose it, and they are not neutral but concrete like S-T. They are only neutral in the sense that they are neither matter nor mind. But in physics and mathematics and the other sciences, these concepts are rightly left unexamined, and that is why the sciences are less concrete than philosophy. The one thing which disappointed me in Mr. Broad's article was that he does not appear to realise that for me the doctrine of the categories, taken along with the notion of S-T, is central; and this failure of insight affects his criticism of me where he discusses my account of S-T. I am not reproaching Mr. Broad. Hardly one or two of my critics have seen the point. It is only that one expects more from Mr. Broad. And while I am in this mood I will get rid of such spleen as I have against some of my reviewers, whose reviews I have seen. Anger is not my master passion; but I have felt something approaching irritation when my first volume, which is fundamental, has been passed over with a word (not of course by Mr. Broad) and exclusive attention directed to the theory of knowledge, and even in some cases the whole doctrine is declared to depend on the theory of knowledge which I expressly declare to be derivative.

Now to the application of these rather general remarks. It will be convenient to take first the position that S and T are necessary to each other, so that each is an abstraction from S-T or Motion and not the reverse. I will come back to the question of perspectives later. That the world is a world of events was for the mathematicians an intuition; the philosopher arrives at the same result by his plodding method of consulting experience direct. Take Time. Its successiveness is inconsistent with its duration. Yet in experience it is both successive and endures. How can that which intrinsically perishes from moment to moment also endure? Mr. Broad answers by asking another question: why cannot a duration be a whole of related but successive moments? (MIND, xxx., hereafter quoted as M., p. 35); or again, the instants related as successive may as a complex have the property of duration. (Imagine that I who am perpetually speaking in vol. ii. of emergents should forget that!) Now this illustrates my remarks about the categories. What is 'relation' in virtue of which duration is a whole of related

successive moments? What does relation stand for in our experience? I answer that it already implies S-T, and that until it receives its concrete interpretation it is in metaphysics a word. To say that duration is a whole of related but successive moments is only to say that moments in fact not only are successive but constitute a duration; and this is the very fact I start from. But it involves an apparent contradiction.

Mr. Bradley solves the contradiction by declaring S or T to be appearances of an absolute reality. But 'appearance' and 'absolute' as thus used are mere concepts, supposed to be legitimately inferred from fact but really postulated concepts. I answer, Go to the concrete experience; and there you find another continuum, S, which gives T something to hold on by; and the successive, perishing nows of T *can be related* into a duration because T is inextricably involved with S within the one Space-Time. What seems contradictory is not the empirical T, and the empirical T is not contradictory. For it is not mere T but is spatial, being the T side of S-T; and this S-T is not a mere concept but is the empirical reality, reduced to its simplest terms, in which we live. Further, though S and T by themselves are abstractions, they are real in so far as they are discoverable elements of the reality S-T; the abstractions are not mere inventions of the mind but well-founded.

Thus the plain concrete fact is that S and T are mutually involved: Time is as duration spatial, and Space is as divisible temporal. There is no circularity here: they do not merely wash each other's linen, as Mr. Broad quotes laughingly (I can't help thinking that by this time that linen has been washed so often that it can stand no more washing): each has a different job. I go on to show that it is not enough that there should be two continua, one primarily successive, and the other primarily extended, but that the many-one relatedness of points and instants (which is actually found) is needed. Mr. Broad detects a vicious circularity: but I can see none, and I think his propositions on page 36 are not accurate. I admit I have been careless in saying each instant has *its* point, and each point *its* instant (M. 34). But I do not say that successive instants are connected into a duration because each instant involves an enduring point, and that a point endures because it occurs at many instants. That would be circular. I say (1) that an instant could not be a part of a duration if there were no element with it which was non-successive; (2) but that this is not enough: in order that a point should endure it must occur at many instants, and in order that instants should be successive,

each must occupy many points. There is no vice here. The last proposition, that each point is in fact repeated throughout the whole of time, etc., is not really contradictory to propositions iii. and iv. The repetition I am dealing with is intrinsic repetition (see my I., p. 49). In the passage quoted from I. 81 the repetition is that of a point in a section. I shall refer to this later.

In my attempt to establish the connexion of the three dimensions of S with the characters of T, I have been very presumptuous, as I confess (A. I., 58—I shall refer to my book as A). But I will explain my purpose. S-T is, in the mathematical sense, of course 4-dimensional: events vary in four orders. I may have given a different impression, but I did not mean to impugn that at all—to say that the world is a 3-dimensional one. What I feared was that the mathematical statement is taken to mean that the time-dimension is added on merely to the three spatial ones, and I have tried to show that it is not independent of them, nor they of it. In other words, I wanted to deepen our sense of the obligations of S and T to one another, that each was a part of the other's being. It is probable enough that I have not succeeded. A very competent correspondent told me (the remark was not intended for publication and I have not asked his leave to publish it) that he would give his boots for the proposition to be true, but that he did not think I had proved it. I feel it in my bones that the proposition is true. If I have not succeeded in the proof some one else may; and I am not afraid to be wrong in a good cause.

Mr. Broad thinks I have failed, and in our long and amicable correspondence in the matter I failed to move him or he me. He fails to move me still in what he gives on M., 37 ff. He has certainly pointed out some incorrectness in my statement, which may however readily be mended. (*a*) It would be quite enough to say (M., 37) let there be two instants t_1, t_2 at two different points. (*b*) My 'either . . . or' certainly means 'both . . . and'. The real difficulties are those urged on page 38, though as Mr. Broad himself says I have tried to anticipate them in the footnote (A. I., 53). Why should there not be many motions in the same line, starting at different moments, or going in different directions? Now I still think that these questions assume that our line is drawn in a 3-dimensional space and that we are looking on from the outside. We are not thinking ourselves into the 1-dimensional space of which we are speaking. Moreover, they assume, I believe, an absolute space and an absolute time in this world. But in fact, as I see now, the difficulties raised

are really irrelevant. For it is enough to speak of any one motion in a line. Granting that T in any perspective is irreversible in direction, the S of that perspective of S-T could not be 1-dimensional, and that is enough for my purpose. (I think that the notion of a perspective where the S is 1-dimensional is probably impossible; but of perspectives more presently.)

I do not speak of the further and still more complicated later arguments, beyond saying that I am sure I ought to have been able to state them more easily. But I do not believe that the apparent plausibility of the arguments arises, as a writer in the *Oxford Magazine* with the not-unidentifiable initials H.B.W.J. says, merely from the representation of T spatially which I have adopted. On the contrary, it seems to me the only way of representing the T, seeing that S is only 3-dimensional. You could of course dispense with representation altogether, but the periphrases would be intolerable. The truth is that it is the attempt to represent a 4-dimensional world where the T dimension is as it were homogeneous with the three spatial ones which presents the really formidable difficulty, as any one can satisfy himself who refers to the humorous treatment of this difficulty by Mr. Eddington (*S*, *T*, and *G*, p. 49).

I come now to the general account of S-T which Mr. Broad discusses first. I seem to have given him a great deal of trouble, but at any rate he has given a perfectly clear and faithful statement (M., 29-30) of my meaning. I know that to speak of pure S-T is puzzling; and it is of course a theory to suppose, as I do, that material and all qualitied events are as it were nodosities in S-T. I should not have many philosophers with me in the idea of a pure unqualitied S-T actually existent before objects. Only perhaps I may invoke Spinoza to stand beside me and the pale ghost of Timæus of Locris. Still at any rate we may consider the purely spatio-temporal characters of things by themselves. And next I ask the reader to consider the question in its connexion with our apprehension of S and T which I call intuition. I have always been troubled by the question of how to co-ordinate the so-called independent spaces of touch and sight, and I do not see how it can be done. On the other hand, it is easy to see how touches and colours can be co-ordinated within an extension. As I so often put it, when we see a patch of colour, we see not a colour with extension but an extension with a colour. A pure S-T enables us to understand. It is for me an æther of pure motions, chaotic at first, and without differences of quality (the one quality is that of being

motion),[1] but of intensity and direction; within which groups of motions are generated which bear what we ordinarily call quality: red; or life, which I take to be a quality of living motions, not merely the motions themselves, as Mr. Broad thinks it is (M., 145).

In the next place there is the analysis of S-T into point-instants or pure events which I describe as the limits of motions and as involving a concept. I want to explain myself and lay myself bare upon this matter because I want to get more light upon it for myself. A point-instant or pure event or event-particle (I somewhat dislike this phrase because it suggests materiality, or at least quality) is conceptual in the sense that it is not reached without the use of concepts, but for me at least it is a real constituent or element of S-T. Each point-instant is a real individual though we can never hold it. The line is composed of such, though the point-instant never is one of the terms of the route by which we approximate to it. Thus it is not artificial like a section (I return to this presently) but is actually there. The limit is actual. There is an old question which I like to hear asked in the rolling French? L'infini actuel est-il contradictoire? I with many another answer no. It is never completed, else how could it be infinite. Still less can we by our thinking arrive at the end. But actual it is. Now there is in principle no greater difficulty in holding the actual reality however conceptual of the point-instant, an infinite of division or inclusion though not an infinitesimal. The all-comprehended is no less actual than the all-comprehending.

Here enters once more the difference I began with speaking of between the philosopher and the physicist or mathematician. For me the important thing is that there are elements of S-T; I might define point-instants so. When I attempt to call it the limit of a motion, I am really fumbling with mathematical notions, leaving my last like an undutiful cobbler. I know that the position is difficult and perhaps it may be thought to be wanting in concreteness. But I say no, for the ideal is perfectly concrete, and you cannot dispense with real elements of S-T. At any rate this is what I have intended, seeing these difficult matters darkly through the foggy and fuliginous air of this dear Manchester.

The reason why I say all this is that Mr. Broad says that I should have made my account of S-T and its elements very much clearer if I could have used Mr. Whitehead's

[1] Mr. Broad's phrase (M., 31, line 3) 'a quality corresponding to the swiftness of the motion' is a slip. The correspondent to that is intensity.

method of extensive abstraction (which, of course, I had seen the sketch of in his *Organisation of Knowledge*). Now I do not propose to discuss Mr. Whitehead, partly because I am incompetent. I prefer to rejoice when I find myself in community with him, as for instance in our common devotion to the concrete. But though it is precious hard to distinguish Mr. Whitehead's physics from philosophy, it is still physics. It is all important for him to define his elements exactly, as he does by the method, which turns on the use of concrete durations. But at any rate he recognises that there are elements, and I doubt whether but for the previous intuition of the reality of such elements, he could have been set upon the proper method of defining them, so as to get concepts that can exactly represent them. The process is an *ex post facto* conceptual construction to replace the vaguely apprehended elements, but the elements are there before our eyes, in the same sense that the red corpuscles are there before us in the blood though we do not distinguish them. If you want to get some measure of the significance of Mr. Whitehead's account of the event-particle in terms of concrete durations, you must contrast it with Euclid's purely conceptual definition of a point as that which has no parts and no magnitude.

There is only one further remark which I will venture to make at present about Mr. Whitehead's 'method' and again because it seems to illustrate the difference I have been speaking of. Quite legitimately as a physicist he uses the conception of the 'relation' between events, without examining what relation stands for. But as a metaphysician, this relation seems to me homogeneous with its terms, when you translate it thoroughly into the concrete; and then the question arises whether you ought still to speak of S and T as being relational in the first instance and not rather as I say stuff within which relations are discriminated. This is the puzzle which besets me in reading all the recent physical work on S and T. It does not affect the truth of the work for the reason I have so often named. But according to convenience the writers speak, or appear to do so, sometimes as if S and T were systems of relations and sometimes as if they were metaphysical 'stuff'.

It is this system of S-T which I have tried to describe the look of in my account of perspectives and sections which Mr. Broad finds so much open to question and quite rightly thinks difficult and even obscure. My one object was to bring out the fact that to separate S and T is artificial, though under provisos justifiable; that S-T is a system of

events; and for this it is no matter whether events are conceived as by Mr. Whitehead as durations, or the word is used as by me for event-particles. The conception was not familiar to philosophers, and I found my task very difficult. One point I was conscious that I had left obscure and fumbled over, and that was the notion of points intrinsically simultaneous. Mr. Broad has misunderstood me. He takes me to mean (M., 31), that two flashes of light and a sound starting at the same moment would be intrinsically contemporary, though not necessarily so in a perspective. That would be assuming an absolute date for the events whereas all that I apprehend are dates as in my perspective. There comes in the conception of relativity. 'Intrinsically contemporary' points are for me the points (even in a perspective) which are occupied by one instant and give as I say (A. I., 50) an instant its structure, and are needed to make it an instant. It is in the total S-T that an instant has every point for its occupation, but that notion is the artificial one of a section of S-T through that instant.

The main position is that if you are to take glimpses of the real world of S-T (and you may add its qualities or 'objects' (Whitehead), for to the end it remains a world of events); if you wish to do this and see the world as a history, which it essentially is, you must take it by perspectives which give you historical reality and not by sections which are but useful artifices. The distinction is really quite simple. Take a finite thing, a cube say, and slice it into sections. You can reconstruct the cube from the slices, but you have to do it yourself. The slices do not add themselves together. But go round the cube and take its perspectives. You never get a slice; you take in the whole contour of the cube as far as you can see it; and (this is the point) the perspectives overlap; one cries out for the next to complete it; they fit together by themselves; and this is what happens when we see not the single perspective but the thing of which we have the perspectives, which I have therefore described as the system of its perspectives unified within a certain volume of S-T which is its 'substance' (A. II., chaps. iv. and vii.). Of course, perspectives of a finite differ from those of the infinite S-T, for the point of view there is included in the perspective and further our visual perspectives need eyes. But the great point is that perspectives are historical realities and sections are not. And as I have said before, the event-particle is historically real and the section is not, it is purely conceptual, the other is merely *arrived at* in part by conception.

Mr. Broad gives (M., 31) a perfectly correct statement of what I mean by a perspective from an instant, except for the slips I have mentioned; but when he comes (32) to speak of perspectives from a point, he gives a notation which at first puzzled me and leads on to an important matter. He says, "the 'temporal perspective' from e_{st} includes event-particles of the form $e_{st'}$, but none of the form $e_{s't}$, etc.". Now alike in temporal and spatial perspectives the whole of S and T is given, though not all point-instants. I suppose, therefore, that by s' Mr. Broad means a different space from s, what he calls "the space of a perspective" (34). But he mistakes me here. The difference of one perspective from another is that points occur in the one with different instants from the other. But each contains all S and all T. Whereas total S-T contains not only all S and all T, but all point-instants. In the one case, S-T as a whole, you have every point with every time, while in a perspective you have every point with some definite instant or instants, or every instant with some definite point or points. But the framework of S and T is present in each perspective. That is the difference between a perspective of the cube taken from the eye by vision, and the perspectives of S-T taken from point-instants by intuition. We see only the illuminated part of the cube; but the point-instant 'sees' the whole of S-T and selects its perspective of point-instants. To put the same position otherwise: a section of S-T from an instant gives you instantaneous S, but though the date of every such section is different the total S is the same. With this explanation Mr. Broad will see that there is no contradiction between the two statements he quotes from me (M., 33, 34). I know quite well that Minkowski and others would say there are infinite spaces which are sections of S-T. But this I think arises from taking T strictly as an additional dimension to the three of S—a matter I have discussed already. For me there is only one S and one T, but according to the position of the observer the instants will in the different perspectives be differently, and of course only partially, distributed over the points. That is why I speak of total Space or Time; each is only one and the same in all the perspectives and in all the sections.[1] Again I think it important to make this quite clear for the better passing of judgment on my attempt at describing S-T. Moreover, it raises pretty plainly the question of the proper way to interpret relativity for philosophy.

[1] But observe that it is not as common to all the sections that I call total S or T real, but as common to all the perspectives.

I am not proposing to discuss that topic here, though I hope to do so at some other opportunity. Relativity has been interpreted in many ways, in the direction of pluralism, monism, idealism and realism, and the different combinations of these. Which is the correct one it would not be easy to say.

Finally, Mr. Broad questions (M., 32) whether it is legitimate to speak of perspectives at the level of pure S-T at all. Certainly, the word is metaphorical, though the metaphor is well grounded, because (for me) the point instant is a sort of body-mind, as explained in A. II., ch. ii. Mr. Broad thinks the notion is out of place unless the motions are not pure but qualitied, light, I suppose, or sound. He forgets my notion of the 'intuition' which point-instants possess. Even if all motions had the same velocity their intuition would give them the perspective described. But of course I am in fact supposing that S-T consists of motions of all velocities (which, observe, are their intensity, not their quality. For this I refer to A. I., ch. vii). How then, it is asked, can there be several motions intersecting at an event-particle, as the perspective notion supposes? Is not that to imagine an event-particle, which is the limit of a motion, having several velocities at once? But is not Mr. Broad in finding this difficulty taking the event-particle to be not a limit but an infinitesimal, a very small duration? Velocity can arise only out of the transition between one event-particle and another—I must not say, the next. (See again the analysis of intensity.) That being so there is no more reason why motions should not intersect in the same event-particle, than why lines of different direction should not intersect in a point. I hope this statement will commend itself to Mr. Broad, even if he still finds my account of S-T after all this commentary and these admissions a failure.

B.

I had to be somewhat long upon S-T because that is fundamental in its general outlines to my book. Upon Mr. Broad's second article I can, I hope, be a little shorter. And first the doctrine of enjoyment and contemplation, which is my contribution to the absorbing question of what the mind is, and its relation to things. It is a doctrine about which I am beset with doubts, as will be plain to whoever reads A. II., 109 ff., where I speak of the doctrine of my friends the realists overseas, Mr. Holt, Mr. Perry and others. It may be I am wrong and they are right, that behaviourism in psychology and in the theory of knowledge

may be victorious. To me, the issue is that, and there is hardly a day that I do not think about it. If I live to be convinced that I am wrong I trust I shall not be afraid nor ashamed to say so. To die as a behaviourist would be, I think, quite an honourable end. Meantime, till that hateful day arrives, I pursue the policy of making a clean breast of my thought, in order that Mr. Broad and others may have the materials for a better judgment.

Mr. Broad "sums up his difficulties about enjoyment in one question: Is enjoyment by a mind a mode of knowledge or only a mode of being?" I sum up my answer by saying: it is undoubtedly a mode of being, but not *only* a mode of being, for it is that kind of being which is a knowing, and is at once a knowing of objects (in virtue of which relation it is called contemplation), and of itself. It is first a mode of being. Assuredly. My whole enterprise is a study in ontology, and have I not said more than once that the theory of knowledge is not prior to metaphysics but an incidental chapter of it? (That is why I have felt the irritation I spoke of before at certain reviewers.) I should have done better to keep throughout the words the enjoyed and the contemplated (see A. I., 13), but it would have been very inelegant. These two modes of being are at any rate the two concerned in the cognitive relation, which is their spatio-temporal compresence. Mr. Broad does not, of course, make the mistake of supposing that the act of contemplation and the enjoyment are separate existences, and so I need not linger over that.

But secondly, enjoyment is not a mere mode of being, its very essence is to be a knowing, a knowing *of* its object, and an awareness of itself, where the last of means consisting in. Mr. Broad proposes to me to say that besides enjoyment and contemplation, there is knowledge by enjoyment and knowledge by contemplation (M., 135). But I see no advantage in it. I readily admit that knowing is a word applied in the first instance to contemplation. I do not know myself in the same way as I know my object. That is in fact the point of the distinction. But knowledge by enjoyment is the same thing as the enjoyment over again. I will put the matter thus. Distinguish knowledge from knowing. Knowledge then means existences. Some of these existences are physical or other 'natural' objects. Some are acts of knowing. That knowing is a knowing of objects and is knowing of itself in the only way in which the knowing can be known. Directly you speak of knowing by enjoyment, you have to add the proviso that this is not knowing *of* the enjoyment. Otherwise you would have the mind looking on at itself, which if

the notion of enjoyment is valid, it cannot do, or at any rate does not do. On the other hand, knowledge arrived at by enjoyment and by contemplation is the original distinction of the enjoyed and contemplated over again.

Perhaps I can make things clearer and shorten my reply to Mr. Broad if I am allowed to drop a moment into gossip, assuredly not because I think my mental history interesting. I arrived at the notion of enjoyment in the first instance by thinking, like better men, about causality. Asking how a thing could be the cause of the mental state which apprehended it, and observing that we were unaware of the neural effect which it actually produced, I concluded that the presentation of the object was not as it were a mental picture produced by the thing in my mind, but was the thing itself or a selection from it, and that the mental process was an 'act' of mind which I lived through (see A. II., 157). It was then I understood the position of Mr. Moore's article in refutation of idealism. In endeavouring to make clear to myself what the nature of this enjoyment was which we lived through when the object was revealed to us, I came more and more to think of it on the analogy of the animal's or plant's selective reaction to stimuli. Accordingly, mental acts were in the line of organic reactions, only not merely vital but so developed as to allow the emergence of mind. Quite late I thought I could thus understand how our purely vital processes could be objects to us, as they are revealed to us in organic and kinæsthetic sensations, which certainly seem as much objects as colour. This recognition is one of the motives which keep me from a behaviourist metaphysics —only one, but I had better not raise this large issue here but reserve it for some later opportunity. But I had already asked myself whether the enjoyment, being like any reaction specific to its stimulus, could not be described completely in the likeness of vital reactions. Consciousness is admitted to be temporal; and I completed my view when I could see that mentality occurred along certain spatial lines. Being mentality it enjoyed itself and its own motion, and this is what I mean by saying that we are aware of or enjoy ourselves as direction, that is in enjoyed space-time. Of course, if you will try to find a direction of mental process which you can contemplate, you find none and the problem is queered from the outset.

Finally, partly by my own reflection and partly by the hints of others, I came to see how very much I had been repeating with a difference the doctrine of Spinoza. So far as S-T is concerned I have tried to explain this in a paper on

'Spinoza and Time' now published.[1] But it may clear up the theory of knowing if I point out that enjoyment appears to me to be contained in Spinoza's proposition that the mind is the idea of the body, and in that other great saying that the idea which Paul has of Peter indicates rather the constitution of Paul's body than the nature of Peter (*Eth.* ii., 17, Sch.). In other words, that the idea of Peter which Paul has is a mental condition of which the other aspect is a bodily condition of Paul, and that it is different according as it is the idea corresponding to Peter or to James. In fact, enjoyment and contemplation replace Spinoza's ambiguous use of the genitive in the phrases 'idea corporis' and 'idea Petri'. Where I still dare to differ from Spinoza is that for him there is an idea of the mind, which is united to it as the mind to the body and an idea of that idea and so on. I should say the mind is an idea and that an idea of it is merely repetition. I can only think of an idea of an idea in so far as an idea (of an external thing) is included in a larger whole of ideas which is the mind.

With these remarks I can reply to some of Mr. Broad's difficulties. He himself (M., 130) clears up the apparent absurdity of the statement that the mind enjoys its own space and time; it means simply that the mind is spatio-temporal. But the word enjoy is not "used ambiguously" (131), and it does imply knowledge, such knowledge as is suitable to enjoyment. I need not labour this further. In the same way, when I say that in contemplating a horse I do not contemplate but enjoy the togetherness (M., 130), I mean only that the togetherness of the horse with me is experienced as a character of my enjoyment. The horse would experience it as a character of his enjoyment. In other words, the togetherness is not contemplated by me (nor by the horse). Now surely this is only description of the fact. When I see the horse what I see is the horse; that is the whole object. But the togetherness is there, and is experienced by me as attached to the enjoyment, not to the contemplated.

Then there is the important matter discussed in M., 131-3. Mr. Broad raises the alternative that the mind may contemplate its own acts and be 'beside' them as the act is 'beside' the tree, and he complains that I have not proved that it is not so. Well, it is a question of fact and not of proof. Philosophy proceeds by description; it only uses argument

[1] I add here that the categories, as I describe them, correspond to Spinoza's *communes notiones*. Also, I take the opportunity of correcting a mistake in the little book. Page 52, last line, read: 'he does not mean that in the usual sense of the word I perceive, etc'.

in order to help you to see the facts, just as a botanist uses a microscope. Mr. Broad has a passion for argument, naturally enough as he does it so well, but I dislike it, even in Mr. Broad. The passage he quotes from A. I., 19, is not an argument, but a mere restatement of what was said before. The fact is (as I see it), that when I am describing or watching a mental act, that act is enjoyed along with the other enjoyments then existent, say the act of description, but it is enjoyed as part of the whole mind and not as something distinct from the mind. I recall the 'great saying' I quoted from Spinoza about Paul's idea of Peter. I may be wrong in the way I see the fact;[1] but if they inscribe on my cinerary urn in the crematorium, Erravit cum Spinoza, I am well content. Remember, too, that you have the same internal complexity in the contemplated; as when the larger fact of the peace includes the smaller fact of the break-up of Austria.

In what he writes of introspection (M., 132), Mr. Broad has a little misunderstood. When I contrasted dissected mental acts with blurred ones, I was not raising the point that Mr. Stout discusses early in his *An. Psych.*, about whether you can analyse mental states. I had been saying that whenever I express my mental condition, when I merely say I feel cold, or say ugh!, I am really practising introspection. But the name is commonly used only when I am describing a dissected state, and what I wanted to say was that psychological introspection only means describing that state, when it is done for scientific and not for morbid, practical purposes. And I was contending that you describe the mental act using the object of it as an indirect means, and that the object itself is not introspected, no, not even if you are observing an image. Of course you may say if you choose that images and sensations are introspected, but then you must say that physics is an introspective science.

In dealing with my complex treatment of memory and mental space-time Mr. Broad has been perfectly clear and faithful. The mental condition at any moment with its memories and expectations is as Mr. Broad says for me a perspective of the mind with its space-time. In fact it was through the mental perspectives as I describe them that I came to the physical perspectives as I describe them. Here is another self-revelation which may damn me! But I have nothing to add; apart from the points already raised. The sole question is whether the 'present self' is merely an

[1] And in my interpretation of Spinoza. Perhaps I may provoke someone to discuss the matter.

artificial selection, or "a natural unit" (M., 136); and that is a question of description.

As to the easier conception of contemplation (that is the contemplated) two difficulties are raised, one of which I can easily remove. It occurs on M., 137. Something is behind my back which I do not see. It is for me not compresent with any sight of it, for there is no seeing evoked by it. But since everything is in some way compresent with everything, the object behind my back affects my brain though it does not make me think. Mr. Broad urges that then a set of motions possessing the qualities q_n, q_{n-1}, etc., may be modified without modifying q_n. But I should say the brain when it does not actually think possesses only q_{n-1}, etc., movements. The precise motions needed for q_n have not been set agoing. We say the brain has the quality of thought because the appropriate movements arise on occasion sufficient. But in the interval the only motions are of the lower order (see the account of permanent secondary qualities, A. II., 60). The brain is then unconscious.

The other and harder matter is the doctrine that when I imagine there is before me an appropriate object in the external world. This perplexes Mr. Broad, though it seems to me quite simple. I assume for the moment that the image is an exact reproduction, say in memory, which of course it never is in fact. When the object is there actually present to the senses it acts on me causally and produces in me a certain mental reaction. If for some reason the same mental movement recurs I have the external object before me, and if it is a remembered object, the real object which I remember. Mr. Broad asks why this must be so, and he sets out (M., 140) the premises which are implied in the notion that it is so. If I were in the habit of arguing I should say I had argued from these premises, for the statement of which I am grateful to Mr. Broad. As a matter of fact, what I do is to interpret images in the light of what I learn from perception, as Mr. Gregory sees in his very interesting article in the July number on 'Realism and Imagination'. It is no matter how the mental act arises, whether by causal action of the object or from a determination of blood in the brain. Given the appropriate mental act, there is the object. Mr. Broad's illustration of the keys and the locks, which he uses against me, really helps me. A key may exist without a lock to open; but if there is no lock to open, the key is a piece of iron of a certain shape but it is not a *key*. To be a key it must be a key *to* a lock; it must be for use. Now the mental act is a key not only for use, but in use: it has an

object. You may have a dog without a mind to see it, but you cannot have the sight of a dog without the dog. As a bare matter of fact, there is the knowing of a dog in imaging it. If I have interpreted the perception of the dog aright, then the consequence for imaging follows at once. (Of course, if the American realists are right, there is no imaging distinct from the image, but the image still has the same status as the percept. This is, however, part of the big issue of which I am at present keeping clear.)

I am accustomed to compare this apprehension of a real object when it is not present to the senses to turning round in order to see it. When the stimulus from the blood sets my enjoyment into the dog attitude, that is like turning me round to see a dog that is really present. I also illustrate from the preparation of an animal for its prey. I think Mr. Broad's unwillingness to accept this illustration (M., 140) comes merely from not distinguishing general objects suitable to general attitudes and specified objects with a specified attitude. The cat may treat a moving bit of dead leaf like a mouse, but that is because he uses towards the leaf only the general scheme of 'a thing to catch'; in other words he is playing. When we think of 'something or other' we are in the most diagrammatic attitude possible, but it is appropriate to the diagrammatic object.

One word in conclusion as to the relation of compresence to appropriateness. That last name is a description rather of the terms in the relation than of the relation itself. Still, as a relation it is the form which compresence assumes in all organic responses. When the one term is a mental act you have the relation of knowing. Now I think we could take this appropriateness-relation and extend it downwards and then we should see that the causal relation is really a kind of 'appropriateness'. As we go down lower and lower in the scale, the selectiveness diminishes, though it remains, until in the end appropriateness sinks into nothing more than bare joint existence of the related things within the continuum of S-T. Point-instants respond appropriately to point-instants, but there is so little *to* them that the whole of them practically is involved in the compresence. (This remark refers to Mr. Broad's doubts on p. 140.)

So far I have been supposing images to be faithful. When we come to illusory images we have to introduce the idea that the mind imputes characters to its objects, which indeed it does in ordinary perception. The principle is simple enough, as Mr. Broad sees (M., 143). Let large letters stand for an object and small ones for the appropriate mental

attitude. Then if an object AB is present and excites the *ab*, and if for some reason, complication, association, mere accidental internal excitement, etc., I am in the attitude *abc*, *c* being in close connexion with *ab*, then instead of apprehending AB, I apprehend ABC. This is a mere consequence of the general principle that attitude implies the appropriate object. Illusory appearance results from the substitution for the ideal supplement to a present object of another. I say then that the illusory object is one all whose materials and the mode of their combination are found in the real world, and that the unreality of the whole comes about from the interference of the mind, which itself is one of the realities of the world.[1]

Mr. Broad, however, does find a difficulty in the application of this doctrine to illusory sensations, and I will try to remove it. I take the grey patch which I see green on a red ground. I intuite the contour and extent of the patch, and this supplies me with the element of singularity in the sensum, for S-T individuates. Owing to the field of red, the part of the retina corresponding to the grey patch responds in the way appropriate to green. The green which I thus see is real green somewhere in the world, say in the grass. Such greenness occurs in the real world in a determinate contour—that is the way universals are found. Accordingly the actual intuited contour is seen green. The actual grey of the patch does not affect the eye as grey, and its place is taken by the green 'transferred' from elsewhere. The intuited contour takes the place of the nose in the familiar illusion of feeling the nose double; greenness takes the place of doubleness in that experiment. The only difference is that the doubleness is felt and the greenness seen. Mr. Broad would, I imagine, find no difficulty if the green were supplied in idea. But the conditions are such that the attitude induced in the eye is sensory in this case and not merely idea. The patch of grey does not of course become green, but I see it so. Squinting is the best analogy I can find, because in squinting in the classical experiment I quote (A. II., 215), the two pots are seen to overlap.

[1] Imputation in this sense is something quite different from apprehending truth and goodness and beauty, though all apprehension of beauty involves imputation to the object. I do not raise here the question of tertiary qualities, which Mr. Dawes Hicks, who agrees with me in the main in the view to be taken of knowing, raises in his criticism in the April *Hibbert*. I wish I were able to deal in full with this valuable criticism (with a very skilful summary of the book) and with Mr. Gregory's article before mentioned. But I find Mr. Broad a sufficient handful for one occasion.

As to my difference with Mr. Stout (M., 141) that blue spectacles are not on the same footing as the lens of the eye, I remain unconvinced and obstinate. Of course the blue spectacles might be a part of my organ of vision. In that case, except for adaptation, I should see things blue, and see them wrong. Nature has secured for us approximately achromatic eyes in order that we may not make this mistake. With imperfect eyes we do make such mistakes, which thus are illusions of sense. However, the question is not whether we can consider the spectacles a part of our eyes, but whether they are so. Mr. Broad says we can by appropriate means see our eyes as much as the spectacles. But can we by any contrivance see our lenses, as engaged in the act of seeing? This fact that we do not see our eyes, while we do touch our hands, has a bearing on the theory of space-perception (A. II., 170).

With regard to the very interesting remainder of Mr. Broad's article, I must be brief. As to C, "the hierarchy of qualities," I do not think I can add anything new, and I should have to repeat myself inordinately. I can only suggest two things: (i) that in place of 'must' and 'could not' we should read 'do' and 'do not'. It is all a question of fact and description, and of whether the facts as described fit in with the theory as a whole; (ii) that in settling whether life has a status like that of red or only means certain ways of moving or other changes and nothing else, we cannot put aside the evidence of the organic and kinæsthetic sensations. I think that in them you catch life as a quality. (Anyhow I am disposed to think that these sensations are destined to play a larger part in metaphysics than hitherto, whether my reading of them is right or wrong.) But the whole of Mr. Broad's section C has to be considered carefully. And I must take his remarks on Universals also (section D) *ad avizandum*. I attach great importance to that topic, but am not prepared at present with anything further.

In section E upon deity, Mr. Broad expresses some doubt whether I mean my 'theology' to be taken seriously, and seems inclined to regard my fourth Book (as someone said, perhaps it was Mr. Broad himself), as the comedy completing the three previous tragic Books. I can assure him that I am very serious. These three pages are full of Mr. Broad's fun. But the topic *is* a dangerous one. As Bailie Nicol Jarvie said when he and his companion were passing the hill of the fairies: "there's nae gude in speaking ill o' the laird within his ain bounds". I have only a few corrections to make.

(i) Mr. Broad deserts his scientific sobriety for a moment to 'parody,' my 'theology' (M., 28): "God never is, but always to exist, and There is no God, but gods". This is not quite exact. What I say is that God as actually possessing deity does not exist but is an ideal, is always becoming; but God as the whole Universe tending towards deity does exist. The same inexactness is repeated (p. 148). Deity is a quality and God a being. Actual God is the forecast and as it were divining of ideal God. I know these things are hard to make quite plain, and I daresay I have not succeeded. (ii) Mr. Broad's suggestion of actual gods I have myself mentioned. I identify them with 'angels' (A. II., 346, 365). But they would make no difference to the doctrine for we do not know them. (iii) A much more important point: I do not say as Mr. Broad thinks that we "ought" to regard the new qualities produced by S-T with religious reverence; but that religious reverence is the way we do regard such a next higher quality—no ought but a fact, if rightly described.

But I make no further remarks upon this matter, because Mr. Broad is not here asking for explanation but making legitimate criticism. I only observe that I have added something to the subject in the little piece on Spinoza mentioned before in the light of some questions raised at a meeting of the Aristotelian Society and kindly reported to me.

I have done my best to supply explanations, but I fear I may have sometimes appeared to be repeating what I had said already. I hope it may help a little towards forming a judgment on my work. At any rate, it has done me good to try to do what Mr. Broad has done me the honour of asking me to do. This is an open letter to Mr. Broad, and the pleasure of writing a letter depends on the person to whom it is addressed, and I have liked writing to Mr. Broad.

III.—LITERARY TRUTH AND REALISM, THE ÆSTHETIC FUNCTION OF LITERATURE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY (II).

By P. Leon.

In the first part, we dealt with the more or less naïve testing of an æsthetic product, literature, by the standard of reality and with the covert ethical demands made on it. But the question as to the relation to reality of the æsthetic qualities or the æsthetic attitude may be put more philosophically. Granting that the æsthetic act is not itself an act of attribution, we may yet ask: As these æsthetic qualities are qualities of something, what are they qualities of? What is the metaphysician to say of their reality? Is there an objective or absolute æsthetic aspect or order of anything? Has the universe as a whole an æsthetic aspect or order?

The æsthetic qualities are qualities of the real. There is no creation out of nothing, and the poet gets at least his suggestion from everyday reality. But these qualities are reached by abstraction and elaboration, and their relation to reality is like that of ideals, or of "limiting cases," or mathematical characters; so that it would be as unreasonable to look for a case of pure tragedy, for example, in any concrete portion of the real, as it would be to want to handle a surface apart from a solid or a point without magnitude. Æsthetic aspects or orders are objective, firstly, because they are inherent in a reality in which intelligence is present, and, secondly, because any concrete portion of reality may, in part at any rate, be capable of some æsthetic aspect or enter as an element in one; but they are none of them absolute, in that any real can exhibit different æsthetic aspects according to the particular abstraction and selection, and none without abstraction and selection; in other words, an æsthetic unity will not always coincide in extent with what we treat as a whole for any other purpose. The universe as a whole has in it all these æsthetic aspects, but whether it itself is susceptible of one aspect embracing and subsuming all these is a difficult and perhaps not a possible question. At any

rate philosophy must first show us that the universe is not merely additive or a miscellany, must give us a category subsuming all the others, and must decide on the relation between the good and evil in the universe.

With the latter problem especially, the question of the æsthetic aspect of the universe always keeps in close touch. But the asthetic requirements are different from any others and far more easily appeased. Hence when philosophy does present us with a view of the universe which makes at all an æsthetic appeal, we get more satisfaction than philosophy usually can give us. Such would seem to be the satisfaction derivable from most so-called explanations of the problem of evil. As ethical beings, we are committed to a truceless war with evil, and to be told that evil is necessary for the good, which gains a quality and strength from its very struggle, and that because of its evil this is the best of all possible worlds, so that we could not wish it otherwise, is only to be puzzled and mortified. Either the ethical attitude is ultimately meaningless, or we must want to eliminate all evil. At any rate no explanation is easily acceptable. But if we regard the universe as a drama, then the struggle is essential and we should certainly not want it other than it is. Nor need evil be proved a subordinate antagonist. The tragedy is a splendid one, if evil is triumphant. Good may even be shown to exist merely that evil may climb on its shoulders, and the universe may be explained as a bitter joke or irresponsible prank. We should be equally happy, at any rate, if our commerce with the universe could be reduced to æsthetic contemplation and utterance. Such an impossible supposition is fairly useless, but does throw some light on the relation between our æsthetic, theoretic, and ethical demands which *prima facie* are far from being one and the same. That "truth is beauty and beauty is truth" we do not know. It is a saying very hard to digest.

To resume: the purport of the argument has been in the main negative; we have tried to show what literature is not. Because it embraces, enlists, and appeals to the whole of experience, is, as it were, an essence distilled from it, it is particularly difficult from an analysis of our enjoyment of it to avoid identifying the æsthetic act with any and with every form of experience; with sensation, feeling, and emotion, and above all with ethical and theoretic interests; the view of the function of literature as that of predication or attribution will in some form or other always creep in. Positively, we have tried to name the æsthetic function as seen working in literature, as the creation and appreciation

of certain contrasts or developments through moments. This is meant to apply to complete literary works. Such a work is the drama, and Aristotle's account of it is in the main not misleading. This at least applies to his technical and formal analysis: the positing of the organic unity of the work, the emphasis on the importance of the μῦθος, and the account of the moments of the movement: the tying and unravelling, the turn, the catastrophe. Such an account, we believe, may be applied to less complex works, even to the briefest epigram and the commonest joke or funny story. Tragedy consists in the development of one contrast, comedy in that of another. Bergson is right in saying that laughter depends upon the apprehension of some contrast, though he fails in his attempt to specify it.

The lower limits of literary creation are difficult to fix, and it is therefore hard to show to what extent an account, meant for a pure case, applies to imperfect ones. What shall we say of bare effusions of feelings, of sketches, of stories without a point, of novels without plot, situation, or central idea, but packed with reflections, interesting experiences, psychological analysis, etc.? Where is the contrast and development? We must say that as wholes these works are not artistic though they may be made up of artistic parts. They appeal to our theoretic and practical interest, and as every one of us can say "nihil humani a me alienum puto," there is little in human affairs that will not hold our attention. But the human interest is not, as such, æsthetic. If that means condemning a large part of literature, and particularly the novel as handled by most men, we must protest that at least our prejudices are not deduced from our theory but the latter is elicited from them. Besides, we are not interested in condemnation or in prescribing rules, but in analysis and distinction. There is no reason why people should not take their æsthetic enjoyment in bits and punctuate it with exercises of the theoretic intelligence, with passing judgments on politics or psychology or criticising testimony, etc., if that pleases them. Here we insist on the distinction, not on the division.

Croce is fond of giving "le mot juste" as an example of artistic creation. If it cannot be called an example of a complete artistic product, it is certainly illuminating to consider it as a minimum or unit. Now "le mot juste" is essentially metaphor, and as such its æsthetic interest does not lie in its being "juste," exact, or accurate; this would bring us back to the attribution theory, though of course when "le mot juste" occurs in argument, in anything of which the purport is

theoretic, it has to be considered for exactness, and then along with the epigram it is generally thought of limited use, if not an evil altogether. The æsthetic appeal of the metaphor depends rather upon its not being "juste". If we like to hear Keats speak of a star as "watching with eternal lids apart, like Nature's patient sleepless Eremite," this is not because we believe that a star has lids or watches or is a patient Eremite, but because we know that this is not the case. No information about stars is given, nor, as some might say, are we made to feel the essential nature of stars. For metaphors mutually contradictory or with almost nothing identical except the point of reference, may be successively used and approved. So Wordsworth calls the daisy "a nun demure of lowly port," "a sprightly maiden of Love's court," "a queen in crown of rubies drest," "a starveling in a scanty vest," and "a little cyclops with one eye staring to threaten and defy," each in turn "as is the humour of the game". In each case the æsthetic act is the contemplation of the contrast in similarity between "daisy" and that with which we compare or identify it. Similarity of course there must be, to make contrast, but that sort of similarity exists between everything and everything else in the universe, and the appropriateness of the metaphor is not determined by completeness of truth or exactness, but by relevance to the context, "as is the humour of the game".

The metaphor is indeed ubiquitous and omnipotent. It is the cell of which the living body of the artistic work is composed, and it is important to see that the life which flows through the whole also animates the part, especially as a proper understanding of the metaphor will help to dispose of many puzzles in æsthetic. In a way all language is metaphorical, and so we may identify linguistic with artistic. But important limitations must be added. Language is also used for the purposes of exact thought and for ordinary conversation, and in both spheres its function is semantic or deictic: it merely labels and points out, and this is effected in two ways. For exact thought we carefully guard against the interference of the æsthetic interest on the one hand, and against the reabsorption of our abstraction into the gulf of totality on the other hand, by eliminating all colour and suggestiveness, and we discount, if we cannot avoid, the metaphorical bearing of a word. In English we are helped in this by using foreign and unfamiliar words the value of which lies precisely in the fact that their other uses outside the context are either unknown or not thought of (*cf.* "demise" denoting a legal aspect and "death"). Thus, with the help

of the context, we pin down an abstraction and set a bound to meaning. In ordinary conversation, on the other hand, we heap up every colour in one confused mass and the suggestions are infinite. Here words denote that which we apprehend as an unanalysed and unbounded total. Hence too much and at the same time too little meaning is conveyed. In literature, again, a special kind of abstraction is exercised, and the colours are defined and suggestions bound down to the exact extent required by the situation. Hence in good poetry the absolute dependence of a word's value on its place in the context. Æsthetic value commences, then, with the mere use of language in a certain way, and so we can see a ground for our partial appreciation of works that as wholes have been said to be inartistic. Every piece of vivid and figurative writing will have æsthetic value; if it is not artistic as a whole, it is at least made up of artistic elements, and so we get at any rate "disjecta membra poetæ".

It will be profitable, at this point, to recur to the danger of identifying the æsthetic act with every form of experience and its accompanying pleasure. From superficial reflection on the metaphor, it would seem as if nothing could give us complete pleasure till we have got it into a metaphor, and as if, once we have done this, we developed a new enthusiasm for both members of the comparison. Daffodils, the moon, autumn, gnats, the sunset, the skylark, may ordinarily arouse a feeble interest or liking in many of us. But when they are severally spoken of as "a jocund company tossing their heads in sprightly dance," "wandering companionless among the stars that have a different birth," "close bosom-friend of the maturing sun," "mourning in a wailful choir," "the flaming monstrance of the West," "a bright spirit pouring his full heart in profuse strains of unpremeditated art," then a magic wand seems to have turned into objects of love both these and the things with which they are brought into relation—jocund companies dancing, lonely wanderers, wailful choirs, monstrances, spontaneous singers, etc., and it might therefore seem that enjoyment of these things and the poetic activity are identical. But the appearance is fallacious. We do not really think these things are what the poet calls them. They are themselves, and when left to ourselves we may have no particular liking for any of them. A primrose, to us, a primrose is and nothing more, and we may think a faulty philosophy only can find sermons in every stone. Even under the poet's influence it is neither member of the several pairs that we like or are interested in. What we do like is to hear the poet talk of them in the way in which he does. The æsthetic

enjoyment lies in dwelling on the contrast in similarity between the two terms and on the movement from one to the other and back again.

So, because we may sing of our loves, our drinking, or fighting, our pleasure in the scent of flowers, in swimming, eating, hard work or high thinking and noble doing, it does not follow that to fight, to eat, to love, to be fond of flowers, to admire virtue and wisdom, etc., are æsthetic acts or that their pleasures or the interest in them are in any way poetical. Yet certain of these acts or interests and pleasures are called poetical, and are contrasted with others which are supposed to be dull or pedestrian (*e.g.*, to marry is generally held to be prosaic, while free love is considered poetical). To dwell on these or elements of them or of anything under the sun, in certain relations, is an æsthetic act. Guyau almost says we can drink a pastoral symphony and eat a lyric. He might go on to say that we can fight an epic, voyage an Odyssey, live a tragedy or poem (the latter is actually a well-known expression). No doubt to dwell on drinking fresh milk, in relation to other things, as he does, and *e.g.*, to identify it with hearing a pastoral symphony, is an æsthetic act. But it consists not in the drinking or its pleasure but in the contemplation of the contrast in similarity thus set up.

In this way we can also solve or dismiss the problem of the inclusion in literature of the bad and unpleasant. If the poet does not, as we have seen, make us like or be interested in what is good and pleasant, then he need not do this in the case of what is bad and unpleasant. But in the region of the latter, as everywhere else, he can find or create his contrasts, measured development of situation, and apply his metaphors. And then the paradox of admiring or being pleased with what is bad or unpleasant disappears. For the pleasure in literature is in apprehending these contrasts and is not the pleasure or interest in the "things" contrasted, just as the pleasure derived from seeking and finding an explanation is not a pleasure in the things explained.

But here we must again beware of referring to an external reality. Just as the scientific names of flowers denote the scientist's flowers and not those of the poet nor those of everyday life, and just as all scientific terms are defined by their universe of discourse, so terms in literature are fixed by their context, and we must not uncritically identify any case we meet with in literature with anything we apprehend as a total in our experience. Thus a "murder" in a Greek tragedy is not like a murder committed before our eyes, and again, while many vices in life involve meanness, pettiness

or squalor, these, unless necessary for æsthetic reasons, are generally absent from what may be regarded as the corresponding analogues in fiction. Not that wickedness in fiction is not really wicked, but it is not presented merely as wickedness, to be arraigned and condemned, just as goodness is not presented for admiration and edification. Both are introduced only as contributory to æsthetic effect.

The above is but a re-statement, from the point of view of literature, of the old formal view of art, and is prompted by a suspicion that what has been added is, in the main, unintelligible, untrue or misleading. To show this a volume of negative criticism would be needed. Even the bare reference to some contemporary work necessitates a barbarous contamination of the views of different authors, and it is particularly difficult to capture and confine Mr. Bosanquet's elusive subtleties and draw out Croce's blunt brevities in one and the same general statement. But some remarks and queries may be taken for what they are worth.

The view that art gives us the characteristic, even if distinguishable from the condemned theory of the typical, is bound up with unresolved difficulties about degrees of reality and the meaning of the terms "significance" and "essential" when used absolutely. But apart from this, it brings us back to the standpoint of attribution and reference to reality. For if you profess to be giving the characteristic or essential significance of anything, you are, it would seem, making a statement which may be met with "yes" or "no". For it is not as if it were meant that an accidens or proprium of the characteristic is that it has æsthetic appeal but we must take it that its æsthetic appeal lies in its being characteristic and presumably also in our seeing *that* it is characteristic.

As for the theory that the work of art is to express, and more particularly, to express feeling or emotion, its main use seems to be to suggest ideas which its philosophical exponents very rightly reject; so that they would agree with most of what will here be said; only after the misconceptions it engenders have been dispelled, there seems little left in the theory to retain. It is a difficult enough account of such arts as architecture, dancing or even music; but if plausible anywhere, it should be so in literature. And it is, when it comes to simple matters like the short lyric, for example. We may say that Shelley's "Indian Serenade" expresses the passion of love, or "Love's Philosophy" the aspiration after free love through the feeling of oneness with Nature. Now this is reducing the work of art to the skeleton which some how underlies it and we have already criticised it. But we

may do so again from a slightly different point of view. If the poem is to be taken as expressing the feeling of love, in the way that the man might be said to be expressing it, by his looks or acts, by falling, fainting, failing, or if the interest in the poem is really an interest in the sex passion, or we will even say in the vivid presentation of it, that interest must be theoretic and ethical. We should firstly want to know whether the feeling existed anywhere in that particular form, and deciding that it did, we should condemn it, as lacking self-control. In the case of the second poem, we should certainly protest against the misconception about Nature and man's relation to it and against some highly improper sexual ethics. But the interest is not really in the sex passion (we may like good erotic poetry even if sex bores us, just as we may like drinking songs even if we think drinking an abomination), nor is it in sex ethics. Instead of these we might equally have had what at this level would be named as religious fervour, or the enthusiasm of the saint or the ascetic or the patriot, or, on the other hand, a taste for unnatural vice or the enjoyment of cruelty or contempt or every execrable feeling there is. That would make no difference to the æsthetic appreciation, and this would not mean that we take pleasure in these feelings or even that we are interested in them, at least ethically and emotionally or theoretically; for of course there is an æsthetic interest in the æsthetic whole. The æsthetic interest in all cases is in the metaphors, in the development through definite moments, in the balance and contrast. But what is this balance and contrast between? It is between characters, ideas, qualities, feelings (but not necessarily feelings), such as they are in the poem; whatever we say, we must do violence to an indivisible whole by analysis, just as we do in analysing the judgment into ideas. By divorcing these elements from the whole, we can form a framework, call it a feeling, and say that the poet expresses it. This is what the expressionist theory means at this level.

But, we may object, why *feeling?* The epigram hardly expresses a feeling, but develops a peculiar relation between ideas or circumstances or moral traits. (The analysis is in any case vicious.) The framework with which the writer is said to start may be a conception, ethical, political, religious, or metaphysical. Wordsworth in his "Ode on Intimations of Immortality" "expresses" a certain conception about the pre-existence of the soul, and Horace certain valuations about life. Of course, unlike the thinker, they do not merely label certain exact aspects abstracted from all feeling and

suggestiveness, *i.e.*, from the concrete of experience, in order to discuss their connexion with other such aspects. Theirs are concretes, though limited and defined and not, as we have seen, the infinite and indefinite concretes at the level of totality apprehension. Their language, too, is metaphorical, and to begin with, it is wrong to say that they start with these frameworks and express them. But because a poem differs in this way from a discussion, it cannot therefore be said always to express feeling. For even a work of speculative theory may be presented so as to appeal æsthetically, without there being more feeling than would have gone with a different presentation, except, of course, for the æsthetic pleasure in the æsthetic apprehension. If in the present discussion, instead of bringing out the arguments in the order in which they could best support each other, we had adopted an exposition designed to bring out and emphasise the contrast between what is expected of literature and what it is found to yield, there would *eo ipso* have been produced an æsthetic effect, however feeble. Plato's discussion of the ideas, which is as it were a rhythmic movement to and fro between the ideas and the many, and a dwelling on the contrast between the splendid clarity, fixity, and immutability of the former, and the mean obscurity and fluctuation of the latter, attracts us æsthetically even more than it convinces us logically. The æsthetic element, a matter partly of language, partly of the manner of envisaging and developing a problem and its solution, is prominent in Bergson, Schopenhauer, and in parts of Hegel. It might even seem that most philosophers, at any rate those with whom we disagree, were pleased with their own theories on æsthetic even more than on logical grounds.

The theory about the expression of feeling is adduced as an account even of our appreciation of natural beauty. We are variously said to find our feelings, express, embody, feel them into or in natural objects, or the latter are said to embody, symbolise, express our feelings for us. Animism would seem to be necessarily involved in the enjoyment of nature, and to explain the relation between mind and matter, we might think, it is not necessary to read theories of objective idealism or of materialism, but merely to look at a beautiful scene. Nature, then, it is said, speaks to us, and there is a soul in all things. But a careful scrutiny of our appreciation shows us that in the first place we are merely contemplating a harmony of forms, lines, and colours. The daisy, as the poet himself confesses, is after all a flower, an object of a certain hue and shape. That, then, is the æsthetic act; but

by a law of its nature it stimulates other æsthetic acts. If we are painters we proceed to draw and paint beautiful objects, and there is no question here of mind in matter, or of feeling and soul in sensuous forms, in spite of all that may be said about landscape painting; there is only beauty in matter. But as few of us are painters and most of us can to some extent use language, we generally proceed to æsthetic activity in words and the minimum of this will consist in using metaphor. Material objects may be simply compared or identified with other material objects. A daisy is called "a silver shield with boss of gold," and "a pretty star" as well as "a nun demure," "a sprightly maiden," "a queen," etc. But if we do speak of the material in terms of the spiritual, it is not because we see that matter is mind, or that the latter is in or is expressed by the other, but partly because we see it is not. The reverse process of talking of the spiritual in terms of the material is even more common and in either case there is nothing more than the æsthetic delight which the use of metaphor always gives, *i.e.*, that of seeing things in the contrast relation. Poetry is not to be identified either with mysticism or with materialism, nor is either of these, in itself, poetical. It is this overflowing, then, of the first æsthetic activity into another, *i.e.*, literary creation through metaphor, that gives rise to the above theories. This literary creation may also be stimulated by the æsthetic enjoyment of sculpture, architecture or music, and then its product may be ascribed to the latter arts as that which they "express," thus giving further support to the expressionist theory.

At the risk of raising many perplexities, we may apply the same account even to our appreciation of a beautiful face. A face, we say, appeals to us because it expresses certain feelings or qualities of character. But if, although we find sometimes that the owner does not possess these feelings or qualities, we still use the same language, surely in that case its value can be that of metaphor only. The feature and feeling ought to coincide in the same owner, if one "expresses" the other, but the appropriate application of the analogy need not depend upon the coincidence.

Supreme as is the æsthetic satisfaction, nevertheless in the keenest enjoyment of any beautiful thing we are never completely at rest, but seem to be standing on the threshold of some mystery or be present at the dawn of some revelation. It is this which underlies its identification with some form of mystical philosophy. But in the first place, this feature is not peculiar to the æsthetic activity, but is common to any

intense experience, and in the second place, a careful scrutiny will show us that the dawn is not of an explanation, but of a further æsthetic creation, either in the same or in a different art.

If the expressionist theory comes to grief over a simple lyric or the enjoyment of natural beauty, a further difficulty ensues when the literary work is more complex, as in the case of the drama or novel. By expression of feeling do we mean that the feelings of the characters in the piece are expressed? Are we to say that Othello's jealousy is expressed, and then, speaking generically, that jealousy is expressed? If we say this we shall land ourselves into further difficulties of referring to reality. Feeling, it would seem, is by its very nature chaotic, indescribable, and ineffable, and the intelligence, when immersed in it, is at the level of struggling with undefined, unanalysed totality apprehended as such. Now while this is a very distressing thing in reality, the most delightful feature about characters in fiction is that they always feel in perfect similes and in clear-cut thoughts even when their state of mind is specially mentioned by the author as confused. In the novel one always feels with an "as if—" or with thoughts kindly presenting themselves, generally in marshalled array, whereas in reality the feeling is like nothing on earth except itself and there are no thoughts, or at the most thoughts still-born or wraiths and phantoms of thoughts; otherwise we should be absorbed in thinking, not in feeling. This difference, while a virtue for æsthetic purposes, is a fault from the point of view of faithfully rendering reality, which is the meaning that must be given to "expression" as used at this level. But though this meaning is common to most people who use the word, it is not Croce's or Bosanquet's. For to take a work of art in parts, like this, is to destroy its nature as organic. Shakespeare's Othello would then be a sum of expressions. The drama, however, is neither Othello's jealousy, nor Desdemona's submissiveness, nor Iago's cruelty and malice, neither the complication nor the unravelling of events, but a relation of all these or rather all these in a certain relation. We may call it a situation, rhythmically deploying itself. It is this unity as a whole, Othello as a complete play, that is said to express some feeling. But what can it express? How can feelings and actions in a certain relation be a feeling or express or embody one? Besides, if "to express" is to mean anything, it must be based on the literal meaning of pressing something out of somewhere, and imply that what is expressed exists before being expressed. But both Bosanquet and Croce strongly deny this. The feeling

is the drama or story and the drama or story is the feeling. Would it not be less misleading, then, to say that the writer creates something, not a feeling, but certain elements in a certain relation? The perplexity is really the same in the case of the short lyric. If Shelley's poem in any way does "express" the feeling of love, we have seen that it is not this which makes it a poem, but the movement through definite moments, the balance, the contrasts, the metaphors, and these are just themselves and cannot be said either to be love, or to be essentially of love, or to express love. If it be said that it is not the feeling of love which is expressed but the æsthetic delight (and this apparently is what is intended by the philosophical exponents), the answer is that the delight is *at* the apprehension of these very things and therefore cannot either be these, or be before them, or be expressed in or by them. Besides, if this is meant as an answer to the question "what is the æsthetic activity, and in what do we take æsthetic pleasure?" it is tautologous. For we are committed apparently to the statement that the æsthetic activity is the expression of æsthetic pleasure, and that we take æsthetic pleasure in æsthetic pleasure or in its expression.

The difficulties become still clearer, when the matter is looked at from the point of view of the reader or listener. The writer is said to express a feeling or emotion and to convey it to the reader, who is variously said to realise it, enter into it, or experience it. This reduces the æsthetic appreciation to having a feeling. We have already seen that to have feelings of any kind is not poetical, nor is it the poet's business to rouse any in us, though of course the apprehension of his æsthetic creation is accompanied by æsthetic delight. Here we may look at the question again. Amusement will be allowed to be æsthetic, but is it a feeling merely? We do indeed feel pleased when we are amused, but we feel pleased because we are amused (*i.e.*, apprehend objects in a certain way), and not the other way round. Being pleased and being amused are not identical then. And keeping away from the word "pleasure," is it not still confounding to say that in making a joke the humorist expresses his feeling of amusement, and in telling it to us successfully he conveys to us his feeling of amusement? What he does is to apprehend a certain situation, and when we do the same we laugh with him and are pleased. Laughter then depends upon an attitude or act of the intelligence, which like every other act is characterised by a unique feeling accompanying it. Intellectual illumination is also accompanied by a feeling; yet the two are not identified.

If the contemplation of the comic is not a feeling, neither is that of the tragic. To be sad is certainly not the same as to apprehend the tragic, but is to apprehend the tragic to be sad or does it involve this? The "cathartic" trouble in Aristotle's Poetics and the numerous cautions with which the "terror" or "pity" inspired by the sublime or the tragic have been hedged, are historic warnings against an affirmative answer. Here it is sufficient to remark that for anything to inspire merely terror, pity, or disapproval (*i.e.*, practical emotions or judgments) it need merely be apprehended as a totality or by its bare practical aspect, and the language adequate for communication is semantic or denotational. We pity most the misfortunes of our friends or country, but we do not dwell and linger on our pity or on the misfortunes, draw these out into metaphors, and present their various features to our attention in a special order. To do this would be not only irrelevant but absurd. So, merely to feel pity or terror, it would be enough for us to be told that King Agamemnon on his return from Troy was killed by his wife who had conspired with her paramour. The order in which we learn the events, the measured apportionment of the attention to each, the balance, the interplay of light and darkness, the orchestration of details, as it were, do not affect the practical import of the situation; they do not add to the criminality or horror of the action. Hence readers of novels who really pity their hero or detest the villain skip parts or turn to the end to find out their fate. The order of presentation, the rhythmic development, the writing, *i.e.*, the whole art, is to them immaterial or even an impediment. For the function ascribed to tragedy the argumentum of a drama is adequate; the tragedy itself is superfluous.

Tragedy certainly does not make us sad in the same way as a bereavement, for example, or if this be objected to on the ground of its being too personal and narrow, as the defeat of a great cause dear to us. Indeed it does not make us sad at all, but rather glad. Witnessing a tragedy is in itself an act of apprehending certain elements in a certain relation, and when unimpeded is accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction, though this is inextricably bound up with the sadness *in* the tragedy. Some have actually tried to explain this feeling of satisfaction by saying that tragedy shows us good somehow and in spite of all triumphant over evil. That would be an ethical, not æsthetic, satisfaction, and if it means that tragedy shows us *that* good is triumphant, this is again the attributional theory and is false. Tragedy

does not show us that anything is anything, and least of all that good triumphs over evil. The same objections will apply to the statement that tragedy shows us or expresses the seriousness of life. Because Iago is wicked and Othello in the tragedy kills Desdemona, why should we think that life, *i.e.*, our life and that of other people, is serious? We can only say that the play is a serious tragedy. We might well ask what Hecuba is to us and what we are to Hecuba.

Finally, when it is said that the æsthetic enjoyment makes us feel the energy of life and increases our vitality, the same may be said of any intense activity, hard thinking, working, fighting, etc. We can only mean that an intense activity is intense.

The expressionist theory as an interpretation of the other arts, cannot here be discussed. But in all of them, with the exception of painting and sculpture, it lacks even the plausibility which it has when applied to literature. When the Gothic cathedral is said to express the lofty aspiration of the Middle Ages, it may be suggested that the problem is one for the Logic of Analogy and Association rather than for Æsthetic in particular, except so far as it has already been alluded to under the question of metaphor and the stimulation of literary creation by the other arts.

Little as this theory seems to leave to art and more particularly to literature, it is yet not the same as the play theory nor does it state that literature consists merely in a certain order of words and sentences in metre and versification. The rhythm movement and development mentioned are those of an action, situation, feeling, and thought, or aspects of these, not merely metre, and their creation and appreciation are only possible to a being capable of every form of experience. If, however, the Muses still seem to have been too much stripped by it, it at any rate gains support from an examination of the utterances of artists themselves whose talk about their art amongst themselves is in the main technical, though they, too, sometimes indulge in moralising and false theorising. The theories here criticised are often espoused by people who, having the æsthetic appreciation but feebly, seek a substitution rather than a definition for it. It is not those who really appreciate music, who, on hearing a piece of music, make up a story or images which they then say the music expresses; they play through the piece, or listen to it a second time, or discuss it technically. The other procedure is adopted by those whose artistic appreciation is mainly literary, and who would seem to think that the function of one art is to express another.

Those again who have little artistic capacity of any kind, but who have the theoretic and ethical interests active, who are fascinated by emotions or wish to have these roused in themselves, or who being endowed with a large sympathy are interested in all things human, think the function of all the arts, and particularly of literature, is merely to satisfy all these wants. All these interests, as we have seen, come into literature, but only in a subordinate way, as means, conditions, material. Neither the operation of any single one of these, nor the co-operation of all these, constitutes in itself the æsthetic activity or interest.

The latter, after all, even if it is no other activity than itself, has a value as being an aspect of the intelligence. If its significance can be discussed, it can only be discussed in the same way and at the same time as that of all the other ultimate forms of experience. Art, and especially literature, may yet form a valuable, even the most valuable, datum for metaphysics, and a philosophy which will start from literature may perhaps prove as illuminating as those which have started from mathematics or biology or the moral experience. But for this to be possible, literature must first be strictly delimited from everything else, and some contribution towards this end may have been made by the emphatic restatement of an old view, valuable and safe from its very bareness. If it appear that tautology or mere naming characterises the positive statements ventured on, it may be pleaded that such a method, when accompanied by copious negative definition, is not fruitless; it at any rate steers clear of the dangerous ideal which finds illumination in confusion and imagines it has explained anything when it has made it out to be something else.

IV.—DISCUSSIONS.

THE MEANING OF 'MEANING'.

I VERY much hope that Dr. Strong will attain *one* of the aims he sets himself in his chivalrous defence of Mr. Russell's behaviourism in the July Number of MIND. I hope he *will* render it intelligible to Prof. Joachim, or at least will compel him to recognise, that Mr. Russell is not the *only* philosopher who believes "what no one can possibly think". But as for his second aim, that of 'meeting my objections,' I grieve to say that he does not seem to me to be setting the right way about it at all. Indeed, his procedure seems to me to be moving in a diametrically opposite direction, in which he cannot possibly meet my objections, unless the intellectual universe also should happen to be *round*, and so he should suddenly run up against them, just as he imagined that he had lost sight of them for ever! Or, dropping these metaphors from physical space, I would suggest that his endeavours to meet me are distressingly impeded by the all but universal and apparently invincible reluctance of philosophers, whether 'idealists' or 'realists,' whether 'critical' or 'naive,' to describe what happens as it happens: they insist on some *ex post facto* rearrangement in terms of knowledge subsequently acquired and of some pet theory of their own, which they pertinaciously feign to be '*the*' (one and only) true account, though it is plainly one out of several that are about equally capable of assimilating the experienced facts. Now as I had used this question of Meaning as a good test of what I had admitted to be initially *alternative* methods of description, that of the agent and that of the contemplator, a mere attempt to show that the facts *can* be stated in terms of *one* of them is of itself a refusal to meet one of my chief contentions, which was that it was not the *only* method.

But this ignoring of the *elenchus* of the alternative method he was particularly summoned to recognise, is not the only stumbling-block I find in Dr. Strong's account. His handling of his own method seems to me singularly perfunctory, and amazingly incomplete. He considers only *one* case, that in which an 'object' is said to 'mean so-and-so'. Now this case is for me secondary, a mere consequence of using the object in purposive thought; but I can see that for Dr. Strong it must be primary. The value-judgment, however, which gives it this prerogative position also imposes on him the duties of deriving the 'personal' meaning, and of

explaining the relativity of 'the' meaning of an object to various cognitive purposes and personal meanings. These were the observable facts that led me to choose the other alternative, and to start by preference from the 'personal' meaning; but I cannot see that Dr. Strong perceives that it is equally incumbent on him to justify *his* choice.

Instead, he proposes to illustrate the acquisition of Meaning from a 'concrete' example, which he describes as follows (p. 312): "Suppose I hear the sound of an explosion. The explosion is a physical event, taking place at a distance from my body. The sound, on the sensationalist view, is a state of myself, occurring in or in close connexion with my body. As my only access to the explosion is through the sound, I react to the latter as if I had to do, not with a state of myself, but with the actual distant event: in other words, I objectify the sound. From the outset I never take it as a state of myself—although in truth it is one—but solely as a revelation, almost a sensuous embodiment, of the external event. Its sharpness, suddenness, loudness are regarded as characters of that event. The sound has thus not so much acquired, as become converted into, a *meaning*."

Here there is just one sentence, the first, that even attempts to describe the actual event; and even that describes in terms of theory, and begs a multitude of questions. The rest is all an interpretation in the interest of 'realism'. So impatient is Dr. Strong of the actual experience, so eager is he to get away from it to philosophic 'reflection,' and so content is he with a merely schematic *ex post facto* interpretation!

If I undertook to give a truly 'concrete' description of the situation apparently conceived by Dr. Strong, it would contain at least the following, with the *lacunae* it fills up italicised:—

"*While thinking, placidly, on thought*, I am *startled by* a sudden noise. (1)—It is too *loud* not to be objective, and besides I have never had such an *hallucination of hearing*. (2)—*What was it*, I wonder? (3)—An explosion, *peradventure?* (4)—But *of* what? (5)—And *where?* (6)—*Well, what had I better do about it?* (7)"—And so on.

This whole actual train of thought is condensed in Dr. Strong's version into "I hear the sound of an explosion," a colourless, paper proposition which one may surely say never could describe anyone's actual experience. He then goes on to describe the 'intending' which animates the 'personal' meaning-process, in terms of strain-sensations in the familiar way (since James), asserting (without argument) that they "become an awareness of the intending *only*[1] when *we*[1] turn our attention to ourselves, and *use*[1] them—[*in order*] to mean that act," declares (p. 313 s.f.) that "to mean something is to conceive or rather treat it as not wholly revealed to the mind at the moment," and draws the conclusion (p. 314) that "when I see an

[1] Italics mine.

explosion the same meaning essentially is presented to my mind as when I hear it".

Manifestly in all this Dr. Strong is only (1) contemplating 'the' meaning-of-a-thing, and moreover (2), in a merely *cognitive* way. He is not inquiring what it means for *action*, and if he perceives that this problem exists, shrinks from it. This he might be entitled to do if all were cognition, and if there were no such thing as action at all; but so long as he cannot claim to be in the position of Aristotle's 'God,' what he says is not enough. He can say it, of course, and put it forward as a purely cognitive analysis; but it does not cover the case of action, nor provide for any real action or activity, whereas the rival method (which he ignores) turns out to be more inclusive, because in ultimate analysis it can take cognition also as an activity and as involving a personal attitude.

The inadequacy of the contemplative attitude is not alone revealed in its failure really to describe activities: it blazes out, as flagrantly as ever, in its dealings with the self. The 'I' is the natural home and focus of all activities, and simply cannot be reduced to an observable object. Hence *all* intellectualist philosophies have suffered shipwreck on this impregnable rock. Not one of them has been able to give an account of the self that is intelligible and consistent. All have been forced into language which is a maze of contradictions and absurdities. Dr. Strong also, quite naturally and freely, uses language which attributes activity to the 'I'. He contends, quite rightly (though without explaining *how*), that the 'I' and the 'Me' cannot be different persons (p. 314). He admits, moreover, introspection, "when *we* turn our attention to ourselves". And then he actually tells us that "what his attention really fastens on is some obscure bodily sensation—if not the tension in his head muscles, then the rush of blood in his arteries" (p. 315), and that this disposes of the 'I'!

It is astonishing that after all that has been done by, and since, Hume and James to bring out this insuperable *crux* of sensationalism (and indeed of all attempts to explain activity away) a philosopher of Dr. Strong's eminence should profess himself satisfied with this sort of thing. For it seems so clear that nothing short of wilful blindness can fail to see that when "some obscure bodily sensation" is detected, it is detected in the 'Me,' and that the 'I' that observes it is *not* caught in the act of turning itself into an object. If *this* 'I' is an 'illusion' (p. 315), it is one which permeates, and presumably vitiates, every item of our experience.

Nor does Dr. Strong himself seem entirely satisfied with his doctrine. For he adds that "we *cannot* be aware of anything psychical that is not more or less concrete and sensuous. What is non-concrete and non-sensuous is always a *meaning*, a sense of that unfathomed beyond which we cannot contemplate but can only intend." Whence it would seem to follow that as all things psychical we can be aware of are 'concrete and sensuous,' and meanings are neither, meanings cannot be 'psychical'; but if so, how can

we be aware of them? Or if what is meant is that, though meanings are *in* the mind, they are not *of* it, what is it that *is* really and truly and fully 'psychical'? For it would seem that a *consistent* behaviourism should answer '*nothing*'! And this answer would leave only the embarrassment that as the whole population of the mind is allowed to claim 'objectivity,' nothing 'subjective' would appear to be left in it for the 'objective' to be opposed to. I am at a loss, therefore, to conjecture what Dr. Strong can mean here, consistently with his behaviouristic-sensationalistic description of meaning; and in particular what place in nature he assigns to that unfathomed abyss "beyond which we cannot contemplate but can only intend". To me that '*only*' conveys a delicious suggestion that man was made for contemplation, and not contemplation for man. And if this is an essential postulate of his philosophic theory, it is clear that personal meaning must go. Or rather it must be ignored *à tout prix*. For (to *my* thinking) it is quite concrete and knowable, and not a bit 'unfathomable'. We are far more certain of it than of any object of contemplation, which may always play us false, and turn out to be an 'illusion'. But if behaviourist-sensationalism merely ignores personal meaning because it has no room for it, it is merely begging the question I sought to raise. And if it does so for lack of reasons and merely to gratify a traditional bias, must it not be convicted of doing so *wilfully*, and thereby of surrendering to the voluntarism of which it perhorresced the 'irrationalism'? It would appear, therefore, that the existence of personal meaning remains a pitfall in the path of all intellectualism, alike of the sensationalistic and of the rationalistic type.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

V.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Logic : Part I. By W. E. Johnson, M.A., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge; Sidgwick Lecturer in Moral Science in the University of Cambridge. Cambridge: at The University Press, 1921. Pp. xl. and 255.

The volume under review constitutes the first part of a work in which Mr. Johnson proposes to deal with "the whole field of Logic as ordinarily understood". Regarding the proposition as "the unit from which the whole body of logical doctrine may be developed" he devotes the present volume to the consideration of its nature, kinds and implications. In the three remaining parts of his work he promises to deal with demonstration, the logical foundations of science and 'formal probability'. The present instalment of this scheme is by far the most important contribution to logical doctrine which has appeared in this country since Mr. Bosanquet published his study of Logic as the morphology of knowledge; while in its own particular sphere, as an exposition and extension of Formal Logic, in conjunction with a discussion of the more philosophical aspects of the subject, in respect of which formal logicians have too often proved themselves indifferent or incompetent, it seems to me to stand without a rival. I proceed to call attention to some of the more important features and contents of the work.

Logic is defined by Mr. Johnson as "the analysis and criticism of thought" (p. xiii.); it is "a science whose central or essential function is to criticise thought as valid or invalid" (xvi.) He calls special attention in the introduction to his view that for the discharge of this function it is necessary to include in Logic what he calls the 'epistemic' as well as the 'constitutive' aspect of thought. "The former is a recognition that knowledge depends upon the variable conditions and capacities for its acquisition; the latter refers to the content of knowledge which has in itself a logically analysable form" (pp. xxxiii.-iv.). The point is of first-rate importance, since unless both of these aspects are recognised Logic, conceived as Mr. Johnson conceives it, as involving a criticism of thought from the point of view of its validity, becomes impossible, and the science is either merged in Psychology, as the Pragmatists recommend, or ceases to be concerned with thought at all, as some of the Neo-realists proclaim. Few Logicians, it is true, have adopted either of those extreme positions. They have generally presented

us instead with a mixed doctrine, in which psychological and strictly logical considerations are blended without either a clear distinction between them or a justification of their connexion. It is the special merit of Mr. Johnson that he does not offer us a confused doctrine of this kind, but is prepared to point out just how and why a reference to the 'epistemic' aspect of thought is essential for the comprehension of the logical system itself, and to indicate its bearing on different parts of logical doctrine.

The distinction appears in its most fundamental form in the contrast between the proposition, as an object proposed in thought, and the variable attitudes, such as assertion, doubt, supposition, which may be adopted towards it by a thinker. While holding that a proposition is "a single entity . . . that is the same whatever may be the attitude adopted towards it" (p. 6), Mr. Johnson regards it as equally important to recognise that "it is not, so to speak, a self-subsistent entity, but only a factor in the concrete act of judgment" (p. 3), in which both the *assertum* and the act of assertion. both the object of thought and an "occurrent and alterable relation" to it of a thinker are included. Not only so, but for even the most rigidly formal study of the proposition it is constantly necessary to bear this relation in mind. Defining the proposition as "that of which truth and falsity can be significantly predicated" (p. 1), Mr. Johnson holds that these predicates "can only derive their meaning from the point of view of criticising a certain possible mental attitude" (p. 7). Or, as he elsewhere puts it, "the idea of truth and falsity, in my view, carries with it the notion of an imperative, namely of acceptance or rejection" (p. 224).

An essential reference to a subjective attitude is similarly discovered by Mr. Johnson both in the Law of Identity and in the formal laws which hold of compound propositions constructed by means of the conjunction *and*. Thus the former principle, for the traditional formulation of which he substitutes the implicative form, 'If P is true, then P is true,' is only significant if we "contemplate the proposition 'P is true' as one that may have been asserted in different connexions or on different occasions or by different persons" (p. 234). Consider next the Reiterative Law, P and P $\equiv$ P; the Commutative Law, P and Q $\equiv$ Q and P; and the Associative Law, (P and Q) and R $\equiv$ P and (Q and R); which figure so prominently among the formulæ of the 'pure' Logic, which repudiates any subjective implications. Taking them in their fundamental logical meaning, as referring to the conjunction of propositions, Mr. Johnson finds that they "indicate in general equivalence as regards the propositions asserted, in spite of variations in the modes in which they come before thought. Thus the content of what is asserted is not affected, firstly, by any *re*assertion; nor, secondly, by any different *order* among assertions; nor, thirdly, by any different *grouping* of the assertions" (p. 30).

It is, again, by reference to the 'epistemic' aspect of thought

that Mr. Johnson finds a solution of the paradoxical consequences which seem to follow in certain cases from the employment of the familiar formulæ of Formal Logic. Thus, from the proposition P, asserted as true, we can pass by implication to the alternative proposition 'P or Q,' and from this to its equivalent 'if not-P then Q,' whatever propositions P and Q may stand for. So, too, from P we can pass to 'P or not-Q,' and from this to 'if Q then P'. Or, summing up in general terms, (i) a false proposition (*e.g.* not-P) implies any other proposition, (ii) a true proposition (*e.g.* P) is implied by any other proposition. And these results seem to mean that from a false proposition any other proposition can be inferred, and that a true proposition can be inferred from any other proposition whatsoever. Now, Mr. Johnson maintains that while we can infer both 'P or Q' and 'if not-P then Q' from P, we cannot employ these propositions in further inferences without committing a fallacy of contradiction (if we now deny P) or circularity (if we now infer P), owing to the fact that these propositions have been themselves inferred from the original assertion of P. Or, as he puts it, with reference to the implicative form of proposition, "in order that an implicative proposition may be used for inference, both the implicans and the implicate must be entertained hypothetically" (p. 44); and this is impossible if the implicative proposition has itself been obtained from the assertion of one of these or its contradictory. In pointing out that the relation of implication extends beyond that of inferability, and that the difference is due to the presence of an 'epistemic' factor in the latter, Mr. Johnson seems to me to have laid bare the essential nature of these paradoxes. But ought not the appeal to the 'epistemic' factor to be made at an earlier stage by denying that 'P or Q' can be inferred from P? Surely inference, as a species of thought, must involve an increase in the determination of its object; and, if so, it cannot be made to cover the mere slipping back from the determinate proposition P to the less determinate 'P or Q'. While admitting that 'he is a solicitor' implies 'he is a solicitor or a barrister,' I hold that no one ever did or could infer the latter from the former.

Having dwelt so long upon Mr. Johnson's doctrine of the 'epistemic' reference of the proposition, we must now turn to his account of its structure. "In every proposition" he writes, "we are determining *in* thought the character of an object presented *to* thought to be thus determined. In the most fundamental sense, then, we may speak of a determinandum and a determinans: the determinandum is defined as what is presented *to be* determined or characterised by thought or cognition; the determinans as what does characterise or determine in thought that which is given to be determined" (p. 9). This distinction, taken by Mr. Johnson as equivalent to that between a substantive and an adjective, is at once more precise and more ultimate than that between the subject and predicate of traditional Logic. While the 'substantive proper' is an existent, adjectives, relations and propositions can function as

'quasi-substantives,' in so far as adjectives can be found to characterise them, the essential proviso being made that the adjectives so used shall conform to the category of the entity they characterise, the logical character of which is not altered by the peculiar use to which it is being put. Mr. Johnson introduces the expression 'characterising tie' to signify the unique connexion subsisting between substantive and adjective. "The general term 'tie' is used to denote what is not a component of a construct, but is involved in understanding the specific form of unity which gives significance to the construct; and the specific term 'characterising tie' denotes what is involved in understanding the junction of substantive and adjective" (p. 10).

It is of fundamental importance for Mr. Johnson's view to distinguish the conception of a tie from that of a relation. According to him relations are to be regarded as a specific kind of adjective, differing from ordinary adjectives by being transitive, since they include in their meaning a reference to a substantive other than that which they characterise. In a relational proposition, such as 'X hit Y' or 'A is to the right of B,' there is involved, in addition to the characterising tie, a further tie, the relational or coupling tie, by which the substantives in question are connected. "That a tie and a relation are distinct is brought out by considering the fact that if for a given adjective—whether ordinary or relational—we substitute another adjective, we have constructed a *different* unity; but, if we drop the characterising tie with a view to replacing it by some adjective or relation, then either the unity itself is destroyed, or it will be found that the characterising tie remains along with the adjective or relation so introduced. Similarly, the coupling of terms is not a *mode of relating* them for which another mode could be substituted; for, if they were uncoupled, again the unity would be destroyed" (p. 212). A tie, then, unlike a relation, is "entirely unmodifiable" (p. 11), and is not an additional component of the object of thought in which it is involved. Mr. Johnson points out that it is the failure to recognise this distinction which lies at the root of Mr. Bradley's contention that the notion of relation is contradictory as giving rise to an infinite regress. "The pretence of paradox is due to the assumption that to the act of relating or constructing there corresponds a special *mode* of relation; so that a tie is confused with a relation" (pp. 211-2).

Mr. Johnson's theory of the nature of a tie, of the difference between a tie and a relation, and of the distinctive functions of the characterising and relational ties, appears to me of first-rate importance. I find some difficulty, however, in following him in his account of the third kind of tie which he recognises, *viz.*, the assertive tie, and could wish that he had developed this part of his doctrine more fully, especially in view of the fundamental nature of the questions which it raises. We are told that whereas the substantive only exists as characterised by its adjectives and the adjective as characterising its substantive, "thinking effects a

severance between the adjective and the substantive, these being reunited in the *asserted* proposition—not only by the characterising tie, but also by the *assertive* tie" (p. 12). This new tie, for example, comes to be "blended" with the characterising tie when we pass from 'a tall man' to 'a man is tall,' or from 'a child fearing a dog' to 'a child fears a dog'. Hence the copula '*is*' of traditional logic is said to be "a blend of the characterising with the assertive tie" (p. 13). Now I am not clear as to what it is that the assertive tie is held to unite. One's first impression is that it merely connects in some further manner the same components as the characterising tie, *i.e.*, the substantive and adjective which are the explicit terms of the proposition. This supposition, however, would contradict the principle that "the specific difference between one kind of tie and another is determined by the logical nature of the constituents tied" (p. 212), a condition which is, of course, fulfilled by the characterising and relational ties. Moreover, it is not consistent with this principle, or with the nature of a tie, which I understand to possess constitutive and not merely epistemic significance, to regard the assertive tie as merely indicating a subjective attitude towards the proposition. In trying to clear up the function of this tie I am led to notice the view expressed by Mr. Johnson in the following section (chap. i., § 7), concerning the relation of the proposition to fact. The position is there laid down that "any proposition *characterises* some fact, so that the relation of proposition to fact is the same as that of adjective to substantive" (p. 14). Now the recognition of a relation to fact seems to be essentially involved in assertion. Have we not here, then, our clue to the nature of the assertive tie? As connecting the proposition with fact it would have its own constituents to tie, as distinct from the explicit terms of the proposition, and would indicate the unity for the thinker of proposition and fact which constitutes the significance of the asserted proposition as such. I am not sure, however, whether such an interpretation is intended or would be accepted by Mr. Johnson.

The view that the proposition is essentially the characterisation of a substantive by an adjective, involving 'ties' of this and other kinds, seems to render it inevitable that a certain primacy at least should be accorded to affirmation and what is affirmed, over negation and what is denied. The point appears in one form in the discussion contained in chapter iv. of the use of the adjectives 'true' and 'false' to characterise propositions. It is pointed out that the first named adjective may be regarded as strictly speaking redundant, since to assert, consider, or doubt the proposition 'P is true,' cannot be distinguished from asserting, considering or doubting the proposition P itself. The predication of the adjective 'true' is, in fact, analogous to the use of 'one' as a multiplier in arithmetic. On the other hand, the proposition 'P is false' is regarded by Mr. Johnson as a genuine 'secondary' proposition (*i.e.*, as a proposition of a higher order, in which an adjective is predicated of a 'primary'

proposition), which "can only be co-ordinated with primary propositions after a certain change of attitude has been adopted" (p. 53). This want of co-ordination, it is shown, necessitates the recognition of a special condition of the validity of the process of obversion, in which a passage is made from the denial of 'S is P' to the affirmation—'S is non-P'. The process, Mr. Johnson points out, is only valid if to the premise 'S is-not P' there is added the further premise 'S is,' *i.e.*, "S denotes something of which some adjective may be predicated truly in a proposition not merely verbal" (p. 72). He accepts, moreover, the view that the "relation of incompatibility lies at the root of the notion of contradiction" (p. 15), and this is of course founded in the positive natures of the incompatibles. Hence, for him, the negative term 'non-P' is no longer the infinite name of traditional Logic, but stands for an unspecified member of the series of determinations alternative to P of some less definite positive adjective or 'determinable'. Such a term as 'non-conscious,' which "does not stand for any single positive determinable which would generate a series of positive determinates," is not, he declares, "properly speaking an adjective at all" (p. 239).

Mr. Johnson is not, however, prepared to abandon the conception of pure negation, which he defends, in particular, against the aspersions of Mr. Bosanquet. The term, he maintains, has more than one meaning which is legitimate and real. It may, in the first place, "mean the simple attitude of rejection, as opposed to that of acceptance, towards a proposition taken as a unit and without further analysis" (p. 66). Thus, "when some assertum is proposed which can be clearly conceived in thought, and yet repels any attempt to accept it, then the attitude towards such an assertum to which our thinking process has led us is strictly to be called that of pure negation" (pp. 66-67). As an example of the more usual meaning, according to which the denial is contained within the proposition itself, he gives 'wisdom is not blue,' explaining, however, that "such a proposition would have purpose only in a logical context where we are pointing out that certain types of adjective cannot be predicated of certain types of substantive" (p. 67). In all other cases I understand him to maintain that, although the form of predication may be purely negative, a positive factor must be recognised in the judgment, since the denial of the proposed adjective "involves the affirming of *some* other adjective of the same generic kind" (p. 68). Since Mr. Bosanquet admits that "negative judgment does begin with a phase inappreciably differing from the infinite judgment," [1] and since Mr. Johnson recognises that a positive element, though "evanescent," is involved in both his types of pure negation, examples of which are moreover admittedly rare, it might be held that the controversy does not contain much substance. Such a view would, however, be superficial, since the difference springs not merely from the greater prominence of analysis in Mr.

[1] *Logic*, vol. i., p. 286.

Johnson's method, but from his insistence upon the necessity of recognising the primary character of 'otherness,' which "does not presuppose or require a previous assertion of any relation of agreement or of difference" (p. 22). On the contrary, "comparison with respect to any determinable character, whether it yields identity or difference, presupposes otherness of the substantives characterised by the determinable in question" (p. 193); while the ultimate adjectives, or 'determinables,' are disparate or incomparable with one another, relations of agreement and difference subsisting within but not between them. In this connexion one cannot but notice Mr. Johnson's simple suggestion for the solution of the much discussed problem of external and internal relations. He holds that "relations between adjectives as such are internal; and those between existents as such are external. In this account, adjectives are to include so-called external relations, even the characterising relation, as well as every other relation. The otherness which distinguishes the 'this' from the 'that' is the primary and literally the sole external relation, being itself direct and underived. And this relation is involved in every external relation" (p. 250).

Incidental reference has been made above to the two most important features in Mr. Johnson's treatment of the adjective, *viz.*, the inclusion of relations as transitive adjectives and the distinction of adjectives into determinables and determinates. A determinable is not merely a less determinate adjective, but is capable of being determined and of thus giving rise to a definite series of determinates. In his development of this subject Mr. Johnson brings out the important differences between the relation of a determinable to its determinates and that of a class to its members; or, to put it otherwise, between a proposition in which a less determinate is predicated of a more determinate adjective, as in 'red is a colour,' and one in which an adjective is predicated of a substantive, as in 'Plato is a man'. The point is clearly one of great importance and possesses far-reaching consequences, for Philosophy as well as for Logic.

Mr. Johnson's treatment of the more strictly formal part of Logic is distinguished, in the first place, by his adhesion throughout to the view that the proposition is the unit of the logical system. In accordance, too, with his analysis of the proposition, its intensive aspect is always kept uppermost, and the secondary and subordinate character of the class interpretation, which has figured so prominently in the traditional formal logic, is insisted upon. It is, indeed, he holds, "only when arithmetical predicates come into consideration that the notion of extension seems to be required" (p. 123). "In spite then of the prominent employment of the word *class* both in the treatment of propositions and still more in that of principles of the syllogism, it may be maintained that there is no real reference in thought to the class as an extension, but only a figurative or metaphorical application of the word which serves to

bring out certain analogies between such notions as inclusion, exclusion, and exhaustion, which apply primarily to parts and wholes and are transferred as relations between propositions and their constituent elements" (p. 124). The classical example of such transference is to be found in the use of Euler's diagrams and similar devices for the representation of propositions. Mr. Johnson points out, however, that so far from supporting a merely extensive interpretation, the full significance of the diagrams themselves is not appreciated until it is recognised that intension is represented by the boundary line determining the area which is the analogue of the class. The comparison is worked out in detail in a very interesting manner (chap. viii., § 4). A source of much confusion which has crept into the more recent treatment of Formal Logic is removed by the insistence that 'existential' as applied to a proposition should be understood in its proper sense as referring to existence, as distinguished from subsistence, the term 'instantial' or 'indeterminately instantial' being used when all that is intended is a certain method of formulating any general proposition. The further and consequent confusions which have centred round the conception of a universe of discourse are also admirably dealt with. Of the still more important constructive development of the formulæ of Formal Logic it is impossible to give any adequate indication here. Its most striking feature is the way in which Mr. Johnson has succeeded in working out the systematic relation of these to each other, and work of this kind does not lend itself to detached comment but must be studied as a whole.

In making this attempt to call attention to some of the features of Mr. Johnson's work, the chief difficulty throughout has been to make a selection of the points of greatest interest and significance. For Mr. Johnson is never satisfied with merely saying better what has been said nearly as well before, and there is hardly a page in his book which does not throw new light on the subject with which it deals. Its fullness of matter is only imperfectly indicated in the index at the end of the volume, and it is to be hoped that this defect will be remedied in later editions, or, better still, in the completion of the work, to which all its readers will eagerly look forward.

JAMES GIBSON.

Divine Imagining: an Essay on the First Principles of Philosophy. By DOUGLAS FAWCETT. London: Macmillan & Co., 1921. Pp. xxviii. 249.

THIS book is described as 'being a continuation of the experiment which took shape first in "The World as Imagination,"' and as being 'no. 2 of the "World as Imagination" series'. It gives a shorter, clearer, and more brightly written account of the general view set forth in the previous work; and the author hopes to follow it up later with a book on the problem of Individuality. The

doctrine here expounded with considerable skill and great wealth of illustration is one at which Mr. Fawcett has been gradually arriving. His earlier writings might be broadly characterised as pluralistic, with a distinct affinity to Pragmatism and Humanism. Many traces of this earlier attitude are still to be found in his present work; but he is now more nearly related to the dominant school of British idealism, especially perhaps as represented by Mr. McTaggart. To Hegel, however, and to Mr. Bradley he is still markedly opposed. Probably his general position will be best understood by noticing the grounds for this opposition.

Hegel is of course commonly accused of rationalism. His system is often described as one of 'panlogism'. It is very easy to bring forward difficulties in the way of his system thus interpreted. The most obvious difficulty is that with regard to the transition from Logic to the philosophy of Nature. Schelling's reference to the 'ugly black ditch' has been often repeated. In particular the objection has been driven home in our own country by Mr. Pringle-Pattison and Mr. Ward. The old reference of Mr. Bradley to the 'unearthly ballet of bloodless categories' is also still remembered, and his later quotation of the line ascribed to Shakespeare—'Love has reason, Reason none'. Even Mr. McTaggart, though professing in the main to interpret Hegel, has given to emotion and to individuality a place that is not easily to be found in the words of the master. At any rate, most people admit that the philosophy of nature is the weakest part of the Hegelian system. Now Mr. Fawcett, adopting independently a suggestion previously put forward (as he has himself noted) by Frohschammer, urges that the missing link is to be found in Imagination, whose claims he supports with much vigour and considerable subtlety, and in a style of imaginative daring that corresponds very well to the principle that he has chosen.

So far as Hegelianism is concerned, it would of course be out of place here to attempt its defence, even if I felt myself competent for such a task. It must suffice to say that there has probably been a good deal of misinterpretation of it. Hegel's last word, it should be remembered, it not Logic but Spirit. Logic itself, as he conceives it, is in the main a process of dialectic by which we are led to see the inadequacy of the more purely 'intellectual' or abstract conceptions, as contrasted with those that are more concrete and spiritual. Mr. Bradley's saying—'the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real'—may be a better expression of 'the essential message of Hegel' than 'the actual is rational'. It seems to be true, however, that he failed to show in a manner that carried conviction how a spiritual interpretation is to be given to the processes of nature. Hence even Hegelians may allow that there is room for reconstruction within this province; and the contention that such a principle of reconstruction can best be supplied by an appeal to Imagination is one that calls at least for careful consideration.

In support of his thesis, Mr. Fawcett claims that there are no less than sixteen respects in which Imagination supplies a more satisfactory interpretation than most of the other principles that have been appealed to—such as reason, feeling, or intuition. It would take too long to consider these claims in detail; but perhaps the main contentions may be conveniently summed up under a smaller number of general headings.

1. Mr. Fawcett claims that the conception of a creative imagination enables us to have a philosophy which is essentially monistic without being singularistic, and which leads to a view of ultimate reality that is anthropocentric without being anthropomorphic (if such a distinction may be allowed—the expressions are not Mr. Fawcett's). For the imaginative attitude (in its constructive, not in its purely reproductive aspect) is emphatically human, and yet leads to the transcendence of any particular individuality. It implies plurality, and yet seeks to combine the separate elements in a comprehensive unity. The exact relations that Mr. Fawcett believes to subsist between finite centres and the larger unity that underlies them will no doubt be more fully discussed in the work that he has promised on Individuality; but in a general way they are indicated in the present book, and the claims that he enumerates as 1, 2, 7, 9 and 16 all appear to relate to the advantages that his theory possesses from this point of view.

2. He thinks, further, that his theory, more adequately than any other, provides a place both for a perfect cosmic order—a 'divine event to which the whole creation moves'—and also for the apparent contingency in our finite experience; thus enabling us, among other things, to deal effectively with the problem of evil, without, on the one hand, denying its existence or ignoring its importance, or, on the other hand, throwing the responsibility for its existence directly upon the principle that underlies and supports the cosmic order. For imagination is constructive, and implies a process towards a certain completeness that is not at present realised. It implies a universe, but by no means a 'block universe'. The claims that he enumerates as 3, 6 and 10 seem all to be connected with this contention.

3. He urges also (what indeed follows pretty directly from what has just been stated) that his view enables us to believe that we can have a genuine apprehension of ultimate reality, and not merely of appearance; and that we can assign a definite place within that reality to activity, causation, things, relations, evolution, and the time process in general. His claims with reference to these points are enumerated as 4, 5, 6, 11, 12 and 14.

4. He claims, moreover, that from his point of view a new interpretation can be given to the Platonic doctrine of Ideas and to certain types of Oriental mysticism. For, though it is wrong to make any sharp antithesis between Appearance and Reality, or to describe the world of our present experience as Mâya or Illusion, yet it has to be recognised that we find ourselves in the midst of

a process whose beginning and end are concealed from our apprehension; and we can only very partially conjecture the principles by which its course is guided. The references to these points are contained in numbers 8, 9 and 15 of Mr. Fawcett's claims.

With some reservations, I am disposed to allow that in the course of his exposition he makes good most of the claims that he has put forward. The reservations relate chiefly to the time process, the problem of evil, and the place of contingency, to which reference will have to be made later. If the difficulties connected with these could be satisfactorily removed—a pretty large 'if'—the principle of creative Imagination would not have much to fear. I think it must be conceded that modern psychology (at least in this country) has done but scant justice to the creative aspect of Imagination. When Ribot brought out his work on Creative Imagination in 1900, he had to note that the study of it had been almost entirely neglected by psychologists. Indeed, Mr. Fawcett's own work is somewhat disappointing in this respect. He does not bring out as definitely as one could wish the way in which the creative aspect of Imagination is related to its more receptive and reproductive sides. Perhaps the projected work on Individuality will supply what is wanted. But at least he has emphasised a principle which comprehends within itself many different aspects, and which is well adapted to conciliate many old antagonisms. Such oppositions as that between Realism and Idealism, or that between the types of Idealism represented by Plato, Berkeley, Hegel, and Schopenhauer respectively, certainly have their edges considerably blunted by a doctrine that enables us to recognise that all that we are and know may be characterised as being 'such stuff as dreams are made of,' and yet that it does not on that account cease to have genuine objectivity, reality and significance; and this is what I take to be the gist of Mr. Fawcett's argument. Nor is the reconciliation between these apparently antagonistic schools brought about by the way of compromise or accommodation, but rather by the emphasis that is laid upon a more comprehensive way of thinking.

What seems to be most fundamental in the theory that is here maintained is that no form of existence is to be regarded as atomic. 'All things,' as Mr. Fawcett is fond of quoting, 'in one another's being mingle.' Imagination supplies the 'spiritual bond' by which separate existences are combined in a single Cosmos. No doubt, as Mr. Fawcett is aware, the necessity for such a bond has, in some form or other, been recognised by most, if not all, the writers who can, in any really intelligible sense, be described as idealistic. Indeed it has been contended (by Mr. J. W. Scott, for instance, in his recent work on *Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism*) that it is the presence or absence of such a recognition that constitutes the essential difference between idealism and realism. Certainly, in most other respects the distinction appears to be somewhat evanescent. However that may be, Mr. Fawcett at least lays

great stress on this point. In order to give emphasis to it, he has even ventured to coin some new words. He refers to the mode of apprehension in which distinguishable features are comprehended as 'consciring'; and, in order to mark the contrast between this and less synoptic modes of apprehension, he uses the terms 'scious' and 'sciring'. There is certainly some logical justification for these innovations. The English use of the terms, 'science,' 'conscience,' 'consciousness,' etc., would undoubtedly seem awkward and confusing to any one who had not become familiar with it; but it is probably too late to try to make the English language logical or scientific (perhaps Mr. Fawcett would prefer to say 'conscientific'). 'Consciring' would perhaps be a convenient word to adopt; but it may be doubted whether 'scious' and 'sciring' could ever come into general use. Might not the terms 'apprehend' and 'comprehend' serve sufficiently well to mark the distinction that he has in view? —I mean as they are used, for instance, by Shakespeare when he says of 'strong imagination' that 'if it would but apprehend some joy, it comprehends some bringer of that joy'. Or again Kant's term 'synoptic' might serve to indicate what Mr. Fawcett means; only unfortunately it has no corresponding verb. Mr. Sorley (in his book on *Moral Values and the Idea of God*) has recently used it a good deal in connexion with the work of imagination (pp. 252, 262, 463, etc.). 'Synthetic' of course is misleading. It seems to imply the pre-existence of disconnected elements. Mr. Ward brought out long ago its unsatisfactoriness in psychology on this account. But, at any rate, whatever we may think of the language, Mr. Fawcett's exposition of what he understands by 'consciring' is certainly one of the most interesting and instructive parts of his work.

The general doctrine of Imagination, however, is perhaps not quite as new as Mr. Fawcett seems to believe. Though he refers to Frohschammer, he does not appear to be acquainted with the interesting work on *Die Phantasie als Grundprincip des Weltprocesses*, in which the general significance of Imagination as a creative power is discussed. It is true that Frohschammer professed to eschew metaphysics, and set forth his doctrine in a more tentative and much less fascinating form than Mr. Fawcett. But the general conception appears to be similar. Many metaphysical 'idealists' also have, more or less explicitly, recognised the creative function of imagination. Hegel himself is never more in his element than when (as in the *Æsthetic*) he is dealing with imaginative creations. Edward Caird, one of the most faithful of Hegel's disciples, once remarked that any one who understood Shakespeare would have gone a long way towards the understanding of God—which seems to be a way of saying that the world is to be regarded as a product of creative imagination. Mr. Pringle-Pattison also, who, though somewhat critical of Hegel's work, is to a large extent associated with the same idealistic tradition, has declared (*The Idea of God*, p. 127) that 'the truth of the poetic imagination is perhaps the

profoundest doctrine of a true philosophy'; and has even quoted with approval the saying of Mr. Yeats, that 'whatever of philosophy has been made poetry is alone permanent'. Mr. Sorley's recent work has already been referred to. He says in one passage (p. 262) 'The philosophical synopsis is a process in which imagination is called in to construct a new intuition, based on the facts and connexions laid bare by analysis, but imitating the togetherness or wholeness of perception'. Is not this 'conciring'?

Such anticipations or parallels, however, do not either impair the value of Mr. Fawcett's work or detract from its originality. They only serve to show that the theory which he seeks to maintain is one that many people have been feeling after and partly recognising. No one, so far as I am aware, has definitely worked it out as a bold metaphysical construction; and certainly no one has brought it so impressively into relation to the speculative thought of our time. And we may say of him, as Aristotle said of Plato, that his discourses 'are never commonplace; they always exhibit grace and originality and thought'. But it may be well to continue the quotation: 'Perfection in everything can hardly be expected'. There are at least some parts of Mr. Fawcett's work that I find it difficult to follow. He certainly ventures on somewhat daring speculations with regard to the way in which the creative Imagination may be supposed to have worked in the evolution of our world. He admits that what he says about this is only to be regarded as a tentative hypothesis—for 'dogmatism on issues of cosmic range is out of place' (p. 41). But in some respects at least one may question the plausibility of the hypothesis. The idea of a 'metaphysical fall' (pp. 186 and 225) is not altogether novel, and it is no doubt a convenient way of evading a difficulty; but it is surely not easy to reconcile it with the idea of a synoptic creative principle. One seems almost to miss the 'infernal serpent'. And, if the significance of the imaginative construction is to be taken seriously, one would suppose that it must have been due to a rise rather than a fall. It is somewhat difficult, indeed, to see at all definitely how the creative principle is to be understood. Mr. Fawcett states emphatically that the divine Imagination is not to be regarded as 'personal' (pp. 73, 217, 219); yet it would seem at least that it satisfies Mr. Balfour's criterion of personality—it 'takes sides'. It has to be noted, however, that Mr. Fawcett postulates (especially in chap. x.) a limited God, or perhaps limited gods and even demons, in addition to the Cosmic Imagination. But the relations between these do not seem to be made altogether clear. Again, the problem of time is touched upon much too lightly by Mr. Fawcett. 'There is no time,' he says, 'apart from time content' (p. 110). Agreed. But the time process, it would seem, has to make a beginning. It is, one gathers, a creation of the Divine Imagining. Such a beginning is surely even more difficult to picture than to conceive. Mr. Fawcett, like some other speculative philosophers, favours the hypothesis of recurring cycles; but he thinks of the cycles as

succeeding one another with modifications, like the successive editions of a book (p. 149). This is, in some ways, an attractive supposition; but at least it seems to imply something of the nature of 'trial and error' and a certain lack of foresight. 'Deliberation,' he says (p. 190), 'is a secondary phenomenon within a world, and one necessary to ignorance and weakness alone'. But I should have thought that 'trial and error' was even more obviously a sign of ignorance. He suggests that Imagining 'creates as a lark sings'; but it seems to be rather more like Browning's 'wise thrush' that repeats its notes twice over; and apparently it makes some false notes. In order to account for the presence of evil in the world, Mr. Fawcett is forced to recognise (pp. 143-144) an element of chance. But this seems to imply the existence of conditions external to the Divine Imagining. We seem to be involved in a dualism here, as Frohschammer perhaps even more obviously was. If we were to regard imagination as being, in Kant's phrase, a 'blind faculty,' it would be more easy to admit that it might sometimes lose its way; but its gift of 'conscíring' ought surely to save it from such aberrations. Obviously Mr. Fawcett combines an intense realisation of the evils that exist in our world with an equally intense conviction that they will all ultimately be removed. It is a pity, I think, that he has not taken more account of the conception of a 'creation of creators' suggested by Howison and emphasised by Ward. This at least does furnish some explanation of the imperfection of finite individualities and of the conditions with which they have to deal. If evil means opportunity for creative activity, it is at least not as bad as it seems; and if, as Mr. Fawcett appears to believe, creative imagination is the supremest bliss (p. 100), we have not much reason to complain that some of the creating has to be done by us. There is, indeed, one striking passage (p. 189) in which this solution is pretty definitely hinted at. 'The Duchess d'Abrantès said of Napoleon's minions, after the return from Elba, "Ces hommes n'étaient pas les siens, ils étaient eux-mêmes". With the birth of the sentients Divine Imagining surrenders in part Its control. The sentients are not wholly Its, but also "eux-mêmes"!' But, if this is allowed, it hardly seems necessary to appeal to chance or to postulate a revised edition of the universe more nearly in accordance with the heart's desire. As Mr. Fawcett himself remarks (p. 102), 'there are symphonies that transform discords'. If once chance is admitted (though perhaps Mr. Ward's 'contingency' is not open to this objection), we seem to allow something that is quite beyond the control of the Divine Imagining; and, if this is allowed, how are we to justify the complete confidence that Mr. Fawcett evidently has in a 'far-off divine event'? The objection is no doubt partly removed by the recognition of subordinate gods. 'In the end,' Mr. Fawcett says (p. 234), 'all will be well, but the young sub-system . . . cannot escape the trials and misadventures incidental to its youth'. To one who is not acquainted with any of the gods or demons that are presupposed in Mr. Fawcett's account, it is hardly possible to

pass judgment on their wild oats or on their prospects of maturity; but it would seem at least that the Divine Imagining must be to some extent responsible for their upbringing. It almost looks as if they might profit by a mission from some of our newer educationalists. Of course, as Mr. Fawcett says in a different connexion (p. 223), 'our private imagining . . . is not adequate to cosmic imagining; and modesty enjoins reticence'. Still, if we put forward any hypotheses, we must try to make them as intelligible and coherent as possible.

There is a great deal of interesting material (some of it rather elaborate and highly speculative) in Mr. Fawcett's book with which it would not be possible to deal satisfactorily in such a review as this. It is very probable that some—it may be all—of the criticisms that I have made are due to an imperfect grasp of the author's meaning. It takes some time for his ideas to soak in. It is to be hoped that he will not fail to bring out before long the book on Individuality, which ought to clear up much that still remains a little dark. In general, it appears to me that he has made out a good case for assigning to imagination a larger place than it has hitherto held in the interpretation of the Cosmos; but I am not wholly convinced that it can stand so completely alone as he appears to suppose. I think he treats the logical understanding too slightingly and the conception of value too slightly. The former defect is perhaps a legacy from his more pragmatic and pluralistic period. But, with all the qualifications that may have to be made, it must be allowed that he has produced an attractive book that should be read by every one who cares for the more speculative aspects of philosophy. Even if his theories are not entirely novel, and not entirely clear and convincing, his independent method of developing them and the suggestiveness of his exposition may well make his book serve as a landmark in metaphysical speculation.

I have only to add that the book is furnished with an admirable Table of Contents, but is unfortunately without an Index—a serious deficiency in a book of this kind.

J. S. Mackenzie.

The Reign of Relativity. By Viscount Haldane. Third Edition. John Murray, 1921.

Lord Haldane has written a remarkable book and it has had a remarkable reception. Both the book and its reception are significant. The book contains nothing sensational in its doctrine, even from the philosophical standpoint. It does not profess to put forward a new concept and therefore does not challenge comparison with works such as, to mention only contemporaries, Bergson's *Creative Evolution*, Croce's *Aesthetic*, or even Alexander's recent *Space, Time and Deity*. Yet it is admittedly a work of primary philosophical importance. Its reception, moreover, can

hardly be accounted for by the political and legal eminence of its author, nor by the public interest in the mathematical theory of relativity, nor even by the impatient eagerness of the philosophical public to read another exposition of Einstein. Yet the book was sold out in the first week of publication and within three months there is a third edition with revisions and additions. It is not difficult, however, to indicate the reason of this when we have regard to something peculiarly piquant in the present position of philosophy and its relation to the natural sciences.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the influence of Hegel became, almost suddenly, the dominating influence in philosophical speculation. That influence has never been lost though it has manifested itself in various, often apparently directly opposite, directions. It began with the affirmation that mind and its activity, thought, or to use the Greek technical term, the Logos, is fundamental and all-comprehending reality. It set this forth in a phenomenology of mind as the basis of philosophy and in the formulation of a logic no longer purely formal but material. Yet there was one aspect of that philosophy, or rather one whole body of doctrine proclaimed by it and essentially a part of it, which for a whole century has simply seemed to call for apology. Every good Hegelian in fact has tried either to explain away, or at least to modify in his own case, the attitude which Hegel assumed towards the natural sciences, their axioms and postulates, and the methods followed by those who pursued them. Hegel's philosophy of Nature had to be tolerated, it could not be explained away, but it brought reproach on his whole system. Hegel himself was uncompromising. He poured contempt on the achievements of science, stoned its idols, and scorned its champions. To the patient scientific worker he seemed thereby only to cover himself with ridicule. The consequence was that throughout the great scientific nineteenth century the sciences ceased more and more to look to philosophy for support and became ever more estranged from it. In one case, indeed, that of the positive philosophy of Auguste Comte, the sciences cast off metaphysics as the enemy of true philosophy. Strong and self-confident they pursued their course and seemed at last, not indeed to reach finality, but to have established finally the general principle of scientific advance, however limitless the vista of knowledge might prove to be. In the twentieth century we are conscious of a notable change. The advance in knowledge has not, as was so confidently expected, brought new matter under old generalisations, on the contrary it has brought disconcerting dilemmas in the generalisations, and compelled revision of accepted principles. The extension of science has brought to view facts which do not accord with our postulates, and it is not the facts but the postulates which are suspect. Stranger still, from pure science itself, perfected and equipped with contrivances and with attainments such as Hegel had no power even to imagine, there comes the proposal to adopt

the Hegelian principle as the true scientific principle. For this, when it is interpreted, is what the new principle of relativity proves to be.

And what meanwhile has philosophy itself been doing? In the last thirty years philosophical speculation has tended more and more to group itself round two central and directly opposite and contradictory positions. One has taken the thinghood of the thing as the typical reality and emphasised the objectivity of existence and the subjectivity of the knowing relation; the other has taken the mind and its activity as the immediate intuition of reality, and conceived the fundamental universal reality as an original activity of which the individual mind is the type. The chief influences in consolidating the first or realist position have come from American philosophers, although we have notable exponents in England and perhaps the most complete systematic presentation of it in Mr. Alexander's book already referred to. The most striking formulations of modern idealist theory have come from the Latin countries, notably from Bergson in France, and from Croce in Italy, our own idealist philosophers, Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet, having followed more traditional lines. That is to say, they follow Hegel in conceiving the activity as fundamentally and essentially intellectual, as distinct from Schopenhauer who took will and Bergson who takes *élan vital* as original activity and intellect as derived, and from Croce who distinguishes an æsthetic activity which is not logical. But, speaking generally, modern philosophers either affirm that mind is a thing or a group of things or the property of a thing or of a group of things, or at least that it must be treated as such, and that its activity in knowing is essentially passive discernment; or, they affirm that mind is neither a thing nor a property but original and originating activity, and that the object of knowledge both in its form and in its matter is the expression of that activity.

Now the strength of philosophical realism, one might almost say its *raison d'être*, is physical science. Knowledge, it is held, in its ordinary (*a fortiori* in its scientific) intension, is not only meaningless, it is an unsubstantial shadow unless it have its roots in an existence which has absolutely no dependence on mind and the mind's activity in knowing. There is a difficulty in realism—the realist is fully aware of it—it is that we can only adopt the position of an independent existence by assuming it, for knowing it clearly cannot validate its independence. Yet if the assumption is necessary, and it is necessary if science depends on it, then it is the business of philosophy to verify and validate it. This is the vulnerable point in the theory of realism. On the other hand, the weakness of idealism is its apparent subjectivity, and its consequent attitude to science. It has generally acknowledged the necessity in science to assume independent existence for its subject-matter, and it has contented itself with pointing out the theoretical defect and the practical ground on which, and on which alone, it

may be justified. And now science, of itself, working along its own lines, has made the discovery that it has no need of the assumption, and still more that the assumption is positively invalid and an actual obstacle to scientific progress.

"If the principle of relativity is well-founded the very basis of New Realism seems to disappear into vapour" (p. 277). Precisely: let us take an example. Everyone acquainted with the controversial writings of the new realists is familiar with the problem illustrated in the elliptical appearances of the penny. It is the crucial test of the realist theory. There must be some sense, if realism is true, in which the penny *is* round even when and even though all its appearances are elliptical. The principle of relativity cuts away the whole ground on which the problem is posited. For according to the principle of relativity the proposition that the penny is round, if intended in any absolute sense, or if applied to any existence independent of a system of reference, is both meaningless and scientifically worthless. More than this the proposition can be positively disproved because for any actual system of reference for which it is true there are infinite possible and innumerable actual systems for which it is false. And yet more than this, if the observer change his system of reference for which the proposition that the penny is round is true, for another system for which while he is in the first system it is false, in changing to that system he makes it true for that system. What becomes of the realist's problem when paradoxical facts have to be acknowledged as indisputable fact? Science has left the realist in the lurch. He went out of his way under the supposed paramount necessity of being faithful to science, and science rejects his hypothesis. It is the idealist who was faint-hearted and is now rallied by science. "Why are ye fearful, O ye of little faith."

Lord Haldane has added in his third edition a further elucidation of the fact which had led to the formulation of the principle of relativity, the observed constancy of the velocity of the propagation of light. It is the result of the opportunity he has had, since the book was published, of discussing the subject with Einstein himself, and it makes clear precisely why, and in what particular respect, theory of knowledge is involved. When we analyse closely the nature of the process by which we compound velocities in the familiar cases of railway trains and the like, which consists in translating observed changes of position into constant units, say of miles and seconds, we see that it depends absolutely on our power of assuming a particular system to be at rest and of our being able to make use of that assumption. In all the ordinary cases of movements which we can observe in our practical experience, we are able to make this assumption, we do make it, and we can make use of it. In the case of the propagation of light and the compounding of its velocity with the velocities of translation, *i.e.*, with the velocity of the earth's own relative translation, we appear to be able to do the same, and in fact Newton

thought he had done so when he assumed his absolute space and time. But in fact we have no ground for the assumption and cannot make it, and if we seem to make it we cannot use the assumption we seem to have made. Newton did not really use his assumption though he thought it necessary. It finds no place in his actual equations of movement. It is this fact, that we cannot compound the velocities of the translations of systems with the velocity of the propagation of light because we cannot assume a system of absolute rest or make any use of a conception of absolute rest, that is expressed for us in the constant velocity of light. Because we cannot assume rest, our units of co-ordination (miles and seconds) transform themselves automatically. Now what does this mean in metaphysics? Clearly it can only mean that pure objectivity is a senseless abstraction. It is not measurable because it is not even conceivable. The concrete reality, the only reality the mathematician or the metaphysician can deal with is subject-object. This is essentially and substantially the position of modern idealism.

Lord Haldane's idealism has its own distinctive form. It is more faithful to the original Hegelian position than any other actual idealism. When Croce, for example, has told us what is dead in Hegel, we cannot help feeling that what is living has lost most of the magnificent grandeur of the original. It is this grandeur of the Hegelian concept which still holds its spell over Lord Haldane. For him as for Hegel the phenomenology of mind is all-comprehensive and the reasoning process is revealed as one and identical in every detail and in every department of its activity. This comes out with peculiar force in a criticism of Mr. Russell's methods, and leads to the contrast of the two different ideals of philosophy. "In literature, in art, in religion do we reason in ways like this?" he asks in reference to the formal principles of deduction illustrated in processes of mathematical reasoning (p. 283). The difference of the two ideals is not that for one the great spiritual problems, for the other minute problems of logical analysis, are the main attraction, it is that for one the problems are abstract and narrowly specialised, for the other the concrete life of the whole animates and reveals itself in the apparently least significant process. The same idea underlies the question with which he challenges the mechanistic position in biology. "If the categories of life are as much part of a non-mental world as are those of mechanism, why are not the categories of morals and beauty and religion also part of it?"

There is a minor point of some interest in Lord Haldane's account of Realism and Idealism. He gives Thomas Reid the credit of having been the first to reject the theory of representative perception (p. 295). Realists are indeed accustomed to vaunt this claim but historically it is not just. It was Berkeley who rejected the representative theory and that so effectually that it was impossible to revive it without incurring the charge of absurdity. So when Reid opposed his common-sense to Hume's scepticism, he

did not even attempt to rehabilitate Locke's representative theory. If it is a merit in Reid that he did not, or in any realist that he does not, hold a representative theory, it is because it is so difficult to be a realist and avoid it. If, as science assumes, the real object is not perceived but causes the perception then the perception must be representative. Idealism has no corresponding difficulty.

It is not, however, in the criticism of the new realism so much as in the expression of his dissent from various forms of idealism that the distinctive character of Lord Haldane's own philosophy appears. It is clear that Bergson's theory of the intellect—the idea that the activity described by Schopenhauer as will and by Bergson as life is wider and more fundamental than logic, and that intellect is a distorted mode of apprehending reality for a practical end and itself a product of creative evolution—is distasteful to him. He is sympathetic to Bergson's philosophy generally and especially to those parts of it which approach most closely to the Hegelian position. In one particular case he has pointed out and quoted a remarkable passage in the preface of the Phenomenology (Hegel's *Werke*, II., p. 35) in which Hegel seems to anticipate Bergson's *vraie durée*. The pure form of time, Hegel says, is an abstraction, its real character is that of *angeschaute Werden*, and as such it is inseparable from space.

Lord Haldane has not studied Croce or Gentile. With the latter especially he would probably find himself in almost complete agreement. He is at his best in his exposition of Hegel: and if the reader would know what in its fulness Lord Haldane takes the Hegelian doctrine to mean he will find its best expression in the interpretation of Goethe's *Faust* (p. 363).

According to this philosophy the reality of the universe is spiritual not material. Mind is not a kind of thing which looks out of the windows of a body and contemplates scenes of interest or a stage of action. Thought and knowledge are the universal concrete reality manifesting itself at different levels. Time, space, finite individuality are neither the ultimate stuff nor the absolute condition of existence. The universal activity is not transcendent but immanent in every form, in every degree, and at every level of reality, and these forms, degrees and levels are its expression. This is the kind of concept Lord Haldane has expounded in his *Reign of Relativity*.

H. Wildon Carr.

VI.—NEW BOOKS.

Psychologie du Raisonnement. Par Eugenio Rignano, Directeur de la Revue internationale 'Scientia'. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1920. Pp. ix + 544. Prix 15 francs.

M. Rignano was thrown into a "vague state of uneasiness" by reading a number of the "best books on logic". For he found that they gave him no satisfactory account of the processes of reasoning with which they professed to deal. Accordingly he turned to the psychologists. But to his surprise he discovered that they hardly dealt with reasoning processes at all. Thrown back upon himself he remained for a long time unhappy: "Finalement, un beau jour, au moment où j'y pensais le moins, je vis tout à coup, et clairement, ce dont la recherche me tourmentait depuis quelque temps, c'est à dire que m'apparut le véritable mécanisme du raisonnement, tel qu'il résulte du jeu combiné de multiples activités de l'esprit". One of his discoveries was that reasoning is a complex process. Not only so, but the various subordinate processes which enter into reasoning also appeared complex. M. Rignano therefore set to work to analyse the complexity. In his book he reverses this procedure, and starting from those processes which he regards as truly elementary, builds up his account of the complicated and highly developed reaction which is commonly called "reasoning proper". The result is that a book which was intended solely as a treatise on reasoning, turns out to be "un traité complet de psychologie". No psychologist will be surprised at this result.

M. Rignano has written a bulky treatise. But the theory is a simple one, and can be expressed in a few words. The most fundamental characteristic of all systems of any kind whatever is a tendency to retain their equilibrium. If the system in question is organic in character, a disturbance of its order of arrangement may be either externally or internally initiated, but in both cases the system tends to return to the resting state which it had exhibited prior to the disturbance. From this return to equilibrium spring all needs and appetites: all movements of approach or withdrawal; of attack or flight; of acceptance or rejection: "cette seule tendance physiologique d'ordre général suffit pour donner lieu à toute une série de tendances affectives particulières des plus variées".

It may happen, however, that radical change has occurred either within or without the organism, in such a way that mere return to an original state of equilibrium is impossible. Then a partial return occurs, and we have a new resting state of "adaptation". Once any particular state of "adaptation" has been secured, and has persisted for some time, it acquires a tendency to recur. This is the tendency, "que possède chaque accumulation mnémonique en général". "Affective tendencies" then are all those modes of reaction which an organism adopts either in returning to a state of equilibrium which has been disturbed, or in acquiring a new state of "adaptation". They include all "needs," "appetites," interests, and all the executive side of instincts; but they are to be distinguished carefully from affective-tone—which merely accompanies them—and from

emotions, which seem to be treated merely as marking their sudden burst into action.

Suppose that an organism is disturbed in some way. At once there arises an "affective tendency" by the aid of which the organism may be adjusted to the changed situation. The adjustment, being really a mnemonic function, tends naturally to re-establish an old mode of response. But this, particularly as the situation to which adaptation is required may be only partially old, may involve the organism in serious difficulties. Accordingly there arises a new tendency, of a perfectly general character, one of hesitation, or of "is this really the sort of thing to be done now?" The strife of the "primary affective tendency," towards adaptation, with the "secondary affective tendency," towards hesitation, brings to birth Attention.

Attention deals always with cognitive details, with sense data, percepts, images, and ideas, determining their vividness and their relations by way of association. Rignano is not altogether sure about the vividness factor, and puts it down in part to "une augmentation ou une diminution dans la *quantité active* d'énergie nerveuse spécifique constituant telle sensation ou tel souvenir"—a statement the interpretation of which is very far from clear. But the association of cognitive elements effected through attention is directly due to the conflict between some primary affective tendency which has a specific end, and the secondary affective tendency of hesitation, or "desire" to avoid error.

Rignano is now prepared to answer the question, "What is reasoning?" Suppose a practical problem arises. There is the primary affective tendency to get rid of the question, and maintain equilibrium. Then there are generally a number of more specific affective tendencies leading to different experimental modes of solution, each one of these being attempted by actual manipulation. They are all controlled by a secondary affective tendency whose function it is to criticise, and by whose aid alternative solutions have a common end, and display internal coherence. Let the solutions be attempted, not by actual manipulation, but in terms of images, ideas, and thought, and we have reasoning. Reasoning thus is simply "une suite d'opérations ou d'expériences simplement pensees". It is literally nothing but a "*Gedankenexperiment*," to use Mach's term. It has this advantage over manipulation that infinitely more alternatives can be tried; and this disadvantage, that the chances of error are infinitely multiplied.

This brings us to the end of Rignano's fourth chapter. The next five chapters are occupied by an exhaustive study of the development of different forms of the trial and error behaviour which culminate in reasoning, from those of the lowest animals to those of the highest philosophers. Dialectic and "metaphysical" reasoning are next considered, and a chapter on "les diverses mentalités logiques" follows. Then come three thoroughly interesting sections on the "pathology of reasoning".

Dreams are, in striking contrast to certain other modern theories, treated as "non-affective" phenomena, while various forms of madness are put down either to "mono-affectivisme," or else to disturbances in certain of the special affective tendencies. The chapter on dreams is most ingenious, stimulating, and unsound. To say that the illogical nature of dreams is due to their purely intellectual character is delightful as paradox, but unconvincing. The fact is that dreams display about as many different tendencies of all kinds as does waking life, and no simple explanation is adequate to their interpretation. However, if only Rignano's chapter could awaken the "secondary affective tendency" of certain of the Freudians, and make them hesitate a little before their own structures, it might do excellent work.

In a brief conclusion Rignano tries to show how his views demonstrate that all life is committed to an endless struggle between the mechanism of the external world, and its own inner urge towards an imperfectly determined end.

In spite of its inordinate length, this book is thoroughly worth reading. It contains a large number of interesting and original ideas, and it attacks its problems with great daring, a lively fancy, and no small degree of insight. Yet it is unsatisfactory, and for these main reasons :—

(*a*) "mnemonic accumulation" is supposed to explain everything, and is in consequence so general as to be of very little help in reference to any specific difficulty;

(*b*) the connexion between the specific affective tendencies and "mnemonic accumulation" is not made clear;

(*c*) to lump all tendencies together and call them "affective" is to obscure the fact that they differ greatly among themselves, both as to their modes of origin, and as to their modes of operation;

(*d*) to say that reasoning occurs when manipulation is replaced by thinking (*i.e.*, when dealing with things at hand is replaced by dealing with things at a distance) is hopeless, since the obvious fact is that reasoning may occur *in* the process of manipulation just as well as outside of it;

(*e*) even if this characterisation were correct, it still would not answer the question of what reasoning is, but only of when it occurs;

(*f*) the chapters on the pathology of reasoning show a greater acquaintance with the literature of the subject than directly with the facts which they discuss, and, perhaps in consequence of this, they tend to ignore many of these facts—night-mares aside, it is, for example, simply a mistake to say that dreams are non-affective in Rignano's sense of the term;

(*g*) the relations between "affective tendencies," affective-tone, and emotion, though they are discussed, are not adequately considered.

Rignano's book is of great value for its suggestive treatment of a mass of psychological problems; but it by no means sets those problems to rest.

F. C. B.

Sceptica. By Adolfo Levi. Paravia & Co., Turin. [Undated.] Pp. 196.

Mr. Levi, whose excellent Platonic studies I had the pleasure of commending to the readers of a recent issue of Mind, in this well-written little volume plays the part, as his title would suggest, of Sextus Empiricus to all the "dogmatists" in philosophy from Plotinus down to Bergson, Croce, and Gentile. But there is a marked difference in temper between our modern sceptic and his ancient prototype. Both write with a light and agreeable touch in a way that can be understood by the average educated man, but Sextus is throughout cheerful, not to say jaunty. Mr. Levi speaks, in words which plainly come from the heart, of the condition of universal doubt as one of intense inner gloom and mental torture. And I do not wonder that he finds it so. The result of his examination is that every philosophy which professes to tell us anything about reality is condemned. Even the most thorough-going "idealist" is found to make somewhere or other the "realistic" assumption that we can know something about "objective" being. But, objects Mr. Levi, there is no ground for this assumption. In our experience we are all through shut up in the circle of the personal and subjective, and there is no outlet from it. Provisionally then, the least illogical of all doctrines would be rigid Solipsism. It is true that Solipsism is in absolute conflict with Ethics, for in Ethics

—Mr. Levi's "universal doubt" does not seem to have affected his confidence on this point—obligation is categorical and absolute. We ought unconditionally to act on the assumption that we have fellow-men and binding duties to them. We might, as Solipsists, make shift to get over the clash between our theory and our practice by urging that the rules of thinking and the results of logical thinking only concern us so long as we choose to play at the game of thought; action is a different game, and has its own rules. But there is worse behind. As we have no standard but thought itself by which to gauge the worth of our thinking, we cannot be sure that thought itself is not fundamentally wrong-headed. The superior logicality of Solipsism is thus no guarantee of its truth. The least coherent of philosophical theories may, after all, be the nearest to the facts. So Mr. Levi is left in the end doubtful even of his Solipsism, only sure that he must "do his duty" even if human life should have no real significance, and drawing what comfort he can from the thought that perhaps it is braver to do your duty on these terms than it would be if you knew that the whole business meant something.

It will hardly be expected that I should undertake an elaborate discussion of Mr. Levi's discussion of the errors of the dogmatists, which is always suggestive, even when it is least convincing. Of course he is right in saying that even the most "idealistic" system does make what he calls the "realistic assumption," and I think this should have suggested to him that very possibly the assumption is sound. It seems to me that his whole argument is vitiated by a false analysis of the act of experiencing itself. Like so many philosophical writers, he assumes that what we apprehend in an experience is the "content" of a personal and subjective process. I submit that we never apprehend the "content" of the process at all but in every case an "object" towards which the process is directed, and that, consequently, we have no need to escape by a miracle from a circle in which we have never been confined. To take an example; only the other day I received and read a friendly communication from Mr. Levi himself. I submit that Mr. Levi's communication which I read was not in any intelligible sense the "content" of the "subjective" process of reading; it was an object towards which that process (or, as I should prefer to say, that act), was directed. This is why I do not myself believe that the analysis of experience lends any support to Solipsism. And as for the still more ultimate doubt about the validity of thought itself, is Mr. Levi sure that it has an intelligible meaning? What do we suppose ourselves to mean when we talk of a "reality" by which we might test the validity of thinking? If we doubt whether one "hypothesis" will "save" all the "appearances," of course we look out for another which will "save" them. But if we have an "hypothesis" which does justice to all the "appearances," what is meant by the suggestion that it may after all be a false account of "reality"? Is not Mr. Levi rather like a child who is crying for the moon? I might add that at times his employment of some of the perennial *cruces* (the antitheses of the One and the Many, the Infinite and the Finite, and the like), seems to me to involve the common fallacy of the "omitted alternative". And in one place there is what is not usual in Mr. Levi, a simple mistake about facts. It is not true that Kant committed the blunder of first denying that the Categories are valid of *noumena* and then using the Category of Causality to connect *noumena* with appearances. Kant is quite clear on the point that the only reason why we cannot apply the Categories to the *noumena* is that we have no direct acquaintance with *noumena* and so do not posses the means of "schematising" the Categories for *noumena*. That in some way the Categories, as the basis of all interrelation, do apply to *noumena* is assumed to be certain. The question I should, however, most like to put to Mr.

Levi is whether he has ever tried to draw any distinction between motived and unmotived doubt. If we find a theory working out to a formal denial of its own postulates, or, again, absolutely in contradiction of established facts, we have a sound motive for suspecting its truth, but the very suspicion reposes on the assumption that there really is a rational scheme of things. It is because we make this "realistic" assumption that we suspect a theory which appears to lead us into a contradiction. But the suggestion that "all thinking may perhaps be vicious" amounts to an unmotived and purely wanton scepticism. It seems to me really much on a level with the alleged doubt of the German metaphysician whether the planet we call Jupiter "really is Jupiter" or not. And there are two final remarks I would make. I am not sure that Mr. Levi does not assume that the difficulties he raises about Theism or Monadism do not prove these doctrines to be not only self-contradictory but false. This, if he means it, is in him an inconsistency. If thought is possibly inherently fallacious there is no reason why the most self-contradictory theory ever propounded should not happen to be the exact truth. Also I do not think he is really entitled, even provisionally, to fall back for comfort on duty and its imperatives. We need thought to discover the path of duty as much as to discover the path of a planet, and if thought cannot be trusted I do not see how we are to know that we have duties at all, or, if we have, what in particular they are. This destroys Mr. Levi's last hope of comfort. It may be brave to fight in the dark against an unseen foe, if you believe you are fighting for the "good cause". But I see no special moral heroism in letting off a gun into the night at random, if you do not know whether you are aiming at any one nor, if you are, whether the target may not be your best friend.

A. E. Taylor.

Our Social Heritage. By Graham Wallas. London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921. Pp. 292.

Readers of *Human Nature in Politics* and of *The Great Society* will know that a new work by Prof. Graham Wallas is sure to contain remarks on a considerable number of topics. This is still more the case with the present volume, where the author, though excluding from consideration certain sections of our social heritage, leaves as his subject "the ideas, habits, and institutions directly concerned in the political, economic, and social organisation of those modern communities which constitute that which he called in 1914 *The Great Society*". He is led to consider successively, the expedients "by which the work and thought of individual human beings can be directed," the training of men when associated in groups, "the co-operation among members of a nation," and the attempts at world-co-operation. The ideas of liberty, natural rights, honour, and the like, the effect of supra-national influences such as those of science or of the Church, the dangers of professionalism, the value of such an institution as constitutional monarchy, come in for discussion by the way.

Different parts of the book will accordingly be interesting to different readers. Prof. Graham Wallas is always stimulating, his criticism, though it may not produce agreement, is never unreasonable, and those criticised will do well to consider what he has to say. Lawyers will probably find the section on the independence of judges among the less convincing parts of the argument, but they will recognise some force in what is said about their professionalism and their conservatism, points on which a certain number of lawyers have been ready to insist for themselves. Doctors may find that the author treats as though they were comparatively simple

questions of adjustment which are found difficult in practice, but they will note with appreciation his plea for division of labour. Members of the army may reject as impracticable the suggestion that an officer, even if specially able, should receive "part of his training on the sea and in the air as well as on land" (for this is a question of what is technically possible), but they will do well to consider their relation to the other departments of the state, which is discussed by Prof. Graham Wallas, if not dispassionately, yet with such an amount of detachment as is reasonably possible. Teachers will have no cause to complain that their importance is underrated; and they will be wise if they bear in mind all that is said about the large amount of teaching which has to be and is being done by amateurs. Teachers in the older Universities, though they may note that the author's information is not quite up to date, will no doubt be ready to consider suggestions which would add "perhaps 30 per cent." to the efficiency of their instruction. The student of nineteenth century history, of the development of party politics, or of the psychology of meetings as exhibited in recent important instances, will find much to attract him. Those who are concerned with the present position of the Church of England in relation to social and political questions, will sympathise with the author in the difficulty of ascertaining what that position is; they will probably suspect that some of the authorities cited by him do not carry great weight, and that some of them are liable to be influenced by a desire to correct, if not to contradict, the utterances of their contemporaries; but, without entering in this place on theological discussion, we may safely advise those who base their hopes of human improvement largely on religious influences to think carefully over the impression made by some of the most important branches of the Christian Church on a painstaking and, in part at least, a sympathetic critic.

Readers of this journal will probably, apart from the attraction which so multifarious a book is bound to have for many individuals of different kinds, feel a common and special interest in two matters.

One of these concerns the question of local or professional representation in the state, about which so much has been and is being written. In *The Great Society* Mr. Wallas, while recognising the defects of purely local representation and feeling doubts as to the possibility of remedying these completely by representation of minorities or by proportional representation, refused to be led into the purely professional organisation which the syndicalists desire, and suggested a compromise embodying both principles to some extent. In the present volume he adds to this by a useful criticism of Mr. Cole's recently-published *Social Theory*. He objects to Mr. Cole's distinction between the state, as being concerned with men's identity and not with their differences, and the organised vocations, as being concerned with the separate interests of the groups, on the ground that the state does not as a matter of fact show so great a tendency to uniformity in its administration as do the organised industries. It is true that this criticism appears to be rather unfortunate in form, as Mr. Cole's contention is, not that the state treats everyone alike, but that it is concerned with the interests which all citizens have in common: there is no reason why a body should not, in dealing with those common interests, pay due regard to individual differences. But the tendency of vocational groups to adopt rigid and uniform rules, on which Mr. Wallas lays so much stress, affords an additional reason for the central co-ordinating body being a strong one; and this is a point which those who agree with Mr. Cole would do well to bear in mind.

The second point is a more general one. Mr. Wallas is continually reminding us, whether in a critical or in a constructive mood, of the value of psychology and the psychological method of approach to the problems of

political philosophy. One passage suggests that he does not entirely understand the ground on which objection is taken by some people to this point of view. After some just remarks to the effect that, though a physiological psychologist may avoid terms such as 'consciousness, mental states, mind, etc.,' it does not follow that consciousness and the rest do not exist, he replies to a criticism by Mr. Ernest Barker which appears to Mr. Wallas to be misleading. Mr. Barker (*Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the present day*) has said that 'to analyse the processes of social instinct that lie in the dim background of a society now united in the pursuit of a common moral object is not to explain the real nature or the real cause of such a society,' and Mr. Wallas comments that 'the "pursuit of a common moral object" is not, apparently, part of the legitimate subject-matter of psychological science'. It is not likely that Mr. Barker objects to the fact that psychologists study this subject: his point is that the psychological analysis taken by itself is likely to direct attention to the wrong point and not likely to lead to a solution of the problem. Habits which were originally developed for one purpose may serve a purpose which is entirely different: a study of the habit and of its history may convince us that its purpose has so changed and that its survival is caused in part by mere thoughtlessness or want of critical reflexion, but this study, like other historical studies, cannot enable us by itself to pass judgment on the institution which it serves. The value of an institution can only be tested by consideration of its tendency to promote social good or whatever else our object may be, that is to say, by arguments which may be biological or ethical or metaphysical but which can hardly be psychological. No one is concerned to undervalue the importance of what the psychologist has to contribute: he can help us much as to means, and, at any rate indirectly, as to ends. But is not the psychologist too much inclined to assert his complete independence for all purposes? We, none of us, have any wish for bad metaphysics, but can we dispense with metaphysics altogether?

P. V. M. Benecke.

Addresses on Psycho-analysis. By J. J. Putnam, M.D., with a preface by S. Freud. The International Psycho-analytical Press, 1921. Pp. 470 + v.

The International Psycho-analytical Library is to be congratulated on issuing as the opening volume of its series this collection of addresses by the late Prof. James Putnam, who died in 1918 at the age of 72. They are of particular interest and value in that they were written by a clinician of vast experience during the last ten years of his life, and moreover by one who had a great reputation as a Professor of Neurology at Harvard University. They are arranged in chronological order and are for the most part expositions of some of the principles of the Freudian theory. The book as a whole is by no means a complete exposition of psycho-analysis, and it has the objections inherent in this method of publication that it lacks continuity in subject matter and that it involves a large amount of repetition. On the other hand it gives us the advantage of being able to follow out the gradual development of Putnam's views and of being able to recognise his difficulties, and also of being able to realise more fully the deep sense of conviction with which he wrote and which is stamped almost on every page, both conviction as regards those points which satisfied him that Freud was right and conviction as to his beliefs that in many points Freud was wrong.

In spite of much opposition the psycho-analytical movement has been

steadily gaining ground during the last few years, and it requires a man with sound judgment and experience to view these theories in their right perspective and to estimate the elements of strength and the elements of weakness in Freud's doctrine at their proper value. This Putnam has done with his characteristic open-mindedness.

He would seem to agree with much of the criticism put forward by other impartial observers that many of Freud's conceptions, which are based on a knowledge of the psycho-neurotic mind, cannot be applied altogether to mankind in general, and he is of the opinion that Freud underestimates the importance of the conscious life. But he maintains that in so far as it is possible for anyone to investigate human nature and human motives by the scientific method Freud's theories are sound enough, though they are incomplete inasmuch as "the formulas of natural science express only a portion of the truth," for every act and motive of our lives is controlled by two sets of influences, the partial motives which psycho-analysis studies and ethical motives which are only thoroughly studied by philosophy, and "whatever a man does is done with a dim consciousness that his acts are inferentially based on a recognition of the bonds that connect him as a moral being with every other man and with the source of energy which underlies the universe".

Much of the book is taken up in defending these partial truths in so far as Freud as a clinician only pretends to deal with the aspect of the life of experience. Putnam entertains no doubt as to the fact that psycho-analysis gives the best chance for the reinstatement of knowledge, reason, and insight and considers it a 'piece of narrow intolerance' to raise the cry of exaggerated introspection as one of its dangers, when the neurotic's every moment is already spent in introspection of the worst sort. This is still a debatable point and is only true provided that due care is taken in the class of case analysed and when there is reasonable prospect of the treatment being carried through to a successful issue He warns us however that psycho-analysis is a trenchant weapon and that extreme care must be taken in the handling of neurotic children if one wishes to do good and avoid harm, and his statement "I propose nothing so insensate as that parents or even teachers should practice psycho-analysis" is particularly appropriate at the present time, for the definite limitations to this method of treatment are apt to be forgotten. Most of the criticism hitherto has centred round the sexual problem, but Putnam, like all those who have had actual experience in psycho-analysis, regards the opposition to Freud's sexual theories as merely a matter of prejudice, and it is perhaps now more a question of terminology. Putnam uses the term 'sexual' in the broad sense and the significance of the term is apparent in that "in view of the fact that even in self-assertion feelings of personal relationship are present either towards oneself or towards others who stand in intimate connexion with oneself, the sex element cannot be excluded".

Although Putnam agrees with Freud as to the sexual element, and admits that the principle of the conservation of energy can be applied as profitably with reference to mental phenomena as it has been to physical phenomena, yet he is equally convinced that Freud misapplies the scientific method and utilizes these principles to the tacit exclusion of others which are still more significant. It is from this standpoint that his original views come into prominence, and he insists on the necessity for widening psycho-analysis by a study of philosophic methods. In this respect he is in closer agreement with Jung than with Freud, though he does not quite admit it, and it is difficult to understand why he objects so strongly to Jung's rejection of Freud's theories of 'infantile sexuality' and 'fixation,' for in his own view the basis of all conflict is the struggle between the sense of our infinite origin and the necessity we are under of attempting to express ourselves in

finite form, whilst the struggles between our infantile instincts and the influences tending toward a conventional life are only the symbolic basis for the conflict. Like Jung he refuses to accept altogether the materialistic dogmata—absolute determinism cannot hold for "we have no right to draw the implication that as no energy is ever lost, so no energy is ever gained and that we live in a world of determinism," nor can he accept Freud's hedonism, for "every man has a sense of moral values as a sort of birthright"; his "dim sub-conscious visions in which the logical formulas of philosophic reasoning are foreshadowed" would seem to be equivalent to Jung's 'archetypes'. And like Jung he seems to hold that treatment must not be merely analytical but also synthetic as regards ethical obligations. He holds that the genetic principle, the tracing of the most complex manifestations of conscious life to the primary instincts, has been of immense service but that it leads us to a deadlock, and moreover Freud has given us no adequate argument to support the sweeping statements that he has made in regard to it. For Putnam evolution should be expressed as a circular process, beginning with what he calls the 'psyche generatrix,' an equivalent to Kant's 'causal energy,' and this 'psyche generatrix' must be also the object of study, whilst the "energetic something which underlies evolution contains and uses at each moment an impulse of which human volition is the example most clearly evident". There is an interesting chapter of a technical nature on Griselda Phantasies (Chap. X.) with a discussion on the origin of masochism. Dreams, in his view, call attention also to the stronger sides of our nature and these latter must be sought out, and "even if we assume that it is stretching a point to say that the meaning which is arrived at was not contained in the dream, this does not really matter" from the therapeutic standpoint. There is a valuable criticism of the work of Alfred Adler (Chap. XVI.), with which he sympathises to some extent, although he regards it as being not incompatible with Freud's views. The book ends with an obituary by Ernest Jones and a bibliography of Putnam's psychological writings.

E. Prideaux.

Psychology and Psychotherapy. By William Brown, M.A., M.D., D.Sc., with a foreword by Dr. Aldren Turner, C.B., M.D. London: Edwin Arnold, 1921. Pp. xi + 196. 8s. 6d.

Dr. Brown's position as Reader in Psychology in the University of London, and his extensive experience of war neuroses at Craiglockhart and at the front are sufficient to ensure a respectful hearing for anything he may have to say on the relation between psychological theory and its practical application in therapeutics.

His book is divided into five parts. The first deals mainly with "dissociation" which is discussed in the light of the views of Janet, Morton Prince, Freud and Jung. The second is concerned with theoretical considerations, notably with Freud's theory of dreams and of the unconscious, with emotion, with instinct and the sexual impulse. The third is devoted to psychological factors in psychotherapy and contains the essence of the author's personal contribution to the subject. The fourth part describes various examples of the psychoneuroses of war, and the fifth consists of a chapter on the relation of mind to brain with some notes on Psychical Research.

The foregoing should suffice to show that the book deals with a great variety of interesting matter, but the present writer must confess that, apart from this general interest, he found it somewhat disappointing. The author's aim is "to show the psychological principles underlying the modern theory and practice of psychotherapy," and it is quite certain

that it is very necessary that this should be done in a more convincing fashion than has hitherto been achieved. We urgently need an exposition of the subject which shall bring the *ad hoc* terminology and conceptions of the Freudian and similar schools into line with established psychological doctrines. But in order to do this it is necessary to have a coherent and unified view of mental processes in general of which the psychoneuroses shall appear as no more than a special class of instances.

One looks in vain for such a coherent view in Dr. Brown's book. The author seems too content to deal in isolated phenomena such as Abreaction, Dissociation, Emotional Revival, Suggestion and so forth, and does not attempt to unify the processes which lead to pathological states with those which lead to their cure by exhibiting them as special instances of a *general* process in which the organism reacts, in accordance with unchanging laws, to different environments.

Too little stress is laid on the essential characteristic of all pathogenic situations, the feature, that is to say, of *conflict* between incompatible reactions excited by different elements in the total situations—between the *morale* of the soldier, for instance, and the self-preserving instincts of the animal organism. It is this conflict which results in the adoption of a compromise form of reaction which constitutes the psychoneurosis.

One suspects, also, that the curative process of Abreaction, Emotional Revival or Psycho-catharsis, to which Dr. Brown attaches great value, is not really to be explained so simply as is indicated by saying that "the bottled up emotion is worked off" under hypnosis or the like. "Bottling up" an emotion is a very convenient and suggestive metaphor but, like all metaphors, needs careful handling when invoked to supply an explanation.

Again, Autognosis—the acquisition by the patient of a knowledge of his own motivating tendencies, etc.—is not really different from the process which is commonly recognised as being responsible for the curative efficiency of psychoanalytic treatment. The value of the latter consists essentially in the bringing to consciousness of experiences and tendencies which were previously repressed and thus rendering valueless the compromise reactions (symptoms) determined by their repression. "Autognosis" may be a good label for this process, but its nature is insufficiently brought out. Similarly Re-association, another member of Dr. Brown's quartet of curative factors, is a logical corollary of autognosis and would clearly appear to be so if the process of dissociation were more thoroughly considered in its proper light as a specially extensive case of repression under the influence of conflict.

The personal influence of the physician, Dr. Brown's fourth factor, should also have been brought into line by showing that it, and it alone, is responsible for the overcoming of the 'resistances' obstructing the psychoanalytic process which aims at the abolishing of repression (autognosis).

It must not, however, be inferred from the preceding criticism that Dr. Brown's book is not one which may, and should, be read with profit by all who are interested in this subject. The author has experience and independence, which is more than can be said of some writers, and it is only by the co-ordination of well-founded, if divergent, views that we can hope to escape from the tyranny of dogmatic extremists and arrive at well-balanced opinions concerning the problems involved.

W. Whately Smith.

Introduction à la Psychologie: L'instinct et l'émotion. By J. LARGUIER DES BANCELS. Paris: Payot. Pp. 286.

The scope and point of view of this work are indicated with sufficient clearness by the chapter headings: L'objet et les méthodes de la psychologie, L'âme et le corps, La conscience et le système nerveux, La moelle et le cerveau, L'activité réflexe et l'activité cérébrale, L'instinct, L'émotion. It is what it professes to be—an introduction to psychology, and from the functional and biological point of view. The various topics are necessarily treated in a general way, general results, rather than details, of recent experimental investigations being cited and interpreted. The result is a book, admirably clear, and on the whole satisfactory as far as it goes, but leaving the impression which is too often left by such books, that we rarely get to grips with the real psychological problems. To some extent an exception must be made with respect to the last two chapters, and more particularly the last. These two chapters, in which are discussed the problems of instinct and of emotion, constitute the really valuable portion of the book.

The first of these chapters is devoted to instinct. It begins with an attempt to define instinctive activity and to work out its relation to habit on the one hand, and to reflex activity on the other. With regard to habit there is no difficulty; habitual actions are acquired, instinctive innate. Instinctive actions are "actes adaptés, que tous les représentants d'une espèce accomplissent de même sans les avoir appris". What then of the reflex? The author's thesis is that the reflex constitutes the type of instinctive actions. The reflex is nothing but an elementary instinct, and every instinct can be regarded as a system of reflexes. Of course this is the characteristic behaviourist conclusion. But is it true? And is it a conclusion inevitable to a behaviourist standpoint? A negative answer may be given to both questions. In instinctive activity the whole vital system appears to be involved. There is thus an 'integration' which is by no means essential to the reflex as such, nor to any system of reflexes so long as it remains merely a system of reflexes. The point has not escaped the author, but he appears to have missed its significance.

The course of thought pursued in the rest of the chapter is somewhat curious, and the logical connexions are not too obvious. The author goes on to discuss the 'decay' of instincts. Then he takes up the 'genesis' of instincts, and thereafter discusses 'fears primitive and derived,' attempts an analysis of 'sentiments,' and ends with a classification of human instincts. Some of the views put forward are highly controversial, but a detailed criticism need not be attempted here. It should however be noted, that in spite of the work of Freud, though not ignoring it, he reiterates James's teaching regarding the decay of instincts, that he apparently does not know Shand's work, and that the following classification of human instincts is given: Les instincts alimentaires, Les instincts de défense, La curiosité, L'instinct sexuel, Les instincts parentaires, Les instincts sociaux, Les instincts égoïstes, Le jeu.

The chapter on emotion is the most important in the book. M. Larguier des Bancels rejects McDougall's view that emotion is merely the inner aspect, or an essential constituent, of instinct. According to his view it is rather a substitute, the necessity for which arises from the failure of instinct. Or it is a 'disorder' of instinct. Of course this view is not a new one, if it is merely equivalent to regarding all emotion as pathological. But taken in this narrow sense the view is untenable, and the real interest of M. Larguier des Bancels' discussion lies in the attempt to work out a psychology of emotion which will include what is essential and valuable in the theories of James, Ribot, and McDougall without abandoning the older

theory. There is much to be said for such an attempt, but to describe emotions as 'disorders,' or to characterize them as pathological creates more difficulties than it solves.

Passing to the psychological nature of emotion, the author distinguishes between the mechanism and the consciousness of the emotion. This inevitably leads him to the James-Lange theory which he strenuously defends. Here again it is a pity that the author is apparently unacquainted with recent work on the subject, notably Shand's. A consistent psychology of instinct and emotion can doubtless be developed along the general lines followed, but it must include what is sound in the work of James, McDougall, Shand, Freud, and Rivers. Of such a psychology we are here presented with little more than fragmentary outlines. In spite of this the chapter on emotion has considerable interest and value.

As an introduction to psychology the book as a whole, in spite of the points criticised, must be pronounced excellent.

JAMES DREVER.

Psyche's Lamp: A Revaluation of Psychological Principles as Foundation of all Thought. By ROBERT BRIFFAULT. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1921. Pp. 240.

This is not so original a book as its author seems to suppose, nor are its conclusions likely to call forth such a chorus of indignation as he anticipates. In a postscript—thoughtfully provided as "first aid to critics"—Mr. Briffault announces that the conclusions to which his arguments have led "are a challenge to the most fundamental of all notions, to the foundation of all past and current thought and evaluations of life's values, the notion of individuality, the *sum* that was once regarded as the one solid rock of certainty amid a universe of uncertainties," and he adds in the next sentence "Berkeley dissolved the 'external world' of the thinker; I call in question the existence of the thinker himself" (p. 238). Has Mr. Briffault forgotten Hume, not to mention William James and the latest exponents of Behaviourism?

It is true that Mr. Briffault's method of attack is quite different from Hume's and owes not a little to modern psychology and biology of which he has an extensive knowledge. He differs also from Hume in having a pronounced ethical purpose which gives added charm to a naturally flowing style. Mr. Briffault is convinced that "the concept of individuality has plunged the world into despair from which it could be saved were we but persuaded of the continuity and impersonal unity of all the forces that represent the substance of being" (p. 240). He thus sets out to expose the "illusion of individuality" which reached its climax in the *cogito* of Descartes. Because our cognitive consciousness does not reach beyond the cycle of what we call 'our individual life,' we suppose that in thought we find the foundation of the *sum*. But, as Hume pointed out, there is much that we do not remember even in that which we call distinctively "ours"; hence, lapse of memory does not suffice to establish discontinuity of the individual. There is, then, no warrant for the conclusion that the discontinuity of cognitive experience constitutes the line of demarcation between the individual and the "continuity of life". This argument is reinforced by the consideration that much of our mental attitude is the result of the unconscious workings of mind that is continuous in the race; from which, again, it follows that cognition is not the essence of mind and, therefore, cannot be the principle of its differentiation. This seems to me both true and important, and Mr. Briffault is only mistaken in supposing that it is revolutionary and, further, that it is capable of supplying the key to all problems.

The book is interestingly written and is easy reading. It is obvious that the author considers the ethical applications of his theory to be of great significance, and questions of evaluation constantly recur. Space permits us to touch on two problems only. Chap. VII. is devoted to the discussion of "freedom" about which some interesting things are said. Mr. Briffault points out first that the problem largely arises from a failure to recognise that the causality of mental process is nothing but "the control which an idea exercises over thought and action" (p. 170), and it is just this relation of control that constitutes freedom. Secondly, he argues that all necessity is logical, and results only from the lameness of our intellect which forces us to demonstrate the obvious. Thus the scientific determinism that would construct the universe given the data is but the elaboration of a tautology. Hence no consequence of any importance follows. Mr. Briffault concludes that our dynamics is inapplicable to the universe. So, too, is our psychology and the conception of purpose; with the rejection of the latter our ethical values cease to have meaning in reference to the whole of things. Yet, in his summing up, Mr. Briffault falls into inconsistencies and speaks of the universe as *punishing* sins against the laws of Life, and he even concludes with the exhortation *to trust* the universe that we do not need to cognise.

So, after all, value returns and we judge the universe of which we are but a fragment.

L. S. S.

Dual Evolution. Being outlines in a theory which is thought to reconcile Idealism and Realism from the viewpoint of Humanism. By J. O'Callaghan. London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1921. Pp. viii, 259. Price 12s. net.

Mr. O'Callaghan claims to keep a tight hold of actuality, and will not allow himself to be led astray into the excesses of either an absolute monism or an intellectualist mechanism. As part of his vision of the actual world he has three irreducibles; a world of matter outside of and indifferent to selves; selves behind and owning those activities we call consciousness; and consciousness, the system of activities by which the self passes from potentiality to actuality. Matter is essentially sensation, and possesses extensity and duration, which are real where abstract space and time are unreal. Sensation which is matter and sensation which is in consciousness seem to be two different things, though they are both essentially movements.

There is much of which we are not clear, though the fault is perhaps not Mr. O'Callaghan's. After his modest sub-title, he makes amends by being sufficiently assertive throughout his book. The book has attractive and repellent aspects. There is no index. There is an annoying use of adjectives as nouns (irreducibles, perceptibles, apprehendibles, distinguishables, recognisables and expressibles, etc.); an exuberant flow of language too often where terseness would prove welcome; a hearty disdain for the mechanical philosophers: but it is all in the interests of concreteness, vividness, actuality (his chief friends are "particularities," his main enemy an "epiphenomenon"); and he has learned so many excellent things from such excellent masters (among whom may be noted Croce and Bergson) that it is a pity from a philosophical point of view that he let his imagination run riot instead of bowing to the rigour of a decent logic. Among other marvels, he speaks of the origin of life (108-109), and this is an essential part of his theory; of the relation of the parent "selves" (as distinct from their "bodies") to the offspring "selves" (120-122); of the significance of the differentiation of male and female (224); and, in

matters psychological, of the experience of pure sensation (69), the key to consciousness (72), the possibility of moments of unchanging duration in the inner core of the self (88).

With all this, there is an essential rightness of vision, however much imagination may range; and in these days when the ordinary reader wants something definite for his comfort, the ordinary reader will find in Mr. O'Callaghan much instruction on the right lines, as well as comfort.

The main thesis of the book is that the mechanical world is the deliberate creation of a personal God; that it is only an approximation to an ideal mechanism, and so implies a beginning and perhaps an end; that into this world, after it had evolved to a sufficient complexity, God introduced potentialities (selves), which then passed through an evolution of a different sort in the achieving of actuality. The one evolution is material, and consists only of re-arrangements of matter; the other evolution is historical, and is essentially a creation of newness through a free struggle against material obstacles (which may and often does end in failure). This second evolution was necessary because God wished to create, not creatures, but children. Thus Mr. O'Callaghan is a theological vitalist.

Bodies are the servants, not a part, of selves; and memories, conscious activities of all sorts, belong to selves apart from bodies, and thus, after evolving, a self can persist after it has thrown aside its body, in precisely the same state as it was in when it had a body. The philosopher who is groping with difficulties may envy Mr. O'Callaghan his whole-hearted belief in his views. And Mr. O'Callaghan, in turn, may look in pity on the timidity of the philosopher who will not believe what might so easily be true. But the philosopher who has set himself his task must stick to it, and pursue his laborious way.

L. J. Russell.

Il Metodo di Insegnamento nelle Scuole Elementari d' Italia. Aristide Gabelli. Prefazione di E. Codignola. Pp. 64. Firenze, 1921. Lire 2.

La Libertà d' Insegnamento. Bertrando Spaventa. Una Polemica di settant' anni fa con Introduzione, Appendice e Note di Giovanni Gentile. Pp. 185. Lire 6.

Introduzione alla Pedagogia. M. Casotti. Pp. 103. Firenze, 1921. Lire 3.50.

(Publications in the Educational Series *La Nostra Scuola.* Edited by E. Codignola, Vallecchi Editore, Firenze.)

These little books come opportunely to-day, when the Minister of Education in Italy is Benedetto Croce, the brilliant leader of the philosophical school in sympathy with which they are written. Only the third deals directly with the philosophy of education; but the two others have a considerable indirect interest for students of philosophy.

Gabelli, we are told in the preface to *Il Metodo*, was one of the Italian positivists, whose work survives the death of his school through his subtle and concrete feeling of educational values. The present brochure is a paper offered by him to the educational congress at Rome in 1880, and is the first instalment of a projected reprint of his whole works. It is a demand for a reform of elementary education inspired by Froebel, pretty much as Fichte's *Reden*, which he has in mind, were inspired by Pestalozzi. The turn he gives to his positivism converts it, I think, into a desirable educational realism.

The tract on "Freedom of Teaching," of which the nucleus is Spaventa's articles in the democratic journal *Progresso* in the autumn of 1851, seems

to me of extraordinary historical interest, containing as it does in Gentile's long introduction much detailed citation from Cavour's letters and speeches, and in the appendix the speeches, etc., with which Spaventa was in controversy, and has also a somewhat curious philosophical moral for anyone interested in political freedom and the idea of a collective will. The point was that the cry for "freedom of teaching" was utilised in defence of the *status quo*—in which the clergy monopolised the schools—and against the establishment of a national system of the state. Thinkers like Spaventa, whose thunder was thus stolen, had to draw distinctions, and give a pregnant meaning to 'freedom,' and were more or less brought into conflict with their own side. Gentile's point is to show that the Liberals were substantially agreed in favour of a state system, though once at least Cavour in debate refused to tamper with the plain watchword 'Freedom of teaching'. Competing schools, outside the state system, were to be permitted, but were not expected to be successful in many cases.

Mario Casotti is a follower of Croce and Gentile, and his *Introduzione*, (which, he insists, is really an introduction, and not a complete manual) follows, as it seems to me, pretty much the lines of Gentile's *Sommario di Pedagogia*. It is a fresh and spirited defence of this position, and the reader ought to bear in mind the statement in the preface just referred to, if he feels, as I confess that to some extent I feel, that the Pedagogics are used to throw light on the philosophy rather than *vice versa*. The real interest is the double contention of the philosophy in question, that the universe is creative and progressive, and is identical with the thinking ego. It is thus understood that philosophy is one with Pedagogics. The view of education thus introduced is liberal and full of life. I will venture just to indicate what seems to me like a weakness in it, due to the philosophy to which it is akin.

Following, as I suppose, Gentile's distinction of 'autodidattica' and 'eterodidattica,' Casotti employs a distinction between 'autoeducazione' and 'eteroeducazione' the main and ultimate meaning of which is that all education resolves into 'autoeducazione'; that is to say into the creative development of the pupil's own mind; though it is recognised as in a striking chapter of Gentile's *Sommario*, *Il vero maestro*—that the universe takes part in this self-education. Now though this is acknowledged by both writers, and an attitude of gratitude and reverence to the world, social and other, which helps to educate us, is demanded by Gentile, and even something more, "a religious adhesion and submission to reality" is desiderated by Casotti,[1] yet I cannot help thinking that the identification of the "Io" and the universe is very far too facile and that the objectivity and greatness of things, and all we have to learn from them, is unduly minimised in the educational theory, as the relation of objective reality to thought and thinking is misconceived in the philosophy. Compared with Plato and Aristotle, with their insight into life, and their concrete inspiration drawn from the detailed forms and modes in which the universe communicates to man his own nature, I confess that this modern doctrine, though large and spiritual in its intention, seems to me extraordinarily thin and phantasmal.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

[1] P. 99. This almost suffices to constitute a philosophical advance upon Gentile's attitude, I should say.

L'Évolution Psychologique et la Littérature en Angleterre (1660-1914). Par L. Cazamian. Paris : Félix Alcan, 1920. Pp. 268.

The subject of this short, clearly written and interesting book is not, as the author himself fully recognises, capable of precise treatment. The influences determining the changes in the general character of a literature are too many, and the changes themselves too difficult to estimate, for this to be otherwise.

M. Cazamian endeavours to simplify his undertaking by the use of two explanatory hypotheses. First, he supposes a natural alternation to occur between two tendencies in the mind, the tendency to emotional and the tendency to intellectual satisfaction. In other words an alternation between Romanticism and Classicism, terms which are here used in a more careful and explicit fashion than is usual. Secondly, he uses the familiar sociological principle of the importance of the *milieu* as controlling this natural alternation. By far the greater part and probably the more valuable part of his book is concerned with the effects, traced in some detail, of social changes upon literary history. The first, the psychological principle of explanation is, however, of most interest philosophically.

M. Cazamian finds in the last three centuries of English literature five distinct phases: Elizabethan Romanticism, the Augustan age, the Romantic Revival, a second Classicism of the age of Tennyson and Matthew Arnold, and a final Romanticism at the end of the century. The rapidity of alternation increases in so marked a fashion as to suggest that to-day the rhythm may have broken down, the two phases being no longer distinguishable. The indispensable condition for a general change of phase he finds in the wearing out of satisfactions, a fresh tendency arising only when the opposed tendency has been overstimulated and æsthetic sensitiveness in that direction dulled. The question as to the nature of this wearing out, especially puzzling in view of the great differences in persistence of appeal between different works, is not discussed closely, in fact all the psychological parts of the book are merely adumbrated from a distance. Both this problem and the general psychological problem of the relation of emotional to intellectual satisfactions,—the antithesis is more popular with men of letters than with psychologists,—require clarification if M. Cazamian's argument is not to remain unduly vague. A further cause of elusiveness is the occasional use of the hypothesis of collective consciousness with the perhaps unavoidable failure of actuality which this method of exposition so often brings. When we are told (p. 219) 'le génie anglais retourne à une certaine attitude intellectuelle et artistique qui ne lui est pas inconnue, et avec laquelle ses souvenirs subconscients sont déjà familiers,' it is a little difficult to be sure what is being said.

These problems, however, will vex only a few of M. Cazamian's readers and these only at a few pages. The bulk of the book deals freshly and informatively with the social factors in the history of our literature. There are in addition many very apt appreciations and criticisms. A few are disputable: the denial to Sterne of anti-classical rebelliousness (p. 114) and the slightly too 'continental' appraisement of Byron are instances: but the distinctively critical parts of the book have the scholarship and the fine quality which we have learned to expect from French writers.

I. A. Richards

"*Gnade und Freiheit.*" *Untersuchungen zum Problem des Schöpferischen Willens in Religion und Ethik.* By Felix Weltsch. München: Kurt Wolff, 1920. Pp. 155.

This is a live and stimulating work, with many points of suggestive character in the course of its discussions.

The opening chapter deals with "Faith as Trust-Decision" or determination. Faith is resolved into the two elements of trust and decision. The whole life of man is held to consist of these determinations of faith. The chapter thus becomes a panegyric on faith, with particular emphasis on its influence in the sphere of religion. But when you carry one principle of man's complex nature to a height of extreme and overshadowing importance, some lack of balance and harmony is sure to result. Faith assumes a somewhat arbitrary and irrational character, and appears grounded in mere will to believe. But the philosophy of faith does not sanction such an attitude. True faith is always grounded in reason. The author runs everything back into Anselm's *credo ut intelligam.* But this is clearly inadequate. For if you urge *crede ut intelligas* as a principle, it must, in the mutual commerce of faith and reason, be supplemented by the principle *intellige ut credas.* Herr Weltsch's fundamental position is, that we must trust the universe. But he makes this no result of observational and reflective processes, but of a free decision. Such an unmotived trust seems unsatisfactory. We are to trust the Whole, to account the universe as of absolute value, for no other apparent reason than that such trust is the law of our whole life. But if it is not irrational to believe that the world has a meaning for us, our faith in the universe must yet have grounds. Its value depends upon these grounds.

"Life and Unity" form the theme of the second chapter. The author takes all development of spirit to consist of a double wave-movement—a wave of unity and a wave of life. The deepest striving of spirit is the desire of unity. Over against the ego stands an immense manifoldness. Life's most essential quality is unity; chaos is overcome only as life finds unity, or creates it. There are complexes, whose unified character is not destroyed by their having parts. Such a unity is a whole. Such a whole is the world. While this whole is grasped, the parts are jointly apprehended, and the wish of the spirit is satisfied, as the manifoldness is seized in a unified act. The unity of philosophic system, it is contended, arises in this way. Life, as signifying the whole of experience, is the object of our unified activity. Life and unity are the two poles of being, and are in bitter conflict. For we have no sooner created a unity than a new wave of experience destroys this unity like a house of cards thrown into a heap. Rationalism, optimism, pessimism, grace, are then discussed.

Chapter the third treats of "Vitality and Spirit". Vitality is life-force; a secret impulse, which is part of Nature-Becoming. The three great elements of spirit are, consciousness, unity, freedom. Between these two original principles, vitality and spirit, a truly tragic relation reigns: they can neither live with, nor without, each other. Spirit appears to rise out of vitality, but as by a leap or spring. What is of spirit breaks out of Nature, yet it represents something quite new—a fresh start rather than a continuation. Spirit is scarcely born, when it turns against Nature. It rends the connexion, and will be free. From these initial positions, the author works out his interesting chapter, with references to activists, realists, romanticists, etc., and to the doctrines of grace and freedom. It is significant that James is the only non-German philosopher referred to throughout the work, except Bergson.

"Freedom and Necessity," "Grace and Freedom," are the titles of chapters four and five respectively. No attempt is made to deal with the

whole freewill problem, but only with so much of the theme of grace and freedom as is connected with the question of the creative in will. The concept of creative freedom is defined, discussed, and supported. But the argumentation does not contain anything very new. For the development of the concept of grace we are referred to the history of Christian dogmatics, but are told that in no dogmatic is the concept of religious freedom presented in a pure upbuilding and secure denomination. It is always left in the very negative position of a mere opposer of grace. Such is the imperfection, the inner paradox of grace. But I do not think the antithesis which the author seeks to establish between grace and freedom can be sustained. We are not entitled to regard as in its operations unpsychological, nor to view grace as doing violence to freedom, which in fact it implies or involves. The acceptance of grace is just one of those free acts which the author delights to emphasise.

The sixth and last chapter deals with "Creative Freedom as Religious Principle". There is some interesting discussion of being and reality—a subject which has everywhere received a good deal of recent attention. Reality is said to be the first, the source, the gate of our experience, while being is the result of an act of judgment. "We live in reality and reality lives in us." Reality is thus the first, pre-logical matter of our experience. "Being has no intensity," says the author; intensity is through becoming. Absolute Being is the ideal or final aim of Becoming, which this latter can never reach. But the author appears to me hardly critical enough of what is involved in a theory of Becoming, although there is a good deal of soundness in many of his contentions. Absolute Being is to the believer in grace, he says, a ready-made reality value; to the believer in freedom, it is the ideal, or a value to be realised. To the former, it is reality; to the latter, it is end and aim. The discussion is then continued on historical lines.

JAMES LINDSAY.

The Psychology of Conviction. By JOSEPH JASTROW. Houghton Mifflin Company. Pp. xvii, 387. $2.50.

This is a collection of essays of a popular type most of which have appeared in monthly journals and reviews, though all have been revised and some rewritten with a view to giving more unity to the series. Only a small minority of the essays deal directly with the subject indicated in the title of the book, but there are many points elsewhere which have a bearing on the topic, though they deal with such varied subjects as "Fact and Fable in Animal Psychology," "The Antecedents of the study of Character and Temperament," "Malicious Animal Magnetism" (Mrs. Eddy's "personal delusion"), "The Psychology of Indulgence: Alcohol and Tobacco," "The Feminine Mind" and "Militarism and Pacifism". As to the main topic, the author seems sound so far as he goes. He does not carry us very deep into the fundamentals of psychology, but perhaps one should not ask that of a collection of popular essays. The essay on the "Democratic Suspicion of Education" is not very convincing, but then to an Englishman it does not seem a real "live" subject—he could say more on the aristocratic suspicion of democratic education. The essay on the feminine mind has some good common sense in it, especially about the lack of finality of judgments, based on mental tests, as to the comparative capacity of the sexes. "Men and women," writes Prof. Jastrow, "do equally well (or equally badly) in college, because their doing well or not depends on qualities too irregularly related with their most significant strengths and weaknesses. The records of what intellectually specialised men and intellectually

specialised women do with their minds, when released from academic discipline, is a far more significant criterion. In professional pursuits, the supporting, congenially masculine qualities, combining with the special intellectual grasp, may account largely for the overwhelming prominence of men's names in general biographical dictionaries and in those of the specialities."

C. W. V.

The Psychology of Industry. By JAMES DREVER, M.A., B.Sc., D.Phil. Methuen, 1921. Pp. xi, 148.

This is a popular account of the questions that have, within recent years, come to be considered as 'industrial psychology'. The reviewer is of the opinion that enough popular accounts of this subject had already appeared, and that what was required was research. But if another popular book had to be written, it should, to be valuable, have attempted a more critical survey of the subject than is given in earlier books. Unfortunately, Dr. Drever seems to have written his book very hastily, and to have approached his sources very uncritically, with the result that, among many sensible comments, the errors of earlier popularisers occur, sometimes in exaggerated form. In discussing Taylor's pig-iron case, for instance, he states that the men were made to work for 7 minutes and then to rest for 10 (p. 74); though the actual work and rest periods were *either* (according to the size of the load) about 9 minutes and 1½ minutes respectively, *or* about 4½ minutes and ¾ of a minute (as will be clear if calculations are made from the data given in the note to pp. 60-61 of Taylor's *Principles of Scientific Management*, 1913 edn.). Again, the bicycle-ball case is given in its ordinary form, as selection of workers made on the basis of reaction-time; though in fact no reaction-time test was here used (as may be inferred by comparing the account of the case given by Taylor in *Shop Management* with that in his *Principles of Scientific Management*: the latter account is inexcusably misleading). To take another feature: the various references given throughout the book seem often to be arbitrary, and are not nearly so useful as they might be, second or third hand accounts being sometimes referred to, for no apparent reason, instead of originals. Thus, the reference (p. 76) for the handkerchief-folding case is Hollingworth and Poffenberger's *Applied Psychology*, p. 151. But the account of the case given by these authors is meagre in the extreme, while two other books in Dr. Drever's bibliography (pp. 153-155) describe it in detail, and one of these, F. B. and L. M. Gilbreth's *Fatigue Study* (pp. 127-131) gives the original account of it.

Further, the arguments in certain parts of the book seem to show defects due to haste. The reviewer can make little or nothing of two of the four reasons given (pp. 93-94) to explain why bad lighting has a detrimental effect upon the efficiency of work. The first reason given (p. 93) is practically identical with the second (p. 94), while the third and the fourth (p. 94) seem to have nothing whatever to do with the matter.

The discussions are generally developed in an interesting way, and the book will give a good general idea of industrial psychology to anyone who knows nothing about it.

B. M.

Psycho-analysis and the War Neuroses. By Drs. FERENCZI, K. ABRAHAM, E. SIMMEL, and E. JONES. Introduction by Prof. S. FREUD. The International Psycho-analytical Press, 1921. Pp. 59.

This, the second volume of the International Psycho-analytical Library series, consists of four short but instructive papers on the bearing of

psycho-analysis on the war neuroses. After establishing the psychogenetic origin of the symptoms, the main point insisted on is that the investigation of the war neuroses, though it has not shown the sexual theory to be correct, does not show that the sexual theory is incorrect. An attempt is made by Ferenczi and Abraham to show that it applies in that the trauma brings about a regression to the stage of narcissism—they do not explain, however, why so many of the neuroses are not of the narcissistic type, and Ferenczi's argument that because sexual impotency often results, therefore there must be a sexual background for the neuroses, sounds rather like stating that because a man loses his appetite for food as one of his symptoms, that therefore his disordered digestion is the cause of his neurosis. The most valuable paper is that by Ernest Jones, who gives a very clear précis of the present position of psycho-analysis—he holds that the sexual question in relation to the war neuroses is simply *sub judice* and must await further investigation, and he raises a very important point as to whether a current wish, however strong, that is only half conscious and sometimes fully conscious can ever in itself produce a neurosis. Most of us, who have had experience of war neuroses in this country, would not agree with Freud who tells us in his introduction that most of the neurotic diseases brought about by the war disappeared on the cessation of the war conditions or with the fact that the "neuroses could not occur in professional soldiers". Referring to the sexual etiology of the war neuroses, he suggests that "with an impartial attitude and some willingness it should not be difficult to find the way to further elucidation". It would seem simpler for him to make his exclusively sexual theory irresistible and to do away with the need for willingness, for to many of us, with our knowledge gained by the war of the significance of the instinct of self-preservation, the wholesale attribution of all neuroses to sexuality is comparable to the attribution of all bacterial infections to the same bacillus, though we have no repugnance to sexuality and recognise its importance in the peace neuroses.

E. Prideaux.

Mysticism, Freudianism and Scientific Psychology. By Knight Dunlap, Professor of Experimental Psychology in the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. St. Louis: C. V. Mosby Company, 1920. Pp. 173.

It would convey the purport of this book better if we turned its title round and called it "Mysticism, etc., *versus* Scientific Psychology". It is an effort to take a stand upon certain principles of psychological science, and from that vantage ground evaluate a number of interesting contemporary currents of psychological, religious and philosophical thought. The attitude taken up towards all of these is critical; and with the doubtful exception of mysticism (which is differentiated into a genuine and a "pseudo" variety) the attitude to all is also antagonistic. There is a good deal of information in the book of an elementary kind. Copious extracts are given from the writings of the mystical and the psycho-analytic writers. Some historical setting is given to the former. And some facts are recorded regarding the publications of the latter. The author's own position is described as psycho-biology (p. 122) and it is distinguished from the standpoint called "behaviourism," which appears to the author to merge psychology wholly into something un-psychological. The book provides a guide through part of a very deep thicket in modern thought and writing, a guide which is "clear" provided you look for nothing more in it than the clearness of a guide book. But we fear that neither psycho-analysis nor mysticism, whatever may be said of the other subjects passed in review, is treated sufficiently from the inside, to accomplish in any deep way its design, namely, the "enlightenment of the

public" concerning the "real nature" of that "siren trinity," which the author designates "spiritualism, philosophical mysticism, and the newer psychology of Freud and his satellites".

J. W. S.

The Works of Aristotle, translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross, M.A. Vol. x.: *Politics*, by BENJAMIN JOWETT; *Oeconomica*, by E. S. FORSTER; *Atheniensium Respublica*, by Sir F. G. KENYON. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921. Pp. xvi (text and index unpaged).

Of the contents of this new volume of the Oxford English Aristotle, the principal item, the version of the *Politics*, is, in the main, the familiar one of Jowett, revised by Mr. W. D. Ross with the aid of O. Immisch's valuable recent Greek text. Neither the notable merits nor the occasional demerits of Jowett's translation call for comment in a notice like the present. The full value of Mr. Ross's work on the text could only be treated by going over the Greek with his translation line by line, but I am glad to see that while he has, of course, profited by Immisch's recension, he has judiciously refused to follow some of that scholar's rather unnecessary deviations from well-attested readings which yield excellent sense. (I note that in most of the cases where I had myself recorded dissatisfaction with these innovations in my copy of Immisch's edition, Mr. Ross has reverted to the MSS.)

In Mr. Forster's translation of the *Oeconomica* (no very easy task owing to the state of the text of *Oeconomica* B), I note one curious slip. Aristotle —or rather the unknown author of the tract called *Oeconomica* A—says at 1345 a 30, that a house should be cool in summer and sunny in winter. This will be secured, we are told, if the house is *κατάβορρος*, "looking down the north wind," *i.e.*, if it has a south aspect. I cannot understand by what momentary aberration Mr. Forster turned this into a recommendation that a house, to be warm and get the sun in winter, should "face north". He should try living on the Scores in St. Andrews in January.

Sir F. G. Kenyon's Version of the essay on the Athenian Constitution is a careful revision of his formerly published translation. The revision was, of course, made necessary by the fact that the translation was first made from the tentative first recension of the text. Subsequent study of the papyrus, which is our sole authority for the Greek, has lead to a considerable number of absolutely certain corrections. Unless another MS. should be discovered, the text of the essay is now as completely settled as it is ever likely to be. Sir F. G. Kenyon's name alone would be sufficient guarantee for the fidelity of the rendering. I cannot refrain from expressing admiration for its excellence as literature.

A. E. TAYLOR.

L'Estetica del Croce e la Crisi dell' Idealismo Moderno. By ANTONIO ALIOTTA. Naples: Perella, 1920. Pp. 173.

In Wildon Carr's *Philosophy of Croce* (p. 73) there is an account of the dilemma on the horns of which Aliotta believed he had successfully impaled Croce. The dilemma was that either hallucinations and hysterical emotions are artistic facts, and this is repugnant to our æsthetic sense; or else there is an immediate experience which is not æsthetic intuition. Croce, to quote Aliotta's words, "gagliardamente ed onestamente" defended himself, choosing without hesitation the first horn of the dilemma with all its paradoxical

consequences from the standpoint of common sense. Anyone who is interested in the duel can now read in this little book the original article written in 1904. It is followed by other criticisms of Croce, the latest dated 1917 and dealing with the *Storiografia*. The book brings out with great clearness two different approaches to the central problem of idealism, for the author though a relentless critic of Croce agrees with his idealism. According to Aliotta, Croce starts from a metaphysical presupposition of experience, whereas he, Aliotta, claims to start from common experience. The metaphysical presupposition is Croce's "Lo spirito non può uscire fuori di se stesso se non intuendo, formando, esprimendo". To the present reviewer on the other hand this seems self-evident truth of experience.

H. W. C.

Giordano Bruno e il Pensiero del Rinascimento. By Giovanni Gentile, Florence, 1920. Pp. 293.

This volume contains seven papers, of which the first gives the title to the book: all except the seventh ("Humanism and the Renaissance"), have appeared previously in journals or pamphlets. The first three deal mainly with Bruno, the fourth with Campanella ("The idea of man in the Renaissance"), the fifth with Leonardo as a philosopher, and the sixth with Galileo. The general topic underlying all is the relation of philosophy to religion, and especially to "institutional religion". The papers show Gentile's admirable scholarship, lucidity, and fairness of mind. Perhaps his admiration for Bruno leads him to emphasise unduly the 'overworldliness' of the latter's philosophy. By it, for example, and by the resulting contrast between philosophy and practical life, he explains the partial adherence of Bruno at different times to the Genevan and Lutheran Confessions, his earlier submission to the Inquisition, and his final refusal and martyrdom, —when the question was one of the renunciation of his philosophy itself. It is improbable that the motive in each case was so fully conscious as this implies.

The papers contain many interesting new suggestions as to the historical origin and development of the conceptions of Nature, Man, and God in the Renaissance. They are to be completed by a further volume, "Researches in the Philosophy of the Renaissance".

J. L. M.

L'Unità del Pensiero Leopardiano. By Pasquale Gatti. Naples. [Undated.] Pp. 106.

A strongly polemical essay directed against Prof. Gentile. In 1906 Mr. Gatti published a work on the philosophy of Leopardi in which he undertook to show that the great poet is proved by his posthumously published prose remains to have been equally great as a systematic philosophical thinker. This was denied by Gentile, who asserted that Leopardi was a poetic genius but not a systematic thinker at all. In 1917, however, Gentile himself published an essay strongly asserting the unity of Leopardi's thought but making no reference to the fact that Mr. Gatti had maintained the same thesis long before and had been ridiculed by Gentile for doing so. Of course Mind cannot enter into the merits of the controversy, though on the facts as he states them Mr. Gatti appears to have good *primâ facie* grounds for a complaint, and it is not altogether creditable to the Italian press that he should have met the difficulty he tells us he has met in getting his protest published.

May the writer of these lines take this opportunity of remarking that he has no connexion with the editorship of MIND, and that Italian work for notice in these pages should be sent not to him but to the Editor in Cambridge?

A. E. TAYLOR.

Relativity, the Electron Theory, and Gravitation. By E. CUNNINGHAM. Longmans, Green, and Co. Pp. vii, 146.

This book contains an excellent introduction to the Theory of Relativity. It makes no use of very complicated mathematics, and yet is detailed enough to give the reader a really adequate idea of the grounds and consequences of the new views. In the last chapter a sketch is given of Weyl's extension of Einstein's conceptions. The work can be confidently recommended to those who want something more adequate than the numerous and bad elementary expositions with which the market has lately been flooded. It unfortunately contains a good many misprints in mathematical formulæ. Among these may be mentioned errors on pp. 30 (formula 2); 75 (where k/dt is printed for $/kdt$); 74 (where $ict_1 - t_2$ appears for $ic(t_1 - t_2)$; and on p. 98.

C. D. B.

The Absolute Relations of Time and Space. By A. A. ROBB. Cambridge University Press. Pp. viii, 80.

In this little book Dr. Robb supplies a welcome synopsis of the argument in his larger *Theory of Time and Space.* A short appendix is added in which the author sketches a way in which he thinks that his theory might be applied to the problem of gravitation. It is to be hoped that the present book will lead many people to study Dr. Robb's chief work.

C. D. B.

The Training of Mind and Will. By W. TUDOR JONES, with a Foreword by ALEX. HILL, M.D. London: Williams & Norgate, 1920. Pp. vii, 70.

The Making of Personality. By W. TUDOR JONES. London: Williams & Norgate, 1920. Pp. vii, 72.

These two little books represent "the substance of innumerable lectures on Civics," delivered, under the auspices of the Y.M.C.A., to thousands of soldiers and sailors during, and after, the War. As such they may be taken to represent the fruits of a notable attempt to bring philosophy, in the shape of psychology and ethics, down from the clouds and into contact with the ordinary life of ordinary young men, which cannot but meet with the approval of all who think that if philosophy is good for anything it must benefit also moderate intelligences, and should not be content to remain a mystery reserved for the few. It is remarkable, and a valuable comment on the moral theories that endeavour to make the end super-individual and the State the core of morality, that Dr. Tudor Jones should thro ghout find it necessary to make his appeal through an ethic and psychology of self-development and self-realisation. There is little doubt that if moralists would only consent to bring their theories to the test of application, they

would learn not a little about the real meaning and value of their 'principles'.

F. C. S. S.

The Principles of Æsthetics. By De Witt H. Parker. Boston: Silver, Burdett & Co., 1920. Pp. 374.

It is becoming recognised that the term 'expression' is a danger signal in æsthetics. Mr. Parker, like so many others, is indebted to Croce for suggestions without which he would have written a better book; although, as again is usual, he accepts nothing whatever of the doctrines of the Italian writer. Defining art as 'expression, not of mere things or ideas, but of concrete experience with its values, and for its own sake' (p. 52), he yet makes no serious attempt to give a precise account of what this expression is. Such explanations as 'the putting forth of purpose, feeling, or thought into a sensuous medium, when they can be experienced again by the one who expresses himself and communicated to others' (p. 16) are plainly insufficient. In this avoidance of precision at an essential point Mr. Parker's exposition is no worse, however, than those of such well-known upholders of expressionist views as Mr. Carritt and Prof. Bosanquet.

The more interesting parts of the book are those in which points of psychological detail of importance to Criticism are discussed, notably in Chapter IV. where an approach is made to the little explored question 'of what kinds of elements are the things we speak of as *Hamlet* or the *Monna Lisa* composed?' In dealing with the more difficult questions as to the various structures of æsthetic experiences the author is less successful, as may be seen by his assertion, 'it is clearly necessary that the feeling tone of the form be identical with that of the content which the artist puts into it' (p. 98). Such dogmatism is far too readily admitted in this uncertain field.

I. A. Richards.

L'Art et la Vie Sociale. By Ch. Lalo. Paris: Librairie Octave Doin, 1921. Pp. 373.

This essay which belongs to an imposing collection of manuals upon all subjects, the Encyclopédic Scientifique directed by Dr. Toulouse, deals in a very readable and often amusing manner with such subjects as the influence of family life, of class distinctions, of political régimes upon art at different times and in different societies. The author, who is well-known as a populariser of opinions upon art, gives here a highly discursive treatment to these matters, and the value of his book lies rather in separate discussions than in any central position. He has much to say upon the economics of artistic production, and upon the causes of popular attitudes towards the arts. The range of topics covered includes the art of dress, and his analysis of the fluctuations of fashion throughout the war, as demanding always stuffs of which a scarcity was being felt, is a good instance of his method. It is pleasant to find the author quite clear as to the relations of Art to War. To the maxim, 'L'art est lié aux manifestations de la force,' he replies, (p. 278), 'soit; mais de quel lien? La santé aussi est "liée" à la maladie, ou la vie à la mort: l'opposition ou la négation est le seul rapport naturel de la guerre à l'art.'

I. A. R.

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T. Michelson, *The Owl Sacred Pack of the Fox Indians* (Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 72), Washington, Government Printing Office, 1921, pp. 84.

V. Branford, *Whitherward? Hell or Eutopia*, London, Williams & Norgate, 1921, pp. xv, 116.

M. Lecat, *Relations Intellectuelles avec les Centraux?* Louvain and Brussels, M. Lecat, 1921, pp. viii, 128.

Hall Caine, *The Master of Man*, London, W. Heinemann, 1921, pp. 432.

VII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Vol. xviii., No. 3. **J. H. Leuba.** 'The Meaning of "Religion" and the Place of Mysticism in Religious Life.' [Mysticism is *one* type of religion, but does not exclude the others unless it becomes dominant.] **W. T. Bush.** 'Philosophy in France.' [Reviews D. Parodi on Contemporary Philosophy in France.] xviii., 4. **R. B. Perry.** 'A Behaviouristic View of Purpose.' ["A determining tendency is a general response-system, tentatively advancing towards completion, or tentatively renewing itself. Interested or purposive action is tentative action adopted because the anticipatory responses which it partially arouses coincide with the unfulfilled or implicit phase of such a determining tendency."] xviii., 5. **H. W. Schneider.** 'Instrumental Instrumentalism.' [Instrumentalism is a bad word, as suggesting "a philosophy which tries to get along without aims and ends". It really means, however, "insistence on the importance of teleological relationship". Its chief danger is to conceive itself too formally.] Report on 'The Oxford Congress of Philosophy,' by **W. P. Montague.** xviii., 6. **W. K. Wright.** 'McDougall's Social Psychology in the Light of Recent Discussion.' [Reviews the 14th edition of *Social Psychology* and discusses criticisms on it in general terms.] **H. H. Parkhurst.** 'The Twentieth Meeting of the American Philosophical Association.' xviii., 7. **R. B. Perry.** 'The Independent Variability of Purpose and Belief.' [Traced in the cases of fixed belief + varying purpose, variable belief + fixed purpose, converse relation of purpose and belief, and of interest and belief.] **B. Ruml.** 'Reconstruction in Mental Tests.' [A warning against exclusive interest in applicable results.] **J. R. Kantor.** The 29th Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association. [Severely critical.] xviii., 8. **A. P. Brogan.** 'Urban's Axiological System.' [Criticism based on the contention that the fundamental value category is not 'ought' but 'better-than'.] **J. E. Turner.** 'Some Philosophic Aspects of Scientific Relativity.' xviii., 9. **S. P. Lamprecht.** 'Some Political Implications of Ethical Pluralism.' [Continues article in xvii., 21. "Since goods are plural, since no selection of goods is authoritative, since many personal choices can legitimately be made, since antagonism and discord are recurrent and certain, therefore the requirements of the moral life demand the greatest possible harmonisation of rival programmes of action. On the one hand, no single principle of eternal justice is possible; on the other, mere force cannot create right. . . . Compromise is the sole alternative to violence as a means of achieving human excellence. . . . But force . . . may be exercised by a sovereignty, that is, by a power sufficient to compel a peaceful compromise. . . . Where no sovereignty exists, its creation is the first step to the common good," and it is "an overwhelmingly important practical problem" whether a world-wide sovereignty can be erected before civilisation crashes.] **T. de Laguna.** 'The Complex Dilemma.' [Denies its validity.] xviii., 10. **J. R. Kantor.** 'A Tentative Analysis of the Primary Data of Psychology.' [On behaviourist lines: hopes to

"exclude from psychology all animistic prepossession and unscientific description".] **W. R. Wells.** 'Is Supernaturalistic Belief essential in a Definition of Religion?' [Concludes that it is, but does not define 'supernaturalism'.]

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. xxx., No. 1. **M. C. Carroll.** 'The Principle of Individuality in the Metaphysics of Bernard Bosanquet.' [A sympathetic resumé of Bosanquet's doctrine.] **A. K. Rogers.** 'Principles in Ethics,' II. [Continues discussion of how individual is to determine what is the best life for him. It must in the first place be one which satisfies his strongest personal interests, gives scope to his individual bent. But everyone also has moral interests, founded on the moral consciousness; these may not be so lively as the personal interests, but in the long run neglect of them is punished. Secondly, therefore, the best life will be one which has 'something to offer as a contribution to the permanent structure of reality'. This limits the field of choice; but within these limits personal interest must decide.] **D. S. Robinson.** 'Dr. Whitehead's Theory of Events.' [Accuses that philosopher of 'misty profundity'. 'What is meant by the community of nature to all? . . . What is the act of reference, the act of discrimination, the act of apprehension, the consciousness of the relation between a percipient and an external event, that is, what are these in terms of events? Is apprehension a property of events, and, if so, is it a property of all or only of some? Does the apprehension in an event know itself as a separate event from the event in which it is, or know the event of which it is a property, or know other events? Precisely what is the entity defined as the continuous ether . . . in terms of events? I simply cannot understand how the author can refuse to face such questions.'] **R. F. A. Hoernlé.** 'The Oxford Congress of Philosophy.' Discussion [**A. H. Jones:** 'The Basis of Significant Structures']. Reviews of Books. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes. List of Articles. Vol. xxx., No. 2. **R. B. Perry.** 'The Appeal to Reason.' [A long and interesting paper. More and more the age realises that what it needs is a better knowledge of human nature; all our construction must be founded on psychology. The new psychology, with its naturalistic method, tends to deny the influence of Reason in determining action. Now it is true that the Reason as conceived by the intellectualist is a myth; but the knowing mind, and evidentially tested belief, are obviously factors in determining action. We must apply the naturalistic method to discovering how in the concrete they do this. The writer goes on to examine the influence of reason on personal and collective action. Even where an action is first caused solely by instinct, reason may come in later as a real motive force. 'Rationalisation' is a normal and beneficial process.] **J. W. Scott.** 'Psychology and Idealistic Philosophy.' [Idealism never succeeded in showing how the values of the dialectical process are preserved within the finished dialectical result. May not the new psychology help us to solve the problem? It has begun a tentative focussing of an area of facts formerly untouched by science. (*To be continued.*)] **M. C. Carroll.** 'The Nature of the Absolute in the Metaphysics of Bernard Bosanquet.' [Tries to gather a connected view on this point from Gifford Lectures and other works. The principle of self-transcendence is the clue chiefly used.] Proceedings of the Twentieth Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. Notices of New Books. Notes.

BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. x., Parts 2 and 3. March, 1920. **E. M. Smith** and **F. C. Bartlett** contribute a second article 'On Listening to Sounds of Weak Intensity.' [This gives an account of a

research which grew from tests used in selecting candidates for Anti-Submarine service during the War. The results of chief interest seem to be as follows: that variations are liable to occur in the relative efficiency of the two ears, such variations as were observed developing gradually and extending over a long period; that sounds of weak intensity may take as long as four seconds to produce their full effect; that conditions of diffuse illumination tend to induce in the listener an attitude which is judged to be favourable, but that in the early stages of learning to recognise a sound, darkness provides the more favourable condition. An attempt to make a qualitative analysis of the process of listening to sounds of weak intensity shows: that sound stimuli may often be perceived when they cannot be heard as sounds; that subjective sensations of extreme vividness often occur which however to some extent may be discriminated from sounds having an objective basis; that external distracting sounds are most disconcerting when they are irregular, or like the test sound, or of a familiar character; that on the whole a subject's judgment concerning the efficiency of his reactions is likely to be accurate only when that judgment is a favourable one.] **T. P. Nunn.** 'Psychology and Education.' [Summarises the recent developments in Psychology which are of most importance to Education, making special reference to the work on transference of training, the theories of McDougall and Shand on instinct and sentiment, intelligence tests and the theories of general and specific abilities.] **Chas. S. Myers** in 'Psychology and Industry', after giving a general survey of the field, records some interesting experiments of his own. During the last year of the war he was concerned in the selection, at the Crystal Palace, of candidates for training in hydrophone-listening for hostile submarines: "Tests were devised for keenness of hearing, accuracy of sound discrimination, memory for pitch, rhythm and quality of sound, power to discriminate between different pitches, rhythms and qualities, general accuracy, general information, ability to grasp complicated instructions, etc. The result of the application of such tests was that the training authorities at Portland reported that the first batch of lads sent them from the Crystal Palace was far away the best they had ever received, and that the next batch was even better still." **W. H. R. Rivers'** article on 'Psychology and Medicine,' is the Inaugural Address to the first meeting of the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society, and discusses the relation of the new section to the other sections. **W. B. Morton.** 'Some Measurements of the Accuracy of the Time-Intervals in Playing a Keyed Instrument.' [In an attempt to get at the times obtained by simultaneous tapping of different rhythms by the respective hands, Morton surmised that 'the two hands were not really acting independently but that it was the pattern made by the combined systems of movements which was presented to the player's attention'.] **May Smith** and **Wm. McDougall.** 'Some Experiments in Learning and Retention.' [Illustrates the great importance of effort or volition in rendering repetition effective in memorising. The results seem to show that in some persons practice in memorising might produce improvement of retention as well as of the power to commit to memory.] Other articles include 'The Present Attitude of Employees to Industrial Psychology,' by **Susie S. Brierley**; 'Suggestion and Suggestibility,' by **E. Prideaux**; 'The Single General Factor in Dissimilar Mental Measurements,' by **J. C. Maxwell Garnett**; and 'Observations on the De Sanctis Intelligence Tests,' by **W. B. Drummond.**

Revue Néo-Scolastique de Philosophie. Année xxiii., No. 90. [May, 1921.] **P. Charles,** S.J. *Dante et la Mystique.* [A slightly rhetorical popular lecture. The main, and obviously true, thesis is that

Dante's "mysticism"—which the writer hardly distinguishes from his passion for formal symbolism—arises from no distrust of reason; the poet was no "sceptic". True, but is it equally true that he "had *never* doubted?"] **D. Nys.** *L'Homogénéité de l'Espace.* [Appeals to our experience of sensible bodies can prove neither that "real space" is Euclidean nor that it is not. The true question is a metaphysical one. Are the specifically Euclidean postulates possessed of a "metaphysical necessity" or are they not? The "space of philosophy" = "the complex of relations of distance which connect the bodies of the material universe" and must be regarded as homogeneous unless we accept the "illusory hypothesis" of absolute space. But "absolute geometrical space" is another matter. The geometer is really concerned with *figures*, and his question is whether a figure can be magnified or reduced without change of form. In point of fact, however, all physical facts seem to be representable by reference to a system of three (Euclidean) axes at right angles to one another, and there is no reason to regard the non-Euclidean geometries or the spaces of more than three dimensions as more than a device for rendering algebraical formulæ "more manageable and more fertile". But is Euclidean geometry itself at bottom more than a similar device? Is not the question whether "real space is Euclidean" something like the question whether the planet we call Jupiter is "really" Jupiter? And is not the assumption that "the philosopher's space" is an aggregate of relations of *distance* irrelevant to the issue? One naturally suspects that some convention about the measure of distance is surreptitiously introduced under cover of this definition. Mr. Nys's essay takes no account of the possibility that a non-Euclidean geometry of four dimensions may recommend itself for the estimate of intervals in the "space-time" continuum as naturally as Euclidean geometry for the measurement of spatial "distances".] **A. Farges.** *Deux déviations de la Théorie thomiste sur l'Action transitive.* [The supposed difficulties about transitive causality have arisen merely from the incompetence or ignorance of modern speculators. They are all refuted by anticipation in the Aristotelian doctrine of potentiality and actualisation. The writer takes things far too easily. It is difficult to believe that, *e.g.*, Leibniz suffered from not having read or not having understood Aristotle's *Physics*. M. Farges is right in insisting on the importance of Aristotle's thesis that a κίνησις falls wholly within the κινητόν and on the unreality of the supposed "transference of state" from agent to patient, but it is hard to see that the consequences he deduces from the Aristotelian theory of κίνησις are all compossible or necessary. Thus he, like Aristotle, assumes that in every action there is an "agent" and a "patient". May one ask which body is agent and which patient in the dynamical transactions between the earth and the moon? One might say that the earth "acts" on the moon, *e.g.*, making its period of axial rotation correspond with its period of orbital revolution. But equally the moon "acts" on the earth, *e.g.*, producing the bulge at the equator and four-fifths of the annual 50″ of precession. Again Mr. Farges holds that Aristotelianism shows the absurdity of "action at a distance". Apparently he does not reflect that all action of any body "outside its own skin" is action at a distance. If a body can only act "where it is," in the sense "within the volume it occupies," no body can act at all on *any* other. If the proviso "where it is" is relaxed at all, there seems no objection in principle to action at any "distance". It is not on the face of it absurd to hold that in any sense in which it is true that a body can act only "where it is," every particle "is" present through the whole field of gravitation. Mr. Farges argues that the "law of the inverse square" in some way proves his, and Aristotle's, proposition. But physicists

would presumably be put to it to attach any precise sense to his assertion that the force of gravity undergoes a "loss of energy" in "passing from one point to another". It seems to the present writer that the notion of transitive action, however necessary for science, does involve difficulties which are not to be removed by mere eulogy of the *perennis philosophia* of "common sense". If common sense is "perennial," so are error and confusion. One would expect a really valid analysis of the facts of transitive action to reveal the necessity of a much more elaborate set of postulates than Aristotle, Mr. Farges, or common sense suspects. And as neither Leibniz, nor Descartes, nor Malebranche, nor Kant disputes the *facts*, the rather scornful tone with which Mr. Farges treats their analyses of the facts is scarcely justified. I do not know why Aristotle is given the credit of inventing the "undulatory" hypothesis. He denied that light takes any time to travel (*de Anima*, B7, 418b, 20), and thus, in spite of Mr. Farges, himself assumed *actio in distans*. I could wish Mr. Farges had told us his opinion of the curious theory by which Aristotle tries to explain at the end of the *Physics* why a missile does not fall to the ground as soon as it leaves the hand. The first of the mediæval "deviations" referred to in the title of the essay is the grotesque theory of some of the later scholastics that perception is due to material effluxes from the perceived body which somehow become immaterial on their journey to "consciousness"—the so-called "intentional species" (a fusion of Aristotle with Democritus); the second, and more subtle, is the theory of Suarez that the action is a modality not of the "agent," but of the "patient," and its attribution to the "agent" as its cause is a simple *denominatio extrinseca*; "action" is then properly not a "predicament," *valde analogice est accidens*. Mr. Farges holds Suarez possibly responsible for the "subjectivism, immanentism, and agnosticism" with which he charges all philosophy from Descartes onwards. His great error is to make action into a mere logical relation; action *is* not a logical relation, it engenders such relations. (This seems true and important, whatever one may think of Aristotle's account of action.) As for the "intentional species," they may still play a useful part in psychology, if we are careful to remember that they are not material emissions, but physical actions, and that they are not the objects of perception, but "determinants" of cognition. (This again seems a sound position.) But the real *crux* of the Aristotelian doctrine, its sharp distinction of "agent" and "patient," is accepted without discussion.] **A. Bouyssonie.** *Les Principes de la Raison.* **L. Noël.** *Retour à la Scolastique?* **A. Mansion.** *La Philosophie en Belgique*, 1908-1917. *Comptes Rendus.*

Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica. Anno xiii., No. 1, January-March, 1921. **G. Gentile.** *Arte e Religione.* [For an acute criticism of this essay see the article of Chiochetti in *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* for March-April, 1921. Chiochetti seems wholly right in maintaining that Gentile's antithesis between art and religion as the extreme poles of the "subjectivity" and "objectivity" of the human spirit is incoherent in itself and false to all the facts. If the artist as such lives in a dream-world of sheer "subjectivity," we ought to find this character specially marked in the greatest art, *e.g.*, in the poetry of Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare. Is any one of the three at all like a baby immersed, if babies really are so, in a purely fantastic "play" world of his own creation? There seems something radically wrong with a theory which would require us to give Byron higher rank as an artist than Sophocles. True art, to be sure, is not didactic; it is interested in "sense" for itself and not as a peg on which to hang universal "predicates". But to get to "subjectivity" in Gentile's sense we have to proceed, as Gentile does, to the crude con-

fusion of the logical "subject" of which predicates are affirmed with the psychological "subject" who affirms them. No wonder then that, as it is clear that without thought there would be neither art nor religion, Gentile has to add that there never has been any art or any religion which is "pure"; in other words, his Hegelian construction refuses to fit the facts. It is not even true that the higher the art or the better the religion the more nearly it approximates to Gentile's ideal. This is declared to be the "living contradiction" of art, but it is rather only the contradiction of Hegelianising theories about art. Chiochetti is justified in arguing that, as there never is "art which is not religion," the thesis and antithesis of the triad are, by Gentile's own showing, not real opposites, and that the "dialectic movement" through opposition to synthesis proves to be a sham.] **G. Calò.** *La Scuola, lo Stato e le Classi Sociali.* [The present educational crisis in Italy, marked by the revolt of many of the "liberals" against the claims of the "lay State" to control education, is complicated by the failure of the old "liberal" conception of the State as having the merely negative function of preventing encroachment by one individual on the rights of others. It is equally impossible to be content with a State that does nothing and with a "leviathan" which does everything. The true function of the "democratic national State" is to assist its members to win their personal freedom without suppressing their personal initiative. Hence the State has the right and duty not only to provide a minimum of education for all its members, but to ensure an education which tends to develop the sense of civic and national duty. The State cannot consent to abdicate these functions in the interest of a religious confession. On the other hand, a State monopoly of education is socially pernicious, but such a monopoly does not exist in Italy. If private schools do not flourish this is because (1) there is little widespread interest in education, and (2) not enough private wealth to support them. Gentile proposes to reduce the number of State "secondary schools" to a minimum while keeping the primary school in the hands of the State. This would mean in practice setting up a class barrier and creating a vast "educational proletariat". It is essential to foster a higher sense of responsibility in the teaching profession, and this might, in part, be done by distinguishing the State-conducted examinations, which might be the qualification for professional careers, from examinations held as tests of the pupil's knowledge and ability by boards representative of the teachers. The demand of the teaching profession for a free hand in the management of schools is thoroughly justified. Even the demand of syndicalists for the "proletarianising" of education is not likely, in the author's opinion, to lead to the evils which have been anticipated. We may look in future to see the technical education of artisans carried on by private organisations within the factory, etc.; the provision of the necessary general intellectual and moral culture will always devolve on the State.] **V. Cento.** *Linee d'una teoria generale dei rapporti fra Chiesa e Stato.* [Since State and Church have radically different ends, it would be absurd for the State as such to adopt a "confession"; it is precisely because the State recognises this difference of ends that its refusal to adopt a confession is not "irreligious". But Cavour's "free Church in a free State" is not a satisfactory ideal. Absolute "tolerance" of all "religious" organisations could only arise from pure indifference. *E.g.*, the State could not without absurdity tolerate a sect which made prostitution a religious duty. It would be the State's duty to suppress such a sect in the interest of the liberty of all. The first duty of the State, as guardian of the liberty of all, is to maintain its own full autonomy. In the inevitable collisions between a dual State

and actual Church, "the authority which has the clearer consciousness of its proper limits" always proves to be really the stronger.] Reviews. Anno xiii., Fasc 2, March-April, 1921. **Amato Masnovo.** *Gli albori del Neo-Tomismo in Italia.* [A short historical study of the influence of the Spanish Jesuit, Baltasar Masdeu, who taught logic and philosophy at Piacenza at the opening of the nineteenth century.] **Emilio Chiochetti.** *La religione e il cristianismo nell' idealismo attuale di G. Gentile.* [An "advance" chapter from a forthcoming work on the philosophy of Gentile. The essay is an eloquent and able protest against the attempts of Gentile, in the true Hegelian spirit, to strip religion in general, and Christianity in particular, of all features which will not fit into an Hegelian scheme. It is, of course, particularly easy to show that actual Christianity has always insisted on the reality and "transcendence" of God, and is wholly incompatible with Gentile's "rigorous immanentism". Nor is Gentile the only philosopher who needs to be told that an "explanation" of religion is worthless unless it explains religion "not as the philosopher would like it to be, but as it is". I agree with Chiochetti that what Hegelian philosophers are pleased to patronise as the essence of Christianity is the merest travesty of the historical Christian faith.] **Cl. Baeumker.** *Pietro d'Ibernia.* [Peter of Ireland, the early teacher of St. Thomas, is probably identical with the Peter of Ireland who, as has recently been discovered, "determined" in a dispute held before Manfred, King of Sicily. The problem was whether "members" are made for "functions" or "functions" for "members," a question naturally suggested by the treatment of "ends in nature" in Aristotle's *Physics.* In the essay, of which only the first part is published, Prof. Baeumker discusses the use made in the "determination" of Aristotle and Averroes.] *Analisi d'Opere.* [Short notices of recent books.]

VIII.—NOTES.

"COMMON SENSE AND THE RUDIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY."

With reference to Mr. L. J. Russell's candid explanation of the inaccuracies complained of, I certainly did not intend a charge of incompetence. At worst some carelessness was imputed. I agree that his very brief references to my book were not technically criticisms; but, in the broader sense of the term, to question a writer's meanings and methods, however slightly, is to criticise.

Of the passage referring to "sense-data" no more need be said. The serious inaccuracy (which led me wrongly to suspect Mr. Russell of having unconsciously created a fallacy in my argument which he proceeded to expose indirectly by a question) I now understand to be due to a slip in typing which missed correction. When, however, this unfortunate slip made me appear to say that a mental image begins to exist when something is recognised as the very same thing which we previously recognised, and Mr. Russell followed this up by the question "On what, then, is the recognition based?" it was, I think, perfectly natural for me to conclude that he had the second (misquoted) "recognised" in his mind, and referred by his question to what would have been an obvious fallacy on my part. I now suppose that he understood me to write "previously perceived," and conclude that what he really questioned was, not how recognition could be based on previous recognition, but how, by means of a mental image, we can recognise what is *not merely similar to, but identical with* what we before perceived.

May I be allowed to offer a brief reply to this question?

I take it to be a fact that we do recognise familiar persons and many other objects as not merely members of some specific class, but as identical each with himself or itself. Moreover, we think of them as themselves, not only when they actually reappear in our field of vision, but when they are certainly absent—*i.e.*, beyond the present range of our sense-organs. That mental *something* which enables us both to recognise an object on its reappearance as its individual self, and to refer to it as such when it is not present, is what I call a "memory image". This is the fundamental type of "mental image". It may also be called a pre-conceptual idea; being the sort of idea which answers to the proper name of a person familiarly known and involves subtle distinguishing traits, many of which could be much better expressed by artistic portraiture than by verbal description; though the understood proper name is a subject-nucleus to which logical predicates may be subsequently attached. Some of these, such as "being a person," are of course understood from the first, but may be only very vaguely understood. The real subjects referred to are, on my view, individual molar bodies (with or without minds) which actually have peculiarities of shape, bulk, action, etc., distinguishing each of them from all the other instances of the lowest plural species to which it belongs. These peculiarities are originally and spontaneously observed through actual visual (and some other) sensations or consecutive series of such sensations (giving so many different aspects of the one body which remains visibly

present and so self-evidently identical with itself) and are thence incorporated in the image, or idea, of the body. This idea itself is inseparable from the judgment which refers all past glimpses and other impressions of the body to the fact of the substantial unity of the body having been related to our own sense-organs in particular ways at particular junctures of time and place. Since the idea, incorporating in a weakened form sufficient distinguishing marks of the particular body to which it refers, persists (at least as a defined mental potentiality, probably connected with some particular centre of cerebral action) until the real body reappears, there is no mystery in the real body, when it reappears and re-presents those marks in their full perceptual strength, being recognised as its individual self, and not merely as an instance of some type.

CHARLES E. HOOPER.

A FRENCH HISTORIAN OF THE PHILOSOPHIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES: FRANÇOIS-JOSEPH PICAVET (1851-1921).

ON 21st May, at the age of 70, passed away M. François Picavet, Secretary of the Collège de France, Chargé de Cours at the Sorbonne, and Directeur d'Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, formerly Editor of the *Revue Internationale de l'Enseignement*, for many years joint editor with the late M. Théodule Ribot of the *Revue Philosophique*, and also at various times a contributor to MIND. In him we lose one of the most distinguished Mediævalists, the friend and correspondent of many scholars both in this country and the United States, and a teacher whose devotion to his work and lofty ideal of scientific probity were an inspiration to those who entered his classroom or approached him privately for help or advice.

François Picavet began his career as "Instituteur" in a Primary school. In 1870-71 he served with the Armée du Nord under Faidherbe. While teaching, he prepared himself for a University degree at Douai, followed by the "agrégation" in Philosophy, and the Doctorat ès Lettres. In 1888 he became lecturer at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, later Directeur d'Etudes pour l'Histoire des Doctrines et des Dogmes (Section des Sciences Religieuses). His writings, besides many pamphlets, and "brochures,"[1] and contributions to different philosophical Journals in France and abroad, and to the "Grande Encyclopédie,"[2] include editions of writings of Condillac, Cicero, D'Alembert, and Kant; "Instruction Morale et Civique," 1888; "Les Idéalogues," 1891; "De Epicuro Novæ Religionis Auctore," 1891; "L'Education," 1895; "Gerbert," 1897; "Esquisse d'une Histoire Générale et Comparée des Philosophies Médiévales," 1905; "Roscelin, Philosophe et Théologien," 1911; "Essais sur l'Histoire Générale et Comparée des Philosophies Médiévales," 1913; "Littérature Française en Langue Latine" (in "L'Histoire de la Nation Française" series), 1921, etc., etc.

To M. Picavet is largely due the honour of restoring in France the study of the Philosophies of the Middle Ages, and he grouped together the leading Mediævalists of France, Britain, and America in an Association for the development of Mediæval studies. His writings are not, however, confined to the period generally so described, for he recognised no break in the history of thought. Epicurus, the Sophists, Stoics, Platonists, and Sceptics of Antiquity, the Encyclopædists, the Idealogists, Condillac, Maine de Biran, Kant, and the modern Théodule Ribot, have formed the

[1] *E.g.*; "Abélard et Alexandre de Hales," 1896; "Averroës et les Averroïstes du XIII Siècle," 1902; "Valeur de la Scolastique," 1902, etc.
[2] "Porphyre," "Scolastique," "Thomisme".

subject of his writings as well. But his special interest was devoted to the historical study of the Philosophies of the Middle Ages, not only from a conviction that that period forms an essential part of the history of human development, but because the greatest Mediæval thinkers appeared to him as philosophers of real value. With indefatigable zeal he set himself to the often arid and always laborious task of going, pen in hand, through the monumental tomes of the Schoolmen. No consciousness of the labour spent led his clear and well-balanced mind, set above everything on "la recherche de la Vérité," to magnify or overestimate the actual result, often small out of all proportion to the toil. That intellectual integrity gave special value to his work, while the disinterestedness of his position, on topics where too often sectarian bias is discernible in Catholic and Protestant alike, lent added authority. M. Picavet's great work defines itself as the study of the relations of theology and philosophy from the Carolingian Renaissance onwards, and his writings generally, more definitely the "Esquisse" and the "Essais," are the basis for a vast General and Comparative History of the Philosophies of the Middle Ages. In 1906 the Faculty of Letters of the Sorbonne instituted for him a Lectureship in the History of the Philosophies of the Middle Ages. This historical study of the evolution of Christianity, free from all prejudice or bias, brought to his classes men and women of all tendencies, and freethinker and Catholic priest listened alike to a teacher who respected the tenets of all sincere seekers after truth. Starting from the period when primitive Christianity set itself to evolve a rational system by which to justify its doctrines, M. Picavet showed the part played by Neo-Platonism, or Plotinism, in a union with Greek philosophy which profoundly modified the development of Catholicism. He drew attention to the influence of Plotinus in the course of Mediæval thought, Christian, Jewish, and Arab, notably as the informing spirit of the Scholastic Philosophy, however much the outer form and formulæ derive from Aristotle.[1] And he traced the Plotinian strain through the later centuries, especially interesting himself and his students in the complex and fascinating developments of the seventeenth century.

During the long and painful illness which led to his death, M. Picavet refused to abandon his administrative work at the Collège de France; much less his students. Two weeks before he passed away, though worn to a shadow, he lectured to his students on the last occasion on which he left his home alive. His wide sympathy made him a friend not only to his students but to all whom he could help. During the war, when his home in the north was in the hands of the Germans, and his only son, a "sous-officier de mitrailleuses," was for four months reported missing, then known to be a prisoner of war, and later exposed to the still greater horrors of a German Reprisal Camp, M. Picavet, quietly carrying on his work, was a source of strength and hope to many. He was the correspondent and helper of numbers of soldiers from his native place, whose families were cut off from them in the invaded provinces. Before his students he set continually the highest ideal of work and scientific probity. He never forgot that while the immediate aim, the examination, must be faced as an entrance to a career, they were men and women preparing for a wider purpose, to live life well. To those of us who had the privilege of working under him he stands for all that is finest in the French national character, simplicity, sincerity, humanity, clear-sighted and sane judgment, and an unswerving loyalty to Truth and the Ideal.

M. P. Ramsay.

[1] *Cp.* M. Emile Boutroux's communication on this subject to the *Académie des Sciences Morales*, *Esquisse*, pp. vii.-viii.

MIND ASSOCIATION.

The 21st Annual General Meeting of the Association was held on Saturday, 9th July, in Trinity College, Cambridge. Prof. S. Alexander of Manchester University was elected President for 1922, and it was agreed to meet at Manchester next year at a convenient time in July to be fixed by the officers, and to hold a Joint Session with the Aristotelian Society and the British Psychological Society, the details to be arranged by the President, Treasurer, and Editor. Mr. H. Sturt having resigned the office of Hon. Secretary after holding it for 20 years was elected an Honorary Member of the Association. Mr. G. R. G. Mure, of Merton College, Oxford, was appointed Hon. Secretary. The Hon. Treasurer and Hon. Auditor were re-elected, as were the Vice-Presidents, with the addition of Prof. G. F. Stout, on his vacating the office of President.

After a Dinner held in the Guest Room, Trinity College, Prof. James Ward, on behalf of 58 members of the Mind Association, formally presented Prof. G. F. Stout with a portrait-drawing of himself by Mr. James Paterson, a silver flower bowl, and a pair of silver candlesticks, in recognition of his long service as Editor of Mind, from 1892 to 1920.

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